



# Certification Report

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## Target of Evaluation

Application date/ID	June 30, 2006 (ITC-6086)
Certification No.	C0052
Sponsor	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
Name of TOE	ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific
Version of TOE	Controller ROM Ver1.101.2
PP Conformance	None
Conformed Claim	EAL2
Developer	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility	Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association, Information Technology Security Center (JEITA ITSC)

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

September 5, 2006

Haruki Tabuchi, Technical Manager  
Information Security Certification Office  
IT Security Center

**Evaluation Criteria, etc.:** This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following criteria prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme".

- Common Criteria for Information-technology Security Evaluation Version 2.3
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 2.3

## Evaluation Result: Pass

"ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific Controller ROM Ver1.101.2" has been evaluated in accordance with the provision of the "IT Security Certification Procedure" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

**Notice:**

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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## 1. Executive Summary

### 1.1 Introduction

This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of “ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific Controller ROM Ver1.101.2” (hereinafter referred to as “the TOE”) conducted by Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association, Information Technology Security Center (hereinafter referred to as “Evaluation Facility”), and it reports to the sponsor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the corresponding ST and manuals (please refer to “1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product” for further details) attached to the TOE together with this report. The assumed environment, corresponding security objectives, security functional and assurance requirements needed for its implementation and their summary specifications are specifically described in ST. The operational conditions and functional specifications are also described in the document attached to the TOE.

Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements conformed to the TOE, and does not certify individual IT product itself.

Note: In this Certification Report, IT Security Evaluation Criteria and IT Security Evaluation Method prescribed by IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme are named CC and CEM, respectively.

### 1.2 Evaluated Product

#### 1.2.1 Name of Product

The target product by this Certificate is as follows:

Name of Product: ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Security Kit  
for Asia Pacific  
Version: Controller ROM Ver1.101.2  
Developer: Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

#### 1.2.2 Product Overview


This product is firmware that is provided as an optional product of ApeosPort 750 I, ApeosPort 650 I, DocuCentre 750 I and DocuCentre 650 I (Fuji Xerox’s digital multifunction machines with copy, printer, and scanner functions. Hereafter “ApeosPort/DocuCentre.”)

This product protects document data that is stored on the hard disk drive when ApeosPort/DocuCentre performs processings of copy, print, and scan from being illicitly disclosed. The following are the security functions provided by this product:

- HDD overwriting for residual data
- HDD data encryption
- Key-operator authentication
- Customer-engineer operation restriction


### 1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation

ApeosPort/DocuCentre consists of three board-units: controller board and control panel. TOE is a set of programs that are recorded in the system ROM mounted on the controller board. TOE's physical configuration image and functions are shown in Figure 1-1.



**Figure 1-1: TOE's Physical Configuration Image**

Usage environment of ApeosPort/DocuCentre with TOE security functions and operation overview is shown below.



**Figure 1-2: Usage Environment**

<Overview of TOE operation related to key operator>

Identification and authentication are performed at the control panel of ApeosPort/DocuCentre or the key-operator’s client. Key operator makes settings described in Table 1-1 after being identified and authenticated as key operator.

**Table 1-1: Setting Data**

Item number	Setting data
1	Setting for HDD overwrite function
2	Setting for using password
3	Key-operator’s password
4	Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function
5	Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator’s ID
6	Setting for HDD data encryption function
7	Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive

<Overview of TOE operation related to general user>

By operating the control panel of ApeosPort/DocuCentre or the user’s client and performing copy, print, or scan, used document data is stored on the hard disk drive built into ApeosPort/DocuCentre. At this time, security functions automatically operate according to the setting data in Table 1-1 before general user knows (when the “setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data” and the “setting for HDD data encryption function” are enabled, used document data is stored after being encrypted, and then overwritten and erased at the time of completion of each processing).

1.2.4 TOE Functionality

TOE has the security functions described below:

<HDD overwriting function for residual data>

After the operation of copy, printer, and scanner functions, this function overwrites and erases used document data stored on the hard disk drive.

<HDD data encryption function>

At the time of the operation of copy, printer, and scanner functions, this function encrypts document data when storing it on the hard disk drive.

<Key-operator authentication function>

This function identifies and authenticates key operator at the control panel or the key-operator's client, and enables only the key operator to make settings on the TOE security functions described below:

- Setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data
- Setting for using password
- Key-operator's password
- Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID
- Setting for HDD data encryption function
- Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive

<Customer-engineer operation restriction function>

This function enables only the key operator to make the setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function.

### 1.3 Conduct of Evaluation

Based on the IT Security Evaluation/Certification Program operated by the Certification Body, TOE functionality and its assurance requirements are being evaluated by evaluation facility in accordance with those publicized documents such as "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[2], "IT Security Certification Procedure"[3] and "Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure"[4].

Scope of the evaluation is as follow.

- Security design of the TOE shall be adequate;
- Security functions of the TOE shall be satisfied with security functional requirements described in the security design;
- This TOE shall be developed in accordance with the basic security design;
- Above mentioned three items shall be evaluated in accordance with the CC Part 3 and CEM.

More specific, the evaluation facility examined "ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Data Security Kit Security Target V1.03" as the basis design of security functions for the TOE (hereinafter referred to as "the ST")[1], the evaluation deliverables in relation to development of the TOE and the development, manufacturing and shipping sites of the TOE. The evaluation facility evaluated if the TOE is satisfied both Annex C of CC Part 1 (either of [5], [8], [11] or [14]) and Functional Requirements of CC Part 2 (either of [6], [9], [12] or [15]) and also evaluated if the development, manufacturing and shipping environments for the TOE is also satisfied with Assurance Requirements of CC Part 3 (either of [7], [10], [13] or [16]) as its rationale. Such evaluation procedure and its result are presented in "ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific Evaluation Technical Report V1.2" (hereinafter referred to as "the Evaluation Technical Report") [22]. Further, evaluation methodology should comply with the CEM (either of [17], [18] or [19]). In addition, the each part of CC and CEM shall include contents of interpretations (either of [20] and [21])

## 1.4 Certification

The Certification Body verifies the Evaluation Technical Report and Observation Report prepared by the evaluation facility and evaluation evidence materials, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation is conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Certification review is also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process. Evaluation is completed with the Evaluation Technical Report dated August, 2006 submitted by the evaluation facility and those problems pointed out by the Certification Body are fully resolved and confirmed that the TOE evaluation is appropriately conducted in accordance with CC and CEM. The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the evaluation facility and concluded fully certification activities.

## 1.5 Overview of Report

### 1.5.1 PP Conformance

There is no PP to be conformed.

### 1.5.2 EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level of TOE defined by this ST is EAL2 conformance.

### 1.5.3 SOF

This ST claims "SOF-basic" as its minimum strength of function. Attack level of the attackers assumed for this TOE is low level. Therefore, the claim of "SOF-basic" as the minimum function strength is appropriate.

### 1.5.4 Security Functions

Security functions of the TOE are as follow.

<HDD overwriting function for residual data (SF.OVERWRITE)>

According to the "setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data" that is set by key operator, this function overwrites and erases the used document data on the hard disk drive using the way described in Table 1-2.

If overwriting of the used document data is not finished such as due to power shutdown, this function overwrites and erases the data at the next system booting because a list of the used document data that is to be overwritten and erased is in the hard disk drive.

**Table 1-2: Control of Overwriting**

Number of overwritings	Data to overwrite with
One time	0
Three times	First time: random number Second time: random number Third time: 0

<HDD data encryption function (SF.ENCRYPTION)>

According the "setting for HDD data encryption function" that is set by key



operator, this function encrypts document data stored on the hard disk drive. At the time of booting, TOE generates cryptographic key using the “cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive” that is set by key operator.

When storing document data on the hard disk drive, TOE stores the document data after performing encryption using the cryptographic key generated at the time of booting. When reading the stored document data, TOE also performs decryption using the cryptographic key generated at the time of booting.

Cryptographic key is lost when the power of the mainframe of ApeosPort/DocuCentre is shut down.

#### <Key-operator authentication function (SF.MANAGE)>

This function controls the operation of TOE setting data so that the operation can be performed by the authenticated key-operator. Before allowing the operation of TOE setting data, this function identifies and authenticates key operator with “key-operator’s user ID” and “key-operator’s password” entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator’s client.

While “key-operator’s password” is being entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator’s client, asterisks (“\*”) of the same number as the characters of the entered password are displayed in the “password” input field of the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator’s client.

When the “key-operator’s user ID” and “key-operator’s password” entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator’s client are correct and the identification/authentication of key operator succeeds, this function allows the operation of TOE setting data. When either of the “key-operator’s user ID” or “key-operator’s password” entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator’s client is incorrect and the identification/authentication of key operator fails, this function displays identification/authentication error. When authentication fails the same number of times as that set in the “access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator’s ID,” this function denies authentication. Only the key operator who is authenticated in the above-described way can set:

- “HDD overwriting function for residual data” to “Not perform,” “Perform (one time),” or “Perform (three times).”
- “setting for using password” to “Not perform” or “Perform.”
- “HDD data encryption function” to “Not perform” or “Perform.”
- “key-operator’s password” to 7 to 12 alphanumeric characters.
- “access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator’s ID” to “Not perform” or “Perform (1 to 10 times).”
- “cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive” to 12 alphanumeric characters.

#### <Customer-engineer operation restriction function (SF.CEREST)>

This function controls the operation of the TOE setting data for “setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function” so that the operation can be performed by the authenticated key-operator. “setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function” can be set to “Not perform” or “Perform”. By setting to “Perform,” customer engineer can be restricted from referring to / changing settings on TOE security functions.

### 1.5.5 Threat

This TOE assumes such threats presented in Table 1-3 and provides functions for countermeasure to them.

**Table 1-3 Assumed Threats**

Identifier	Threat
T.RECOVER <Illicit recovery of used document data>	General user and the person who is not related to TOE might recover used document data such as by removing the hard disk drive and connecting it directly to a tool.
T.CONFDATA <Illicit access to TOE setting data>	General user and the person who is not related to TOE might change settings by accessing TOE setting data from the control panel or key-operator's client. This setting data is allowed to be accessed only by key operator.

### 1.5.6 Organisational Security Policy

No organisational security policies to comply with are required of the TOE utilized in organisations.

### 1.5.7 Configuration Requirements

This product is offered as an optional product that is installed on Fuji Xerox's digital multifunction machines, ApeosPort 750 I, ApeosPort 650 I, DocuCentre 750 I and DocuCentre 650 I.

### 1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment

Assumptions required in environment using this TOE presents in the Table 1-4. The effective performance of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these preconditions are satisfied.

**Table 1-4 Assumptions in Use of the TOE**

Identifier	Assumptions
A.SECMODE <Protection mode>	When operating TOE, key operator makes settings as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key-operator's password: 7 to 12 characters</li> <li>- Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function: "Perform"</li> <li>- Setting for using password: "Perform"</li> <li>- Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID: "Perform" and five times</li> </ul> Additionally, key-operator's password is managed so that it is prevented from being guessed or disclosed.
A.ADMIN <Trust in key operator>	Key operator has knowledge necessary to fulfill the assigned role and does not conduct improperly with malicious intention.

<b>A.NET</b> <b>&lt;Network connection condition&gt;</b>	<b>ApeosPort/DocuCentre that TOE is installed on is connected to an internal network. This internal network constitutes an environment where interceptions are not made.</b> <b>Even when this internal network is connected to an external network, ApeosPort/DocuCentre cannot be accessed from the external network.</b>
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### 1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product

Documents attached to the TOE are listed below.

- ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide Edition 0.3

## 2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility

### 2.1 Evaluation Methods

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in CEM in accordance with the assurance requirements in CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities are report in the Evaluation Technical Report. It described the description of overview of the TOE, and the contents and verdict evaluated by each work unit prescribed in CEM.

### 2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted

The history of evaluation conducted was present in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

Evaluation has started on July, 2006 and concluded by completion the Evaluation Technical Report dated August, 2006. The evaluation facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by developer, and examined the evidences in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the evaluation facility directly visited the development and manufacturing sites on July, 2006 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management and delivery and operation by investigating records and staff hearing. Further, the evaluation facility executed sampling check of conducted testing by developer and evaluator testing by using developer testing environment at developer site on July, 2006.

Concerns found in evaluation activities for each work unit were all issued as Observation Report and were reported to developer. These concerns were reviewed by developer and all problems were solved eventually.

As for concerns indicated during evaluation process by the Certification Body, the certification review was sent to the evaluation facility. These were reflected to evaluation after investigation conducted by the evaluation facility and the developer.


### 2.3 Product Testing

Overview of developer testing evaluated by evaluator and evaluator testing conducted by evaluator are as follows.

#### 2.3.1 Developer Testing

##### 1) Developer Test Environment

System configuration for the test that was conducted by developer is shown in Figure 2-1.



**Figure 2-1 System Configuration of Developer Testing**

## 2) Outlining of Developer Testing

Outlining of the testing performed by the developer is as follow.

### a. Test configuration

Test configuration performed by the developer is showed in the Figure 2-1. Developer testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the TOE configuration identified in ST.

### b. Testing Approach

For the testing, following approach was used.

1. Method of directly observing the behavior of security functions from the external interfaces by stimulating the external interfaces of these functions by operating ApeosPort/DocuCentre and PCs.
2. Method of checking the behavior of the security functions of which behavior cannot be directly observed from the external interfaces (“HDD overwriting function for residual data” and “HDD data encryption function”) using the tools (debug serial and IDE monitor).

Debug serial was connected via the original converter to ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and used for checking the condition of the data in the hard disk drive. IDE monitor was used for checking the contents of the data communicated between the controller board and the hard disk drive in ApeosPort/DocuCentre by monitoring the communicated data. By generating pseudo-errors of the hard disk drive by connecting the trunk cable, which has a switch to turn off the power of the hard disk drive, to the hard disk drive, the test on the operation errors of the overwriting and erasing function was conducted.

### c. Scope of Testing Performed

Testing is performed 26 items by the developer.

The number of test items for testing each security function was as follows:

- HDD overwriting function for residual data: 17 items
- HDD data encryption function: 4 items
- Key-operator authentication function: 4 items
- Customer-engineer operation restriction function: 1 item

The test covered the behavior of each function, and the overall test volume and scope were appropriate.


#### d. Result

The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results and the actual test results provided by the developer. The Evaluator confirmed the developer testing approach performed and legitimacy of items performed, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the test plan and the actual test results.

### 2.3.2 Evaluator Testing

#### 1) Evaluator Test Environment

Configuration of the system used for evaluator testing is shown in Figure 2-2.



**Figure 2-2: System Configuration for Evaluator Testing**

#### 2) Outlining of Evaluator Testing

Outlining of testing performed by the evaluator is as follow.

##### a. Test configuration

Test configuration performed by the evaluator is showed in the Figure 2-2. Evaluator testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the TOE configuration identified in ST.

##### b. Testing Approach

Evaluator conducted the test in the same methods as those for developer testing based on the judgment that the testing methods implemented by developer are suitable to verify the expected behavior of security functions.

c. Scope of Testing Performed

Evaluator conducted the 25-item test (3 items created uniquely by evaluator, 17 items conducted by sampling evaluator testing, and 5 items of intrusion test). The test created uniquely by evaluator was conducted by considering the accuracy of the developer testing for security functions.

For sampling test, 17 items, which are 65 % of the 26 items of the test conducted by developer, were selected.

For intrusion test, vulnerability analysis was conducted based on the result of developer vulnerability analysis, and 5-item test was conducted based on this analysis result.

d. Result

All evaluator testing conducted is completed correctly and could confirm the behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator also confirmed that all the test results are consistent with the behaviour.

## 2.4 Evaluation Result

The evaluator had the conclusion that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

### 3. Conduct of Certification

The following certification was conducted based on each materials submitted by evaluation facility during evaluation process.

1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be reflected.
3. Evidential materials submitted were sampled, its contents were examined, and related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The Evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

Concerns found in certification process were prepared as certification review, which were sent to evaluation facility.

The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in Observation Report and certification review were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report.



## 4. Conclusion

### 4.1 Certification Result

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report, the Observation Report and the related evaluation evidential materials submitted and confirmed that all evaluator action elements required in CC Part 3 are conducted appropriately to the TOE. The Certification Body verified the TOE is satisfied the EAL2 assurance requirements prescribed in CC Part 3.

### 4.2 Recommendations

None

## 5. Glossary

The abbreviations used in this report are listed below.

CC:	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM:	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL:	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP:	Protection Profile
SOF:	Strength of Function
ST:	Security Target
TOE:	Target of Evaluation
TSF:	TOE Security Functions
IIT:	Image Input Terminal
IOT:	Image Output Terminal

The glossaries used in this report are listed below.

General User:	One who uses copy and printer functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.
Key Operator:	One who manages ApeosPort/DocuCentre.
Customer Engineer:	Fuji Xerox's engineer who maintains and repairs ApeosPort/DocuCentre.
Control Panel:	Panel on which the buttons, lamps, and touch panel display that are necessary for operating ApeosPort/DocuCentre are arranged.
User's Client:	Client that is used by general user. General user uses printer functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre by using printer driver that is installed on the user's client.
Key-operator's Client:	Client that is used by key operator. Key operator checks and rewrites TOE setting data for ApeosPort/DocuCentre using the Web browser.
Printer Driver:	Software that converts data on user's client to print data described in page description language (PDL) that can be interpreted by ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Used on user's client.
Printer Function:	Function to decompose and print out print data sent from user's client.

- Storage Print:** Print method in printer function. In this method, bitmap data created by decomposing print data is once stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and printed according to the general-user's instruction from the control panel or when the designated time comes. There are following five methods:
- Security print
  - Sample print
  - Authentication print
  - Time designation print
  - Print that uses mailbox
- Scanner Function:** Function to scan an original in IIT and print out from IOT, according to the general-user's instruction from the control panel. When multiple copies of the same original are instructed to be printed, the document data is
- scanned in IIT,
  - stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre,
  - read from the internal hard disk drive for the same number of times as the number of designated copies, and printed out.
- Scanner Function:** According to the general-user's instruction from the control panel, scans an original in IIT and stores it in an expanded mailbox created in the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. The stored document data is retrieved by network scanner utility on user's client.
- Expanded Mailbox:** Logical box created in the hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. The following can be stored in this box: the document data scanned by scanner function and the document data for the print that uses an expanded mailbox.
- Document Data:** In this ST, "document data" is used as a generic term for the data including all the image information that pass the inside of ApeosPort/DocuCentre when general user uses copy, printer, and scanner functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. The following are included:
- Bitmap data that is printed in IOT when using copy function.
  - Print data sent from user's client and bitmap data created by decomposing the data, when using printer function.
  - Bitmap data that is stored on the internal hard disk drive when using scanner function.
- Used Document Data:** Document data of which use is finished after being stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.
- To Overwrite and Erase:** To overwrite the data area with the specific data when document data stored on the hard disk drive is to be deleted.
- Cryptographic Seed Key:** 12-digit alphanumeric characters that are entered by user. Cryptographic key is generated from this key.

**Cryptographic Key:** 128-bit data that is automatically generated from cryptographic seed key. Encryption is performed using this cryptographic key.

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