

Recent Topics on Symmetric Ciphers

- Security and implementation of S-box -

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Overview

- Trends of Block/Hash Primitives and Intel Processors
- Security Issues on S-box
 - *Differential cryptanalysis: Security and related open problems*
 - *Linear cryptanalysis: Security and related open problems*
- Implementation Issues on S-box
 - *Processor Architecture of Pentium and Athlon*
 - *Ordinary Implementation of AES*
 - *Bitslice Implementation of AES and Camellia*

RED: lookup tables & logical
BLUE: arithmetic & logical

1976: **DES** (for hardware)

1987: **RC2** (16bit), **FEAL** (8bit)

1989: **MD2** (16bit)

1990: **MD4** (32bit), **Multi2** (32bit)

1991: **IDEA** (16bit)

1992: **MD5** (32bit)

1994: **RC5** (32bit)

1995: **SHA-1** (32bit)

1996: **MISTY1**

1998: **AES**, **RC6**, **Serpent**, **Mars**, **Blowfish**

2000: **Kasumi**, **Camellia**, **Whirlpool** (64bit)


2002: **SHA-2** (32,64bit)

2004: **ARIA**

70 <u>1971</u> : 4004 (4bit,4KB,740KHz) First processor <u>1974</u> : 8080 (8bit,64KB,2MHz) <u>1978</u> : 8086 (16bit,1MB,5-10MHz) Segment <u>1982</u> : 80286 (16bit,16MB,6-12.5MHz) Protect mode <u>1985</u> : 80386 (32bit,4GB,16-33MHz) Virtual memory <u>1989</u> : 80486 (25-100MHz) on chip L1 cache <u>1993</u> : Pentium (60-200MHz) Superscalar <u>1995</u> : Pentium Pro (150-200MHz) <u>1997</u> : Pentium II (233-1300MHz) 64-bit MMX <u>1999</u> : Pentium III (450-1400MHz) SSE <u>2000</u> : Pentium 4 (-3.4GHz) SSE2 “Northwood” <u>2003</u> : Pentium M (-2.1GHz) <u>2004</u> : Pentium 4 (-3.8GHz) SSE3 “Prescott” EM64T <u>2006</u> : Core (-2.33GHz) <u>2006</u> : Core2(-2.93GHz) SSE4 EM64T	75 80 85 90 95 00 05
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S-Box - a lookup table -

- 6-in/4-out
 - DES design criteria unknown
 - 7-in/7-out, 9-in/9-out
 - MISTY a power function over a Galois field
 - 8-in/8-out
 - AES, Camellia, ARIA (block ciphers)
 - SNOW, MUGI (stream ciphers)
- an inversion over Galois field $GF(2^8)$



Why an inversion over $GF(2^8)$?

(+)

- Suitable for software implementation
- Believed (but not proved) to be strongest against differential and linear cryptanalysis

(-)

- Might be weak against algebraic attacks

Differential attacks and S-box

Differential Uniformity:

$$DP_S(dx,dy) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \#\{x \mid S(x+dx) + S(x) = dy\}$$

Strength against differential attacks:

$$DP_S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \max_{dx \neq 0, dy} DP_S(dx,dy)$$

- (1) $DP_S \geq 2$ for any S .
- (2) If $S(x) = x^3$ then $DP_S = 2$ for odd n .
- (3) If $S(x) = 1/x$ ($S(0) = 0$) then $DP_S = 4$ for even n .

Open Problems 1

- (I) *Find a bijective function S over $GF(2^{2m})$ such that $DP_S=2$.*
- (II) *Find a bijective function S over $GF(2^{2m})$ such that $DP_S=4$ and S is not linearly equivalent to an inversion.*

Remark:

Probably (I) does not exist. Confirmed for $m=2$.

Linear attacks and S-box

Nonlinearity:

$$LP_S(mx, my) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |\#\{x \mid mx \bullet x = my \bullet S(x)\} - 2^{n-1}|$$

Strength against linear attacks:

$$LP_S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \max_{mx, my \neq 0} LP_S(mx, my)$$

- (1) $LP_S \geq 2^{(n-1)/2}$ for any S .
- (2) If $S(x) = x^3$, then $LP_S = 2^{(n-1)/2}$ for odd n .
- (3) If $S(x) = 1/x$ ($S(0) = 0$), then $LP_S \geq 2^{n/2}$ for even n .

Open Problems 2

- (I) *Find a function S over $GF(2^{2m})$ such that $2^{(2m-1)/2} < LP_S < 2^m$.*
- (II) *Find a bijective function S over $GF(2^8)$ not linearly equivalent to an inversion such that $LP_S=2^4$.*

Remark:

Probably (I) does not exist. Confirmed for $m=2$.

x86 Architecture

eax	=	ax	=	ah\al
ebx	=	bx	=	bh\bl
ecx	=	<b(cx)< b=""></b(cx)<>	=	ch\cl
edx	=	dx	=	dhd\l
esi	=	si		
edi	=	di		
ebp	=	bp		
esp	=	sp		

32bit

mm0
mm1
mm2
mm3
mm4
mm5
mm6
mm7

64bit

CISC Instruction Set

```
xor eax, [esi+ebx]
add 12[ebp], al
```

destination source

xmm0
xmm1
xmm2
xmm3
xmm4
xmm5
xmm6
xmm7

128bit

Pentium III & 4: at a glance

Encryption speed of Gladman's Serpent assembly codes optimized for P3

	Pentium III Coppermine	Pentium 4 Northwood	Pentium 4 Prescott
32-bit x86: Straightforward	773	1267	689
64-bit MMX: 2-block parallel	570	1052	1119
128-bit XMM: 4-block parallel	—	656	681

32-bit x86

(cycles/block)

block 1

64-bit MMX

block 1

block 2

128-bit XMM

block 1

block 2

block 3

block 4

Micro-operations (μ ops)

- Pentium instructions are decomposed into RISC-style simple operations (μ ops) at the decoding stage
 - Intel has not published exact details on μ ops
 - Programmers cannot direct read/write a code of micro-operations

Physical Register



```
 xor    eax,[mem] -
```

A Pentium instruction

A diagram illustrating the mapping of assembly instructions to virtual registers. On the left, a horizontal arrow points from the text "ter" to a brace grouping two assembly statements. Above the brace, the text "Virtual Registers" is written in a large, bold font, with a downward-pointing arrow indicating its relationship to the grouped statements.

Virtual Registers

→ {

load	reg1,[mem]
xor	reg2,reg1

Corresponding μ ops

How to measure performance

```
xor eax,eax
cpuid
rdtsc
mov CLK1,eax
xor eax,eax
cpuid
```

Encryption(...,block)

```
xor eax,eax
cpuid
rdtsc
mov CLK2,eax
xor eax,eax
cpuid
```

```
xor eax,eax "Overhead"
cpuid
rdtsc
mov CLK3,eax
xor eax,eax
cpuid
```

/* nothing */

```
xor eax,eax
cpuid
rdtsc
mov CLK4,eax
xor eax,eax
cpuid
```

$$((CLK2-CLK1)-(CLK4-CLK3)) / \text{block}$$

Difficulties in Measurement

- Common Implicit Assumptions
 - Should run in a constant time without interruptions
 - Should take more cycles if an interruption takes place
- These assumptions do not hold on Pentium 4 (?)

HT: Hyperthread	Northwood w/o HT	Northwood with HT
Most frequent cycles	632 cycles	636 cycles
Minimum cycles	632 cycles	600 cycles (very rare)

“Overhead” measurement results

Also Prescott Stepping 3 Revision 0 looks unstable

Advanced Encryption Standard

```
Cipher(byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)])
begin
    byte state[4,Nb]

    state = in

    AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1])           // See Sec. 5.1.4

    for round = 1 step 1 to Nr-1
        SubBytes(state)                   // See Sec. 5.1.1
        ShiftRows(state)                 // See Sec. 5.1.2
        MixColumns(state)                // See Sec. 5.1.3
        AddRoundKey(state, w[round*Nb, (round+1)*Nb-1])
    end for

    SubBytes(state)
    ShiftRows(state)
    AddRoundKey(state, w[Nr*Nb, (Nr+1)*Nb-1])

    out = state
end
```

Figure 5. Pseudo Code for the Cipher.¹




Figure 6. SubBytes () applies the S-box to each byte of the State.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \overset{\circ}{S_{0,c}} \\ \overset{\circ}{S_{1,c}} \\ \overset{\circ}{S_{2,c}} \\ \overset{\circ}{S_{3,c}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} S_{0,c} \\ S_{1,c} \\ S_{2,c} \\ S_{3,c} \end{bmatrix}$$




Figure 9. MixColumns () operates on the State column-by-column.....





Figure 8. ShiftRows () cyclically shifts the last three rows in the State.




Figure 10. AddRoundKey () XORs each column of the State with a word from the key schedule.

One round of AES is simple

ShiftRow+SubBytes+MixColumn

$$\begin{aligned}
 A' &= T0[A_0] \wedge T1[B_1] \wedge T2[C_2] \wedge T3[D_3] \\
 B' &= T0[B_0] \wedge T1[C_1] \wedge T2[D_2] \wedge T3[A_3] \\
 C' &= T0[C_0] \wedge T1[D_1] \wedge T2[A_2] \wedge T3[B_3] \\
 D' &= T0[D_0] \wedge T1[A_1] \wedge T2[B_2] \wedge T3[C_3]
 \end{aligned}$$

AddRoundKey


$$\begin{aligned}
 A &= A' \wedge \text{KeyA} \\
 B &= B' \wedge \text{KeyB} \\
 C &= C' \wedge \text{KeyC} \\
 D &= D' \wedge \text{KeyD}
 \end{aligned}$$

$A, B, C, D, A', B', C', D'$: 4-byte data


A_i : i-th byte of A

T_i : 1KB table (1byte->4bytes)

Another tables in the final round



AES round function in x86



ShiftRow+SubBytes+MixColumn
can be done by a four-time repetition
of the following sequence:

movzx	esi,cl
mov/xor	reg32_2,T2[esi*4]
movzx	esi,ch
mov/xor	reg32_1,T1[esi*4]
shr	ecx,16
movzx	esi,cl
mov/xor	reg32_0,T0[esi*4]
movzx	esi,ch
mov/xor	reg32_3,T3[esi*4]

Our implementation of AES

	Pentium III	Pentium 4 Northwood	Pentium 4 Prescott
μ ops / block	596	654	654
cycles / block	232	251	284
cycles / byte	14.5	15.7	17.8
μ ops / cycles	2.57	2.61	2.30

Slow in Prescott probably due to its high load latency

x86 vs. x64: Registers

64bit		32bit				128bit	
rax	eax	=	ax	=	ah\al	xmm0	
rbx	ebx	=	bx	=	bh\bl	xmm1	
rcx	ecx	=	=	ch\cl	xmm2		
rdx	edx	=	dx	=	dh\dl	xmm3	
rsi	esi	=	si	=	sil	xmm4	
rdi	edi	=	di	=	dil	xmm5	
rbp	ebp	=	bp	=	bpl	xmm6	
rsp	esp	=	sp	=	spl	xmm7	
r8	r8d	=	r8w	=	r8b	xmm8	
r9	r9d	=	r9w	=	r9b	xmm9	
r10	r10d	=	r10w	=	r10b	xmm10	
r11	r11d	=	r11w	=	r11b	xmm11	
r12	r12d	=	r12w	=	r12b	xmm12	
r13	r13d	=	r13w	=	r13b	xmm13	
r14	r14d	=	r14w	=	r14b	xmm14	
r15	r15d	=	r15w	=	r8b	xmm15	

x64: Better and Worse

- (+) more registers, longer registers
- (+) most instructions have a 64-bit form
 - ex) `rol reg32,8 => rol reg64,8`
- (-) longer instruction, inefficient decoding
 - a prefix byte needed for an extended instruction form.
- (-) a 64-bit instruction is not always fast
 - ex) “shift” and “rotate” on Pentium 4

Pentium 4 vs. Athlon 64

Pentium 4 (Prescott core) up to 3.8GHz

- (+) long pipeline stages, high clock frequency
- (+) instructions are cached after being decoded
- (-) poorly documented, never works as Intel claims

Athlon 64 up to 2.8GHz

- (+) high superscalability (5 uops/cycle)
- (+) well documented, less frustrating for programmers
- (-) its decoding stage can be a bottleneck

Instruction Latency/Throughput

Processor	Pentium 4 Prescott (EM64T)		Athlon 64 (AMD64)	
Operand Size	32-bit	64-bit	32-bit	64-bit
mov reg, [mem]	4, 1	4, 1	3, 2	3, 2
mov reg, reg	1, 2.88	1, 2.88	1, 3	1, 3
add/sub reg, reg	1, 2.88	1, 2.88	1, 3	1, 3
xor/and/or reg, reg	1, 2	1, 2	1, 3	1, 3
shr reg, imm	1, 1.75	7, 1	1, 3	1, 3
shl reg, imm	1, 1.75	1, 1.75	1, 3	1, 3
ror/rol reg, imm	1, 1	7, 0.14-1	1, 3	1, 3

latency, throughput

slow 64-bit *right* shifts and 64-bit rotations

Rotate shifts on 64-bit Pentium 4

rol rax,1	rol rax,1
	xor r9,r9
rol rbx,1	rol rbx,1
	xor r9,r9
rol rcx,1	rol rcx,1
	xor r9,r9
rol rdx,1	rol rdx,1
	xor r9,r9
rol rsi,1	rol rsi,1
	xor r9,r9
rol rdi,1	rol rdi,1
	xor r9,r9
rol rbp,1	rol rbp,1

49 cycles (throughput : 1/7) 7 cycles (throughput : 1)

Some Code Examples

	32 bit	64 bit (1)	64 bit (2)
	<pre>xor eax,0[esi+ecx] xor ebx,4[esi+ecx] add ecx,8</pre>	<pre>xor rax,0[rsi+rcx] xor rbx,8[rsi+rcx] add rcx,16</pre>	<pre>xor rax,TABLE+0[rcx] xor rbx,TABLE+8[rcx] add rcx,16</pre>
Length	10 bytes	13 bytes	18 bytes
Pentium 4	2.2 cycles	2.2 cycles	2.2 cycles
Athlon 64	1.0 cycle	1.0 cycle	1.4 – 1.9 cycles

	32 bit	64 bit (1)	64 bit (2)
	<pre>movzx ecx,al xor ebx,[esi+ecx*4] shr eax,8</pre>	<pre>movzx rcx,al xor rbx,[rsi+rcx*8] shr rax,8</pre>	<pre>movzx rcx,al xor rbx,TABLE[rcx*8] shr rax,8</pre>
Length	9 bytes	12 bytes	16 bytes
Pentium 4	1.7 cycles	7.0 cycles	7.0 cycles
Athlon 64	1.0 cycle	1.0 cycle	1.0 cycle

Performance of AES on x64 Processors

- The structure of AES is optimized for 32-bit processors.
- Free from “register starvation” due to 16 general registers.


Performance of AES (128-bit key) on Athlon64/Pentium 4

	AES		
Processors	Athlon 64 64-bit	Pentium 4 64-bit	Pentium 4 32-bit
cycles/block	170	256	284
instructions/cycle	2.74	1.81	-
uops/cycle	3.53	2.34	-

Bitslice Implementation of Block Ciphers

- Introduced by Biham (FSE'97)
- n -block parallel execution using n -bit registers
- 1 software instruction = n simple hardware gates
 - AND, OR, XOR, NOT...
- Very efficient if
 - registers are long
 - registers are many
 - the target algorithm is small in hardware
- Protection against cache timing attack

Principle of Bitslice Implementation




Bitslice and S-box

- Many recent block ciphers have adopted an 8x8 S-box (a lookup table), linearly equivalent to an inversion over $\text{GF}(2^8)$.
 - AES, Camellia, SNOW2.0, ARIA etc
- An inversion over $\text{GF}(2^8)$ is strong against differential/linear attacks (actually best known), but can be weak against cache timing attacks.
- The bitslice implementation can compute an inversion over $\text{GF}(2^8)$ without a table lookup.


Multiplication over $GF(2^{2n})$ using $GF(2^n)$

Basis of $GF(2^{2n})/GF(2^n)$: (1, a)



$$Z_0 + Z_1 a = (X_0 + X_1 a)(Y_0 + Y_1 a) \quad \text{where } \text{Tr}(a)=1$$


Inversion over GF(2^{2n}) using GF(2^n)



$$Z_0 + Z_1 a = 1 / (X_0 + X_1 a) \quad \text{where } \text{Tr}(a) = 1$$


Circuits on GF(2^2)

Addition




```
xor x0,x1
xor y0,y1
```

Multiplication




- (1) mov t0,x1 ; t0 temporary
- (2) xor x1,x0
- (3) and x0,y0
- (4) and t0,y1
- (5) xor y0,y1
- (6) and x1,y0
- (7) xor x1,x0
- (8) xor x0,t0 ; y1 unchanged

Inversion




and x0,x1
not x0

Multiplication/Inversion on GF(2^4)




35 instructions with 3 temp. registers



34 instructions with 4 temp. registers

Inversion on GF(2^8)



177 instructions (156 reg-reg's + 21 mem-reg's)

Implementation Results

The Full AES S-box

Basis Change (before inversion)	Inversion	Basis Change (after inversion)	Constant XOR	Total
12	177	16	(4)	205 (209)

Performance of Bitsliced AES/Camellia on Athlon64/Pentium 4

	AES		Camellia	
Processors	Athlon 64	Pentium 4	Athlon 64	Pentium 4
cycles/block	250	418	243	415
instructions/cycle	2.75	1.66	2.74	1.61
uops/cycle	3.20	1.93	2.99	1.75

Concluding Remarks

- A combination of lookup tables and logical operations is suitable for both software and hardware.
- Understanding hardware is important in doing software.
- Pentium 4 looks a dead end of processor design
 - The long pipeline leads to an overheating problem
 - AMD Athlon64 very often runs faster than Pentium 4
- Parallel encryption will be increasingly important
- Intel's new 'Core' processors go back to Pentium III
 - Bitsliced ciphers can be much faster on Core2