

ACO Composition in v3.0

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History of inclusion

- CCv2.x traditionally applied to component TOEs
- What happens when putting together the results of individual component TOEs?
 - = results of two individual component TOEs
- Further analysis is required to determine assurance of the composed TOE


Types of composition

- Layered
 - On same platform
 - Base provides services to dependent
- Examples
 - Database is dependent component on an operating system base component
 - Money purse application is dependent component on a smart card base component


Types of composition

- Peer-to-peer
 - Peers are dependent on each other
 - Mutual dependency can be dealt with through iteration of reliance analysis
 - Reliance becomes blurred when peer-to-peer TOEs are located on the same platform
 - Need to designate one as base:
 - Authentication server is base component for an operating system
 - Audit log server is base component for a firewall appliance

Composition stumbling blocks



Composition Stumbling Blocks




Design information required for new TSF portion

Composition Stumbling Blocks

- What can be done if design evidence is not available?
 - Only evaluate composition at EAL1
 - Take a different approach to assurance... ACO
 - Focused on composition of components certified up to EAL4
 - Does not preclude composition of components above EAL4, but not specifically addressed

Assurance philosophy



Risk mitigation

- Have assurance in individual components
- Identify the portions of products not included in component evaluation
- Perform evaluation activities to mitigate risks that these additional portions contain weaknesses

Composed TOE approach

- Understand how the components interact
 - Reliance of dependent component on base component
- Determine what has previously been evaluated
 - TSFI of base component
- Gain confidence in the “gaps”
 - Mainly rely on testing, use design information available
- When evaluate a composed TOE
 - When both components are certified
 - When the base component has been certified, in parallel to the dependent component evaluation

Composed TOE approach

- Security Target (ASE)
- Reliance analysis (ACO_REL)
- Analysis of assurance measures applied to base component (ACO_COR)
- Details of interfaces and internals (ACO_DEV)
- Guidance for composed TOE (AGD)
- Testing of base component as used on composed TOE (ACO_TBT)
- Vulnerability analysis of composed TOE (ACO_VUL)

Why new class

- Many similarities to component TOE evaluation, but significant differences
- Included additional methodology where possible (e.g. ASE, AGD), which is clearly identified to apply only when evaluating a composed TOE
- New requirements necessary to perform the various impact analyses

Composition Assurance Packages

- The only way of achieving $\langle EAL2 \rangle$ is by applying the requirements in the $\langle EAL2 \rangle$ assurance package.
- There are many different ways of achieving a “level of confidence”
- CAPs provide given levels of confidence for composed TOEs
- EALs provide given levels of confidence for component TOEs

$$CAP\langle a \rangle \neq EAL\langle 2 \rangle$$

Composition Assurance Packages

- CAP applied to two EAL3 TOEs will result in a CAP certificate
- However, CAP has been developed to be levelled along the same lines as EALs.
- CAP does not need to be applied to EAL1 TOEs to be composed, as a “traditional” EAL1 evaluation can still be performed.

How does this relate to systems

- Approach to add components
 - Need to investigate whether addition of components is iterative or can add more than 2 components at once
- Only deals with technology side of systems
 - Not operational or environmental aspects