



Certification Report

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Target of Evaluation (TOE)

Application Date/ID	2015-08-10 (ITC-5559)
Certification No.	C0505
Sponsor	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
TOE Name	Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060 models with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, Print, and Fax
TOE Version	Controller ROM Ver. 1.0.13, FAX ROM Ver. 2.0.8
PP Conformance	U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009)
Assurance Package	EAL2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Developer	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility	Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

2016-03-31

Takumi Yamasato, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
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Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme."

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 4
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 4

Evaluation Result: Pass

"Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060 models with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, Print, and Fax" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the

"Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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1. Executive Summary

This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060 models with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, Print, and Fax, Version Controller ROM Ver. 1.0.13, FAX ROM Ver. 2.0.8" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., and the evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2016-03-18 by Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., and provide security information to procurement personnel and consumers who are interested in this TOE.

Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter referred to as the "ST") that is the appendix of this report together. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of the TOE are described in the ST.

This Certification Report assumes procurement personnel who purchase the TOE to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.

1.1 Product Overview

An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.

1.1.1 Assurance Package

Assurance Package of the TOE is EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2.

1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality

The TOE is the multi-function device (hereinafter referred to as "MFD"), which has such basic functions as copy, print, scan, and fax.

In addition to the basic MFD functions such as copy, print, scan, and fax, the TOE provides security functions to protect the document data used in basic functions and the setting data affecting security, etc., from disclosure and alteration.

In regard to these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance package. Threats and assumptions that the TOE assumes are described in the next clause.

1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives

The TOE assumes the following threats and provides security functions against them.

The document data of users and the setting data affecting security, which are assets to be

protected, may be disclosed or altered by unauthorized operation of the TOE or by unauthorized access to the communication data on the network to which the TOE is connected.

Therefore, the TOE provides security functions such as identification and authentication, access control, and encryption, to prevent the assets from unauthorized disclosure or alteration.

1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions

The evaluated product is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.

The TOE is assumed to be located in an environment where physical components and interfaces of the TOE are protected from the unauthorized access. For the operation of the TOE, the TOE shall be properly configured, managed and maintained according to the guidance documents.

1.1.3 Disclaimers

The following operation and functions will not be assured by this evaluation.

In this evaluation, only the configuration, to which the setting condition shown in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" such as restriction for customer engineer operation is applied, is evaluated as the TOE. If the TOE settings are changed, the configuration will not be assured by this evaluation.

The TOE has Remote Authentication and S/MIME functions, which are only available for overseas models and not provided for Japan models.

1.2 Conduct of Evaluation

Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed on 2016-03, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.

1.3 Certification

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] prepared by the Evaluation Facility and evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process. Those concerns pointed out by the Certification Body were fully resolved, and the Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the Evaluation Facility and fully concluded certification activities.

2. Identification

The TOE is identified as follows:

TOE Name:	Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060 models with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, Print, and Fax		
TOE Version:	Controller ROM	Ver. 1. 0.13	
	FAX ROM	Ver. 2.0.8	
Developer:	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.		

Users can verify that a product is the evaluated and certified TOE by the following means.

Users operate on the control panel according to the procedure written in the guidance document, and confirm the name of the model, the version and optional information displayed on the screen or written in the print output of the configuration setting list.

- Model name: Either of the following

For Japan)

DocuCentre-V 3060, DocuCentre-V 2060

For overseas)

ApeosPort-V 3065, ApeosPort-V 3060, ApeosPort-V 2060,
DocuCentre-V 3065, DocuCentre-V 3060, DocuCentre-V 2060

- Each version of Controller ROM, and FAX ROM
- Option

All of the following functions: Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, Print, and Fax.

The functions are confirmed by their icons displayed on the screen or their setting values. If the function is not installed in the TOE, the icon of the function is not displayed and the setting values of the function are not written.

3. Security Policy

This chapter describes security function policies that the TOE adopts to counter threats, and organizational security policies.

The TOE provides the basic MFD functions such as copy, print, scan, and fax, and has functions to store the user document data in the TOE's internal HDD and to communicate with user clients and various servers via network.

When those MFD functions are used, the TOE provides security functions that fulfill the security functional requirements required by the Protection Profile for MFDs, U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009) [14][15] (hereinafter referred to as the "PP"). The security functions that the TOE provides include identification/authentication and access control of users, encryption of the document data stored in HDD, data overwrite at deleting the document data in HDD, and encryption communication. The TOE prevents the user's document data and the setting data affecting security that are assets to be protected from being disclosed or altered by unauthorized persons.

The TOE assumes the following user roles:

- General User
Any person who uses the basic MFD functions, such as copy, print, scan, and fax, provided by the TOE.
- System Administrator
A user who has been specifically granted the authority to configure settings of the TOE security functions. System administrator includes "key operator" who can use all the management functions, and "SA (system administrator privilege)" who can use a part of the management functions.
- TOE Owner
Any person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing the security objectives for the TOE operating environment.
- Customer Engineer
Customer service engineer who maintains and repairs the MFD.

The TOE's assets to be protected are as follows:

- User Document Data
User Document Data consist of the information contained in a user's document.
- User Function Data
User Function data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE. For the TOE, Mailbox is included.
- TSF Confidential Data
TSF Confidential Data are the data used for security functions, and whose integrity and confidentiality are required. In the definition of the TOE, they include passwords of users, the cryptographic seed key used to generate a cryptographic key, the setting values of encryption communication protocol, and the audit logs.
- TSF Protected Data

TSF Protected Data are the data used for security functions, and whose integrity only is required. In the definition of the TOE, they include the setting values of security functions excluding TSF Confidential Data. For example, TSF Protected Data include user IDs, information on users who are authorized to use the basic functions, information on the owners of document data, etc.

3.1 Security Function Policies

The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Chapter 3.1.1, and to satisfy the organizational security policies shown in Chapter 3.1.2.

3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies

3.1.1.1 Threats

The TOE assumes the threats shown in Table 3-1 and provides the security functions to counter them. These threats are the same as those described in the PP.

Table 3-1 Assumed Threats

Identifier	Threat
T.DOC.DIS	User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.DOC.ALT	User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.FUNC.ALT	User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.PROT.ALT	TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.DIS	TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.ALT	TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.

3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats

The TOE counters the threats shown in Table 3-1 by the following security function policies. Details of each security function are shown in Chapter 5.

1) Countermeasures against threat "T.DOC.DIS," "T.DOC.ALT" and "T.FUNC.ALT"

These are threats to user data (User Document Data and User Function Data). The TOE counters the threats by the following functions: User Authentication, Hard Disk Data Overwrite, and Internal Network Data Protection.

The User Authentication function of the TOE allows only identified and authenticated users to use the TOE. When successfully identified and authenticated users attempt to use MFD's basic functions such as copy, print, scan, and fax, the TOE checks the identification information of authorized users set for each basic function of the MFD and allows only authorized users to use them. In addition, when users who are permitted to use the basic functions of the MFD attempt to manipulate user data, the TOE allows only users with access rights to access the data.

The Hard Disk Data Overwrite function of the TOE is to overwrite the internal HDD area where the document data are stored when the data are deleted. This function prevents the residual information of the deleted document data from being read out.

The Internal Network Data Protection function of the TOE is to use encryption communication protocol and to encrypt the communication data when the TOE communicates with client PCs and various servers.

With the above functions, the TOE prevents the user data to be protected from being disclosed or altered by unauthorized usage of the TOE or by unauthorized access to the communication data.

2) Countermeasures against threat "T.PROT.ALT," "T.CONF.DIS," and "T.CONF.ALT"

These are the threats to the data used for security functions. The TOE counters the threats by the following functions: User Authentication, System Administrator's Security Management, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, and Internal Network Data Protection.

The User Authentication function and the System Administrator's Security Management function of the TOE are to allow only identified and authenticated system administrators to refer to and change the data used for security functions. For general users, changing their own passwords is permitted.

The Customer Engineer Operation Restriction function of the TOE is to allow only identified and authenticated system administrators to refer to and change the setting data that control enabling and disabling of customer engineer operation restriction.

The Internal Network Data Protection function of the TOE is to use encryption communication protocol and to encrypt the communication data when the TOE communicates with client PCs and various servers.

With the above functions, the TOE prevents the data to be protected from being disclosed or altered by unauthorized usage of the TOE or by unauthorized access to the communication data.

3.1.2 Organizational Security Policies and Security Function Policies

3.1.2.1 Organizational Security Policies

Organizational security policies required in use of the TOE are shown in Table 3-2. These organizational security policies are the same as those described in the PP, except that P.CIPHER is added.

Table 3-2 Organizational Security Policies

Identifier	Organizational Security Policy
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION	To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION	To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING	To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT	To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.CIPHER	To prevent unauthorized reading-out, the document data and used document data in the internal HDD will be encrypted by the TOE.

3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organizational Security Policies

The TOE provides the security functions to satisfy the organizational security policies shown in Table 3-2. Details of each security function are shown in Chapter 5.

1) Means of organizational security policy "P.USER.AUTHORIZATION"

The TOE realizes this policy by the User Authentication function.

The User Authentication function of the TOE allows only identified and authenticated users to use the TOE. When successfully identified and authenticated users attempt to use MFD's basic functions such as copy, print, scan, and fax, the TOE checks the identification information of authorized users set for each basic function of the MFD and allows only authorized users to use them.

2) Means of organizational security policy "P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION"

The TOE realizes this policy by the Self Test function.

The Self Test function of the TOE is to verify check sum of Controller ROM and FAX ROM upon booting. The TOE also checks the TSF data stored in NVRAM and SEEPROM to detect errors. Thus, this function verifies the integrity of TSF executable code.

3) Means of organizational security policy "P.AUDIT.LOGGING"

The TOE realizes this policy by the Security Audit Log function.

The Security Audit Log function of the TOE is to record security relevant events as audit logs. Only identified and authenticated system administrators can read out the stored audit logs. It is not possible to delete and modify the audit logs.

4) Means of organizational security policy "P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT"

The TOE realizes this policy by the User Authentication and the Information Flow Security functions.

The User Authentication function of the TOE allows only identified and authenticated users to use the TOE. Furthermore, the TOE terminates a session when the state that a user does not perform any operations continues for the specified amount of time.

With the Information Flow Security function of the TOE, the data received from various external interfaces of the TOE cannot be transferred to the internal network unless the data are processed by the TOE, thereby preventing unauthorized data transfer from external interfaces (including telephone lines) to the internal network.

5) Means of organizational security policy "P.CIPHER"

The TOE realizes this policy by the Hard Disk Data Encryption function.

The Hard Disk Data Encryption function of the TOE is to encrypt data to be written to the internal HDD. The cryptographic algorithm is 256-bit AES.

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine the use of the TOE.

4.1 Usage Assumptions

Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. These assumptions are the same as those described in the PP. The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.

Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE

Identifier	Assumptions
A.ACCESS.MANAGED	The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING	TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING	Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST	Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

4.2 Environmental Assumptions

The TOE is assumed to be used at general office, connected to the internal network, and used from client PCs connected to the internal network. Figure 4-1 shows the general operational environment of the TOE.

It is possible to use the print function of the TOE by connecting client PCs to the TOE via USB ports




Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE

The following are components excluding the TOE in the operational environment of the TOE:

1) General User Client

General User Client is a general-purpose PC for general users and connected to the TOE via USB or the internal network. The following software is required:

- OS: Windows Vista or Windows 7
- Printer driver

When the client is connected to the internal network, the following software is required in addition to those listed above:

- Web browser (included with OS)

2) System Administrator Client

System Administrator Client is a general-purpose PC for system administrators and connected to the TOE via the internal network. The following software is required:

- OS: Windows Vista or Windows 7
- Web browser (included with OS)

3) LDAP Server, Kerberos Server

When Remote Authentication is set for the user authentication function on the TOE, authentication server of either LDAP server or Kerberos server is necessary. When Local Authentication is set, neither authentication server is necessary.

LDAP server is also used to acquire user attributes to identify SA role when Remote Authentication is used. Thus, even for the authentication with Kerberos server, LDAP server is necessary to use the SA role.

In this evaluation, the following software is used as LDAP server and Kerberos server.

- Windows Active Directory

4) Mail Server, FTP Server

The TOE has basic functions to transfer document data with Mail server and FTP server. These servers are necessary upon using the basic MFD functions.

It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the cooperating software other than the TOE shown in this configuration is out of scope in the evaluation. Those are assumed to be trustworthy.

4.3 Clarification of Scope

As described below, there are restrictions on the security functions of the TOE.

1) Restrictions for Japan models

Remote Authentication and S/MIME functions are not provided for Japan models. The S/MIME function is used for E-mail and Internet Fax Send functions. Although the E-mail and Internet Fax Send functions are provided, they are disabled and not evaluated for Japan models.

2) Restrictions for Remote Authentication

The TOE function that restricts the number of characters of password to be nine or more is not applied to user password stored in the Remote Authentication server (LDAP server or Kerberos server). A system administrator is responsible for ensuring that user password stored in the remote authentication server is long enough not to be predicted.

3) IPsec for IPv6

The TOE was evaluated with only IPsec protocol for IPv4. The TOE was not evaluated with IPsec for IPv6, so the operation with IPsec for IPv6 is not assured by this evaluation.

5. Architectural Information

This chapter explains the scope and the main components (subsystem) of the TOE.

5.1 TOE Boundary and Components

Figure 5-1 shows the components of the TOE. The scope of the TOE is the MFD including the Fax board.




Figure 5.1 Components of the TOE

The TOE has security functions and other basic MFD functions. The following describe the security functions of the TOE. Regarding the basic MFD functions, please refer to Glossary in Chapter 11.

1) User Authentication

This function includes identification and authentication of users, access control for MFD's basic functions, and access control for user data.

a) Identification and authentication of users

This is the function to identify and authenticate TOE users with their IDs and passwords. Identification and authentication are applied to the following user interfaces.

- Control panel
- Client PCs (Web browsers, Printer Driver)

The following types of authentication are available: "Local Authentication" that uses user IDs and passwords stored in the TOE, and "Remote Authentication" that uses LDAP servers and Kerberos servers outside the TOE.

For enhanced security, the following are provided for the user identification and authentication.

- For Local Authentication, users are required to use passwords of nine or more characters.
- For Local Authentication, if a system administrator fails to be authenticated for five times in a row, the authentication process is suspended. This restriction is not applied to general users.
- If no user operation is confirmed for a specified amount of time after a user has been successfully authenticated, the session is terminated.

b) Access control for MFD's basic functions

This function allows only authorized users to use MFD's basic functions such as copy, scan, network scan, print, fax, and manipulation of Mailbox.

When a user attempts to use MFD's basic functions, the TOE verifies identification information of authorized users set for each basic function of the MFD. If the ID of the user attempting to use functions matches the identification of an authorized user, the user is permitted to use the functions.

c) Access control for user data

This is the function to restrict the access to document data and Mailbox used in MFD's basic functions to only authorized users.

The method of access control differs depending on whether the data are document data stored in Mailbox and the Private Print area, or those generated in the process of the fax function or network scan function via the control panel.

As to the stored document data, and the Mailbox itself, access control is performed based on the owner information of them. If the information on a user attempting to access data matches the owner information, the user is permitted to manipulate the data.

As to the document data generated in the process of the fax function or network scan function, only those users who performed the functions are allowed to send the data by fax or via network. No access means to such data is provided to other users.

However, for both types of data, system administrators are allowed to delete all document data.

2) System Administrator's Security Management

This is the function that permits only identified and authenticated system administrators to configure, refer to, and change the setting of the data used for security functions. For general users, changing their own passwords is permitted.

3) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction

This is the function with which system administrators restrict the operation by customer engineers. Only identified and authenticated system administrators are permitted to refer to and change the setting data that control enabling and disabling of customer engineer operation restriction. If customer engineer operation is restricted, customer engineers are required to enter the password set by a system administrator in order to operate the MFD.

4) Security Audit Log

This is the function that records security relevant audit events as audit logs. Only identified and authenticated system administrators can read out the audit logs stored in the TOE via Web browsers. It is not possible to delete or modify the audit logs.

Up to 15,000 events can be stored as audit logs. When the number of events exceeds the limit, the oldest event is deleted to record a new event.

5) Hard Disk Data Encryption

This is the function that encrypts data to be stored in the internal HDD. The cryptographic algorithm is 256-bit AES. A cryptographic key is generated upon booting the TOE using the proprietary method of Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., based on the cryptographic seed key of 12 alphanumeric characters set by system administrators when the TOE is installed. The same value of the cryptographic key is generated every time the power is turned on and stored in the volatile memory, while it is deleted when the power is turned off.

6) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

This is the function that overwrites the internal HDD area where document data were stored when the data are deleted. This overwrite operation is performed in the following cases.

- When document data have become unnecessary after a user finishes using MFD's basic functions. Unnecessary data include those temporarily generated in the TOE while the TOE is executing some processing.
- When a user has requested to delete document data.
- When the power of the MFD is turned on. If the overwrite operation has not been completed when the power is turned off, the operation resumes when the power is turned on.

System administrators can select one pass overwrite (overwriting with zero) or three pass overwrite (overwriting with a random number, a random number, and zero). It should be noted that the data actually overwritten on the internal HDD are encrypted. Therefore, the data actually overwritten is different from the data the system administrator specifies to overwrite with.

7) Internal Network Data Protection

This is the function that encrypts communication with IT devices using the following protocols and methods.

- IPsec, TLS (v1.0, v1.1, v1.2), S/MIME

8) Information Flow Security

This is the function that prevents unauthorized data transfer from external interfaces (including telephone lines) to the internal network. Data received from external interfaces of the TOE cannot be transferred to the internal network unless the data are processed by the TOE.

9) Self Test

This is the function that conducts the following self tests when the TOE is turned on.

- Verification of the check sum of Controller ROM and FAX ROM
- Verification of TSF data stored in NVRAM and SEEPROM

5.2 IT Environment

When user authentication by Remote Authentication is enabled, the TOE uses an external authentication server (LDAP server or Kerberos server) to identify and authenticate users. The TOE also checks whether a user has the SA role or not by using LDAP server, in case of Remote Authentication.

6. Documentation

The identification of the documents attached to the TOE is listed below. TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy the assumptions.

1) For Japan

- DocuCentre-V 3060/2060
Administrator Guide (ME7486J1-1)
(SHA1 hash value: 5a21a32d24fd6ab412c1a4e0c0ba3dc07be92430)
- DocuCentre-V 3060/2060
User Guide (ME7485J1-1)
(SHA1 hash value: dad33679dc68327b85d7c204498a93cc5edbd7b6)
- DocuCentre-V 3060/2060
Security Function Supplementary Guide (ME7596J1-2)
(SHA1 hash value: 3db4218f9e07c639e2dbc477e0e636a2b73ab6e8)

2) For overseas

- ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060
Administrator Guide (ME7494E2-1)
(SHA1 hash value: 6793b923a0ed2f703acb837df0f571c814ea0893)
- ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060
User Guide (ME7493E2-1)
(SHA1 hash value: 9e215620f2c0f69a4da114f290c53bea1f6c0fc5)
- ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060
Security Function Supplementary Guide (ME7597E2-2)
(SHA1 hash value: 3f5be8ad51309b56c11b63382e77d412efd0b5c6)

* Note: SHA1 hash value

The guidance documents are stored on the DVD that is included with the MFD product. TOE Users can confirm the integrity of the guidance documents by comparing their calculated SHA1 hash values.

7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results

7.1 Evaluation Facility

Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department that conducted the evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which is agreed on mutual recognition with ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of evaluation.

7.2 Evaluation Approach

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in accordance with the assurance components in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict of each work unit in the CEM.

7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity

The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

The evaluation has started on 2015-08 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2016-03. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted.

Additionally, the evaluator directly visited the development site on 2015-08 and 2015-10, and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management and delivery, by investigating records and interviewing staff. For manufacturing sites, site visits were omitted as the Evaluation Facility determined that the examination details of the past CC-certified products could be reused. Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the sampling check of the developer testing and the evaluator testing by using the developer testing environment at the developer site on 2015-10 and 2016-03.

Concerns that the Certification Body found in the evaluation process were described as the certification oversight reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility. After the Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, those concerns were reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.

7.4 IT Product Testing

The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had performed. As a result of the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation and those confirmed validity, the evaluator performed the reproducibility testing, additional testing and penetration testing based on vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary.

7.4.1 Developer Testing

The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer performed and the documentation of actual testing results. The content of the developer testing evaluated by the evaluator is explained as follows.

1) Developer Testing Environment

Figure 7-1 shows the testing configuration performed by the developer.




Figure 7-1 Configuration of the Developer Testing

Configuration items for the developer testing are shown in Table 7-1 below.

Table 7-1 Configuration Items for the Developer Testing

Items	Description
TOE	For Japan) DocuCentre-V 3060, 2060 For overseas) ApeosPort-V 3065, 3060, 2060 DocuCentre-V 3065, 3060, 2060
Server	Used as various servers. - PC with Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 - Mail server: Xmail Version 1.27 - FTP server: Standard software in OS - LDAP server: Standard software in OS - Kerberos server: Standard software in OS
System Administrator Client	Used as system administrator client. The testing is performed with the following two models: a) PC with Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (Web browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 8) b) PC with Microsoft Windows VISTA Business SP2 (Web browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 7)
General User Client 1	Used as general user client (connected via internal network). The testing is performed with the following two models: a) PC with Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (Web browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 8) b) PC with Microsoft Windows VISTA Business SP2 (Web browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 7) Additionally, the following software is used. For Japan) - Printer Driver: ART EX Print Driver Version 6.9.0 - Fax Driver: ART EX DirectFax Driver Version 2.9.0 For overseas) - Printer driver and fax driver: PCL6 Print Driver Version 6.9.0 * Fax drivers are used for confirming that they cannot be used.
General User Client 2	Used for confirming send/receive fax. - PC with Microsoft Windows VISTA Business SP2 * PC modem port is connected to public telephone line.
General User Client 3	Used as general user client (connected via USB port for printer). - PC with Microsoft Windows VISTA Business SP2 For Japan) - Printer Driver: ART EX Print Driver Version 6.9.0 - Fax Driver: ART EX DirectFax Driver Version 2.9.0 For overseas) - Printer driver and fax driver: PCL6 Print Driver Version 6.9.0 * Fax drivers are used for confirming that they cannot be used.

SATA Bus Monitor	A tool to monitor the SATA bus data transferred to and from the internal HDD. - PC with Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 to which the dedicated device, ST2-31-2-A by Catalyst Enterprises, is connected - Dedicated software: stx sata protocolsuite V4.20
Debug Serial	Debugging terminal of the MFD; i.e., PC whose serial port is connected to the terminal port of the MFD for debugging via interface converter. - PC with Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 - Terminal Software: Tera Term Pro Version 2.3
Interface converter	Fuji Xerox-unique conversion board to connect the MFD and debug serial.
Public Telephone Line	Use a pseudo exchange system (N4T-EXCH by How Inc.) as an alternative of public telephone line.

The TOEs tested by the developer are the all models of the TOE, which have the same TOE identification of Chapter 2. However, the test items differ depending on the model.

Table 7-2 shows the models of the TOE and the performed developer testing. The developer selected one representative model from each of the three product series and tested them on all test items. Other models were tested on only some of the test items. The evaluator evaluated the developer testing as sufficient, since the models of different model numbers differ only in the printing speed, and they have the same implementation of the security functionalities.

Table 7-2 TOE Models and Performed Testing

	Series of the TOE	Models tested all test items	Models tested only some test items (Confirm that the difference in the print speeds does not affect the results.)
1	DocuCentre-V Series (For Japan)	DocuCentre-V 3060	DocuCentre-V 2060
2	ApeosPort-V Series (For overseas)	ApeosPort-V 3060	ApeosPort-V 3065 ApeosPort-V 2060
3	DocuCentre-V Series (For overseas)	DocuCentre-V 3060	DocuCentre-V 3065 DocuCentre-V 2060

The developer testing was performed in the same TOE testing environment as the TOE configuration identified in the ST.

2) Summary of the Developer Testing

A summary of the developer testing is as follows.

a. Developer Testing Outline

An outline of the developer testing is as follows.

<Developer Testing Approach>

- (1) Operate basic MFD functions and security management functions from the MFD control panel, system administrator client, and general user client, and confirm the MFD behavior, panel display, and audit log contents as a result.
- (2) To confirm the Hard Disk Data Overwrite function, use the SATA bus monitor as a testing tool and read out and check the data to be written to the internal HDD and the contents of the internal HDD after the data are written.
- (3) To confirm the Hard Disk Data Encryption function, use the serial port for debugging to directly refer to the document data etc., stored in the internal HDD and check that they are encrypted. In addition, confirm that the encrypted internal HDD cannot be used and an error is displayed on the control panel when the internal HDD is replaced with that of another MFD with different cryptographic key.
- (4) To confirm the Hard Disk Data Encryption function, compare the generated cryptographic key and encrypted data by the TOE with the known data calculated by the specified algorithm, and confirm that the algorithm to generate a cryptographic key and the cryptographic algorithm are as specified.
- (5) To confirm the encryption communication protocol function such as IPsec, use the testing tools to be described later and check that the encryption communication protocol is used as specified. Also confirm the protection function against various Web inputs and print job commands.
- (6) Connect the general user client 2 via public telephone line and use it for transmitting fax with MFD. Besides, to confirm the Information Flow Security function, check that dial-up connection from general user client 2 to the TOE via public telephone line is disabled.

<Developer Testing Tools>

Table 7-3 shows tools used in the developer testing.

Table 7-3 Developer Testing Tools

Tool Name	Outline and Purpose of Use
SATA Bus Monitor (PC and dedicated device) * See Table 7-1 for configuration.	Monitor the data in SATA bus for connecting the internal HDD in the MFD, and check the data to be written to the internal HDD, and also read out the data written in the internal HDD.

Protocol Analyzer (Wireshark Version 1.10.6)	Monitor the communication data on the internal network, and confirm that the encryption communication protocol is IPsec, TLS, or SNMPv3 as specified.
Mailer (Microsoft Windows Live Mail 2011)	Transmit E-mails with the TOE via Mail server, and confirm that the encryption and signature by S/MIME are as specified.
HTTP debugger (Fiddler 2.4.7.1)	A tool to mediate the communication between a Web browser (client PC) and a Web server (MFD) and to refer to and change the data communicated between them.
Debug Serial and Interface Converter * See Table 7-1 for configuration.	Read out the data written on the internal HDD and check the contents.
Nmap Ver.6.46	A tool to detect available network service ports.

<Content of the Performed Developer Testing>

Basic MFD functions and security management functions are operated from every interface, and it was confirmed that the security functions to be applied to various input parameters are operated as specified. Regarding the user authentication function, it was confirmed that each case of local authentication, remote authentication (LDAP server), and remote authentication (Kerberos server), behaves as specified according to the user role.

The variations of the input parameters include the rewrite of communication data between web browsers and the TOE, and power-on/off of the TOE while document data is overwritten.

b. Scope of the Performed Developer Testing

The developer testing was performed on 80 items by the developer.

By the coverage analysis, it was verified that all security functions and external interfaces described in the functional specification had been tested.

c. Result

The evaluator confirmed an approach of the performed developer testing and the legitimacy of tested items, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the testing plan and the actual testing approach. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the testing results expected by the developer and the actual testing results performed by the developer.

7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing

The evaluator performed the sampling testing to reconfirm the execution of security functions by the test items extracted from the developer testing. In addition, the evaluator

performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the "independent testing") to ensure that security functions are certainly implemented from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation. The independent testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.

1) Independent Testing Environment

The configuration of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is the same as that of the developer testing shown in Figure 7-1, except for the following.

- As the TOE, only DocuCentre-V 3060 (for Japan), ApeosPort-V 3065 (for overseas), and DocuCentre-V 3060 (for overseas) were used.
- As a fax destination, DocuCentre-V 3060 and ApeosPort-V 3065, which are the TOEs, were used instead of general user client 2.

The evaluator judged that testing on three representative models is sufficient, since other models differ only in the following: ApeosPort-V or DocuCentre-V, for overseas or for Japan, and model numbers which indicate the print speeds.

The evaluator determined that changing the fax destination does not affect the security functions of the TOE.

The independent testing was performed in the same environment as the TOE configuration identified in the ST.

The testing tools and components in the independent testing environment were the same as those used in the developer testing and some of them include tools and components developed by the developer. The validity verification and operation tests for the testing tools and components were performed by the evaluator.

2) Summary of the Independent Testing

A summary of the Independent testing is as follows.

a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing

Viewpoints of the independent testing that the evaluator designed from the developer testing and the provided evaluation evidential materials are shown below.

<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>

- (1) For interfaces to which strict testing was not performed on the behavior of security functions in the developer testing, confirm the behavior of them with different parameters.
- (2) As the sampling testing, select the test items of the developer testing from the following viewpoints:
 - Check all the security functions and the external interfaces.
 - Check the access control for the combinations of all user types and Mailbox as well as those of all user types and Private Print.
 - Check all the authentication methods (local authentication, remote authentication by Kerberos server, remote authentication by LDAP server).

b. Independent Testing Outline

An outline of the independent testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.

<Independent Testing Approach>

The independent testing was performed by the evaluator using the same testing approach as the developer testing.

<Independent Testing Tools>

The same testing tools as those of the developer testing were used.

<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>

The evaluator performed the sampling testing of 60 items and the additional testing of 8 items, based on the viewpoints of the independent testing.

Table 7-4 shows viewpoints of the independent testing and the content of the major testing corresponding to them.

Table 7-4 Major Independent Testing Performed

Viewpoint	Outline of the Independent Testing
Viewpoint (1)	Confirm that the behavior of the TOE is as specified when the entry for changing or entering passwords exceeds the limit values.
Viewpoint (1)	Confirm that access control to Mailbox for system administrators is as specified.
Viewpoint (1)	Test whether or not the account lock is performed as specified, and also test whether the account lock is performed as specified even when different user accounts exist.
Viewpoint (1)	Confirm that the behavior of the TOE is as specified when users who own document data are unregistered while their document data exist in the TOE.
Viewpoint (1)	Confirm that, even when the printer driver is configured so that data is saved in Mailbox or data is saved using other options, the data is saved in the Private Print area and is not saved in Mailbox, as the TOE is configured.

c. Result

All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.

7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluator devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation. The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.

1) Summary of the Penetration Testing

A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

a. Vulnerability of Concern

The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.

- (1) There is a concern corresponding to the TOE regarding various vulnerabilities of Web and weak encryption methods used during TLS encrypted communication, according to the publicly available vulnerability information. The evaluator confirmed that there is no publicly available vulnerability to be concerned in other communication protocols.
- (2) There is a concern corresponding to the TOE regarding the unexpected execution of processing by PDF files and unauthorized access by print job commands, according to the publicly available vulnerability information.
- (3) There is a concern that the TOE behaves unexpectedly for the entry exceeding the limit value or the entry of unexpected character code on the interface other than Web, such as control panel.
- (4) There is a concern of unauthorized access by USB port from the analysis of vulnerability on the documentation.
- (5) There is a concern that the security function is invalidated when NVRAM and SEEPROM, to which the setting data are stored, are initialized, from the analysis of vulnerability on the documentation.
- (6) There is a concern that the document data as protected assets become inconsistent when multiple users access the document data in Mailbox, from the analysis of vulnerability on the documentation.
- (7) There is a concern that security functions do not behave properly, being affected by unauthorized access during initialization processing or by run-down of battery for MFD's system clock.

b. Penetration Testing Outline

The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially exploitable vulnerabilities.

<Penetration Testing Environment>

Penetration Testing was performed in the same environment as that of the evaluator independent testing, except for the additional PC with tools for penetration testing. Table 7-5 shows details of tools used in the penetration testing.

Table 7-5 Penetration Testing Tools

Tool Name	Purpose of use
PC for Penetration Testing	Client with Windows 7 or Windows VISTA, which operates the following penetration testing tools.
Fiddler V4.4.9.0	A tool to mediate the communication between Web browser and Web server (TOE), which refers to and changes the communication data between them.
SSLScan Ver.1.8.2	A tool to determine whether SSL/TLS cipher suites are supported or not.
ContentsBridge Version 7.3.0	Printer software for PC by Fuji Xerox.
Metasploit Version 4.6.2	The tool is used for the creation of the testing data to inspect the vulnerabilities caused by PDF files.

<Items of the Performed Penetration Testing>

Table 7-6 shows vulnerabilities of concern and the content of the penetration testing corresponding to them.

Table 7-6 Outline of the Penetration Testing

Vulnerability	Penetration Testing Outline
(1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conducted various entries to Web server (TOE) using Web browser and Fiddler, and confirmed that there is no known vulnerability, such as bypass of identification/authentication, buffer overflow, and various injections. - Executed SSLScan for the TOE, and confirmed that weak encryption methods are not supported.
(2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirmed that the processing is not executed when a PDF file including unauthorized processing is input. - Confirmed that the protected assets could not be accessed when directories are searched using a print job command.
(3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirmed that it becomes an error when the character of out-of-spec length, character code, and special key are entered from the control panel, or general user client (printer driver).
(4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirmed that, other than the intended functions such as print, it cannot be used even when attempting to access the TOE by connecting the client for the penetration testing to each USB port of the TOE.
(5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirmed that an error occurs and the TOE cannot be used even after replacing NVRAM and SEEPROM with the new ones to which no setting is applied.

(6)	- Confirmed that the access is rejected during the operation by others when multiple users access document data in Mailbox.
(7)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirmed that operation is rejected during initialization processing of the MFD right after the power-on. - Confirmed that an error is displayed and the MFD cannot be used when the power is turned on while the battery for the system clock of the MFD has run down.

c. Result

In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could exploit.

7.5 Evaluated Configuration

TOE configuration conditions for this evaluation are as described in the guidance documents shown in Chapter 6. To enable security functions of the TOE and securely use them, system administrators of the TOE need to configure the TOE settings to satisfy the configuration conditions as described in the guidance. If these setting values are changed to the values different from those specified in the guidance, the configuration will not be assured by this evaluation.

It should be noted that TOE configuration conditions include settings that disable some functions which the TOE provides. For example, setting values for the TOE as described below are included.

- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction: [Enabled]
- WebDAV setting (Network Scan utility): [Disabled]
- Direct Fax (Fax driver): [Disabled]
- Remote Maintenance function: [Disabled]
- Receive Mail: [Disabled]
- SNMP: [Disabled]

For Japan models, the additional setting is required as described below.

- Send Mail: [Disabled]

System administrators of the TOE need to be noted that TOE configuration conditions include the settings to disable some functions that the TOE provides. If these setting values are changed to the values different from those specified in the guidance, the configuration will not be assured by this evaluation.

7.6 Evaluation Results

The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.

- PP Conformance:
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009)

The TOE also conforms to the following SFR packages defined in the above PP:

- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
 - 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
 - 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
 - 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
 - 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B
 - 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
 - Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance components.

- All assurance components of EAL2 package
- Additional assurance component ALC_FLR.2

The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.

7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

The evaluator recommendations for users are not mentioned.

8. Certification

The Certification Body conducted the following certification based on the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.

1. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
2. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
3. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.

8.1 Certification Result

As a result of verification of the submitted Evaluation Technical Report and related evaluation documentation, the Certification Body determined that the TOE satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 in the CC Part 3.

8.2 Recommendations

Procurement personnel who are interested in this TOE need to consider whether the scope of this evaluation and the operational requirements of this TOE satisfy the operational conditions that they assume, by referring to the descriptions in "1.1.3 Disclaimers," "4.3 Clarification of Scope," and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration."

Especially, when maintenance function is enabled for use, any effects on security functions of this TOE are out of the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, it is a responsibility of the administrator to decide whether to accept maintenance.

When using the print function of the TOE, the printed documents from the client PC are stored in the TOE, and the operation from the control panel is required to output printed documents. However, document data stored in the Mailbox of the TOE can be output as printed documents by operation from the client PC. Thus, it should be noted that the TOE may not be able to satisfy the needs of procurement personnel who expect that document data can be printed out only when they operate from the control panel to ensure the security of paper documents.

9. Annexes

There is no annex.

10. Security Target

Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document along with this Certification Report.

Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-V 3065/3060/2060 DocuCentre-V 3065/3060/2060 models with Hard Disk, Data Security, Scan, Print, and Fax Security Target, Version 1.1.7, March 18, 2016, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

11. Glossary

The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.

CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP	Protection Profile
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.

ADF	Auto Document Feeder
CWIS	CentreWare Internet Services
IIT	Image Input Terminal
IOT	Image Output Terminal
MFD	Multi Function Device
NVRAM	Non Volatile Random Access Memory
SA	System Administrator privilege
SEEPROM	Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory

The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.

Copy Function:	Copy Function is to read the original data from IIT and print it out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
Customer Engineer (CE):	Customer service engineer who maintains and repairs the MFD.
CWIS Function:	CWIS is a service used by general users and system administrators via the Web browser in order for them to confirm the status of the TOE, change settings of the TOE, and request the TOE to retrieve and print the documents.
Fax Function:	Fax function is to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel, the original data are read from IIT and sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data sent from the sender's machine via public telephone line are received.
Key Operator:	Key operator is a system administrator who can use all the management functions.

Mailbox:	A logical box in the MFD to store the document data scanned by the scanner function or received by the fax function. The stored document data can be printed out via the control panel, or printed out and retrieved via Web browser.
Network Scan Function:	Network Scan function is to read the original data from IIT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel, and automatically send to FTP server, Mail server, and SMB server according to the setting of the MFD.
Print Function:	Print function is to print out the data from IOT, which are sent to the MFD from printer driver or Web browser of a general user client. The received print data are stored into the Private Print inside the MFD, and printed out according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
Private Print:	An area in the MFD to store print data sent from a general user client to the MFD.
SA:	SA is a system administrator who can use a part of management functions. The role of SA is set by key operator as required by the corresponding organization.
Scan Function:	Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and then store them into the Mailbox inside the MFD according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
System Administrator:	An authorized administrator who configures TOE security functions and other device settings. This term covers both key operator and SA (System Administrator privilege).

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