



Certification Report

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Reception Date of Application (Reception Number)	2020-07-20 (ITC-0764)
Certification Identification	JISEC-C0710
Product Name	SHARP MX-8081 fax standard model with MX-FR65U; and MX-8081 / 7081 fax option model with MX-FR65U and MX-FX15
Version and Release Numbers	0110Se00
Product Manufacturer	SHARP CORPORATION
Conformance of Functionality	PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance	Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated S eptember 10, 2015 (Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security Evaluation Facility	Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department

IT Product (TOE)

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows. 2021-02-17

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IT Security Technology Evaluation Department IT Security Center

Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document."

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5

Evaluation Result: Pass

"SHARP MX-8081 fax standard model with MX-FR65U; and MX-8081 / 7081 fax option model with MX-FR65U and MX-FX15, Version 0110Se00" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "SHARP MX-8081 fax standard model with MX-FR65U; and MX-8081 / 7081 fax option model with MX-FR65U and MX-FX15, Version 0110Se00" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by SHARP CORPORATION, and the evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2021-01 by Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, SHARP CORPORATION, and provide security information to procurement entities and consumers who are interested in this TOE.

Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of the TOE are described in the ST.

This Certification Report assumes "general consumers who purchase this TOE" to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.

1.1 Product Overview

An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.

1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package

The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (referred to as the "Conformance PP").

Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)

1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality

This TOE is an IT product and a digital multifunction device (hereinafter referred to as the "MFD") equipped not only with copy, printer, scanner and fax function, but also with a function to save and retrieve documents (referred to as the "document filing function" in this TOE).

The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP that is the Protection Profile for the MFD, to prevent unauthorized disclosure and tampering of the data handled by the MFD.

For these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements required by the Conformance PP.

The following show the threats and the assumptions that the TOE assumes:

1.1.2.1 Threats

The TOE presumes the following threats:

There is a threat of unauthorized disclosure or tampering of User Document Data and data relevant to security functions which are the assets to be protected of the TOE by operating the TOE and/or accessing the network to which the TOE is connected.

There is also a threat of compromising security functions of the TOE due to the failure of the TOE itself or by installing unauthorized software.

1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions

The evaluated product is assumed to be operated in the following configuration and assumptions.

It is assumed that the TOE is operated in the environment where unauthorized physical access is restricted and it is connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.

The management and maintenance of the TOE under operation shall be appropriately performed by an administrator trusted by the procurement entities in accordance with the guidance documents. In addition, users of the TOE shall be trained to use the TOE securely.

1.1.3 Disclaimers

In this evaluation, the following operations are outside the scope of assurance:

- Operations in the state where the operational environment of the TOE shown in "4.3 Clarification of Scope" is not secure
- TOE's operations under conditions other than those indicated in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration."

1.2 Conduct of Evaluation

Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2021-01, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according to the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.

1.3 Certification

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process.

The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns were fully resolved, and that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]).

The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.

2 Identification

The TOE is identified as follows:

TOE Name:	SHARP MX-8081 fax standard model with MX-FR65U; and MX-
	8081 / 7081 fax option model with MX-FR65U and MX-FX15
TOE Version:	0110Se00

The TOE name consists of the MFD main unit and mandatory option. TOE components are shown in Table 2-1. The TOE with "standard" fax function is sold in Japan, and "none" is sold outside Japan.

Table 2-1	TOE	Components
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Model number of Main unit	Fax	Mandatory option
MX-8081	Standard	MX-FR65U
MX-8081 or MX-7081	None	MX-FR65U and MX-FX15

Users can verify that a product is the evaluated and certified TOE by the following means.

The following information indicated on the casing of the TOE and the operation panel should be confirmed in accordance with the description in the product guidance.

 \cdot Model number of Main unit

The model number of main unit indicated on the casing shall be the name contained in "Model number of Main unit " of Table 2-1.

• Fax

If the "Fax" column of Table 2-1 is "Standard", "STANDARD" is indicated in the FAX field of the operation panel, and if it is "None", "NONE" is indicated.

Mandatory option

The option name indicated on the operation panel shall be the name in "Mandatory option" of Table 2-1.

 \cdot TOE version

The TOE version indicated on the operation panel shall match the TOE identification version.

3 Security Policy

The TOE provides MFD basic functions such as copy function, printer function, scanner function, fax function and document filing function. It has the functions to store user's document data inside the TOE as well as to communicate with user's terminals and various servers via the network.

The TOE provides the following security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance PP:

- \cdot A function to identify and authenticate users
- \cdot A function to control access to user data
- \cdot A function to encrypt and store user data
- \cdot A function to protect user data on the communication paths when using the LAN
- \cdot A function to restrict security management to the identified and authenticated users
- \cdot A function to log events related to security
- \cdot A function to verify and install updated firmware
- \cdot A function to verify normal operation of security functions at start-up
- \cdot A function to separate the PSTN and LAN
- \cdot A function to overwrite data under processing such as copy function at the completion or cancellation
- · A function to delete all user data completely

Details of the security functions of the TOE are shown in Section 5.1.

Details of the user roles, protected assets, threats, organisational security policy that the TOE assumes are shown in Sections 3.1 to 3.4.

3.1 Users

For use of the TOE, users in Table 3-1 are assumed.

Table 3-1 User Categories

Designation	Category Name	Definition
U.NORMAL	Normal User	A User who has been identified and
		authenticated and does not have an administrative role
U.ADMIN	Administrator	A User who has been identified and
		authenticated and has an administrative role

3.2 Assets

Assets to be protected in the TOE can be classified into two categories in Table 3-2. Out of them, Table 3-3 shows user data, and Table 3-4 shows TSF data, each of which consists of two types of assets.

Designation	Asset category	Definition
D.USER	User Data	Data created by and for Users that do not
		affect the operation of the TSF
D.TSF	TSF Data	Data created by and for the TOE that might
		affect the operation of the TSF

Table 3-2 Asset categories

Table 3-3 User Data types

Designation	User Data Type	Definition
D.USER.DOC	User Document	Information contained in a User's Document,
	Data	in electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB	User Job Data	Information related to a User's Document or
		Document Processing Job

Table 3-4 TSF Data types

Designation	TSF Data Type	Definition
D.TSF.PROT	Protected TSF	TSF Data for which alteration by a User who
	Data	is neither the data owner nor in an
		Administrator role might affect the security of
		the TOE, but for which disclosure is
		acceptable
D.TSF.CONF	Confidential	TSF Data for which either disclosure or
	TSF Data	alteration by a User who is neither the data
		owner nor in an Administrator role might
		affect the security of the TOE

3.3 Threats

Table 3-5 shows the threats to be countered by the TOE.

Table 3-5 Threats

Designation	Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.

Designation	Definition
T.TSF_COMPROMISE	An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
	Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's
	interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE	A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security
	if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE	An attacker may cause the installation of
	unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE	An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise
	compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring
	or manipulating network communication.

3.4 Organisational Security Policy

Table 3-6 shows organisational security policies required for use of the TOE.

Table 3-6 Organisational Security Policies	

Designation	Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION	Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and administrative functions.
P.AUDIT	Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION	The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION	If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL	Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other values that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage of User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized access and must not be stored on that storage device.
P.FAX_FLOW	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE	Upon completion or cancellation of a Document Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual image data from its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
P.PURGE_DATA	The TOE shall provide a function that an authorized administrator can invoke to make all customer-supplied User Data and TSF Data permanently irretrievable from Nonvolatile Storage Devices.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.

4.1 Usage Assumptions

Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE.

The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.

Designation	Definition
A.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
	TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be
	provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK	The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the
	TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN	TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE
	according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS	Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according
	to site security policies.

Table 4-1 Assumptions

4.2 Environmental Assumptions

The TOE is installed in an office and connected with the PSTN and LAN which is the internal network of the organization, and used with a client PC and various servers similarly connected to the LAN.

Figure 4-1 shows the general operational environment as assumptions of the TOE.

Users use the TOE by operating the operation panel of the TOE or a PC connected to the LAN.




Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE

The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.

(1) Client PC

It is a general PC used by users.

The following software are required for use of the TOE.

 \cdot Printer Driver

The name is "SHARP <model number of main unit> PCL6 Driver" if the sales territory is other than Japan and "SHARP <model number of main unit> SPDL2 Driver" if the sales territory is Japan. The "<model number of main unit>" means either one of the model number of main unit in Table 2-1.

 \cdot Web Browser

(2) Audit Server

It is an audit server to store the audit log generated by the TOE. It must use the syslog protocol and support TLS 1.2. Installation of this server is mandatory.

(3) Authentication Server

In the case of "external authentication method" shown in "Identification and authentication function" in Section 5.1.1, an authentication server which supports TLS 1.2 and of which authentication protocol is LDAP authentication method is required.

(4) Mail Server

It is necessary to send user document data scanned using the "Scanner function" as an E-mail attached file. It must support TLS 1.2.

(5) FTP Server

It is necessary to send user document data scanned using the "Scanner function" to the specified FTP server. It must support TLS 1.2.

It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the TOE shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are assumed to be trustworthy.

4.3 Clarification of Scope

In the TOE, a server such as an authentication server may be installed in addition to the audit server that is mandatory to install. In addition, it is necessary to install a firewall to connect to the Internet which is an external network. It is the responsibility for the operators that these servers and firewalls are operated securely.

5 Architectural Information

This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.

5.1 TOE Boundary and Components

Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE.

The area enclosed by the frame indicated as the "TOE" in Figure 5-1 is the TOE. It does not include Audit server, Mail server, FTP server, Authentication server, Client PC, User and External fax machine.




Figure 5-1 TOE boundary

The TOE function consists of security functions (functions shown in colored box) and basic functions (functions shown in white box) in Figure 5-1.

The security functions are described below. For basic functions, see Chapter 11.

5.1.1 Security Functions

(1) Identification and authentication function

It is a function to identify and authenticate users of the TOE by login names and passwords in the operation panel, the web browser of the client PC, and the printer driver.

• It requests a password consisting of upper or lower case letters of the alphabet, numbers, or special characters and having the number of characters set by the administrator or more.

- It supports "internal authentication method" using user information stored in the TOE and "external authentication method" using external authentication server.
- When entering a password, it displays an asterisk instead of the input character.
- It stops accepting authentication for 5 minutes if password authentication has failed consecutively.
- After identification and authentication, the session is terminated if no operation is performed for the time set by the administrator in the case of the operation panel, or for 5 minutes in the case of the web browser.
- (2) Access control function

It is a function to control access of user data when manipulating user data with the basic functions of the TOE.

- It controls access to user data based on the policy defined for each type of user such as owner of user data or user role.
- (3) Stored data encryption function

It is a function to encrypt and store user data, etc., in the TOE.

- User data and TSF data are encrypted by AES CBC mode with a 256-bit key and stored.
- An encryption key for encrypting user data, etc., is created by a random number generator having sufficient entropy.
- (4) Network protection function

It is a function to protect user data on the communication path when using the LAN.

- Encrypted communication by TLS 1.2 is used between the TOE and various servers such as audit server.
- The encryption key used for encrypted communication is created by a random number generator having sufficient entropy.
- In the communication between the client PC and the TOE, IPP over TLS communication is used for the printer driver, and HTTPS communication is used for the web browser.
- (5) Security management function

It is a function to restrict the security management of the TOE to the identified and authenticated users.

- Registration / deletion of internal authentication users, change of minimum password length, setting of various servers, overwriting of user data and TSF data, etc., are provided only to users with the administrator role.
- Inquiries about user login names and authority groups of the users themselves, and change of passwords are provided to all internal authentication users.

(6) Audit function

It is a function to log events related to use of the TOE and security.

- In addition to the start and end of the audit, a log of the audit event such as the end of the job and failure of identification and authentication is generated as audit data. In the audit data, the event name, date and time of occurrence, user login name, event result and additional information are recorded.
- The generated audit data is sent to the audit server by using the syslog protocol and TLS 1.2.
- The audit data generated by the TOE is encrypted and stored in the TOE until it is successfully transmitted to the audit server. In the TOE, it is possible to store 40,000 audit data. The audit data generated newly in excess of 40,000 is not stored but is discarded.
- (7) Software verification function

It is a function that the TOE verifies the update firmware and enables installation

of only legitimate firmware.

- It verifies that it is a legitimate firmware by checking the hash value of the firmware with a digital signature provided at the same time as the firmware and the hash value calculated by the TOE using SHA 256.
- A user with the administrator role can acquire the version of the firmware.
- (8) Self-testing function

It is a function to verify the normal operation of the security functions at the startup of the TOE.

- Verification that the security functions operate normally is done by the entropy source health test of the random number generator, by the known answer test of the encryption algorithm, and by confirming that the firmware is not corrupted.
- In the verification, if any error is detected in all or in part, the TOE stops the start-up and suspends any operation until the power is turned off.
- (9) Fax line separation function

It is a function to separate the public switched telephone network (PSTN) and LAN.

- In order to protect the LAN against attacks from the PSTN, it restricts inputs from the PSTN to fax reception and prohibits forwarding of the received fax.
- (10) Residual data overwrite function

It is a function to overwrite data under processing such as copy function at the completion or cancellation.

It overwrites the user document data with the value set by the administrator at the end of the document job. (11) Data purging function

It is a function to completely delete user data, etc.

It overwrites all user data and TSF data on the internal storage according to the request of the user with the administrator role. At this time, the encryption key for stored data encryption is regenerated.

5.2 IT Environment

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The TOE communicates with various servers and client PCs via the LAN.

The TOE sends the generated audit data to the audit server. The administrator reads the audit data from the audit server.

In the case of the external authentication method, the authentication server is used to identify and authenticate users.

The TOE can send the scanned user document data to the mail server and FTP server.

6 Documentation

Among the TOE, the identification of guidance attached to the TOE whose sales territory is Japan is shown in Table 6-1, the identification of guidance attached to the TOE whose sales territory is other than Japan is shown in Table 6-2.

TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy the assumptions.

Name	Version	Language
スタートガイド	TINSJ5470FCZZ YT1	Japanese
かんたん操作マニュアル	2020C-JP1	Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル	2020C-JP1	Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル (タッチパネル操作編)	2020C-JP2	Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル (アドレス帳登録編)	2020C-JP2	Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル (Webページ設定編)	2020C-JP1	Japanese
ソフトウェアセットアップガイド	2020C-JP1	Japanese
Q&A集(困ったときは)	2020C-JP1	Japanese
取扱説明書 データセキュリティキット MX-	JP1	Japanese
FR65U		
注意書 データセキュリティキット MX-FR65U	1.0	Japanese
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices適合状	V1.0	Japanese
態でMX-FR65Uをご利用のお客様へ		

Table 6-1 Attached Documents (1)

Table 6-2 Attached Documents (2)

Name	Version	Language
Start Guide	TINSM5465FCZZ KS1	English
Quick Start Manual	2020C-EX1	English
User's Manual	2020C-EX1	English
User's Manual (Touch Panel Operation)	2020C-EN2	English
User's Manual (Address Book Registration)	2020C-EN2	English
User's Manual (Web Page Settings)	2020C-EN2	English
Software Setup Guide	2020C-EN2	English
Troubleshooting	2020C-EN1	English
MX-FR65U Data Security Kit Operation Guide	EX1	English
MX-FR65U Data Security Kit Notice	1.0	English
How to set up MX-FR65U to be the "Protection	V1.0	English
Profile for Hardcopy Devices" compliant		

7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results

7.1 Evaluation Facility

Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department that conducted the evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of evaluation.

7.2 Evaluation Approach

The evaluation was conducted on the assurance requirements in the CC Part 3 required by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.

Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report.

The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of the Conformance PP.

7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity

The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

The evaluation started in 2020-07 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2021-01.

The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted.

Furthermore, the evaluators conducted the evaluator testing at the developer site in 2020-11.

Concerns found in evaluation activities were issued as the Observation Reports and reported to the developer. Those concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all the concerns were solved eventually. Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as the certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility.

The Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, which was reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.

7.4 IT Product Testing

As the verification results of the evidence shown in the evaluation process, the evaluators performed the independent testing to ensure that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented and penetration testing based on the vulnerability assessment.

7.4.1 Developer Testing

The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements of this evaluation.

7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing

The evaluators conducted evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as "independent testing") based on the evidence presented during the evaluation to ensure that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented.

The independent testing performed by the evaluators is explained as follows.

(1) Independent Testing Environment

Configurations for the independent testing are based on the operational environment of the TOE shown in Figure 4-1, and the components are as shown in Table 7-1. Although there are differences in the following points, the evaluator also evaluates that these configurations are equivalent to the configuration identified in the ST, and there is no problem in checking the function of this TOE.

- Among the components of the TOE shown in the TOE identification in Chapter 2 (see Table 2-1), the differences of the MFD main unit are installation of the fax function, the difference of the printing speed, the difference of the display language depending on destination. None of them affect security. However, in order to confirm that it does not affect the security functions, the following MFD main units were tested.
 - MX-8081 (FAX: Standard, Printing speed: High speed, Language: Japanese)
 - MX-7081 (FAX: None, Printing speed: Low speed, Language: English)

- Firewalls installed to protect the TOE against unauthorized access from the external network do not exist in the testing environment because they do not affect the operation of the TOE.
- The evaluator used a telephone line simulator (a pseudo exchanger), which can emulate the same fax communication protocol as the PSTN, as an alternative to the PSTN.
- In the TLS test, communication between the TOE and the server / client PC is performed via the TLS testing tool created by the Evaluation Facility. Since the TLS testing tool only modifies the packet data of the TLS handshake message, it does not affect the functions of the TOE.
- For some tests such as cryptographic tests, the testing firmware created by the developer is used for calling for testing the cryptographic modules in the TOE. The module called in the test using the testing firmware is the same as the module of the TOE, so it does not affect the functions of the TOE.

Configuration Item	Detail	
TOE	MX-8081 (Fax: Standard)	
	• Option: MX-FR65U	
	MX-7081 (Fax: None)	
	· Option: MX-FR65U, MX-FX15	
Audit Server	rsyslog ver.8.24.0	
Mail Server	Postfix ver.2.10.1	
Authentication	openLDAP ver.2.4.44	
Server		
FTP Server	Microsoft Internet Information Services ver.8.5	
	9600.16384	
Client PC	OS : Windows 8.1 / 10	
	Web browser:	
	Internet Explorer 11	
	· Google Chrome 86.0.4240.75	
	Printer driver:	
	• SHARP MX-8081 SPDL2 06.00.07.27	
	· SHARP MX-7081 PCL6 06.00.07.27	

Table 7-1 Components of Independent Testing

(2) Summary of the Independent Testing

A summary of the independent testing is as follows.

a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing

The viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the requirements of the Conformance PP and on the evaluation documentation

submitted for evaluation are shown below.

<Independent Testing Viewpoints>

- 1. Checking security functions by SFR.
- 2. Checking if the encryption implementation is correct.
- b. Independent Testing Outline

An outline of the independent testing that the evaluators performed is as follows.

<Independent Testing Approach>

For the external interfaces of the TOE, inputs were provided using the TOE operation panel, client PC and testing tools, and the behaviors were observed using the following methods.

- If the behavior can be observed from the external interface of the TOE, the external interface of the TOE is used.
- If the behavior cannot be observed from the external interface of the TOE, the logs in the audit server are investigated, and network analyzer or testing firmware is used.

<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>

The independent testing was performed on 34 items by the evaluators.

Table 7-2 shows viewpoints of the independent testing and the content of the testing corresponding to them.

Viewpoint	Outline of the Independent Testing
1	Checking security functions
	\cdot To confirm for each SFR that all the security functions are as specified
	by the test items created from the assurance activities of the
	Conformance PP or the specification of SFR.
2	Checking encryption implementation
	\cdot To confirm the implementation of the following encryption algorithm to
	be tested by the testing firmware installed on the TOE.
	- RSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
	- ECDSA (signature verification)
	- DSA (signature verification)
	- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-ECB-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-
	GCM-256

- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384
- CTR_DRBG
\cdot The encryption key of the user document data and the user document
data encrypted and stored inside the TOE are taken out by the testing
firmware and decrypted by the decryption tool to confirm that it is
correctly encrypted.

c. Result

All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.

7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluators devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.

The penetration testing performed by the evaluators is explained as follows.

(1) Summary of the Penetration Testing

A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluators is as follows.

a. Vulnerability of Concern

The evaluators searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.

- 1. There is concern that it can be exploited by the fact that the unintended port of the TOE is enabled or a publicly known vulnerability exists in the running network service.
- 2. In the TOE web interface, there is concern that it can be exploited by the existence of publicly known vulnerabilities, such as bypass of the identification and authentication function by direct designation of URL, and XSS.
- 3. There is concern that manipulation of print job, buffer overflow or arbitrary code execution may occur due to unauthorized print data input to the TOE.
- 4. There is concern that the identification and authentication function may be

bypassed due to unauthorized input from the operation panel, printer driver and web interface.

- 5. When the TOE operates as a TLS client, there may be vulnerabilities in the verification process of the server certificate of the communication destination.
- b. Penetration Testing Outline

The evaluators performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially exploitable vulnerabilities.

<Penetration Testing Environment>

The following testing tools shown in the Table 7-3 below were added to the environment of the evaluator independent testing to implement.

Tool Name	Outline and Purpose of Use
Port Scan Tool	It is used for searching ports.
nmap 7.8.0	
Vulnerability Scan Tool	It is used for detecting publicly known
Nessus 8.10.0	vulnerability.
Web Vulnerability Scan Tool	It is used for detecting general vulnerability of
OWASP ZAP 2.9.0	web.
Active scanner rules(beta) v27.0.0	
Added	
Web Application Analysis Tool	It is used for capturing or issuing
Fiddler 5.0.20194.41348	communication data received or sent by web
	application.
Printer Security Testing Tool	It is used for detecting vulnerability of printing
PRET 0.40	device by using printer language.
Penetration Testing Tool	It is used for creating unauthorized print files.
Metasploit Framework v5.0.9	

Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools

<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>

Table 7-4 shows vulnerabilities of concern and the content of the penetration testing corresponding to them.

Vulnerability	Penetration Testing Outline
1	It is confirmed that unexpected ports are not open and that there is no
	publicly known vulnerability in the available ports by using the port scan
	tool and the vulnerability scan tool.
2	It is confirmed that there is no publicly known vulnerability in the Web
	interface by using the web vulnerability scan tool and web application
	analysis tool.
3	It is confirmed that unintended behavior does not occur by using print
	data in Postscript, PJL language, TIFF format and PDF format that are
	intended to generate unauthorized behavior.
4	It is confirmed that no unauthorized behavior occurs due to character
	strings entered in the identification and authentication function.
5	It is confirmed in the mail processsing that TOE has correctly performed
	the verification processing of the TLS server certificate.

Table 7-4 Content of the Performed Penetration Testing

c. Result

In the penetration testing performed by the evaluators, the evaluators did not find any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could exploit.

7.5 Evaluated Configuration

The requirements of the TOE configurations, which are the assumptions for this evaluation, are as described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to enable the security functions of this TOE and use them securely, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance documents. Different settings are not subject to assurance by this evaluation.

7.6 Evaluation Results

The evaluators had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical Report.

In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.

- PP Conformance:

Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015

Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017

Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]

- Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_ EXT.1 Test

- Treatment regarding FCS_TLS_ EXT.1.1 Test

- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended

- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance components required by the Conformance PP:

ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1

The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.

7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.

8 Certification

Based on the evidence submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process, the Certification Body has performed certification by checking that the following requirements are satisfied:

- 1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall be adequate.
- 2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall properly be solved.
- 3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
- 4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluators presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
- 5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.

Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility.

The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.

8.1 Certification Result

As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Report and related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification Body determined that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required by the Conformance PP.

8.2 Recommendations

Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer to "4.3 Clarification of Scope" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure that the scope of the evaluation target and operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational conditions they assume. If the transmission of the audit data to the audit server fails, the warning messages are displayed on the operation panel and the web page. The TOE tries to retransmit, but the operator needs to be careful about the warning messages.

9 Annexes

There is no annex.

10 Security Target

The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this Certification Report.

Title:	SHARP MX-8081 fax standard model with MX-FR65U; and MX- $$	
	8081 / $7081\ fax$ option model with MX-FR65U and MX-FX15	
	Security Target	
Version:	1.00	
Publication Date:	2020-11-27	
ST Author:	SHARP CORPORATION	

11 Glossary

CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation	
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation	
PP	Protection Profile	
SFR	Security Functional Requirement	
ST	Security Target	
TOE	Target of Evaluation	
TSF	TOE Security Functionality	

The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.

The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard	
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining	
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator	
ECB	Electronic Codebook	
FTP	File Transfer Protocol	
GCM	Galois/ Counter Mode	
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code	
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol	
HTTPS	HTTP over SSL/TLS	
IPP	Internet Printing Protocol	
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol	
MFD	Multifunction Device	
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network	
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm	
SSL	Secure Socket Layer	
TLS	Transport Layer Security	
XSS	Cross Site Scripting	

Field Replaceable (Unit)	The smallest subassembly that can be swapped in the field to repair a fault.
Hardcopy Device	A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of an electronic document or image. These systems include printers, scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs (multifunction peripherals), MFDs (multifunction devices), "all-in-ones" and other similar products.
Copy function	It is a function to copy and print the user document data scanned from paper documents by user's operation from the operation panel.
Scanner function	It is a function to scan paper documents and send the scanned user document data to the mail server and FTP server by user's operation from the operation panel.
Document filing function	It is a function to store the user document data in the internal storage of the TOE at the same time with the copy function, etc., and to print the stored user document data by user's operation from the operation panel or from the client PC via the LAN.
Fax function	It is a function to send and receive the document data to and from external fax machines conforming to the G3 standard connected by the PSTN. It consists of the fax transmission function, in which paper documents are scanned and the scanned document data are sent to the external fax machine, and the fax reception function, in which document data sent from an external fax machine are received and printed by user's operation.
Printer function	It is a function to receive the user document data via the LAN from the printer driver of the client PC and print it by user's operation from the operation panel.
Assurance Activities	Evaluation work that the evaluator must carry out for PP Conformance. It is supplement of the CEM, and it is described in the Conformance PP regarding the Conformance PP [14].

12 Bibliography

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