

Fuji Xerox
DocuCentre-VI C2264
Model with Hard Disk, Data Security,
Scan, and Fax
Security Target

Version 1.1.9

This document is a translation of the evaluated
and certified security target written in Japanese.

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1. ST INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes Security Target (ST) Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description.

1.1. ST Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this ST.

ST Title:	Fuji Xerox DocuCentre-VI C2264 model with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, and Fax Security Target
ST Version:	V 1.1.9
Publication Date:	March 6, 2019
Author:	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

1.2. TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this TOE.

The TOE is DocuCentre-VI C2264.

The TOE name is integrated as below.

TOE Identification:	Fuji Xerox DocuCentre-VI C2264 model with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, and Fax
Version:	• Controller ROM Ver. 1.1.3 • FAX ROM Ver. 2.2.0
Developer:	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

Note: “Fuji Xerox DocuCentre-VI C2264 model with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, and Fax” refers to a configuration in which hard disk, Fax Kit 3, Data Security Kit, and Scanner Kit are installed on DocuCentre-VI C2264.

The table below shows whether it is necessary to purchase and install optional features for each product to be considered equivalent to the TOE.

(The hard disk is installed in the product as a standard feature and is not available as an option.)

Product	Fax Kit 3	Data Security Kit	Scanner Kit
DocuCentre-VI C2264CP	Necessary (optional feature)	Necessary (optional feature)	Necessary (optional feature)
DocuCentre-VI C2264CPFS	Unnecessary (installed as a standard feature)	Necessary (optional feature)	Unnecessary (installed as a standard feature)

Each configuration element is identified by the product code and version number (Data Security Kit and Scanner Kit are identified with product codes only). The guides are identified by the guidance codes. See Table 4 in “1.4.3.1. Physical Configuration Elements” of this TOE for the product code, version, and/or guidance code of each configuration element.

1.3. TOE Overview

1.3.1. TOE Type and Major Security Features

1.3.1.1. TOE Type

This TOE, categorized as an IT product, is the Fuji Xerox DocuCentre-VI C2264 model with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, and Fax (hereinafter referred to as “MFD”) which has the copy, print, scan, network scan, mailbox, and fax functions.

The TOE is the product which controls the whole MFD and protects the data that are transmitted over the encryption communication protocols.

These protocols protect the security of the TOE setting data, Job information, the security audit log data, and the document data on the internal network between the TOE and the remote.

The TOE also prevents the document data and the used document data in the internal HDD from being disclosed by unauthorized person.

1.3.1.2. Function Types

Table 1 shows the Function types and functions provided by the TOE.

Table 1 Function Types and Functions provided by the TOE

Function types	Functions provided by the TOE
Basic Function	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control Panel - Copy - Print - Scan - Network Scan - Fax - Mailbox - CWIS
Security Function	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hard Disk Data Overwrite - Hard Disk Data Encryption System - User Authentication - Administrator’s Security Management - Customer Engineer Operation Restriction - Security Audit Log - Internal Network Data Protection - Information Flow Security - Self Test

- As the TOE uses the Hard Disk Data Overwrite and Hard Disk Data Encryption functions, the Data Security Kit shall be purchased and installed.
- As the TOE uses the following functions: fax, scan, and network scan, when a model to be used as the TOE does not have one or more of the said functions, the Fax Kit 3 and/or Scan Kit shall be purchased and installed.
- To use print function, the printer driver shall be installed to the external client for general user and that for system administrator.
- User authentication is to be performed in Local Authentication Mode.

Note:

- The TOE's optional functions to print from USB and store to USB are set to disabled; they are not included in the target of evaluation.
Therefore, the [Store to USB] and [Media Print] buttons do not appear on the control panel.
- There are two types of mailboxes: Personal Mailbox that SAs and general users can create and Shared Mailbox that Key operator can create. The guidance of the TOE prohibits using Shared Mailbox.

1.3.1.3. Usage and Major Security Features of TOE

The TOE is mainly used to perform the following functions:

- Copy function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and print them out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
When more than one copy of original data are ordered, the data read from IIT are first stored into the MFD internal HDD. Then, the stored data are read out from the internal HDD for the required number of times so that the required number of copies can be made.
- Print function is to decompose and print out the print data transmitted by a general user client.
- CWIS (CentreWare Internet Services) is to retrieve or print out the document data scanned by MFD from Mailbox.
It also enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting data via Web browser.
- Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and store them into Mailbox within the MFD internal HDD, according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
- Network Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and transmit the document data to FTP server, according to the information set in the MFD. This function is operated according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
- Fax function and Control Panel function are to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data are read from IIT and then sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data are received from the sender's machine via public telephone line and then stored in Mailbox. After that, the owner of the Mailbox performs printing via the control panel.

- Mailbox function is a function for general users and system administrators to retrieve or print out document data stored in Mailboxes, such as scanned document data and received fax document data, via the control panel or CWIS.

The TOE provides the following security features:

(1) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data are overwritten with new data after any job of copy, print, scan, etc. is completed.

(2) Hard Disk Data Encryption

The document data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when using any function of copy, print, scan, etc. or configuring various security function settings.

(3) User Authentication

Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user and this function identifies and authenticates users. This function identifies and authenticates a user using his/her ID and password entered from the control panel or CWIS /printer driver of a general user client, and enables access control over use of the TOE.

When a print job is sent from a user client, the TOE identifies and authenticates the user using the registered ID and password and stores the print job.

(4) System Administrator's Security Management

This function allows only the system administrator identified and authorized from the control panel or system administrator client to refer to and change the TOE security function settings.

(5) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction

A system administrator can prohibit CE from referring to, and changing the TOE security function settings.

(6) Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who used what function.

(7) Internal Network Data Protection

This function protects the communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, Job information and TOE setting data.

The following general encryption communication- protocols are supported: TLS and IPSec.

(8) Information Flow Security

This function restricts the unpermitted communication between external interfaces and internal network.

(9) Self Test

This function verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.

1.3.2. Environment Assumptions

This TOE is assumed to be used as an IT product at general office and to be connected to public telephone line, user clients, and the internal network protected from threats on the external network by firewall etc.

Figure 1 shows the general environment for TOE operation.




Figure 1 General Operational Environment

1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software

In the operational environment shown in Figure 1, the TOE (MFD) and the following non-TOE hardware/software exist.

(1) General user client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. When a client is connected to the MFD via the internal network and when the printer driver is installed to the client, the general user can request the MFD to print, and retrieve the document data.

The user can also request the MFD to retrieve the scanned document data via Web browser by using scan function of the MFD. Additionally, the general user can change the settings which he/she registered to the MFD.

When the client is connected to the MFD directly via USB and printer driver is installed to the client, the user can request the MFD to print the document data.

(2) System administrator client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. A system administrator can refer to and change TOE setting data via Web browser.

(3) FTP server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends document data to FTP server via FTP.

The OS of (1) general user client and (2) system administrator client are assumed to be Windows 7, and Windows 10.

The (1) General user client uses “ART EX Driver (Microsoft WHQL Certified Driver)” as a printer driver.

1.4. TOE Description

This section describes user assumptions and logical/physical scope of this TOE.

1.4.1. User Assumptions

Table 2 specifies the roles of TOE users assumed in this ST.

Table 2 User Role Assumptions

Designation	PP Definition	Description
U.USER	Any authorized User.	User:
U.NORMAL	A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE.	General user: A user of TOE functions such as copy, print, and fax.

Designation	PP Definition	Description
U.ADMINISTRATOR	<p>A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP).</p> <p>Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.</p>	<p>System administrator (key operator and SA):</p> <p>A user who is authorized to manage the device using the system administrator mode. A system administrator can refer to and change the TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions via TOE control panel and Web browser.</p>
TOE Owner	<p>A person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing related security policies.</p>	<p>Administrator of the organization:</p> <p>An administrator or responsible official of the organization which owns and uses TOE.</p>
Customer Engineer	-	<p>A user who can configure the TOE operational settings using the interface for CE.</p>

1.4.2. Logical Scope and Boundary

The logical scope of this TOE is each function of the programs.

Figure 2 shows the logical architecture of the MFD.




Figure 2 MFD Units and TOE Logical Scope

There are the following 4 types for Channel.

- a) Private Medium Interface
Control panel and local interface that cannot be accessed by multiple simultaneous Users.
- b) Shared Medium Interface
Mechanisms for exchanging information that can be simultaneously accessed by multiple Users; such as network interface.
- c) Original Document Handler
Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data into the TOE in hardcopy form.
- d) HardCopy Output Handler
Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data out of the TOE in hardcopy form.

1.4.2.1. Basic Functions

The TOE provides the functions of control panel, copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, Mailbox, and CWIS to general user.

Table 3 TOE Basic Functions

Function	Description
Copy Function	<p>Copy function is to read the original data from IIT and print them out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.</p> <p>When more than one copy of an original is ordered, the data read from IIT are first stored into the MFD internal HDD. Then, the stored data are read out from the internal HDD for the required number of times so that the required number of copies can be made.</p>
Print Function	<p>Print function is to print out the data according to the instruction from a general user client. The print data created via printer driver are sent to the MFD to be analyzed, decomposed, and printed out from IOT.</p> <p>The print data are sent by either being decomposed to the data in PDL via printer driver or the document file being designated directly from web browser of CWIS.</p> <p>The print function is of two types: the normal print in which the data are printed out from IOT directly after decomposed and the Store Print in which the bitmap data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD and then printed out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.</p> <p>The normal print cannot be performed on this TOE.</p>
Scan Function, Network Scan Function	<p>Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and then store them into the Mailbox according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.</p> <p>Network scan function is to read the original data from IIT and automatically transmit them to a FTP server according to the information set in the MFD. A general user can request this function from the control panel.</p>

Fax Function	Fax function is to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data are read from IIT and sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data are received from the sender's machine via public telephone line, then stored into the Mailbox
Control Panel Function	Control panel function is a user interface function for general user, CE, and system administrator to operate MFD functions.
CWIS Function	CWIS function is to operate from Web browser of a general user client for general users. CWIS also enables System Administrator's Security Management by which a system administrator can access and rewrite TOE setting data. For this, a system administrator must be authenticated by his/her ID and password entered from Web browser of a system administrator client.
Mailbox Function	Mailbox function is to retrieve or print stored documents from the control panel or CWIS for general users or system administrators.

1.4.2.2. Security Functions

The security functions provided by the TOE are the following.

(1) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data are overwritten with new data after each job (copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, or mailbox) is completed. Without this function, the used document data remain and only the management data are deleted.

(2) Hard Disk Data Encryption

Some data such as the document data in Mailbox remain in the internal HDD even if the machine is powered off. To solve this problem, the document data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, and mailbox or configuring various security function settings.

(3) User Authentication

Access to the MFD functions is restricted to the authorized user. To be identified and authenticated, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFD control panel, or the CWIS/Printer Driver of the user client.

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel:

Copy, fax (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)

b) Functions controlled by CWIS:

Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation.

c) Functions using printer driver of user client

The data of user client is decomposed to the print data described in PDL readable by the MFD, and the print data are stored in TOE (Private Print Function).

When a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, the MFD decomposes the received data into bitmap data and stores the data in the internal HDD as private print according to the user ID.

Among the above functions which require user authentication, some particularly act as security functions. The following are the security functions which prevent the unauthorized reading of document data in the internal HDD by an attacker who is impersonating an authorized user:

- The Store Print function (Private Print function) and the Mailbox function, which require user authentication from the control panel.
- The function to retrieve document data from Mailbox (Mailbox function) which requires user authentication by using CWIS
- The Store Print function (Private Print function) by file designation using CWIS.

Also, these functions identify and authenticate a system administrator using his/her entered ID and password to give him/her the authority to refer to and change the settings of the TOE security functions via the control panel or the system administrator client.

Figure 3 shows the authentication flow of Private Print Function and Mailbox Function.




Figure 3 Authentication Flow for Private Print and Mailbox

- Store Print Function (Private Print Function)

When the MFD is set to “Save as Private Charge Print,” and a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, after the user has been successfully identified and authenticated, the print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

In the same way, when the user is authenticated by entering his/her ID and password from CWIS for authentication, and the user sends a print request by designating the files within a user client, the print data are temporarily stored in Private Print area according to the user ID.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.

- Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and Fax board which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel, and needs to be authenticated to use scan function.

When the user is authenticated, the document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user’s instruction from the control panel.

User authentication is not performed when received fax data is stored in a Mailbox. The data is automatically stored in a Mailbox by the function to sort data into the Mailbox specified in advance for each public telephone line. The Mailboxes to store received fax data must be Mailboxes created by system administrators. When associating a job flow sheet that has a print function with a Mailbox for storing received fax data, system administrators must not select the automatic execution function.

To retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to each registered user’s ID, user authentication is required; the MFD compares the user ID and password preset in the device against those entered by a user from the control panel, or the CWIS

(4) System Administrator’s Security Management

To grant a privilege to a specific user, this TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the System Administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and set the following security functions from the control panel:

- Refer to and set the Hard Disk Data Overwrite;
- Refer to and set the Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;

- Refer to and set the function that use password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication;
- Set the ID and the password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user and set the password;
- Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator's authentication fails;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to and set the TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the User Authentication;
- Refer to and set the Store Print;
- Refer to and set the date and time;
- Refer to and set Auto Clear of Control Panel;
- Refer to and set the Self Test;
- Refer to and set the Report print;
- Refer to and set the Mailbox specified for storing received fax data;

Additionally, this TOE allows only the system administrator, who is authenticated from the system administrator client via Web browser using CWIS, to refer to and set the following security functions via CWIS:

- Set the ID and the password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user and set the password);
- Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator's authentication fails;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to and set the Security Audit Log;
- Refer to and set the TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Create/upload/download an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to and set the User Authentication;
- Refer to and set the Auto Clear of CWIS;

(5) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction

This TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to or enable/disable the Customer Engineer Operation Restriction setting from the control panel and CWIS. For this, CE cannot refer to or change the setting of each function described in (4) System Administrator's Security Management.

(6) Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. Only a system administrator can supervise or analyze the log data by downloading them in the form of tab-delimited text file via Web browser using CWIS. To download the log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled.

(7) Internal Network Data Protection

The communication data on the internal network such as document data, job information, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the following general encryption communication-protocols:

- TLS
- IPSec

(8) Information Flow Security

This TOE has the function of restricting the unpermitted communication between external interfaces and internal network.

Fax board of TOE device option is connected to a controller board via USB interface, but the unauthorized access from a public telephone line to the inside TOE or internal network via fax board cannot be made.

(9) Self Test

This TOE can execute the self test function to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.

1.4.2.3. Settings for the Secure Operation

System administrator shall set the following to enable security functions in 1.4.2.2.

- Hard Disk Data Overwrite
Set to [1 Overwrite] or [3 Overwrites]
- Hard Disk Data Encryption
Set to [Enabled]
- Passcode Entry from Control Panel
Set to [Enabled]
- Access denial when system administrator's authentication fails
Default [5] Times
- User Passcode Minimum Length (for general user and SA)
Set to [9] characters
- TLS
Set to [Enabled]
- IPSec
Set to [Enabled]
- User Authentication
Set to [Login to Local Authentication]
- Store Print
Set to [Save as Private Charge Print]
- Auto Clear
Set to [Enabled]
- Security Audit Log
Set to [Enabled]

- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
Set to [Enabled]
- Self Test
Set to [Enabled]
- Mailbox for storing received fax data and whether to print out the data
Specify a Mailbox for each public telephone line.

1.4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary

The physical scope of this TOE is the MFD. Figure 4 shows configuration of each unit and TOE physical scope.




Figure 4 MFD Units and TOE Physical Scope

The MFD consists of the controller board, Fax Board, Internal HDD, control panel, IIT, ADF and IOT.

The controller board is connected to the control panel via the internal interfaces which transmit control data, to the IIT board and IOT board via the internal interfaces which transmit document data and control data.

The controller board is a PWB which controls MFD functions of copy, print, scan, mailbox, and fax. The board has a network interface (Ethernet) and local interfaces (USB) and is connected to the IIT board and IOT board. The program is installed in Controller ROM.

FAX board is the interface between a public telephone line and the controller board and is connected to the controller board via USB.

The program is installed in FAXROM inside the FAX board.

The IOT (Image Output Terminal) is a device to output image data which was sent from the controller board.

The IIT (Image Input Terminal) is a device to scan an original and send its data to the controller board for copy, scan, and Fax functions.

The ADF (Auto Document Feeder) is a device to automatically transfer original documents to IIT.

The control panel is a panel on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to use and configure MFD functions of copy, print, scan, mailbox and fax.

NVRAM (Including SD Memory) and the internal HDD in TOE are not the removable memory media.

4 types of Channel correspond to the following in TOE.

- Private Medium Interface
Control panel, USB
- Shared Medium Interface
Ethernet
- Original Document Handler
IIT
- HardCopy Output Handler
IOT

1.4.3.1. Physical Configuration Elements of This TOE

The table below shows the physical elements that comprise this TOE.

Table 4 Physical Configuration Elements

	Name	Product code (Guidance code)	Version	Format	Delivery method
1	DocuCentre-VI C2264 CP	NC100556	Controller ROM Ver.1.1.3	Hardware	Courier
2	DocuCentre-VI C2264 CPFS	NC100557	Controller ROM Ver.1.1.3, FAX ROM Ver.2.2.0	Hardware	Courier
3	Fax Kit 3	QC100164	FAX ROM Ver.2.2.0	Hardware	Courier
4	Data Security Kit	EC103551	-	Paper	Courier
5	Scanner Kit	EC103545	-	Paper	Courier
6	DocuCentre-VI C2264 Administrator Guide	(ME8372J1-1)	-	PDF file in a DVD	Courier (included in package with MFD)

7	DocuCentre-VI C2264 User Guide	(ME8371J1-1)	-	PDF file in a DVD	Courier (included in package with MFD)
8	DocuCentre-VI C2264 Security Function Supplementary Guide	(ME8373J1-2 _20190306)	-	PDF file in a DVD	Courier (included in package with MFD)

Note: This TOE is composed of either “1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8” or “2, 4, 6, 7, and 8”.

1.4.4. Guidance

The following are the guidance documents written in Japanese for this TOE.

- DocuCentre-VI C2264 Administrator Guide: ME8372J1-1
- DocuCentre-VI C2264 User Guide: ME8371J1-1
- DocuCentre-VI C2264 Security Function Supplementary Guide: ME8373J1-2_20190306

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM

2.1. CC Conformance Claim

This ST and TOE conform to the following evaluation standards for information security (CC):
CC version which ST and TOE claim to conform to:

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation

Part 1: Introduction and general model (April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5)

Part 2: Security functional components (April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5)

Part 3: Security assurance components (April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5)

CC Part2 extended [FPT_FDI_EXP.1]

CC Part3 conformant

2.2. PP claim, Package Claim

2.2.1. PP Claim

This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to:

U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™ -2009)

2.2.2. Package Claim

This Security Target claims EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.

Also, it claims the following packages of the SFR Package that can select PP description as the package conformant.

Title: 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
Package Version: 1.0

Title: 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
Package Version: 1.0

Title: 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
Package Version: 1.0

Title: 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
Package Version: 1.0

Title: 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B

Package Version: 1.0

Title: 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions,
Operational Environment B

Package Version: 1.0

2.2.3. Conformance Rationale

This ST is written with the functions partially added, covering the following written in the PP: Common HCD Functions, Print Functions, Scan Functions, Copy Functions, Fax Functions, Document Storage and Retrieval Functions, and Shared-medium Interfaces Functions.

The type of TOE in this ST is the MFD (Multi Function Device) with copy, print, scan, network scan, mailbox, and fax functions, and is the same term as Hardcopy Device written in 4.1 Typical Products of PP, incorporating the required functions.

Also, as shown below, the Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security Functional Requirements are written covering the PP.

- P.CIPHER is added for OSP for the TOE in addition to Threats / OSP / Assumptions required in PP. P.CIPHER is the data encryption of the internal HDD, and is independent from other Problem Definition, causing no impact.
There is no change in Assumptions. Therefore, the Threats / OSP / Assumptions are more restrictive than the statement of the Security Problem Definition of PP.
- Security Objectives are set by excluding OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED and OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED from the Security Objectives for the environment specified in PP. As other contents are quoted without any changes and there is no additional objective, the Security Objectives for the environment have the restrictions equivalent to or less than that in the statement of Security Objectives of PP.
- O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED and O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED are added for the Security Objectives for the TOE in addition to the Security Objectives required in PP.
The Security Objectives for the TOE are more restrictive than the statement in the Security Objectives of PP.
- The relation between the SFR specified by PP and that used by ST is shown in Table 15. Table 15 contains refined and additional contents of SFRs. For FPT_FDI_EXP.1, the security attributes of +SMI are not defined in this ST, but as no operation is required to restrict forwarding of data, the requirement of this ST is equivalent to that of PP.
For FDP ACF.1(a), access control of the operation to delete D.DOC in a Mailbox applies not only to general users but also to SAs. This TOE defines Key Operator and SA as roles that have system administrator authority. In FDP ACF.1(a), SAs are applied with the same rules as

general users, which is more restrictive than PP because SAs are privileged in PP. U.USER is not allowed to delete D.DOC except for in Mailbox and Private Print, which is more restrictive than PP.

U.NORMAL is not permitted to delete D.FUNC except for in Private Print even when the user is the owner of the D.FUNC, which is more restrictive than PP.

All U.USER are prohibited from performing modification of D.FUNC outside of Private Print or Copy, which is more restrictive than PP.

For FDP ACF.1(b), access control of all functions applies not only to general users but also to SAs. As mentioned above, applying the same rules to SAs as to general users is more restrictive than PP because SAs are privileged in PP. For FDP ACF.1.3(b), only the Key Operator (not U.ADMINISTRATOR) is explicitly authorized access to all functions, which is more restrictive than PP. For FDP ACF.1.3(b), only U.ADMINISTRATOR is explicitly authorized to store fax documents in a Mailbox. This is specified in accordance with PP Application Note 94.

For FDP ACF.1(d), even a system administrator is not permitted to read scanned data if the user is not the owner of the data, so the subject has been expanded to U.USER. Applying the same rules to system administrators as to general users is more restrictive than PP because system administrators are privileged in PP.

For FDP ACF.1(f), only SAs are permitted to read received fax documents stored in a Mailbox. SAs who do not own the documents cannot access the documents, which is more restrictive than PP because SAs are privileged in PP. Access control of the operation to send a fax applies not only to general users but also to system administrators. Applying the same rules to system administrators as general users is more restrictive than PP because system administrators are privileged in PP.

For FDP ACF.1(g), access control of reading scanned documents stored in a Mailbox applies not only to general users but also to SAs. Applying the same rules to SAs as to general users is more restrictive than PP because SAs are privileged in PP. In this ST, rule (2) defined in PP has been deleted from the access control rules, which is more restrictive than PP. Also, a rule for creating documents to be stored in Mailboxes is additionally specified. This is to explicitly specify that a user can only select a Mailbox he/she owns when storing documents in a Mailbox. Additional rules are specified in accordance with PP Application Notes 19 and 104.

For other SFRs, the same SFRs specified in PP are specified in this ST. Additional SFRs are also specified, which make this TOE more restrictive than PP. Therefore, the SFR of this ST is more restrictive than that of PP.

In this ST, the content quoted from the SFR of PP is written in italics, describing the content required by PP. Also, the assigned part is similarly written in italics, including the part fixed in PP.

- Among the Security Objectives Rationale specified in PP, the objective of P.AUDIT.LOGGING replaces OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED and OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED with O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED and O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED. Also, O.CIPHER is added to the objectives of P.CIPHER. Others describe the content required by PP without any changes to show its assurance.
- Objectives are assured as the description is added for the added TOE objectives and SFR., The relationship between FMT_MSA.1 and the security objectives are different from PP, but this does not change the content of security requirements specified in PP. This is because, in order to protect user data, the requirements to prevent disclosure and alteration of security attributes are applied to TSF data security objectives. As to other TOE objectives and SFR, the contents required by PP are described.
- The SAR specified in PP describes the content required by PP without any changes.

Therefore, this ST demonstrably conforms to the PP.

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This chapter describes the threats, organizational security policies, and the assumptions for the use of this TOE.

3.1. Threats

3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE

This TOE protects the following assets.

Table 5 Assets for User Data

Designation	PP Definition	Asset under Protection	Description
D.DOC	User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user's document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output.	Document data stored for job processing	When a user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and scan, the document data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. The user can retrieve the stored document data in the MFD from a general user client by CWIS function.
		Used document data after job processing	When a user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and scan, the document data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. When the jobs are completed or canceled, only the management information is deleted but the data itself remains.
D.FUNC	User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE.	User job information	A job received from a user or entity outside the TOE.

Table 6 Assets for TSF Data

Designation	PP Definition	Asset under Protection	Description
D.PROT	TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.	Table 26、 Table 27、 Table 28、 Table 29、 Table 30、 Table 31、 Table 34、 Table 35 (excluding the following D.CONF)	Even though the contents of the TOE setting data and security attributes are disclosed, it will not be a security threat.
D.CONF	TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE.	-Data on General user Password -Data on Security Audit Log(Table 16) -Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption - Data on Internal Network Data Protection	The system administrator can set security functions of TOE from the MFD's control panel or the system administrator client by using the System Administrator's Security Management function. The setting data are saved in TOE. General users can set their IDs and passwords from the MFD's control panel by using the User Authentication function. The setting data are saved in TOE. The system administrator can retrieve the security audit log data from the system administrator client. The security audit log data are saved in TOE.

Table 7 Other Assets

Designation	PP Definition	Asset under Protection	Description
Functions	Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD products. These functions are used by SFR packages.	MFD functions	Only the permitted user can use the copy, print, scan, and Fax functions of TOE.




Figure 5 Assets under and not under Protection

Note) The data stored in a general client and server within the internal network and the general data on the internal network are not assumed as assets to be protected. This is because TOE functions prevent the access to the internal network from public telephone line and it cannot be a threat.

TSF data in Table 6 are stored in the internal HDD, NVRAM(Including SD Memory) and SEEPROM of the controller board.

However, the present time data are not included.

The setting data other than TOE setting data are also stored on NVRAM(Including SD Memory) and SEEPROM. Those setting data, however, are not assumed as assets to be protected because they do not engage in TOE security functions.

Security Audit Log data are temporarily stored in NVRAM, but stored in the internal HDD as a file.

3.1.2. Threats agents

This ST assumes the following four categories of threats agents as Attacker, each having low-level attack capability and the disclosed information on TOE operations.

- a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE.
- b) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they are not authorized.
- c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they are not authorized.
- d) Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated threats.

3.1.3. Threats

Table 8 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE. Unauthorized persons are assumed to be the threat agents described in 3.1.2.

Table 8 Threats to User Data and TSF Data

Threat	Affected asset	Description
T.DOC.DIS	D.DOC	User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.DOC.ALT	D.DOC	User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.FUNC.ALT	D.FUNC	User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.PROT.ALT	D.PROT	TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.CONF.DIS	D.CONF	TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.CONF.ALT	D.CONF	TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

3.2. Organizational Security Policies

Table 9 below describes the organizational security policies the TOE must comply with.

Table 9 Organizational Security Policies

Name	Definition
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION	To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION	To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING	To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT	To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of the interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.CIPHER	To prevent unauthorized reading-out, the document data in the internal HDD will be encrypted by the TOE.

3.3. Assumptions

Table 10 shows the assumptions for the operation and use of this TOE.

Table 10 Assumptions

Assumption	Definition
A.ACCESS.MANAGED	The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING	TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING	Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST	Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

4. Security Objectives

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment and the rationale.

4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

Table 11 defines the security objectives to be accomplished by the TOE.

Table 11 Security Objectives for the TOE

Objective	Definition
O.DOC.NO_DIS	The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure.
O.DOC.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.PROT.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.CONF.NO_DIS	The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED	The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED	The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	The TOE shall ensure that audit records are protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	The TOE shall ensure that audit records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorized persons.
O.CIPHER	The TOE shall provide the function to encrypt the document data in the internal HDD so that they cannot be read out.

4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment

Table 11 defines the security objectives for the TOE environment.

Table 12 Security objectives for the environment

Objective	Definition
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED	The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED	The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their organization.
OE.USER.TRAINED	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and have the training and competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED	The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, have the training, competence, and time to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED	The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED	The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity.
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED	The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged access to TOE interfaces.

4.3. Security Objectives Rationale

The security objectives are established to correspond to the assumptions specified in Security Problem Definition, to counter the threats, or to realize the organizational security policies. Table 13 shows assumptions / threats / organizational security policies and the corresponding security objectives.) Moreover, Table 14 shows that each defined security problem is covered by the security objectives.

Table 13 Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security policies and the Corresponding Security Objectives

Objectives	O.DOC.NO_DIS	O.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	O.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	OE.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	O.AUDIT.LOGGED	O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED	OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED	OE.ADMIN.TRAINED	OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED	OE.USER.TRAINED	O.CIPHER	
T.DOC.DIS	✓						✓	✓													
T.DOC.ALT		✓					✓	✓													
T.FUNC.ALT			✓				✓	✓													
T.PROT.ALT				✓			✓	✓													
T.CONF.DIS					✓		✓	✓													
T.CONF.ALT						✓	✓	✓													
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION							✓	✓													
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION									✓												
P.AUDIT.LOGGING										✓	✓	✓	✓								
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT														✓	✓						
P.CIPHER																					✓
A.ACCESS.MANAGED																✓					
A.ADMIN.TRAINING																	✓				
A.ADMIN.TRUST																		✓			
A.USER.TRAINING																			✓		

Table 14 Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem

Threats, policies, and assumptions	Summary	Objectives and rationale
T.DOC.DIS	User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.	O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from unauthorized disclosure. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.

Threats, policies, and assumptions	Summary	Objectives and rationale
		OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.
T.DOC.ALT	User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.	O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.
T.FUNC.ALT	User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.	O.FUNC.NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.
T.PROT.ALT	TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.	O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.
T.CONF.DIS	TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.	O.CONF.NO_DIS protects D.CONF from unauthorized disclosure. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization
T.CONF.ALT	TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.	O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes

Threats, policies, and assumptions	Summary	Objectives and rationale
		responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION	Users will be authorized to use the TOE.	O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user authorization to use the TOE identification and authentication as the basis for OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION	Procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING	An audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, protected, and reviewed.	O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains a log of TOE use and security-relevant events and prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration. OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that audit logs are appropriately reviewed. O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED protects audit logs from unauthorized access, deletion, and alteration for the TOE. O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED enables the analysis of audit logs only by authorized users to detect potential security violations for the TOE.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT	Operation of external interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies. OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes a protected environment for TOE external interfaces.
P.CIPHER	User Data stored in the HDD will be encrypted by the TOE.	O.CIPHER encrypts the document data in the internal HDD to disable unauthorized reading-out of them.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED	The TOE environment provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.	OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a protected physical environment for the TOE.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING	TOE Users are aware of and trained to follow	OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate

Threats, policies, and assumptions	Summary	Objectives and rationale
	security policies and procedures.	Administrator training.
A.ADMIN.TRUST	Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.	OE.ADMIN.TRUST establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship with Administrators.
A.USER.TRAINING	Administrators are aware of and trained to follow security policies and procedures.	OE.USER.TRAINED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User training.

5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

This Protection Profile defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Release 2, Part 2. These extended components are defined in the Protection Profile but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages.


5.1. FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

Family behaviour:

This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external interface to another external interface.

Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.

Component leveling:



FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces, provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before this data is sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role.

Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities.
- b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role.
- c) Revocation of such an allowance.

Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

There are no auditable events foreseen.

Rationale:

Quite often a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface before such (processed) data is allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i. e. without processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that – if allowed at all – can only be allowed by an authorized role.

It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component.

The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP class. However, in this Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both user data and TSF data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this functionality.

This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and could therefore be placed in either the FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this lead the authors to define a new family with just one member.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces].

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security requirement rational.

The terms and phrases used in this chapter are defined below.

- Subject

Term/phrase	Definition
Key Operator	Operation upon using the document data in Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of key operator succeeded.
SA	Operation upon using the document data in Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of SA succeeded.
U.ADMINISTRATOR	Operation upon using the document data in Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of Key Operator/SA succeeded.
U.NORMAL	Operation upon using the document data in Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of U.NORMAL succeeded.
U.USER	Operation upon using the document data in Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of U.ADMINISTRATOR/ U.NORMAL succeeded.

- Object

Term/phrase	Definition
Copy Function	A function to read the original data from the IIT and print them out from the IOT according to a general user's instruction from the control panel.
Scan Function	A function to read the original data from the IIT and store them in a Mailbox as document data according to a general user's instruction from the control panel.
Network Scan Function	A function to read the original data from the IIT and automatically forward the data to an FTP server according to the information registered in the MFD. A general user can request this function from the control panel.
Print Function	A function to convert the print data sent from a general user client into bitmap data, temporarily store the data in the internal HDD, and print it out from the IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
Fax Function	A function to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data is read from the IIT and sent to the

	destination via public telephone line. The document data sent from the sender's machine is received via public telephone line, then stored in a Mailbox.
Mailbox Function	A function used by general users or system administrators to retrieve or print stored documents via the control panel or CWIS.

- Operation

Term/phrase	Definition
send the document data	Distribute the scanned document data automatically to FTP server, and Fax (public telephone line).
retrieve	Output the document data from Mailbox to the following: - Print - Export from CWIS to user client
modify the behavior	Modify the behavior of the following: User Authentication (local, remote), Store Print (storage or deletion upon authentication failure), Internal Network Data Protection (authentication/encryption method), Report Print (only system administrator, users) and Hard Disk Data Overwrite (number of pass, overwrite procedure).

- Security attributes

Term/phrase	Definition
U.NORMAL role	Indicates the authority required for general user to use the TOE.
SA role	Indicates the authority required for SA to use the TOE.
Key Operator role	Indicates the authority required for key operator to use the TOE.
User identifier	This term covers General User identifier, SA identifier, and Key Operator identifier.
General User identifier	User ID used to authenticate and identify general user (U.NORMAL).
SA identifier	User ID used to authenticate and identify SA.
Key Operator identifier	User ID used to authenticate and identify Key Operator.
User identifier for each function	Data on authorized users for copy, print, scan, network scan, and fax functions and on usage restrictions.
Owner identifier of D.DOC	Data on authorized users for the document data inside Mailbox and Private Print.
Owner identifier of D.FUNC	Data on authorized users for the user job.
Mailbox number	A number to identify a Mailbox.
List of Mailbox numbers of	A security attribute of U.USER. A list of Mailbox numbers of

his/her own	Mailboxes created by a general user (U.NORMAL) or an SA for his/her own use.
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- Entity outside the TOE

Term/phrase	Definition
Key Operator	An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance and makes TOE security function settings.
SA(System Administrator Privilege)	The users who manage MFD maintenance and configure TOE security functions. SA can be created/registered by key operator or the other SA who is already registered.
U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)	This term covers both key operator and SA.
U.NORMAL (General User)	Any person who uses copy, scan, network scan, fax, mailbox, and print functions of MFD.

- Other terminology

Term/phrase	Definition
The Fuji Xerox's standard method, FXOSEC	The Fuji Xerox's standard algorithm to generate a cryptographic key. This is used when MFD is booted.
AES	The FIPS-standard encryption algorithm used for encryption/decryption of Hard Disk data.
Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator ID	When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has exceeded the specified number of times, identification and authentication of relevant user is inhibited until the TOE is cycled.
Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication	The data on whether to enable/disable the use of password to be entered from MFD control panel in user authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on minimum user password length	Minimum user password length to set the SA/ General User password from MFD control panel. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on key operator ID	ID data for Key Operator identification. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on key operator Password	Password data for Key Operator authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on SA ID	ID data for SA identification. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on SA Password	Password data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on General user ID	ID data for General User (U.NORMAL) identification. Included in the TOE setting data.

Data on General user Password	Password data for General User (U.NORMAL) authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator	The data on whether to enable/disable access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator ID. They also incorporate the data on the allowable number of the failures before access denial. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Security Audit Log	The data on whether to enable/disable the function to trace/ record the important events of the TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation, based on when and who operated what function. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on User Authentication	The data on whether to enable/disable the authentication function using the data on user authentication when copy, scan, network scan, Fax, mailbox, and print functions of MFD are used. It also incorporates the data on the authentication method. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Store Print	The setting data on whether to store the received print data to Private Print area or print it out. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Internal Network Data Protection	The data on whether to enable/disable the general encryption communication protocols to protect the communication data on the internal network such as document data, job information, security audit log data, and TOE setting data. They also incorporate the data on the setting, certificate, authentication/encryption password, and common key password. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction-	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Customer Engineer Operation Restriction and the data on the maintenance password. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Hard Disk Data Encryption. They also incorporate the data on the encryption seed key. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Hard Disk Data Overwrite. They also incorporate the data on the number of pass (overwrite procedure) and the data on scheduled Image Overwrite. Included in the TOE setting data.

Data on date and time	The time zone / summer time information and the present time data. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Auto Clear	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions of Auto Clear on control panel/CWIS and the time to clear. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Self Test	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Self Test. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Report Print	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Report Print. Included in the TOE setting data.
Store Print/Private Print	A print function in which bitmap data (decomposed print data) is temporarily stored in the MFD internal HDD and then printed out according to the authenticated user's instruction from the control panel.
Data on Received Fax	The data on the Mailbox specified for each public telephone line to store received fax data. Included in the TOE setting data.
Document data	Document data means all the data including image data transmitted across the MFD when any of copy, print, network scan, or scan function is operated by a general user.
Security Audit Log	The chronologically recorded data of important events of the TOE. The events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result.

6.1. Security Functional Requirements

Security functional requirements which the TOE offers are described below.

List of functional requirements to be used in this ST is shown in Table 15 below.

Table 15 Security functional Requirements

Security functional components		PP Required Component	Difference from PP
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation	Yes	Auditable Event is described and added in detail for each TOE.
FAU_GEN.2	User identity association	Yes	No change from PP.
FAU_SAR.1	Audit review	No	The function of retrieving audit log data are provided to system administrator only by the addition of this SFR.
FAU_SAR.2	Restricted audit review	No	
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit trail storage	No	Audit log data are protected from unauthorized deletion or alteration by the addition of this SFR.
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss	No	The oldest stored audit record is overwritten by a new audit event when the audit trail file is full, by the addition of this SFR.
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic key generation	No	The data of internal HDD is encrypted by the addition of this SFR.
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation	No	
FDP_ACC.1(a)	Subset access control	Yes	PP description is quoted for Attributes, Operations, and Access Control rule. For this TOE, the operation of Delete and Modify is detailed and the subjects of Delete and Modify are modified.
FDP_ACC.1(b)	Subset access control	Yes	Access Control SFP is described for each TOE.

Security functional components		PP Required Component	Difference from PP
FDP_ACC.1(c) (PRT SFR Package) FDP_ACC.1(d) (SCN SFR Package) FDP_ACC.1(e) (CPY SFR Package) FDP_ACC.1(f) (FAX SFR Package) FDP_ACC.1(g) (DSR SFR Package)	Subset access control	Yes	PP description is quoted for Attributes, Operations, and Access Control rule. For this TOE, the subjects of FDP_ACC.1(c), FDP_ACC.1(d), FDP_ACC.1(f), and FDP_ACC.1(g) are modified and the operation of Read has been refined.
FDP_ACF.1(a)	Security attribute based access control	Yes	PP description is quoted for Attributes, Operations, and Access Control rule, and also the operations of Delete and Modify are detailed and added for each TOE.
FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(c) (PRT SFR Package) FDP_ACF.1(d) (SCN SFR Package) FDP_ACF.1(e) (CPY SFR Package) FDP_ACF.1(f) (FAX SFR Package) FDP_ACF.1(g) (DSR SFR Package)	Security attribute based access control	Yes	PP description is quoted for Attributes, Operations, and Access Control rule, and also the operation of Read is detailed for each TOE.
FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FIA_AFL.1 (a) FIA_AFL.1 (b)	Authentication failure handling	No	Access denial function for authentication failure in the system administrator authentication is provided by the addition of this SFR.
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FIA_SOS.1	Verification of secrets	No	Described in accordance with TOE.
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback	No	Authentication feedback is protected by the addition of this SFR.

Security functional components		PP Required Component	Difference from PP
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behaviour	No	Setting of security functions is restricted to system administrator only by the addition of this SFR.
FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(b)	Management of security attributes	Yes	Management role of security attributes is described in accordance with TOE.
FMT_MSA.1(c) FMT_MSA.1(d) FMT_MSA.1(e) FMT_MSA.1(f) FMT_MSA.1(g)	Management of security attributes	No	Management of security attributes is described for the TOE.
FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(b)	Static attribute initialisation	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FMT_MSA.3(c) FMT_MSA.3(d) FMT_MSA.3(e) FMT_MSA.3(f) FMT_MSA.3(g)	Static attribute initialisation	No	Described for the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1(a) FMT_MTD.1(b)	Management of TSF data	Yes	Operation list of TSF data are described for the TOE. Note that FMT_MTD.1(b) is for D.CONF only.
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	Yes	List of security management functions is described for the TOE.
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 (SMI SFR Package)	Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces	Yes	No change from PP.
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps	Yes	No change from PP.
FPT_TST.1	TSF testing	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated termination	Yes	Described in accordance with TOE.
FTP_ITC.1 (SMI SFR Package)	Inter-TSF trusted channel	Yes	No change from PP.

6.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and
- [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].

[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
 - *not specified*

[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
 - *all Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table16;*

Table 16 Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events

Relevant SFR	Auditable event	Audit level	Additional information	Actions to be audited (defined by CC)
FAU_GEN.1	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_GEN.2	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_SAR.1	<i>Successful download of audit log data.</i>	<Basic>	<i>None</i>	a) Basic: Reading of information from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.2	<i>Unsuccessful download of audit log data.</i>	<Basic>	<i>None</i>	a) Basic: Unsuccessful attempts to read information from the audit records.
FAU_STG.1	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG.4	<i>None</i>	-	-	a) Basic: Actions taken due to the audit storage failure.
FCS_CKM.1	<i>None</i>	-	-	a) Minimal: Success and failure of the activity. b) Basic: The object attribute(s), and object value(s) excluding any sensitive information (e.g.

				secret or private keys).
FCS_COP.1	None	-	-	a) Minimal: Success and failure, and the type of cryptographic operation. b) Basic: Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of operation, subject attributes and object attributes.
FDP_ACC.1	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_ACF.1(a)	<i>Job completion and cancellation of Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax.</i>	<not specified>	<i>Type of job</i>	a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check.
FDP_ACF.1(b)	<i>Job completion and cancellation of Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax.</i>			
FDP_ACF.1(c)	<i>User name, job information, and success/failure regarding execution of Store Print.</i>			
FDP_ACF.1(d) FDP_ACF.1(f)	<i>User name, job information, and success/failure regarding access to the document in Mailbox.</i>			
FDP_ACF.1(g)	<i>User name, job information, and success/failure regarding access to the document in Mailbox.</i>			
FDP_RIP.1	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.

FIA_AFL.1(a) FIA_AFL.1(b)	<i>Authentication lock of system administrator</i>	<Minimal>	<i>None required</i>	a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).
FIA_ATD.1	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_SOS.1	<i>Change in quality metrics</i>	<not specified>	-	a) Minimal: Rejection by the TSF of any tested secret; b) Basic: Rejection or acceptance by the TSF of any tested secret; c) Detailed: Identification of any changes to the defined quality metrics
FIA_UAU.1	<i>Success/failure of authentication</i>	<Basic>	<i>None required</i>	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism. c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions performed before authentication of the user.
FIA_UAU.7	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_UID.1	<i>Success/failure of identification and authentication</i>	<Basic>	<i>Attempted user identity</i>	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.
FIA_USB.1	<i>User login failure</i>	<not specified>	<i>None</i>	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. creation of a subject). b) Basic: Success and failure of binding of user security

				attributes to a subject (e.g. success or failure to create a subject).
FMT_MOF.1	<i>Changes in security function configuration</i>	<Basic>	None	a) Basic: All modifications in the behavior of the functions in the TSF.
FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(c) FMT_MSA.1(d) FMT_MSA.1(e) FMT_MSA.1(f) FMT_MSA.1(g)	<i>Changes in security settings</i>	<not specified>	None	a) Basic: All modifications of the values of security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3 (a) FMT_MSA.3 (b) FMT_MSA.3 (c) FMT_MSA.3 (d) FMT_MSA.3 (e) FMT_MSA.3 (f) FMT_MSA.3 (g)	None	<Basic>	None	a) Basic: Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules. b) Basic: All modifications of the initial values of security attributes.
FMT_MTD.1(a)	<i>Changes in registration data (ID, password) of system administrator, and in the setting of security functions</i>	<not specified>	None	a) Basic: All modifications to the values of TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1(b)	<i>Changes in registration data (ID, password) of system administrator</i>			
FMT_SMF.1	<i>Access to system administrator mode</i>	<Minimal>	None required	a) Minimal: Use of the management functions.
FMT_SMR.1	<i>Registration of system administrator, changes in user registration data (role), and deletion of system administrator</i>	<Minimal>	None required	a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users that are part of a role; b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.

FPT_STM.1	<i>Changes in time setting</i>	<Minimal>	<i>None required</i>	a) Minimal: changes to the time; b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.
FPT_TST.1	<i>Execution of Self Test and the test result</i>	<Basic>	<i>None</i>	Basic: Execution of the TSF self tests and the results of the tests.
FTA_SSL.3	<i>Log-in timeout from remote. Log-in timeout from control panel.</i>	<Minimal>	<i>None required</i>	a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism.
FTP_ITC.1	<i>Failure of the trusted Communication within a specified period of time, and client host data (host name or IP address)</i>	<Minimal>	<i>None required</i>	a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channel functions. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted channel functions. d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and target of all trusted channel functions.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1	-	-	-	There are no auditable events foreseen.

FAU_GEN.1.2

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information].

[assignment: other audit relevant information]

- for each Relevant SFR - listed in Table 16: (1) information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required);

FAU_GEN.2

User identity association

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FAU_GEN.2.1	For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1:	Audit review
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1	The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records. [assignment: authorized users] - <i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i> [assignment: list of audit information] - <i>all log information</i>
FAU_SAR.1.2	The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.2	Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1	The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1	The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2	The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] - <i>prevent</i>
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.

[selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”]
- *overwrite the oldest stored audit records*

[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
- *no other actions to be taken*

6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1 TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

[assignment: list of standards]

- *none*

[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]

- *the Fuji Xerox’s standard method, FXOSEC*

[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

- *256bits*

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1

The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

[assignment: list of standards]

- *FIPS PUB 197*

[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

- AES

[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

- *256bits*

[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

- *encryption of the document data to be stored in the internal HDD and decryption of the document data retrieved from the internal HDD.*

6.1.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection

The Security Function Policy (SFP) described in Table 17 is referenced by the Class FDP SFRs in this clause.

Table 17 Common Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute	Operation(s)	Subject	*Access control rule
<i>D.DOC</i>	<i>attributes from Table 18</i>	<i>Delete</i> <i>- Delete the document data in Mailbox</i>	<i>U.NORMAL, SA</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own documents</i>
		<i>Delete</i> <i>- Delete the document data in Private Print</i>	<i>U.NORMAL</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own documents</i>
		<i>Delete</i> <i>- Delete the document data except for Mailbox and Private Print.</i>	<i>U.USER</i>	<i>Denied</i>
<i>D.FUNC</i>	<i>attributes from Table 18</i>	<i>Delete</i> <i>- Delete the job data in Private Print</i>	<i>U.NORMAL</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own function data</i>

Object	Attribute	Operation(s)	Subject	*Access control rule
		Delete - Delete the job data except for Private Print	U.NORMAL	Denied
		Modify - Modify the job data in Private Print - Modify the Copy job data	U.NORMAL	Denied, except for his/her own function data
		Modify - Modify the job data except for Private Print or Copy job	U.USER	Denied

*Details of Access control rule

Table 18 SFR Package attributes

Designation	Definition
+PRT	Indicates data that is associated with a print job. - User identifier - Owner identifier of D.DOC - Owner identifier of D.FUNC
+SCN	Indicates data that is associated with a scan job. - User identifier - Owner identifier of D.DOC - Owner identifier of D.FUNC
+CPY	Indicates data that is associated with a copy job. - User identifier - Owner identifier of D.DOC - Owner identifier of D.FUNC
+FAXIN	Indicates data that is associated with an inbound (received) fax job. - User identifier - Owner identifier of D.DOC - Owner identifier of D.FUNC
+FAXOUT	Indicates data that is associated with an outbound (sent) fax job. - User identifier - Owner identifier of D.DOC - Owner identifier of D.FUNC
+DSR	Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job. - User identifier - Owner identifier of D.DOC - Owner identifier of D.FUNC

+SMI	Indicates data that is transmitted or received over a shared-medium interface. - none
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FDP_ACC.1 (a) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 (a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]
 - Common Access Control SFP in Table17
 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].
 - the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table17

FDP_ACC.1 (b) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 (b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]
 - TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 19
 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].
 - users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as operations in Table 19.

Table 19 Function Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
Copy Function (F.CPY)	- User identifier - User identifier for each function	- Copy operation from control panel	U.NORM AL, SA	The user is explicitly authorized by

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
Network Scan Function (F.SCN, F.SMI)	- User identifier - User identifier for each function	- Send the scanned data from control panel to FTP server	U. NORMAL, SA	U.ADMINISTRATOR to use a function
Print Function (F.PRT, F.SMI)	- User identifier - User identifier for each function	- Save the document data from user client in Private Print. - Print(*) the document data in Private Print from control panel	U. NORMAL, SA	
Fax Function (F.FAX)	- User identifier - User identifier for each function	- Send the scanned data to remote fax from control panel	U. NORMAL, SA	
Scan Function (F.SCN, F.DSR)	- User identifier - User identifier for each function	- Scan operation to Mailbox from control panel	U. NORMAL, SA	
Mailbox Function (F.DSR, F.SMI, F.FAX)	None	- Access the document data in Mailbox from control panel or user client	U.NORMAL, SA	a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions

*Job abort for Print function is restricted to the control panel.

FDP_ACC.1(c) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1(c) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]
 - PRT Access Control SFP in Table20

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].
 - the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the PRT Access Control SFP in Table20.

Table 20 PRT Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
<i>D.DOC</i>	<i>+PRT</i>	<i>Read</i> <i>Print the document</i> <i>data in Private Print</i>	<i>U.NORMAL</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own documents</i> <i>When the owner identifier of D.DOC matches the user identifier, print operation is permitted.</i>

FDP_ACC.1 (d) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 (d) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- *SCN Access Control SFP in Table21*

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

- *the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SCN Access Control SFP in Table 21*

Table 21 SCN Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
<i>D.DOC</i>	<i>+SCN</i>	<i>Read</i> <i>- Send the document</i> <i>data to server</i>	<i>U.USER</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own documents</i>

FDP_ACC.1 (e) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 (e) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- *CPY Access Control SFP in Table22*

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

- the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the CPY Access Control SFP in Table 22

Table 22 CPY Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
<i>D.DOC</i>	<i>+CPY</i>	<i>Read</i>		<i>This package does not specify any access control restriction</i>

FDP_ACC.1 (f) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 (f) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]
 - FAX Access Control SFP in Table23

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].
 - the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the FAX Access Control SFP in Table 23

Table 23 FAX Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
<i>D.DOC</i>	<i>+FAXIN</i>	<i>Read</i> <i>- Retrieve the document data in Mailbox</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own documents</i> <i>- When the owner identifier of D.DOC matches the user identifier, retrieval operation is permitted.</i>
	<i>+FAXOUT</i>	<i>Read</i> <i>- Send the document data to fax</i>	<i>U.USER</i>	<i>Denied, except for his/her own documents</i>

FDP_ACC.1 (g) Subset access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 (g) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- *DSR Access Control SFP in Table 24*

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

- *the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the DSR Access Control SFP in Table 24*

Table 24 DSR Access Control SFP

Object	Attribute(s)	Operation	Subject	Access control rule
D.DOC	+DSR	Read - Retrieve the document data in Mailbox	U. NORMAL, SA	Denied, except for his/her own documents - When the owner identifier of D.DOC matches the user identifier, retrieval operation is permitted.
	+DSR, - Mailbox number - List of Mailbox numbers of his/her own	Create - Save the scanned document data to mailbox	U.NORMAL, SA	Denied, unless the specified Mailbox number is included in the List of Mailbox numbers of his/her own of the user.

FDP_ACF.1 (a) Security attribute based access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP_ACF.1.1 (a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- **Common Access Control SFP in Table 17**

[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

- *the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 17, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 18*

- FDP_ACF.1.2 (a) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
- [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
- rules specified in the Common Access Control SFP in Table 17 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects
- FDP_ACF.1.3 (a) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].
- [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
- *Key Operator is explicitly permitted to delete the document in Mailbox.*
 - *U.ADMINISTRATOR is explicitly permitted to delete the document in Private Print.*
 - *U.ADMINISTRATOR is explicitly permitted to delete the job data.*
 - *U.ADMINISTRATOR is explicitly permitted to modify the job data in Private Print and the Copy job data.*
- FDP_ACF.1.4 (a) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
- [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
- *none*
- FDP_ACF.1 (b) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
- FDP_ACF.1.1 (b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant

security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- **TOE Function Access Control SFP** in Table 19

[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

- **users and** list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 19

FDP_ACF.1.2 (b)

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

- [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by UADMINISTRATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]]

- [assignment: other conditions]

- rules specified in the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 19

FDP_ACF.1.3(b)

The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

- the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR, is explicitly permitted to receive fax data and save the received fax data to Mailbox.

- the user acts in the role of Key Operator is explicitly permitted to access to all the functions of TOE.

FDP_ACF.1.4 (b)

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

	<p>[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].</p> <p><i>-none</i></p>
FDP_ACF.1(c)	Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1(c)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].</p> <p>[assignment: access control SFP]</p> <p>- PRT Access Control SFP in Table 20</p> <p>[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].</p> <p><i>- the list of subjects and objects controlled under the PRT Access Control SFP in Table 20, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 20.</i></p>
FDP_ACF.1.2(c)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:</p> <p>[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].</p> <p>[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].</p> <p><i>- rules specified in the PRT Access Control SFP in Table 20 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.</i></p>
FDP_ACF.1.3(c)	<p>The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].</p> <p>[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].</p>

- U.ADMINISTRATOR is explicitly permitted to read the document in Private Print.

FDP_ACF.1.4(c)

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

- none

FDP_ACF.1 (d)

Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP_ACF.1.1 (d)

The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- **SCN Access Control SFP in Table 21**

[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

- *the list of subjects and objects controlled under the SCN Access Control SFP in Table 21, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 21.*

FDP_ACF.1.2 (d)

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

- **rules specified in the SCN Access Control SFP in Table 21 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.**

- FDP_ACF.1.3 (d) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].
- [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
- none
- FDP_ACF.1.4 (d) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
- [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
- none
- FDP_ACF.1 (e) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
- FDP_ACF.1.1 (e) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
- [assignment: access control SFP]
- **CPY Access Control SFP in Table 22**
- [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
- *the list of subjects and objects controlled under the CPY Access Control SFP in Table 22, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 22.*
- FDP_ACF.1.2 (e) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

	<p>[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].</p> <p>- rules specified in the <i>CPY Access Control SFP in Table 21 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.</i></p>
FDP_ACF.1.3 (e)	<p>The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].</p> <p>[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].</p> <p>- none</p>
FDP_ACF.1.4 (e)	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].</p> <p>[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].</p> <p>- none</p>
FDP_ACF.1 (f)	Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 (f)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].</p> <p>[assignment: access control SFP]</p> <p>- <i>FAX Access Control SFP in Table 23</i></p> <p>[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].</p> <p>- <i>the list of subjects and objects controlled under the FAX Access Control SFP in Table 23, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 23.</i></p>

- FDP_ACF.1.2 (f) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
- rules specified in the FAX Access Control SFP in Table 23 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.
- FDP_ACF.1.3 (f) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
- Key Operator is explicitly permitted to read the document in Mailbox.
- FDP_ACF.1.4 (f) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
-none
- FDP_ACF.1 (g) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
- FDP_ACF.1.1 (g) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

[assignment: access control SFP]
- DSR Access Control SFP in Table 24
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the

indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

- *the list of subjects and objects controlled under the DSR Access Control DSR in Table 24 , and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 24.*

FDP_ACF.1.2 (g) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

- ***rules specified in the DSR Access Control SFP in Table 24 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.***

FDP_ACF.1.3 (g) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

- *Key Operator is explicitly permitted to read the document in Mailbox.*

- *Key Operator is explicitly permitted to create the document in Mailbox.*

FDP_ACF.1.4 (g) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

- *none*

FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies

FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the

resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects:
D.DOC , [assignment: list of objects].

[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]

- *deallocation of the resource from*

[assignment: list of objects]

- *none*

6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

FIA_AFL.1(a) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1(a) The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].

[assignment: list of authentication events]

- *key operator authentication*

[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]

- *[assignment: positive integer number]*

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FIA_AFL.1.2 (a) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

- *met*

[assignment: list of actions]

- *Identification and authentication of key operator is inhibited until the TOE is cycled.*

FIA_AFL.1 (b) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1 (b)	<p>The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].</p> <p>[assignment: list of authentication events] - SA authentication (with local authentication)</p> <p>[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] - [assignment: positive integer number] - 5</p>
FIA_AFL.1.2 (b)	<p>When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].</p> <p>[selection: met, surpassed] - met</p> <p>[assignment: list of actions] - Identification and authentication of key operator is inhibited until the TOE is cycled.</p>
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1	<p>The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].</p> <p>[assignment: list of security attributes]. - Key Operator role - SA role - U.NORMAL role - List of Mailbox numbers of his/her own</p>
FIA_SOS.1	Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FIA_SOS.1.1	<p>The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (SA password and U.NORMAL password when local authentication is used) meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].</p> <p>[assignment: a defined quality metric].</p> <p>- Password length is restricted to 9 or more characters</p>
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1	<p>The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.</p> <p>[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]</p> <p>- storing the fax data received from public telephone line</p>
FIA_UAU.1.2	<p>The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.</p>
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1	<p>The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress.</p> <p>[assignment: list of feedback]</p> <p>- display of asterisks (“*”) to hide the entered password characters</p>
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1	<p>The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.</p> <p>[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]</p> <p>- storing the fax data received from public telephone line</p>
FIA_UID.1.2	<p>The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.</p>

FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].

[assignment: list of user security attributes]

- *Key Operator role*
- *SA role*
- *U.NORMAL role*
- *List of Mailbox numbers of his/her own*

FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].

[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]

- *none*

FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].

[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]

- *none*

6.1.5. Class FMT: Security Management

FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of]

- *disable, enable, modify the behavior of*
[assignment: list of functions]
- *List of security functions in Table 25*
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- *the roles listed in Table 25*

Table 25 List of Security Functions

Security Functions	Operation	Roles
<i>User Authentication</i>	<i>enable, disable, modify the behavior</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Security Audit Log</i>	<i>enable, disable</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Internal Network Data Protection</i>	<i>enable, disable, modify the behavior</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Customer Engineer Operation Restriction</i>	<i>enable, disable</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Hard Disk Data Encryption</i>	<i>enable, disable</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Hard Disk Data Overwrite</i>	<i>enable, disable, modify the behavior</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Self Test</i>	<i>enable, disable</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>

FMT_MSA.1 (a) Management of security attributes
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 (a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s),
 information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
 change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
 attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
 - **Common Access Control SFP in Table 17**
 [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]]
 - *query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]*
 [assignment: other operations]
 - *creation*
 [assignment: list of security attributes]
 - *the security attributes listed in Table 18*
 [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- the roles listed in Table 26

Table 26 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles

Security attributes	Operation	Roles
<i>Key operator identifier</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>SA identifier</i>	<i>query modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>General user identifier</i>	<i>query modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.USER</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Private Print)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.USER</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Private Print)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.FUNC</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.USER</i>

FMT_MSA.1 (b) Management of security attributes
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 (b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s),
 information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
 change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
 attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
 - TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 19,
 [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]]
 - *query, modify, delete* ,[assignment: other operations]
 [assignment: other operations]
 - *creation*
 [assignment: list of security attributes]
 - *the security attributes listed in Table 19*

[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
 - the roles listed in Table 27

Table 27 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles (Function Access)

Security Attributes	Operation	Roles
<i>Key operator identifier</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>SA identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>General user identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>User identifier for each function</i>	<i>query, modify</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>

FMT_MSA.1 (c) Management of security attributes
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 (c) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s),
 information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
 change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
 attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
 - *PRT Access Control SFP in Table 20*
 [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]]
 - *query, modify, delete,[assignment: other operations]*
 [assignment: other operations]
 - *creation*
 [assignment: list of security attributes]
 - *the security attributes listed in Table 18*
 [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
 - *the roles listed in Table 28*

Table 28 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles(PRT)

Security Attributes	Operation	Roles
<i>Key operator identifier</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>SA identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>

<i>General user identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Private Print)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.USER</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Private Print)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>

FMT_MSA.1 (d) Management of security attributes
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 (d) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s),
 information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
 change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
 attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
 - *SCN Access Control SFP in Table 21*
 [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]]
 - *query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]*
 [assignment: other operations]
 - *creation*
 [assignment: list of security attributes]
 - *the security attributes listed in Table 18*
 [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
 - *the roles listed in Table 29*

Table 29 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles (SCN)

Security Attributes	Operation	Roles
<i>Key operator identifier</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>SA identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>General user identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.USER</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>

FMT_MSA.1 (e)	Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (e)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].</p> <p>[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] - <i>CPY Access Control SFP in Table 22</i></p> <p>[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] - <i>none</i></p> <p>[assignment: other operations] - <i>none</i></p> <p>[assignment: list of security attributes] - <i>none</i></p> <p>[assignment: the authorized identified roles]. - <i>none</i></p>
FMT_MSA.1 (f)	Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (f)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].</p> <p>[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] - <i>FAX Access Control SFP in Table 23</i></p> <p>[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]</p>

- *query, modify, delete,[assignment: other operations]*
- [assignment: other operations]
- *creation*
- [assignment: list of security attributes]
- *the security attributes listed in Table 18*
- [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
- *the roles listed in Table 30*

Table 30 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles (FAX)

Security Attributes	Operation	Roles
<i>Key operator identifier</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>SA identifier</i>	<i>query, delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>General user identifier</i>	<i>query, delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query,</i>	<i>U.USER</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>

FMT_MSA.1 (g) Management of security attributes
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 (g) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s),
 information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
 change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
 attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
 - *DSR Access Control SFP in Table 24*
 [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
 operations]]
 - *query, modify ,delete,[assignment: other operations]*
 [assignment: other operations]
 - *Creation*
 [assignment: list of security attributes]
 - *the security attributes listed in Table 18*
 [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- the roles listed in Table 31

Table 31 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles (DSR)

Security Attributes	Operation	Roles
<i>Key operator identifier</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>SA identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>General user identifier</i>	<i>query, modify delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>U.USER</i>
<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Mailbox)</i>	<i>query</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>List of Mailbox numbers of his/her own</i>	<i>creation, delete, query, modify</i>	<i>U.NORMAL, SA</i>
	<i>query, modify, delete</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>
<i>Mailbox number</i>	<i>creation, delete, query</i>	<i>U.NORMAL, SA</i>
	<i>query, delete</i>	<i>Key Operator</i>

FMT_MSA.3 (a) Static attribute initialization
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1 (a) The TSF shall enforce the, [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
 - Common Access Control SFP in Table17
 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
 - [assignment: other property]
 - Initialization property in Table 32

Table 32 Initialization property

Object	Security Attributes	Default
<i>D.DOC</i>	<i>Owner identifier of D.DOC</i>	<i>Creator's user identifier</i>
<i>D.FUNC</i>	<i>Owner identifier of D.FUNC</i>	

FMT_MSA.3.2 (a) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- none

FMT_MSA.3 (b) Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1 (b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- *TOE Function Access control SFP in Table 19*
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- [assignment: other property]
- *permissive initialization property for basic functions such as copy, print, scan, network scan, and fax as the default of security attribute.*

FMT_MSA.3.2 (b) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- none

FMT_MSA.3 (c) Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1 (c) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]

- PRT Access Control SFP in Table 20

[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]

- [assignment: other property]

- Initialization property in Table 33

Table 33 Initialization property

Object	Security Attributes	Default
D.DOC	Owner identifier of D.DOC	Creator's user identifier

FMT_MSA.3.2 (c) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]

- none

FMT_MSA.3 (d) Static attribute initialization
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1 (d) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]

- SCN Access Control SFP in Table 21

[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]

- [assignment: other property]

- Initialization property in Table 33

FMT_MSA.3.2 (d) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]

- none

FMT_MSA.3 (e) Static attribute initialization
 Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (e)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.</p> <p>[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] - <i>CPY Access Control SFP in Table 22</i></p> <p>[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] - <i>permissive</i></p>
FMT_MSA.3.2 (e)	<p>The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.</p> <p>[assignment: the authorized identified roles] - <i>none</i></p>
FMT_MSA.3 (f)	Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (f)	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.</p> <p>[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] - <i>FAX Access Control SFP in Table 23</i></p> <p>[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] - <i>[assignment: other property]</i> - <i>Owner identifier of Mailbox which receives the fax data from public telephone line</i></p>
FMT_MSA.3.2 (f)	<p>The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.</p>

	[assignment: the authorized identified roles] - <i>none</i>
FMT_MSA.3 (g)	Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (g)	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] - <i>DSR Access Control SFP in Table 24</i> [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] - [assignment: other property] - <i>Initialization property in Table 33</i>
FMT_MSA.3.2 (g)	The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles] - <i>none</i>
FMT_MTD.1 (a)	Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (a)	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles]. [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] - <i>query, modify, delete</i> [assignment: other operations] - <i>creation</i>

[assignment: list of TSF data]

- TSF data listed in Table 34

[assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR,

[assignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]

- U.ADMINISTRATOR, Key Operator

Table 34 Operation of TSF Data

TSF Data	Operation	Roles
Data on key operator ID	modify	Key Operator
Data on key operator Password	modify	Key Operator
Data on SA ID	query, modify, delete, creation	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on SA Password	modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on User Authentication	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on minimum user password length	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Store Print	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Security Audit Log	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Internal Network Data Protection	query, modify, delete	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on date and time	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Auto Clear	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Self Test	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Report Print	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR
Data on Received Fax	query, modify	U.ADMINISTRATOR

FMT_MTD.1 (b)

Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1 (b) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

- *query, modify, delete*

[assignment: other operations]

- *creation*

[assignment: list of TSF data]

- *list of TSF data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL in Table 35*

[assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- *selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL to whom such TSF data is associated].*

- *U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL to whom such TSF data is associated*

Table 35 Operation of TSF Data

TSF Data	Operation	Roles
<i>Data on General user ID</i>	<i>query, modify, delete, creation</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR</i>
<i>Data on General user Password</i>	<i>modify</i>	<i>U.ADMINISTRATOR , U.NORMAL</i>

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF].

[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]

- *Security Management Functions listed in Table 36*

Table 36 Security Management Functions Provided by TSF

Relevant SFR	Management Function	Management items defined by CC
FAU_GEN.1	<i>Management of data on Security Audit Log settings</i>	There are no management activities foreseen.
FAU_GEN.2	-	There are no management activities

		foreseen.
FAU_SAR.1	<i>Management of data on key operator and SA (ID and password)</i>	a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the group of users with read access right to the audit records.
FAU_SAR.2	-	There are no management activities foreseen.
FAU_STG.1	-	There are no management activities foreseen.
FAU_STG.4	<i>none Reason: The control parameter of audit log is fixed and is not managed</i>	a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure.
FCS_CKM.1	-	There are no management activities foreseen.
FCS_COP.1	<i>Management of data on Hard Disk Data Encryption</i>	There are no management activities foreseen.
FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC.1(c) FDP_ACC.1(d) FDP_ACC.1(e) FDP_ACC.1(f) FDP_ACC.1(g)	-	There are no management activities foreseen.
FDP_ACF.1(a)	- <i>Management of user identifier</i> - <i>Management of owner identifier of D.DOC</i> - <i>Management of owner identifier of D.FUNC</i>	a)Managing the attributes used to make explicit access or denial based decisions.
FDP_ACF.1(b)	- <i>Management of user identifier</i> - <i>Management of owner identifier of function</i> - <i>Management of data on Received Fax</i>	
FDP_ACF.1(c)	- <i>Management of user identifier</i> - <i>Management of owner identifier of D.DOC</i> - <i>Management of data on Store Print</i>	
FDP_ACF.1(d) FDP_ACF.1(f) FDP_ACF.1(g)	- <i>Management of user identifier</i> - <i>Management of owner identifier of D.DOC</i>	

FDP_ACF.1(e)	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: there are no additional security attributes and is not managed.</i>	
FDP_RIP.1	<i>Management of data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite</i>	a) The choice of when to perform residual information protection (i.e. upon allocation or deallocation) could be made configurable within the TOE.
FIA_AFL.1(a) FIA_AFL.1(b)	<i>Management of data on access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator</i>	a) Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication attempts; b) Management of actions to be taken in the event of an authentication failure.
FIA_ATD.1	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: there are no additional security attributes and there are no additional security attributes to be managed.</i>	a) If so indicated in the assignment, the authorized administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users.
FIA_SOS.1	<i>Management of Data on minimum user password length</i>	a) the management of the metric used to verify the secrets.
FIA_UAU.1	- <i>Management of data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication.</i> - <i>Management of data on key operator, SA, and general user password</i> - <i>Management of data on user authentication.</i> - <i>Management of data on minimum user password length</i>	a) Management of the authentication data by an administrator; b) Management of the authentication data by the associated user; c) Managing the list of actions that can be taken before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.7	-	There are no management activities foreseen.
FIA_UID.1	- <i>Management of data on key operator, SA, and general user ID</i> - <i>Management of data on user authentication.</i>	a) The management of the user identities. b) If an authorised administrator can change the actions allowed before identification, the managing of the action lists.
FIA_USB.1	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: action and security attributes are fixed and are not managed.</i>	a) an authorized administrator can define default subject security attributes. b) an authorized administrator can change subject security attributes.
FMT_MOF.1	<i>Management of data on Customer</i>	a) Managing the group of roles that

	<i>Engineer Operation Restriction</i>	can interact with the functions in the TSF;
FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(c) FMT_MSA.1(d) FMT_MSA.1(e) FMT_MSA.1(f) FMT_MSA.1(g)	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed</i>	a) managing the group of roles that can interact with the security attributes; b) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values.
FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.3(c) FMT_MSA.3(d) FMT_MSA.3(e) FMT_MSA.3(f) FMT_MSA.3(g)	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: The role group is only a system administrator and is not managed.</i>	a) managing the group of roles that can specify initial values; b) managing the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values.
FMT_MTD.1(a)	- <i>Management of data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction</i> - <i>Management of data on Report Print</i>	a) Managing the group of roles that can interact with the TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1(b)	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed</i>	
FMT_SMF.1	-	There are no management activities foreseen.
FMT_SMR.1	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed</i>	a) Managing the group of users that are part of a role.
FPT_STM.1	- <i>Management of time and data.</i>	a) management of the time.
FPT_TST.1	- <i>Management of data on Self Test.</i>	a) management of the conditions under which TSF self testing occurs, such as during initial start-up, regular interval, or under specified conditions; b) management of the time interval if appropriate.
FTA_SSL.3	- <i>Management of data on Auto Clear.</i>	a) specification of the time of user inactivity after which termination of the interactive session occurs for an individual user; b) specification of the default time of user inactivity after which termination of the interactive session

		occurs.
FTP_ITC.1	- <i>Management of data on Internal Network Data Protection.</i>	a) Configuring the actions that require trusted channel, if supported.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1	<i>none</i> <i>Reason: The role and transfer conditions are fixed and are not managed.</i>	a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities; b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role; c) Revocation of such an allowance.

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
 - *U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL, key operator, SA*

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role “Nobody” to which no user shall be associated.

6.1.6. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces].

[assignment: list of external interfaces]
 - *any external interfaces*
 [assignment: list of external interfaces]
 - *any Shared-medium interfaces*

FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
 Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST.1	TSF testing
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1	<p>The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].</p> <p>[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]</p> <p>- <i>at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]</i></p> <p>[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]</p> <p>- <i>at initiation under which self test is set</i></p> <p>[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].</p> <p>- <i>[assignment: parts of TSF]</i></p> <p>- <i>TSF executable code</i></p>
FPT_TST.1.2	<p>The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data].</p> <p>[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]</p> <p>- <i>[assignment: parts of TSF data]</i></p> <p>- <i>TSF data (excluding audit log data and present time data)</i></p>
FPT_TST.1.3	<p>The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF].</p> <p>[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]</p> <p>- <i>[assignment: parts of TSF]</i></p> <p>- <i>TSF executable code</i></p>

6.1.7. Class FTA: TOE Access

FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user inactivity].

[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]

- *Auto clear time can be set to 10 to 900 seconds on the control panel.*

- *Login timeout from CWIS is fixed to 20 minutes.*

- *There is no inactive time with printer/fax driver.*

6.1.8. Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]

- *the TSF, another trusted IT product*

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required].

[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required].

- *communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface*

6.2. Security Assurance Requirements

The requirements for the TOE security assurance are described in Table 37.

The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL2. The added security assurance component is ALC_FLR.2.

Table 37 Security Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class	Assurance Component	
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.2	Security-enforcing functional specification
	ADV_TDS.1	Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.2	Use of a CM system
	ALC_CMS.2	Parts of the TOE CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures
	ALC_FLR.2	Flaw reporting procedures
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1	Evidence of coverage
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis

6.3. Security Requirement Rationale

6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale

Table 38 lists security functional requirements and the corresponding security objectives. As shown in this table, each security functional requirement corresponds to at least one security objective of the TOE. Table 39 shows the rationale demonstrating that each security objective is assured by TOE security functional requirements.

Table 38 Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objectives

Objectives	SFRs												
	O.DOC.NO_DIS	O.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	O.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	O.AUDIT.LOGGED	O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	O.CIPHER
FAU_GEN.1										✓			
FAU_GEN.2										✓			
FAU_SAR.1												✓	
FAU_SAR.2												✓	
FAU_STG.1											✓		
FAU_STG.4											✓		
FCS_CKM.1													✓
FCS_COP.1													✓
FDP_ACC.1 (a)	✓	✓	✓										
FDP_ACC.1 (b)							✓						
FDP_ACC.1 (c)	✓												
FDP_ACC.1 (d)	✓												
FDP_ACC.1 (e)	✓												
FDP_ACC.1 (f)	✓												
FDP_ACC.1 (g)	✓												
FDP_ACF.1 (a)	✓	✓	✓										
FDP_ACF.1 (b)							✓						
FDP_ACF.1 (c)	✓												
FDP_ACF.1 (d)	✓												
FDP_ACF.1 (e)	✓												
FDP_ACF.1 (f)	✓												

Objectives	SFRs												
	O.DOC.NO_DIS	O.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	O.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	O.AUDIT.LOGGED	O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	O.CIPHER
FDP_ACF.1 (g)	✓												
FDP_RIP.1	✓												
FIA_AFL.1 (a)							✓	✓					
FIA_AFL.1 (b)							✓	✓					
FIA_ATD.1							✓						
FIA_SOS.1							✓	✓					
FIA_UAU.1							✓	✓					
FIA_UAU.7							✓	✓					
FIA_UID.1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			
FIA_USB.1							✓						
FMT_MOF.1				✓	✓	✓							
FMT_MSA.1 (a)	✓	✓	✓	✓									
FMT_MSA.1 (b)				✓			✓						
FMT_MSA.1 (c)	✓			✓									
FMT_MSA.1 (d)	✓			✓									
FMT_MSA.1 (e)	✓			✓									
FMT_MSA.1 (f)	✓			✓									
FMT_MSA.1 (g)	✓			✓									
FMT_MSA.3 (a)	✓	✓	✓										
FMT_MSA.3 (b)							✓						
FMT_MSA.3 (c)	✓												
FMT_MSA.3 (d)	✓												
FMT_MSA.3 (e)	✓												
FMT_MSA.3 (f)	✓												
FMT_MSA.3 (g)	✓												
FMT_MTD.1 (a)				✓	✓	✓							
FMT_MTD.1 (b)				✓	✓	✓							
FMT_SMF.1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓							
FMT_SMR.1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓						
FPT_FDI_EXP.1								✓					

Objectives	SFRs												
	O.DOC.NO_DIS	O.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	O.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	O.AUDIT.LOGGED	O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	O.CIPHER
FPT_STM.1										✓			
FPT_TST.1									✓				
FTA_SSL.3							✓	✓					
FTP_ITC.1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓							

Table 39 Security Objectives to SFR Rationale

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
O.AUDIT.LOGGED (Logging and authorized access to audit events)	<p>O.AUDIT.LOGGED is the objective to prevent unauthorized disclosure and alteration by creating and maintaining the event logs related to the TOE usage and security. This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirement:</p> <p>By FAU_GEN.1, the security audit log data are generated for the auditable events: (However, audit is unnecessary for the following functional requirements for each reason described below.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FAU_STG.4: The total number of security audit log data events is fixed. The data are stored and updated automatically. - FCS_CKM.1: When cryptographic key generation fails, a system error occurs at the time of booting of the MFD. - FCS_COP.1: An encryption failure is monitored as job status. - FMT_MSA.3: No change in default and rules. <p>By FAU_GEN.2 and FIA_UID.1, each auditable event is associated with the identity of user who caused the event.</p> <p>By FPT_STM.1, the auditable events are recorded with time stamp in the security audit log, using highly reliable clock of TOE.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED (Verification of software integrity)	<p>O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is the objective to provide the procedure of self verification on the executable code of TOE.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirement:</p>

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	<p>By FPT_TST.1, self test function can be set to be executed upon initialization. This function verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.INTERFACE.MANAGED (Management of external interfaces)</p>	<p>O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the objective to manage the operations related to the external interfaces such as CWIS, the control panel, and the printer driver according to the security policy.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirement:</p> <p>In order to prevent attackers from using privileges given to system administrators and accessing protected assets, the power needs to be cycled when the system-administrator authentication fails (FIA_AFL.1 (a)), and the number of system-administrator authentication failures reaches the defined number of times (FIA_AFL.1 (b)).</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user identification and authentication is conducted upon access to CWIS and control panel to identify authorized user and system administrator.</p> <p>The user identification/authentication is also conducted upon saving data for the private print function.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.</p> <p>By FTA_SSL.3, when there is no access to CWIS and control panel for a specified period of time, login is cleared and re-authentication is required. The session is ended immediately after the required processing ends, without retaining the session with printer.</p> <p>By FIA_SOS1, the minimum length of password for SA and general user is limited.</p> <p>By FPT_FDI_EXP.1, unpermitted transfer of the data received from external interfaces to the internal network is restricted.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.USER.AUTHORIZED (Authorization of Normal Users and Administrators to use the TOE)</p>	<p>O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the objective to request the authentication and identification of the user with authority given according to the security policy before the use of TOE is permitted.</p> <p>This objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>By FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b), user authentication is performed and only authorized user is allowed to operate the objects.</p> <p>In order to prevent attackers from using privileges given to system administrators and accessing protected assets, the power needs to be cycled when the system-administrator authentication fails (FIA_AFL.1 (a)),</p>

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	<p>and the number of system-administrator authentication failures reaches the defined number of times (FIA_AFL.1 (b)).</p> <p>By FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1, each role of key operator, SA, and general user is maintained and only the authorized users are associated with the subjects.</p> <p>Also, identified and authenticated users are provided with a list of their Mailboxes so that they can select their own Mailboxes to store scanned documents.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user identification and authentication is conducted upon access from CWIS and control panel to identify authorized user and system administrator. The user identification/authentication is also conducted upon saving data for the private print function.</p> <p>By FIA_SOS1, the minimum length of password for SA and general user is limited.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.1(b), the query, modification, deletion, and creation of security attributes are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.3 (b), the suitable default values are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the role of key operator, SA, system administrator and general user is maintained and associated with the key operator, SA, system administrator and general user.</p> <p>By FTA_SSL.3, when there is no access to CWIS and control panel for a specified period of time, settings on the control panel are cleared and re-authentication is required.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.DOC.NO_DIS (Protection of User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure)</p>	<p>O.DOC.NO_DIS is the objective to protect User Document Data of TOE from unauthorized disclosure.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>By FDP_RIP.1, the previous information of the used document data stored in the internal HDD is made unavailable.</p> <p>Only the authorized user is permitted to operate User Document Data by conducting the user identification by the following:</p> <p>FDP_ACC.1(a),FDP_ACC.1(c), FDP_ACC.1(d), FDP_ACC.1(e), FDP_ACC.1(f), FDP_ACC.1(g) (Enforces protection by establishing an access control policy.), FDP_ACF.1(a),FDP_ACF.1(c), FDP_ACF.1(d), FDP_ACF.1(e), FDP_ACF.1(f), FDP_ACF.1(g), and FIA_UID.1.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.1(a), FMT_MSA.1(c),FMT_MSA.1(d), FMT_MSA.1(e), FMT_MSA.1(f),FMT_MSA.1(g), the query, modification, deletion, and</p>

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	<p>creation of security attributes are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.3 (a),FMT_MSA.3 (c),FMT_MSA.3 (d),FMT_MSA.3 (e),FMT_MSA.3 (f), FMT_MSA.3 (g), the suitable default values are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the role of key operator, SA, system administrator and general user is maintained and associated with the key operator, SA, system administrator and general user.</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for system administrator.</p> <p>By FTP_ITC.1, communication data encryption protocol is supported to protect User Document Data on the internal network between TOE and IT products from any threat.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.DOC.NO_ALT, (Protection of User Document Data from unauthorized alteration)</p>	<p>O.DOC.NO_ALT is the objective to protect User Document Data of TOE from unauthorized alteration.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>Only the authorized user is permitted to operate User Document Data by conducting the user identification by the following: FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), and FIA_UID.1.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.1(a) , the query, modification, deletion, and creation of security attributes are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.3 (a), the suitable default values are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the role of key operator, SA, system administrator and general user is maintained and associated with the key operator, SA, system administrator and general user.</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for system administrator.</p> <p>By FTP_ITC.1, communication data encryption protocol is supported to protect User Document Data on the internal network between TOE and IT products from any threat.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.FUNC.NO_ALT (Protection of User Function Data from unauthorized alteration)</p>	<p>O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the objective to protect User Document Data of TOE from unauthorized alternation.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>Only the authorized user is permitted to operate User Document Data by conducting the user identification by the following: FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), , and FIA_UID.1.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.1(a) , the query, modification, deletion, and creation of</p>

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	<p>security attributes are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.3 (a), the suitable default values are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the role of key operator, SA , system administrator and general user is maintained and associated with the key operator, SA , system administrator and general user.</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for system administrator.</p> <p>By FTP_ITC.1, communication data encryption protocol is supported to protect User Document Data on the internal network between TOE and IT products from any threat.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.PROT.NO_ALT, (Protection of TSF Data from unauthorized alteration)</p>	<p>O.PROT.NO_ALT is the objective to protect TSF Data of TOE from unauthorized alternation.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>By FIA_UID.2, only the authorized system administrator is permitted to handle TSF Data by conducting the user identification.</p> <p>By FMT_MOF.1, the user who enables/disables TOE security functions and makes functional settings is limited to system administrator.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.1(a), FMT_MSA.1(b), FMT_MSA.1(c), FMT_MSA.1(d), FMT_MSA.1(e), FMT_MSA.1(f), FMT_MSA.1(g), modification, deletion, and creation of security attributes are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MTD.1 (a), the person who can make settings of TOE security functions is limited to system administrator. Thus, only system administrators can query and modify TOE setting Data.</p> <p>By FMT_MTD.1 (b), the setting of ID for general users is restricted to system administrator and owner.</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for system administrator.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the roles of key operator, SA, system administrator and general user are maintained and associated with the key operator, SA, system administrator and general user.</p> <p>By FTP_ITC.1, communication data encryption protocol is supported to protect D.CONF on the internal network between TOE and IT products from any threat.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.CONF.NO_ALT (Protection of TSF Data from</p>	<p>O.CONF.NO_DIS and O.CONF.NO_ALT are the objectives to protect D.CONF of TOE from unauthorized disclosure or alteration.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p>

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
<p>unauthorized disclosure or alteration)</p>	<p>By FIA_UID.1, only the authorized user is permitted to handle D.CONF by conducting the user identification.</p> <p>By FMT_MOF.1, the user who enables/disables TOE security functions and makes functional settings is limited to system administrator.</p> <p>By FMT_MTD.1(a), the person who can make settings of TOE security functions is limited to system administrator. Thus, only system administrators can query and modify D.CONF.</p> <p>By FMT_MTD.1(b), the setting of ID and password for general users is restricted to system administrator and owner.</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for system administrator.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the roles of key operator, SA, system administrator and general user are maintained and associated with the key operator, SA, system administrator and general user.</p> <p>By FTP_ITC.1, communication data encryption protocol is supported to protect the security audit log data and D.CONF on the internal network between TOE and IT products from any threat.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED</p>	<p>O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED is the objective that protects the audit logs from unauthorized access, deletion, and modification.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>By FAU_STG.1, the security audit log data stored in an audit log file is protected from unauthorized deletion and alteration.</p> <p>By FAU_STG.4, when the audit trail file is full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten and a new audit event is stored into the audit log file.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED</p>	<p>O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED is the objective that enables the audit logs to be analyzed by the authorized user only to detect potential security violations.</p> <p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>By FAU_SAR.1, the authorized system administrator can read the security audit log data from an audit log file.</p> <p>By FAU_SAR.2, only the authorized system administrator can access the audit log.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>
<p>O.CIPHER</p>	<p>O. CIPHER is the objective that encrypts the document data in the internal HDD so that they cannot be analyzed even if retrieved.</p>

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	<p>This security objective can be realized by satisfying the following security functional requirements:</p> <p>By FCS_CKM.1, the cryptographic key is generated in accordance with the specified cryptographic key size (256 bits).</p> <p>By FCS_COP.1, the document data and used document data to be stored into the internal HDD is encrypted and then decrypted when the data are read, in accordance with the determined cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size.</p> <p>Thus, the functional requirements related to this objective are surely fulfilled.</p>

6.3.2. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

Table 40 describes the functional requirements that security functional requirements depend on and those that do not and the reason why it is not problematic even if dependencies are not satisfied.

Table 40 Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements

Functional Requirement	Dependencies of Functional Requirements	
Requirement and its name	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FPT_STM.1	-
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1	-
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review	FAU_GEN.1	-
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review	FAU_SAR.1	-
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	FAU_GEN.1	-
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss	FAU_STG.1	-
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	FCS_COP.1	<p>FCS_CKM.4:</p> <p>A cryptographic key is generated when MFD is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because there is no means to access the cryptographic key from the outside.</p>

Functional Requirement	Dependencies of Functional Requirements	
Requirement and its name	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation	FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFD is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because there is no means to access the cryptographic key from the outside.
FDP_ACC.1(a) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(a)	-
FDP_ACC.1(b) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(b)	-
FDP_ACC.1(c) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(c)	-
FDP_ACC.1(d) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(d)	-
FDP_ACC.1(e) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(e)	-
FDP_ACC.1(f) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(f)	-
FDP_ACC.1(g) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1(g)	-
FDP_ACF.1(a) Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_MSA.3(a)	-
FDP_ACF.1 (b) Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)	-
FDP_ACF.1 (c) Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1(c) FMT_MSA.3(c)	-
FDP_ACF.1 (d) Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1(d) FMT_MSA.3(d)	-
FDP_ACF.1 (e) Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1e) FMT_MSA.3(e)	-
FDP_ACF.1 (f) Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1(f) FMT_MSA.3(f)	-
FDP_ACF.1 (g)	FDP_ACC.1(g)	-

Functional Requirement Requirement and its name	Dependencies of Functional Requirements	
	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale
Security attribute based access control	FMT_MSA.3(g)	
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection	None	
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling	FIA_UAU.1	-
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition	None	
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets	None	
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	FIA_UID.1	-
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback	FIA_UAU.1	-
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	None	
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding	FIA_ATD.1	-
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.1(a) Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.1(b) Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.1(c) Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1(c) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.1(d) Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1(d) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.1(e) Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1(e) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.1(f)	FDP_ACC.1(f)	-

Functional Requirement Requirement and its name	Dependencies of Functional Requirements	
	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale
Management of security attributes	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	
FMT_MSA.1(g) Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1(g) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(c) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(c) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(d) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(d) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(e) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(e) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(f) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(f) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MSA.3(g) Static attribute initialization	FMT_MSA.1(g) FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions	None	
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FIA_UID.1	-
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamp	None	
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing	None	
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination	None	

Functional Requirement Requirement and its name	Dependencies of Functional Requirements	
	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel	None	
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	-

6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is Hardcopy Device used in restrictive commercial information processing environments that require a relatively high level of document security, operational accountability, and information assurance. The TOE environment will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides almost constant protection from unauthorized and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces.

Agents have limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change, and the TOE self-verifies its executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is appropriate.

EAL 2 is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures. ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE.

7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This chapter describes the summary specifications of the security functions provided by this TOE.

7.1. Security Functions

Table 41 shows security functional requirements and the corresponding TOE security functions. The security functions described in this section satisfy the TOE security functional requirements that are specified in section 6.1 of this ST.

Table 41 Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security Functions

Security Functions Security Functional Requirements	TSE_IOW	TSE_CIPHER	TSE_USER_AUTH	TSE_FMT	TSE_CE_LIMIT	TSE_FAU	TSE_NET_PROT	TSE_INF_FLOW	TSE_S_TEST
FAU_GEN.1						✓			
FAU_GEN.2						✓			
FAU_SAR.1						✓			
FAU_SAR.2						✓			
FAU_STG.1						✓			
FAU_STG.4						✓			
FCS_CKM.1		✓							
FCS_COP.1		✓							
FDP_ACC.1(a)			✓						
FDP_ACC.1(b)			✓						
FDP_ACC.1(c)			✓						
FDP_ACC.1(d)			✓						
FDP_ACC.1(e)			✓						
FDP_ACC.1(f)			✓						
FDP_ACC.1(g)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(a)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(b)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(c)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(d)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(e)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(f)			✓						
FDP_ACF.1(g)			✓						
FDP_RIP.1	✓								
FIA_AFL.1(a)			✓						

Security Functions Security Functional Requirements	TSF_IOW	TSF_CIPHER	TSF_USER_AUTH	TSF_FMT	TSF_CE_LIMIT	TSF_FAU	TSF_NET_PROT	TSF_INF_FLOW	TSF_S_TEST
FIA_AFL.1(b)			✓						
FIA_ATD.1			✓						
FIA_SOS.1			✓						
FIA_UAU.1			✓						
FIA_UAU.7			✓						
FIA_UID.1			✓						
FIA_USB.1			✓						
FMT_MOF.1				✓	✓				
FMT_MSA.1(a)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.1(b)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.1(c)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.1(d)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.1(e)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.1(f)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.1(g)			✓	✓					
FMT_MSA.3(a)				✓					
FMT_MSA.3(b)				✓					
FMT_MSA.3(c)				✓					
FMT_MSA.3(d)				✓					
FMT_MSA.3(e)				✓					
FMT_MSA.3(f)				✓					
FMT_MSA.3(g)				✓					
FMT_MTD.1(a)				✓	✓				
FMT_MTD.1(b)				✓					
FMT_SMF.1				✓	✓				
FMT_SMR.1				✓					
FTA_SSL.3			✓						
FTP_ITC.1							✓		
FPT_FDI_EXP.1								✓	
FPT_STM.1						✓			
FPT_TST.1									✓

The summary of each TOE security function and the corresponding security functional requirements are described below.

7.1.1. Hard Disk Data Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

According to Hard Disk Data Overwrite setting which is configured by a system administrator with the system administrator mode, the used document data in the internal HDD are deleted by either one or three pass overwrite procedure on the document data area when each job of copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, or mailbox is completed.

This is because whether to prioritize efficiency or security depends on the usage environment of the MFD.

When efficiency is prioritized, one pass overwrite procedure is applied. When security is prioritized, three pass overwrite procedure is applied. Three pass overwrite has lower processing speed than one pass but can provide more solid overwrite function. Therefore, three pass is an appropriate number of times to overwrite.

(1) FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

To control the overwrite function conducted after each job, two options are available: one pass (zero) overwrite procedure and three pass (random number / random number / zero) overwrite procedure.

List of the used document data which are to be overwritten and deleted is on the internal HDD. When the existence of the used document data are found in this list at the time of booting the TOE, the overwrite function is performed.

7.1.2. Hard Disk Data Encryption (TSF_CIPHER)

According to Hard Disk Data Encryption setting which is configured by a system administrator with the system administrator mode, the document data are encrypted before stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, and mailbox or configuring various security function settings.

(1) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

The TOE uses the "hard disk data encryption seed key" configured by a system administrator and generates a 256-bit encryption key at the time of booting through FXOSEN algorithm, which is Fuji Xerox's standard method and a secure algorithm with sufficient complexity. (When the "hard disk data encryption seed key" is the same, the same cryptographic key is generated.)

(2) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Before storing the document data into the internal HDD, the TOE encrypts the data using the 256-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting (FCS_CKM.1) and the AES algorithm based on FIPS PUBS 197. When reading out the stored document data, the TOE decrypts the data also using the 256-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting and the AES algorithm.

7.1.3. User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH)

Access to the MFD functions is restricted to the authorized user. A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the MFD control panel, or CWIS/Printer Driver of the user client. User authentication is conducted by using the user information registered in MFD.

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

- a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel
Copy, fax (send), , scan, network scan, Mailbox, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)
- b) Functions controlled by CWIS
Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation
- c) Functions using printer driver of user client
The data of user client is decomposed to the print data described in PDL readable by the MFD, and the print data are stored in TOE (Private Print Function).
When a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, the MFD decomposes the received data into bitmap data and stores the data in the internal HDD as private print according to the user ID.

In addition, access to and setting change of the TOE security functions are restricted to the authorized system administrator. A system administrator needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFD control panel or system administrator client.

(1) FIA_AFL.1(a) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the system administrator authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with key operator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser does not accept authentication operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.

(2) FIA_AFL.1(b) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the SA authentication upon local authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with system administrator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser do not accept authentication operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.

(3) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

The function of the TOE to define and retain the roles of key operator, SA, and general user and the list of Mailboxes owned by the user.

(4) FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

When setting a password of SA and general user, the TOE rejects settings if the password is less than the minimum number of characters.

(5) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

The TOE requests a user to enter his/her ID and password before permitting him/her to operate the MFD function via Web browser of a user client, or the control panel. The entered user ID and password are verified against the data registered in the TOE setting data. The ID and password are also verified for user identification/authentication upon saving data for the private print function.

This identification (FIA_UID.1) and the authentication (FIA_UAU.1) are simultaneously performed, and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed.

When receiving fax data by the public telephone line, the TOE receives the fax data and stores them in Mailbox without user identification and authentication.

(6) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

The TOE offers the function to display the same number of asterisks (~*) as the entered-password characters on the control panel or Web browser in order to hide the password at the time of user authentication.

(7) FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

With the authenticated ID, TOE associates the following items with the subjects: the roles of key operator, SA, and general user and the list of Mailboxes created by the authenticated user.

(8) FMT_MSA.1(a), FMT_MSA.1(b), FMT_MSA.1(c), FMT_MSA.1(d), FMT_MSA.1(e), FMT_MSA.1(f), FMT_MSA.1(g), Management of security attributes

As shown in Table 42, the TOE restricts the handling of security attributes to the user whose identity is authenticated by the user authentication function.

Table 42 Management of security attributes

Security Attribute	Operation	Roles
Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Mailbox)	Query	Key operator, SA, General user
Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Mailbox)	Query	Key operator
Owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Private Print)	Query	Key operator, SA, General user
Owner identifier of D.DOC (all document data in Private Print)	Query	Key operator, SA

Owner identifier of D.FUNC (job information)	Query	Key operator, General user, SA
List of Mailbox numbers of his/her own	Query, delete, create, modify	General user, SA
	Query, delete, modify	Key Operator
Mailbox number	Query, delete, create,	General user, SA
	Query, delete	Key Operator

(9) FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

The TOE clears the login (authentication session) and requests re-authentication if there is no access to CWIS from Web browser for a specified period of time (20 minutes).

In addition, when there is no operation from the control panel for a specified period of time (settable from 10 to 900 seconds), the setting on the control panel is cleared, returning to the authentication screen.

The session with printer is not retained, and the session ends immediately after processing the request of print.

- (10) FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACC.1(b), FDP_ACC.1(c), FDP_ACC.1(d), FDP_ACC.1(e), FDP_ACC.1(f), FDP_ACC.1(g) Subset access control ,
 FDP_ACF.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(b), FDP_ACF.1(c), FDP_ACF.1(d), FDP_ACF.1(e), FDP_ACF.1(f), FDP_ACF.1(g) Security attribute based access control

As shown in Table 43, the TOE restricts the operations of basic functions of MFD, copy, fax, scan, mailbox, and print, to the authenticated user by user authentication function. However, the Key Operator has a privilege to use all functions.

Table 43 Access Control for Basic Functions

Function	Permitted Operations and Rules	User
Copy	When the user identifier of a user who is permitted to use the copy function by a system administrator and the user identifier entered by an identified and authenticated user are matched, copy operation via the control panel is permitted.	SA General user
Scan / Network Scan	When the user identifier of a user who is permitted to use the scan function by a system administrator and the user identifier entered by an identified and authenticated user are matched, sending scanned data to a Mailbox or an FTP server via the control panel is permitted.	
Fax send	When the user identifier of a user who is permitted to use the fax function by a system administrator and the user identifier entered by an identified and authenticated user are matched, sending scanned data to a fax machine via the control panel is permitted.	

Function	Permitted Operations and Rules	User
Print	When the user identifier of a user who is permitted to use the print function by a system administrator and the user identifier entered by an identified and authenticated user are matched, the following are permitted: storing the print data sent from the user client in Private Print and printing the document data stored in Private Print.	
Mailbox	All users can use Mailbox function.	
Fax Receive	Receiving fax data and storing the data in Mailbox are privileges of system administrators.	Key operator SA

As shown in Table 44, TOE restricts the operation on User Data to the authorized user.

Table 44 Access Control for User Data

User Data	Permitted Operations and Rules	User
Copy Data	There is no method of accessing the copy data created in the process of copy operation and there is no access control.	Key operator SA General user
Scan Data	When a scan job permitted by Access Control for Basic Functions is executed, sending of the scanned data to the FTP server is permitted. There is no function to delete D.DOC (scan data).	Key operator SA General user
Fax Send Data	When a fax job permitted by Access Control for Basic Functions is executed, sending of the fax data to the destination fax device is permitted. There is no function to delete D.DOC (fax send data).	Key operator SA General user
Document Data in Mailbox	Retrieving and deleting document data stored in all Mailboxes and storing scanned documents in all Mailboxes are permitted.	Key operator
	When a user stores scanned documents in a Mailbox, the user can select only his/her Mailbox. The user can create D.DOC (document data in a Mailbox) by selecting a Mailbox in which the scanned documents are to be stored and performing scanning.	SA General user
	When the owner identifier for D.DOC (own document data in Mailbox) and the entered user identifier are matched, retrieval and deletion of the own document data in the Mailbox are permitted.	SA General user

User Data	Permitted Operations and Rules	User
Document Data in Private Print	Printing and deletion of all document data in Private Print are permitted.	Key operator SA
	When the owner identifier of D.DOC (own document data in Private Print) and the entered user identifier are matched, printing and deletion of the own document data in Private Print are permitted.	General user
Data of a job that is being executed	When the owner identifier of D.FUNC (job data stored in Private Print) and the entered user identifier are matched, deletion of the job stored in Private Print is permitted.	General user
	Deletion of D.FUNC (job data except for in Private Print) is not permitted.	General user
	Deletion of D.FUNC (all job data) is permitted.	Key operator SA
	When the owner identifier of D.FUNC (job data stored in Private Print) and the entered user identifier are matched, modification of the number of copies of the job stored in Private Print is permitted.	General user
	When the owner identifier of D.FUNC (Copy Job) and the entered user identifier are matched, modification of the number of copies of the copy job is permitted.	General user
	For Private Print and Copy Job, modification of the number of copies of D.FUNC is permitted.	Key operator SA
	For job data except for in Private Print and Copy Job, no modification of D.FUNC is permitted.	Key operator SA General user

With the user authentication function, TOE permits the authenticated user to operate Mailbox, and Private Print as shown in Table 44.

Retrieval operation is restricted to the authenticated user by storing all received fax data in the Mailbox.

- Store Print Function (Private Print)

When the MFD is set to “Save as Private Charge Print,” and a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, after the user has been successfully identified and authenticated, the print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

In the same way, when the user is authenticated by entering his/her ID and password from CWIS for authentication and user sends a print request with designating the files within a user client, the print data are temporarily stored in Private Print area according to the user ID.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.

- Mail Box Function

The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and Fax board which are not shown in Figure 3.

Data in a Personal Mailbox can be taken out, edited*1, printed out, or deleted by general user, SA, and Key operator who were authorized with the same user ID as the user who created the Personal Mailbox.

7.1.4. System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT)

To grant a privilege to a specific user, this function allows only the authorized system administrator to access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and configure the settings of the following TOE security functions from the control panel or system administrator client.

- (1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
 - FMT_MTD.1(a), FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
 - FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
 - FMT_MSA.1(a), FMT_MSA.1(b), FMT_MSA.1(c), FMT_MSA.1(d), FMT_MSA.1(e), FMT_MSA.1(f) , FMT_MSA.1(g) Management of security attributes

The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change the TOE setting data related to the following TOE security functions and to make setting whether to enable/disable each function.

With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.

The settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from the control panel.

- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, enable/disable it, and set the number of pass (overwrite procedure);
- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Encryption, and enable/disable it;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to the setting on the use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication, and enable/disable it;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of failures;
- Refer to the setting of key operator ID and change the ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID, password, and the settings of available functions;

- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to the setting of TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of Store print and set store/print;
- Refer to and set date and time;
- Refer to the setting of Auto Clear of Control Panel, enable/disable it, and configure the deletion time;
- Refer to the setting of Self Test, and enable/disable it;
- Refer to the setting of Report Print, and configure the administrators only/all users;
- Refer to the setting that specifies which Mailbox is used for storing received fax data and specify/remove the Mailbox.

With CWIS function, the settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from a system administrator client via Web browser.

- Refer to the setting of key operator ID and change the ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;
- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA);
- Refer to the setting of Security Audit Log and enable/disable it,
- (When Security Audit Log is enabled, security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text to a system administrator client.);
- Refer to the setting of TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Download/upload and create an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of CWIS auto clear and enable/disable it;

- (2) FMT_MSA.3(a), FMT_MSA.3(b), FMT_MSA.3(c), FMT_MSA.3(d), FMT_MSA.3(e), FMT_MSA.3(f), FMT_MSA.3(g) Static attribute initialization

The TOE sets to permit all basic functions such as copy, print, scan, network scan and fax as the default value of security attribute (FMT_MSA.3(b))

Also, the TOE sets the created user identifier *r* for the owner identifier as the default value of security attribute for D.DOC and D.FUNC. (FMT_MSA.3(c), FMT_MSA.3(d), FMT_MSA.3(g))

However, for the copy function, D.DOC output is not restricted depending on the user's authority and all users are permitted to output the D.DOC (FMT_MSA.3(e)).

Also, the TOE sets the owner identifier of Mailbox that stores the fax data (public telephone line data) as the default of security attribute for D.DOC (fax-receive) (FMT_MSA.3(f)).

(3) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The role of key operator, SA, normal user, and system administrator is maintained and the role is associated with an authorized user.

7.1.5. Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)

A system administrator can restrict CE's operation in the system administrator mode to prohibit CE from referring to / changing the settings related to System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT).

This function can prevent setting change by Customer Engineer.

(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change (enable/disable) the TOE settings related to Customer Engineer Operation Restriction from the control panel and CWIS.

7.1.6. Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU)

According to Security Audit Log setting which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, the important events of the TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. All the TOE users are the targets of this audit log.

(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

It is assured that the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log.

Table 45 shows the details of the audit log.

Table 45 Details of Security Audit Log

The auditable events are recorded with the following fixed size entries:

Log ID: consecutive numbers as an audit log identifier (1 - 60000)

Date: date data (yyyy/mm/dd, mm/dd/yyyy, or dd/mm/yyyy)

Time: time data (hh:mm:ss)

Logged Events: event name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)

User Name: user name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)

Description: description on events
(arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)

Status: status or result of event processing
(arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)

Optionally Logged Items: additional information recorded to audit log (subject identity, etc.)

Logged Events	Description	Status
Change in Device Status		
System Status	Started normally(cold boot)	-
	Started normally(warm boot)	
	Shutdown requested	
	Self Test	Successful/Failed
User Authentication		
Login/Logout	Login	Successful, Failed(Invalid UserID), Failed(Invalid Password), Failed
	Logout	
	Locked System Administrator Authentication	
Change in Audit Policy		
Audit Policy	Audit Log	Enable/Disable
Job Status		
Job Status	Print	Completed, Completed with Warnings, Canceled by User, Canceled by Shutdown, Aborted, Unknown
	Copy	
	Scan	
	Fax	
	Mailbox ^{*1}	
Change in Device Settings		
Device Settings	Adjust Time	Successful/Failed
	Add User	
	Edit User	
	Delete User	
	Switch Authentication Mode	Successful

Logged Events	Description	Status
	Change Security Setting	(Setting items recorded)
Access to Data Stored in Device		
Device Data	Export Audit Log	Successful/Failed
Communication Result		
Communication	Trusted Communication	Failed (Protocol and communication destination stored)

*1) "Mailbox" means operation on documents stored in Mailbox.

(2) FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

TOE records the defined auditable event in the audit log file by associating it with the identity of user who caused the event.

(3) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

It is assured that all the information recorded in the audit log can be retrieved.

Security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text by pressing the button "store as a text file." To download security audit log data, TLS communication needs to be enabled before using Web browser.

(4) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

The person who retrieves the audit log is limited to the authenticated system administrator. A system administrator can access the security audit log data only via Web browser and the access from the control panel is inhibited. Therefore, a system administrator needs to log in from Web browser to access the security audit log data.

(5) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

The security audit log data are to be read only, and not to be deleted or modified, thus protected by unauthorized falsification and alternation.

(6) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

When security audit log data are full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten with the new data so that the new data are not lost but surely recorded.

Auditable events are stored with time stamps into NVRAM. When the number of stored events reaches 50, the 50 logs on NVRAM is stored into one file ("audit log file") within the internal HDD. Up to 15,000 events can be stored. When the number of recorded events exceeds 15,000, the oldest audit log file is overwritten and a new audit event is stored.

(7) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

The time stamp of TOE's clock function is issued when the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log file.

By TSF_FMT, only a system administrator is enabled to change the clock setting.

7.1.7. Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT)

Internal Network Data Protection is provided by the following two protocols which are configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode:

(1) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

The document data, job information, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the encryption communication protocol that ensures secure data communication between the TOE and the IT products (communication service via Web, communication service for printer driver, communication service and other services which require trusted path). This trusted path is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communication data from modification or disclosure.

The followings are the encryption algorithms for network communication provided by the TOE.

Protocol	Target Products.	Encryption Algorithm
TLS	Client PC	AES/128 bits
	(Web Browser, Printer Driver)	AES/256 bits
IPSec	Client PC	AES/128 bits
	(Web Browser, Printer Driver)	Triple-DES/168 bits
	FTP Server	

a) TLS

According to the TLS communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, TLS ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, job information, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

By supporting TLS, the TOE can act as TLS server. Moreover, TLS can protect data transmission between the TOE and the remote from interception and alteration. Protection from interception is realized by encrypting transmission data with the following cryptographic keys. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

- Cryptographic key generated as TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1/TLSv1.2 upon every session
Specifically, one of the cryptographic suites below is adopted:

Cryptographic Suites of TLS	Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key	Hash Method
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	AES/128 bits	SHA1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	AES/256 bits	SHA1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	AES/128 bits	SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	AES/256 bits	SHA256

Protection from the alteration is realized by HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code - IETF RFC 2104) of SSL/TLS.

When SSL/TLS communication is enabled on the Web client, requests from the client must be received via HTTPS. The SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before IPsec is enabled or before security audit log data are downloaded by a system administrator.

b) IPsec

According to the IPsec communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, IPsec ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, job information, security audit log data, and the TOE setting data on the internal network.

IPsec establishes the security association to determine the parameters (e.g. private key and cryptographic algorithm) to be used in the IPsec communication between the TOE and the remote. After the association is established, all transmission data among the specified IP addresses are encrypted by the transport mode of IPsec until the TOE is powered off or reset. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

- Cryptographic key generated as IPsec (ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload) at every session

Specifically, one of the following combinations between secret-key cryptographic method and hash method is adopted:

Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key	Hash Method
AES / 128 bits	SHA-1
3-Key Triple-DES /168 bits	SHA-1

7.1.8. Information Flow Security (TSF_INF_FLOW)

Information Flow Security function restricts the unpermitted communication between external interfaces and shared-medium interfaces (internal network).

(1) FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

TOE provides the following capabilities to restrict the transfer of the received data from external interfaces to the internal network without processing.

External Interface	Restriction on Communication with SMI (Internal Network)
USB (Device)	Interface for receiving print data. Not permitted to transfer the data to other interfaces. (Note: The print job is stored in Private Print)
Fax board / USB (Host)	Unable to access TOE via Fax board that is connected with a controller board by an exclusive USB interface, and the data are not transmitted between public telephone line

	and internal network. Thus, the public telephone line data received by the public telephone line is not transmitted to the internal network.
Ethernet	Unpermitted to transfer the data to other interfaces upon receiving the print data. Unpermitted to receive other user data from the user client or server, and no data are transferred. (Note: The print job is stored in Private Print)
Control Panel	Identification and authentication are required to use functions from the control panel. In addition, there is no function to transfer the data input from the control panel to other interfaces without any instruction.

7.1.9. Self Test (TSF_S_TEST)

TOE can execute a self test function to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.

(1) FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

TOE verifies the area of NVRAM and SEEPROM including TSF data upon initiation, and displays an error on the control panel if an error occurs.

However, an error is not detected for the data on security audit logs and time and date as these are not included in the target. Also, at the time of booting the TOE, the TOE calculates the checksum of Controller ROM and Fax ROM to confirm if it matches the specified value, and displays an error on the control panel if an error occurs.

8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

8.1. Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this ST:

Acronym	Definition
ADF	Auto Document Feeder
CC	Common Criteria
CE	Customer Engineer / Customer Service Engineer
CWIS	Centre Ware Internet Services
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS PUB	Federal Information Processing Standard publication
IIT	Image Input Terminal
IOT	Image Output Terminal
IT	Information Technology
IP	Internet Protocol
MFD	Multi Function Device
NVRAM	Non Volatile Random Access Memory
PDL	Page Description Language
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SEEPROM	Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

8.2. Terminology

The following terms are used in this ST:

Term	Definition
Scan / Network Scan	A service to enable the instruction of directly transferring the data from the control panel of the TOE to Mailbox in the TOE, and via network (FTPprotocol) to PC's shared folder, FTP server. Also, it enables to designate the conversion to PDF, TIFF, and JPEG, etc.
Mailbox	A location to store the scanned document and the received fax document instructed by computer in the TOE. General users (U.NORMAL), SAs, and the Key Operator can create Mailboxes, but the Key Operator is prohibited from creating common Mailboxes in a guidance. The guidance also specifies that a Mailbox created by an SA must be specified as a Mailbox to store received fax documents. A Mailbox also enables to send the document stored in the Mailbox and retrieve the document from controle panel or computers on the network.
Personal Mailbox	Mailbox to be used individually by general user (U.NORMAL) or SA. Key operator can access all Personal Mailbox.
Shared Mailbox	Mailbox to be used and shared by all users. Documents in this Mailbox are considered to have been created by all users, so all users have ownership of the documents. However, the guidance prohibits using this Mailbox.
Store Print	A function to store the confidential output data temporarily in the TOE and start its output after identification and authentication. When this function is set to [enabled], normal printing is disabled. It enables a highly-confidential document output without being mixed with other documents.
CentreWare Internet Services (CWIS)	CWIS is a service on a Web server in the TOE to confirm the status of the TOE, change settings of the TOE, job deletion, and request retrieval and printing of documents toward the TOE via the Web browser of the user client. CWIS can be used with the Windows standard Web browser.
User Authentication	A function to limit the accessible TOE functions by identifying the user before he/she uses each TOE function. Local Authentication and Remote Authentication, TOE operates with Local Authentication mode.
Local Authentication	A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user information registered in the MFD
Hard Disk Data Overwrite	To write over the area of the document data stored in the internal HDD when deleting the data.
Decompose	A function to analyze and convert the print data written in PDL into

Term	Definition
Function	bitmap data.
Decompose	To analyze and convert the data written in PDL into bitmap data by decompose function.
System administrator mode	An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions according to the operational environment. This mode is distinguished from the operation mode that enables a general user to use the MFD functions.
Auto Clear	A function to automatically logout authentication after a specified period of time passes without any operations from the control panel and CWIS. The amount of time until Auto Clear is executed can be specified for the control panel.
Customer Engineer	Customer service engineer, an engineer who maintains and repairs MFD.
Attacker	A person who accesses TOE or protected property by unauthorized means. It includes the approved user who attempts to access by hiding his/her identity.
Control Panel	A panel on which button, lamp, and touch-screen display necessary for MFD operations are arranged.
General User Client	A client for general user.
System Administrator Client	A client for system administrator. An administrator can refer to and change the TOE setting data of MFD via Web browser.
General Client and Server	Client and server which do not directly engage in the TOE operations
Printer driver	Software to convert the data on a general user client into print data written in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on the user client.
Print Data	The data written in PDL, a readable format for MFD, which are to be converted into bitmap data by the TOE decompose function.
Control Data	The data that are transmitted by command and response interactions. This is one type of the data transmitted between MFD hardware units.
Bitmap Data	The decomposed data of the data read by the copy function and the print data transmitted from a user client to MFD by the print function. Bitmap data are stored into the internal HDD after being compressed in the unique process.
Deletion from the Internal Hard Disk Drive (HDD)	Deletion from the internal HDD means deletion of the management information. When deletion of document data from the internal HDD is requested, only the management information corresponding to the data are deleted. Therefore, user cannot access the document data which were logically deleted. However, the document data themselves are not deleted but remain as the used document data until new data are written in the same storage area.

Term	Definition
Original document	Texts, images and photos to be read from IIT in the copy function.
Document Data	Document data means all the data including images transmitted across the MFD when any of copy, print, scan, network scan, mailbox, or fax functions is used by a general user. The document data includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bitmap data read from IIT and printed out from IOT (copy function), - Print data sent by general user client and its decomposed bitmap data (print function), - Bitmap data read from IIT and then stored into the internal HDD (scan function), - Bitmap data read from IIT and sent to the fax destination and the bitmap data faxed from the sender's machine and printed out from the recipient's IOT (Fax function).
Used Document Data	The remaining data in the MFD internal HDD even after deletion. The document data are first stored into the internal HDD, used, and then only their files are deleted.
Security Audit Log Data	The chronologically recorded data of important events of the TOE. The events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result.
Internally Stored Data	The data which are stored in a general user client or in the general client and server, but do not include data regarding TOE functions.
General Data	The data on the internal network. The general data do not include data regarding TOE functions.
TOE Setting Data	The data which are created by the TOE or for the TOE and may affect the TOE security functions. Included in the TSF data, specifically they include the information regarding the functions of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, Hard Disk Data Encryption, System Administrator's Security Management, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, Use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication, ID and password of users, access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, Internal Network Data Protection, Security Audit Log, User Authentication, Report Print, Auto Clear, Data/Time, and Self Test.
Cryptographic Seed Key	The 12 alphanumeric characters to be entered by a user. When data in the internal HDD is encrypted, a cryptographic key is generated based on the cryptographic seed key.
Cryptographic Key	The 256-bit data which is automatically generated based on the cryptographic seed key. Before the data are stored into the internal HDD, it is encrypted with the cryptographic key.
Network	A general term to indicate both external and internal networks.
External Network	The network which cannot be managed by the organization that manages the TOE. This does not include the internal network.
Internal Network	Channels between MFD and highly reliable remote server / client PC. The channels are located in the network of the organization, the owner of the

Term	Definition
	TOE, and are protected from the security risks coming from the external network.
Public Telephone Line/Network	Line/network of transmitting/receiving fax data.
Public Telephone Line Data Fax data	Transmitted/received data over the public telephone line of fax.
Certificate	Defined in the X.509 which is recommended by ITU-T. The data for user authentication (name, identification name, organization where he/she belongs to, etc.), public key, expiry date, serial number, signature, etc.

9. REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST.

Short Name	Document Title
[CC Part 1]	Part 1: Introduction and general model (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-001 (Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
[CC Part 2]	Part 2: Security functional components (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Part 2: Security functional components, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-002 (Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
[CC Part 3]	Part 3: Security assurance components (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Part 3: Security assurance components, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-003 (Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Evaluation Methodology, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-004 (Japanese version 1.0, dated November, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
[PP]	U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™ -2009)