imagio MP 9002/9002T/7502/6002/6002GP series

Security Target

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This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.

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1 ST Introduction

This section describes ST Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview and TOE Description.

1.1 ST Reference

The following are the identification information of this ST.

Title	: imagio MP 9002/9002T/7502/6002/6002GP series Security Target
Version	: 1.00
Date	: 2012-10-10
Author	: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

1.2 TOE Reference

This TOE is a digital multifunction product (hereafter "MFP") with 'Imagio FAX Unit Type36" option installed.

The TOE is identified by the MFP names and the versions of components that constitute the TOE. The identification information of the TOE is shown below.

MFP Names	Ricoh imagio MP 9002/9002T/7502/6002/6002GP	
TOE Versions	So	oftware
	System/Copy	1.00.3
	Network Support	11.90
	Fax	01.00.01
	RemoteFax	01.00.00
	NetworkDocBox	1.00.1
	Web Support	1.00
	Web Uapl	1.00
	animation	1.00
	Scanner (*1)	01.02
	Printer (*1)	1.00
	RPCS	3.12.27
	RPCS Font	1.03
	Data Erase Onb	1.01x
	GWFCU3.5-3(WW) (*1)	01.00.00
	Engine	1.00:01

Table 1 : Identification Information of TOE

OpePanel	1.01
LANG0	1.01
LANG1	1.01
Hard	lware
Ic Key	01020700
Ic Ctlr	03

(*1): "imagio Printer/Scanner Unit Type36" must be installed on the MFP if the versions of Scanner and Printer are not displayed.

Keywords : Digital MFP, Documents, Copy, Print, Scanner, Network, Office, Fax

1.3 TOE Overview

This section defines TOEType, TOE Usage and Major Security Features of TOE.

1.3.1 TOE Type

This TOE is an MFP, which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and outputs documents.

1.3.2 TOE Usage

The operational environment of the TOE is illustrated below and the usage of the TOE is outlined in this section.




Figure 1 : Example of TOE Environment

The TOE is used by connecting to the local area network (hereafter "LAN") and telephone lines, as shown in Figure 1. Users can operate the TOE from the Operation Panel of the TOE or through LAN communications. Below, explanations are provided for the MFP, which is the TOE itself, and hardware and software other than the TOE.

MFP

A machinery that is defined as the TOE. The MFP is connected to the office LAN, and users can perform the following operations from the Operation Panel of the MFP:

- Various settings for the MFP,
- Copy, fax, storage, and network transmission of paper documents,
- Print, fax, network transmission, and deletion of the stored documents.

Also, the TOE receives information via telephone lines and can store it as a document.

LAN

Network used in the TOE environment.

Client computer

A computer that performs as a client of the TOE if it is connected to the LAN, and users can remotely operate the MFP from the client computer. The possible remote operations from the client computer are as follows:

- Various settings for the MFP using a Web browser installed on the client computer,
- Operation of documents using a Web browser installed on the client computer,
- Storage and printing of documents using the printer driver installed on the client computer,
- Storage and faxing of documents using the fax driver installed on the client computer.

Telephone line

A public line for the TOE to communicate with external faxes.

Firewall

A device to prevent the office environment from network attacks via the Internet.

FTP Server

A server used by the TOE for folder transmission of the stored documents in the TOE to its folders.

SMB Server

A server used by the TOE for folder transmission of the stored documents in the TOE to its folders.

SMTP Server

A server used by the TOE for e-mail transmission.

External Authentication Server

A server that identifies and authenticates the TOE user with Windows authentication (Kerberos authentication method). This server is only used when External Authentication is applied. The TOE identifies and authenticates the user by communicating with the external authentication server via LAN.

RC Gate

An IT device used for @Remote. The function of RC Gate for @Remote is to relay communications between the MFP and maintenance centre. A transfer path to other external interface for input information from the RC Gate via network interface is not implemented in the TOE. The RC Gate products include Remote Communication Gate A, Remote Communication Gate Type N, and Remote Communication Gate Type L.

1.3.3 Major Security Features of TOE

The TOE stores documents in it, and sends and receives documents to and from the IT devices connected to the LAN. To ensure provision of confidentiality and integrity for those documents, the TOE has the following security features:

- Audit Function
- Identification and Authentication Function
- Document Access Control Function
- Use-of-Feature Restriction Function
- Network Protection Function
- Residual Data Overwrite Function
- Stored Data Protection Function
- Security Management Function
- Software Verification Function
- Fax Line Separation Function

1.4 TOE Description

This section describes Physical Boundary of TOE, Guidance Documents, Definition of Users, Logical Boundary of TOE, and Protected Assets.

1.4.1 Physical Boundary of TOE

The physical boundary of the TOE is the MFP, which consists of the following hardware components (shown in Figure 2): Operation Panel Unit, Engine Unit, Fax Controller Unit, Controller Board, HDD, Ic ,Ctlr, Network Unit, USB Port, SD Card Slot, and SD Card.




Figure 2 : Hardware Configuration of the TOE

Controller Board

The Controller Board is a device that contains Processors, RAM, NVRAM, Ic Key, and FlashROM. The Controller Board sends and receives information to and from the units and devices that constitute the MFP, and this information is used to control the MFP. The information to control the MFP is processed by the MFP Control Software on the Controller Board. The following describes the components of the Controller Board:

- Processor

A semiconductor chip that performs basic arithmetic processing for MFP operations.

- RAM

A volatile memory medium which is used as a working area for image processing such as compressing/decompressing the image data. It can also be used to temporarily read and write internal information.

- NVRAM

A non-volatile memory medium in which TSF data for configuring MFP operations is stored.

- Ic Key

A security chip that has the functions of random number generation, cryptographic key generation



and digital signature. It has the memory medium inside, and the signature root key is installed before the TOE is shipped.

- FlashROM

A non-volatile memory medium in which the following software components are installed: System/Copy, Network Support, Fax, RemoteFax, Web Support, Web Uapl, NetworkDocBox, animation, LANG0, LANG1, and Data Erase Onb. These are part of the TOE and are included in the MFP Control Software.

Operation Panel Unit (hereafter "Operation Panel")

The Operation Panel is a user interface installed on the TOE and consists of the following devices: key switches, LED indicators, an LCD touch screen, and Operation Control Board. The Operation Control Board is connected to the key switches, LED indicators, and LCD touch screen. The Operation Panel Control Software is installed on the Operation Panel Control Board. The Operation Panel Control Software performs the following:

- 1. Transfers operation instructions from the key switches and the LCD touch screen to the Controller Board.
- 2. Controls the LEDs and displays information on the LCD touch screen according to display instructions from the Controller Board.

OpePanel, which is one of the components that constitute the TOE, is the identifier for the Operation Panel Control Software.

Engine Unit

The Engine Unit consists of Scanner Engine that is an input device to read paper documents, Printer Engine that is an output device to print and eject paper documents, and Engine Control Board. The Engine Control Software is installed in the Engine Control Board. The Engine Control Software sends status information about the Scanner Engine and Printer Engine to the Controller Board, and operates the Scanner Engine or Printer Engine according to instructions from the MFP Control Software. Engine, which is one of the components that constitute the TOE, is the identifier for the Engine Control Software.

Fax Controller Unit (FCU)

The Fax Controller Unit is a unit that has a modem function for connection to a telephone line. It also sends and receives fax data to and from other fax devices using the G3 standard for communication. The Fax Controller Unit sends and receives control information about the Controller Board and the FCU and fax data. FCU Control Software is installed on the FCU. GWFCU3.5-3(WW), which is one of the components that constitute the TOE, is the identifier for the FCU Control Software.

HDD

The HDD is a hard disk drive that is a non-volatile memory medium. It stores documents, login user names and login passwords of normal users.



Ic Ctlr

The Ic Ctlr is a board that implements data encryption and decryption functions. It is provided with functions for HDD encryption realisation.

Network Unit

The Network Unit is an external interface to an Ethernet (100BASE-TX/10BASE-T) LAN.

USB Port

The USB Port is an external interface to connect a client computer to the TOE for printing directly from the client computer. During installation, this interface is disabled.

SD Card/SD Card Slot

There are SD Card Slots for customer engineer and for users.

The SD Card Slot for customer engineer is used when the customer engineer installs the TOE. A cover is placed on the SD Card Slot during the TOE operation so that an SD Card cannot be inserted into or removed from the slot. The SD Card, where Scanner, Printer, RPCS, and RPCS Font are written, is inserted into the slot in advance.

The SD Card Slot for users is used by users to print documents in the SD Card. The slot is set to disabled at the installation.

1.4.2 Guidance Documents

The document sets of this TOE are as follows:

- imagio MP 9002/7502/6002 series User Guide D133-7200
- imagio MP 9002/7502/6002 series Read This First D133-7210
- Notes for Security Guide D129-7872
- Windows 2000 End of Support Information M080-8521
- Note for FAX Unit Installation D643-8640
- Notes on SecurityFunctions D133-7215
- imagio MP 9002/7502/6002 series
 Operating Instructions
 < Notes for Administrators: using this Machine in a Network Environment Compliant with IEEE Std. 2600.1TM-2009> D133-7214
- Operating Instructions Drivers & Utilities imagio MP 9002/9002T/7502/7502SP/ 6002/6002SP D133-7110
- Help 83NHCEJAR1.40 v124

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1.4.3 Definition of Users

This section defines the users related to the TOE. These users include those who routinely use the TOE (direct users) and those who do not (indirect users). The direct users and indirect users are described as follows:

1.4.3.1. Direct User

The "user" referred to in this ST indicates a direct user. This direct user consists of normal users, administrators, and RC Gate. The following table (Table 2) shows the definitions of these direct users.

Definition of Users	Explanation	
Normal user	A user who is allowed to use the TOE A normal user is provided with a login user name and can use Copy Function, Fax Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function, and Document Server Function.	
Administrator	A user who is allowed to manage the TOE An administrator performs management operations, which include issuing login names to normal users.	
RC Gate	An IT device connected to networks. RC Gate performs the @Remote Service Function of the TOE via RC Gate communication interface. Copy Function, Fax Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function, Document Server Function, and Management Function cannot be used.	

Table 2 : Definition of Users

The administrator means the user registered for TOE management. According to its roles, the administrator can be classified as the supervisor and the MFP administrator. Up to four MFP administrators can be registered and selectively authorised to perform user management, machine management, network management, and file management. Therefore, the different roles of the management privilege can be allocated to multiple MFP administrators individually. The "MFP administrator" in this ST refers to the MFP administrator who has all management privileges (Table 3).

Table 3 : List of Administrative Roles

Definition of Administrator	Management Privileges	Explanation
Supervisor	Supervisor	Authorised to modify the login password of the MFP administrator.
MFP administrator	User management privilege	Authorised to manage normal users. This privilege allows configuration of normal user settings.
	Machine management privilege	Authorised to specify MFP device behaviour (network behaviours excluded). This privilege allows configuration of device settings and view of the audit log.

Network management privilege	Authorised to manage networks and configure LAN settings. This privilege allows configuration of network settings.
File management privilege	Authorised to manage stored documents. This privilege allows access management of stored documents.

1.4.3.2. Indirect User

Responsible manager of MFP

The responsible manager of MFP is a person who is responsible for selection of the TOE administrators in the organisation where the TOE is used.

Custome r engineer

The customer engineer is a person who belongs to the organisation which maintains TOE operation. The customer engineer is in charge of installation, setup, and maintenance of the TOE.

1.4.4 Logical Boundary of TOE

The Basic Functions and Security Functions are described as follows:




Figure 3 : Logical Scope of the TOE

1.4.4.1. Basic Functions

The overview of the Basic Functions is described as follows:

Copy Function

The Copy Function is to scan paper documents and copy scanned image data from the Operation Panel. Magnification and other editorial jobs can be applied to the copy image. It can also be stored on the HDD as a Document Server document.

Printer Function

The Printer Function of TOE is to print or store the documents the TOE receives from the printer driver installed on the client computer. It also allows users to print and delete the stored documents from the Operation Panel or a Web browser.

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- Receiving documents from the printer driver installed on the client computer.

The TOE receives documents from the printer driver installed on the client computer. Printing methods for documents is selected by users from the printer driver. The printing methods include direct print, Document Server storage, locked print, stored print, hold print, and sample print.

For direct print, documents received by the TOE will be printed. The documents will not be stored in the TOE.

For Document Server storage, the received documents will be stored on the HDD as Document Server documents.

For locked print, stored print, hold print, and sample print, the received documents will be stored on the HDD as printer documents. A dedicated password, which is used for locked print, is not subject to this evaluation.

- Operating from the Operation Panel The TOE can print or delete printer documents according to the operations by users from the Operation Panel.
- Operating from a Web browser

The TOE can print or delete printer documents according to the operations by users from a Web browser.

- Deleting printer documents by the TOE

The deletion of printer documents by the TOE differs depending on printing methods. If locked print, hold print, or sample print is specified, the TOE deletes printer documents when printing is complete. If stored print is specified, the TOE does not delete printer documents even when printing is complete.

According to the guidance document, users first install the specified printer driver on their own client computers, and then use this function.

Scanner Function

The Scanner Function is for users to scan paper documents by operating from the Operation Panel. The users can send and then save those scanned documents to SMB server, FTP server, and the client computer. The images of the scanned paper documents can be stored in the TOE to be transmitted or deleted afterwards. Methods to transmit documents include folder transmission, e-mail transmission of attachments, and e-mail

transmission of the URL. Folder transmission can be applied only to the destination folders in a server that the MFP administrator

pre-registers in the TOE and with which secure communication can be ensured. Email transmission of attachments and e-mail transmission of the URL are possible only with the mail server and e-mail addresses that the MFP administrator pre-registers in the TOE and with which secure communication can be ensured. Users, who receive e-mails sent by e-mail transmission of the URL, can download scanner documents to the client computer from a Web browser.

Fax Function

As for the Fax Function, the fax complying with the G3 standard, which uses a telephone line, is the target of evaluation. This function consists of Fax Transmission Function and Fax Reception Function.

Fax Transmission Function is to send paper documents or images of electronic documents in the client

computer as documents to external fax devices. Faxes are allowed to be sent only to the telephone numbers that are pre-registered in the TOE. Documents for fax transmission can be stored in the TOE. This is called the Fax Data Storage Function, and those documents stored in the TOE are called fax transmission documents.

Fax transmission documents can be sent by fax, printed, deleted, sent to folders, and sent as attachments by e-mail, all from the Operation Panel. To send documents from the client computer by fax, the fax driver specified in the guidance documents must be installed on the client computer.

A person who sends fax can send the transmission results by e-mail to the e-mail addresses that the MFP administrator pre-registers in the TOE. This is called the E-mail TX Results Function. The person who sends the fax can also send fax transmission documents as attachments by e-mail to the e-mail addresses that the MFP administrator pre-registers in the TOE. The MFP administrator pre-registers the destination servers that provide secure communication with the TOE for folder transmission. Users select the destination server from the servers that the MFP administrator pre-registers, and send data to the folder.

Fax Reception Function is to store documents, which are received from external faxes via a telephone line, in the TOE. The documents stored in the TOE can be printed or deleted from the Operation Panel or a Web browser. Those documents can also be downloaded to the client computer from a Web browser.

Document Server Function

The Document Server Function is to operate documents stored in the TOE by using the Operation Panel and a Web browser.

From the Operation Panel, users can store, print and delete Document Server documents. Also, users can print and delete fax documents.

From a Web browser, users can print and delete Document Server documents, fax, print, download, and delete fax transmission documents. Also, users can send scanner documents to folders, send them by e-mail as attachments, download, and delete them.

Management Function

The Management Function is to control the MFP's overall behaviour. This function can be implemented using the Operation Panel or a Web browser.

Maintenance Function

The Maintenance Function is to perform maintenance service for the MFP if it is malfunctioning. When analysing causes of the malfunction, a customer engineer operates this function from the Operation Panel. The customer engineer will implement this function following the procedures that are allowed to customer engineers only. If the MFP administrator sets the Service Mode Lock Function to "ON", the customer engineer cannot use this function.

In this ST, the Service Mode Lock Function is set to "ON" for the target of evaluation.

Web Function

The Web Function is for the TOE user to remotely control the TOE from the client computer. To control the TOE remotely, the TOE user needs to install the designated Web browser on the client computer following the guidance documents and connect the client computer to the TOE via the LAN.

@Remote Service Function

The @Remote Service Function is for the TOE to communicate with RC Gate via networks for @Remote Service.

In this function, [Proh. Some Services] is selected for @Remote setting information. The scope of evaluation covers the operation with a restriction of access to the protected assets and software of the TOE

1.4.4.2. Security Functions

The Security Functions are described as follows:

Audit Function

The Audit Function is to generate the audit log of TOE use and security-relevant events (hereafter, "audit events"). Also, this function provides the recorded audit log in a legible fashion for users to audit. This function can be used only by the MFP administrator to view and delete the recorded audit log. To view and delete the audit log, the Web Function will be used.

Identification and Authentication Function

The Identification and Authentication Function is to verify persons before they use the TOE. The persons are allowed to use the TOE only when confirmed as the authorised user.

Users can use the TOE from the Operation Panel or via the network. By the network, users can use the TOE from a Web browser, printer/fax driver, and RC Gate.

A person who attempts to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or a Web browser will be required to enter his or her login user name and login password so that he or she can be verified as a normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor.

A person who attempts to use the Printer or Fax Function from the printer or fax driver will be required to enter his or her login user name and login password received from the printer or fax drivers, so thathe or she can be verified as a normal user.

A person who attempts to use the @Remote Service Function from the RC Gate communication interface will be verified whether the communication request is sent from RC Gate.

Methods to verify normal users are Basic Authentication and external server authentication. The users will be verified by the MFP administrator-specified procedure, whereas the MFP administrator and supervisor can be verified only by the Basic Authentication.

This function includes protection functions for the authentication feedback area, where dummy characters are displayed if a login password is entered using the Operation Panel. In addition to this and for the Basic Authentication only, this function can be used to register passwords that fulfil the requirements of the Minimum Character No. (i.e. minimum password length) and obligatory character types the MFP administrator specifies, so that the lockout function can be enabled and login password quality can be protected.

Document Access Control Function

The Document Access Control Function is to authorise the operations for documents and user jobs by the authorised TOE users who are authenticated by Identification and Authentication Function. It allows user's

operation on the user documents and user jobs based on the privileges for the user role, or the operation permissions for each user.

Use-of-Feature Restriction Function

The Use-of-Feature Restriction Function is to authorise the operations of Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function and Fax Function by the authorised TOE users who are authenticated by Identification and Authentication Function. It authorises the use of functions based on the user role and the operation permissions for each user.

Network Protection Function

The Network Protection Function is to prevent information leakage through wiretapping on the LAN and detect data tampering. The protection function can be enabled using a Web browser to specify the URL for possible encrypted communication. If the Printer Function is used, the protection function can be enabled using the printer driver to specify encrypted communication. If the folder transmission function of Scanner Function is used, the protection function can be enabled through encrypted communication. If the email transmission function of Scanner Function is used, the protection function is used, the protection function can be enabled through encrypted communication with communication requirements that are specified for each e-mail address. If the LAN-Fax Transmission Function of Fax Function is used, the protection function can be enabled using the fax driver to specify encrypted communication. When communicating with RC Gate, encrypted communication is used.

Residual Data Overwrite Function

The Residual Data Overwrite Function is to overwrite specific patterns on the HDD and disable the reusing of the residual data included in deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments on the HDD.

Stored Data Protection Function

The Stored Data Protection Function is to encrypt the data on the HDD and protect the data so that data leakage can be prevented.

Security Management Function

The Security Management Function is to control operations for TSF data in accordance with user role privileges or user privileges allocated to normal users, MFP administrator, and supervisor.

Software Verification Function

The Software Verification Function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of the MFP Control Software and FCU Control Software and to ensure that they can be trusted.

Fax Line Separation Function

The Fax Line Separation Function is to restrict input information from the telephone lines so that only fax data can be received and unauthorised intrusion from the telephone lines (same as the "fax line") can be prevented. Also, this function can be used to prohibit transmissions of received faxes so that unauthorised intrusion from the telephone lines to the LAN can be prevented.

1.4.5 Protected Assets

Assets to be protected by the TOE are user data, TSF data, and functions.

1.4.5.1. User Data

The user data is classified into two types: document data and function data. Table 4 defines user data according to these data types.

Туре	Description
Document data	Digitised documents, deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments, which are managed by the TOE.
Function data	Jobs specified by users. In this ST, a "user job" is referred to as a "job".

Table 4 : Definition of User Data

1.4.5.2. TSF Data

The TSF data is classified into two types: protected data and confidential data. Table 5 defines TSF data according to these data types.

Table 5 : Definition of TSF Data

Туре	Description
Protected data	This data must be protected from changes by unauthorised persons. No security threat will occur even this data is exposed to the public. In this ST, "protected data", listed below, is referred to as "TSF protected data". Login user name, Number of Attempts before Lockout, settings for Lockout Release Timer, lockout time, date settings (year/month/day), time settings, Minimum Character No., Password Complexity Setting, auto logout time of the Operation Panel, S/MIME user information, destination folder, Stored Reception File User, document user list, available function list, user authentication method, IPSec setting information, @Remote setting information, and Device Certificate
Confidential data	This data must be protected from changes by unauthorised persons and reading by users without viewing permissions. In this ST, "confidential data", listed below, is referred to as "TSF confidential data". Login password, audit log, and HDD cryptographic key.

1.4.5.3. Functions

The MFP applications (Copy Function, Document Server Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, and Fax Function) that are for management of the document data of user data are classified as protected assets, whose use is subject to restrictions.

1.5 Glossary

1.5.1 Glossary for This ST

For clear understanding of this ST, Table 6 provides the definitions of specific terms.

Table 6 : Specific Terms Related to This ST

Terms	Definitions
MFP Control Software	A software component installed in the TOE. This component is stored in FlashROM and SD Card. The components that identify the TOE include System/Copy, Network Support, Scanner, Printer, Fax, RemoteFax, Web Support, Web Uapl, NetworkDocBox, animation, RPCS, RPCS Font, LANG0, LANG1 and Data Erase Onb.
FCU Control Software	A software component installed in the TOE. This component is stored in the FCU. Among the software components by which the TOE is identified, GWFCU3.5-3(WW) is this.
Login user name	An identifier assigned to each normal user, MFP administrator, and supervisor. The TOE identifies users by this identifier.
Login password	A password associated with each login user name.
Lockout	A type of behaviour to deny login of particular users.
Auto logout	A function for automatic user logout if no access is attempted from the Operation Panel or Web Function before the predetermined auto logout time elapses. Auto logout time for the Operation Panel: Time specified by the MFP administrator within 60 to 999 seconds. Auto logout time for the Web Function: 30 minutes (this cannot be changed by users). This auto logout time is also referred to as "fixed auto logout time".
Minimum Character No.	The minimum number of registrable password digits.
Password Complexity Setting	 The minimum combination of the characters and symbols that can be used as registrable passwords. There are four types of characters: uppercase and lower case alphabets, digits and symbols. There are Level 1 and Level 2 Password Complexity Settings. Level 1 requires a password to be a combination of two or more types of characters and symbols specified above. Level 2 requires a password to be a combination of three or more types of characters and symbols specified above.
Basic Authentication	One of the procedures for identification and authentication of TOE users who are authorised to use the TOE. The TOE authenticates TOE users by using the login user names and the login passwords registered on the TOE.

Terms	Definitions
External Authentication	One of the procedures for identification and authentication of TOE users who are authorised to use the TOE. The TOE authenticates TOE users by using the login user names and the login passwords registered on the external authentication server connected to the MFP via LAN. External Authentication implemented in the TOE includes Windows Authentication, LDAP Authentication, and Integration Server Authentication. Windows Authentication supports NTLM Authentication and Kerberos Authentication. As for this ST, the term "External Authentication" refers to Windows Authentication using Kerberos Authentication method.
HDD	An abbreviation of hard disk drive. In this document, unless otherwise specified, "HDD" indicates the HDD installed on the TOE.
User job	A sequence of operations of each TOE function (Copy Function, Document Server Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function and Fax Function) from beginning to end. A user job may be suspended or cancelled by users during operation. If a user job is cancelled, the job will be terminated.
Documents	General term for paper documents and electronic documents used in the TOE.
Document data attributes	Attributes of document data, such as +PRT, +SCN, +CPY, +FAXOUT, +FAXIN, and +DSR.
+PRT	One of the document data attributes. Documents printed from the client computer, or documents stored in the TOE by locked print, hold print, and sample print using the client computer.
+SCN	One of the document data attributes. Documents sent to IT devices by email or sent to folders, or downloaded on the client computer from the MFP. For these operations the Scanner Function is used.
+CPY	One of the document data attributes. Documents copied by using Printer Function.
+FAXOUT	One of the document data attributes. Documents sent by fax or to folders by using Fax Function.
+FAXIN	One of the document data attributes. Documents received from the telephone line. Documents stored in the TOE after the reception, are also included.
+DSR	One of the document data attributes. Documents stored in the TOE by using Copy Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function, and Fax Data Storage Function. Documents stored in the TOE after being printed with Document Server printing or stored print from the client computer.
Document user list	One of the security attributes of document data. A list of the login user names of the normal users whose access to documents is authorised, and it can be set for each document data. This list does not include the login user names of MFP administrators whose access to the document data is possible for administration.
Stored documents	Documents stored in the TOE so that they can be used with Document Server Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, and Fax Function.
Stored document type	Classification of stored documents according to their purpose of use This includes Document Server documents, printer documents, scanner documents, fax documents, and received fax documents.

Ricon	
Terms	Definitions
Document Server documents	One of the stored document types. Documents stored in the TOE when Document Server storage is selected as the printing method for Copy Function, Document Server Function, and Printer Function.
Printer documents	One of the stored document types. Documents stored in the TOE when any one of locked print, hold printing, and sample print is selected as the printing method for Printer Function.
Scanner documents	One of the stored document types. Documents stored in the TOE using Scanner Function.
Fax documents	One of the stored document types. Documents scanned and stored using Fax Function, and those stored using the LAN Fax.
Received fax documents	One of the stored document types. Documents received by fax and stored. These documents are externally received and whose "users cannot be identified".
MFP application	A general term for each function the TOE provides: Copy Function, Document Server Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function, and Fax Function.
Available function list	A list of the functions (Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function, and Fax Function) that normal users are authorised to access. This list is assigned as an attribute of each normal user.
Operation Panel	A panel that consists of a touch screen LCD and key switches. The Operation Panel is used by users to operate the TOE.
Stored Reception File User	A list of the normal users who are authorised to read and delete received fax documents.
Folder transmission	A function that sends documents from the MFP via networks to a shared folder in an SMB Server by using SMB protocol or that sends documents to a shared folder in an FTP Server by using FTP protocol. The following documents can be delivered to folders: scanned documents using Scanner Function and Fax Function, and scanned and stored documents using Scanner Function and Fax Function. IPSec protects the communication for realising this function.
Destination folder	Destination information for the "folder transmission" function. The destination folder includes the path information to the destination server, the folder in the server, and identification and authentication information for user access. The destination folder is registered and managed by the MFP administrator.
E-mail transmission	A function to send e-mails from the MFP to the client computer via the SMTP Server.
E-mail transmission of attachments	A function to send documents scanned by the Scanner Function or fax transmission documents as e-mail. S/MIME protects the communication for realising this function.
E-mail transmission of the URL	A function to send the URL of scanner documents stored in the MFP by e-mail.
S/MIME user information	Information required for e-mail transmission using S/MIME. Also, this information consists of e-mail address, user certificate, and encryption setting (S/MIME setting). Uniquely provided for each e-mail address, the S/MIME user information is registered and managed by the MFP administrator.

Terms	Definitions
IPSec setting information	Information that determines the action of IPSec of the TOE.
LAN Fax	One of Fax Functions. A function that transmits fax data and stores the documents using the fax driver on client computer. Sometimes referred to as "PC FAX".
@Remote	General term for remote diagnosis mintenance services for the TOE. Also called @Remote Service.
@Remote setting information	Information for the TOE to determine whether the @Remote Service is used with [Proh. Some Services] selected, or set to [Prohibit].
Maintenance centre	The facility where the centre server of @Remote is located.
Repair Request Notification	A function for users to request a repair to the maintenance centre via RC Gate from the TOE.
	The TOE displays the Repair Request Notification screen on the Operation Panel if paper jams frequently occur, or if the door or cover of the TOE is left open for a certain period of time while jammed paper is not removed.

2 Conformance Claim

This section describes Conformance Claim.

2.1 CC Conformance Claim

The CC conformance claim of this ST and TOE is as follows:

CC version for which this ST and TOE claim conformance

Part 1:

Introduction and general model July 2009 Version 3.1 Revision 3 Final (Japanese translation ver.1.0 Final) CCMB-2009-07-001

Part 2:

Security functional components July 2009 Version 3.1 Revision 3 Final (Japanese translation ver.1.0 Final) CCMB-2009-07-002

Part 3:

Security assurance components July 2009 Version 3.1 Revision 3 Final (Japanese translation ver.1.0 Final) CCMB-2009-07-003

- Functional requirements: Part 2 extended
- Assurance requirements: Part 3 conformance

2.2 PP Claims

The PP to which this ST and TOE are demonstrable conformant is:

PP Name/Identification : 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A

Version : 1.0, dated June 2009

Notes: The PP name which is published in Common Criteria Portal is 'IEEE Standard for a Protection Profile in Operational Environment A (IEEE Std 2600.1-2009)".

2.3 Package Claims

The SAR package which this ST and TOE conform to is EAL3+ALC_FLR.2.

The selected SFR Packages from the PP are:

2600.1-PRT conformant

2600.1-SCN conformant

2600.1-CPY conformant

2600.1-FAX conformant

2600.1-DSR conformant

2600.1-SMI conformant

2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale

2.4.1 Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP

The targeted product type by the PP is the Hardcopy devices (hereafter, HCDs). The HCDs consist of the scanner device and print device, and have the interface to connect telephone line. The HCDs combine these devices and equip one or more functions of Copy Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function or Fax Function. The Document Server Function is also available when installing the non-volatile memory medium, such as hard disk drive, as additional equipments.

The MFP is the type of this TOE. The MFP has the devices the HCDs have, and equips the functions that HCDs equip including the additional equipments. Therefore, this TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PP.

2.4.2 Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP

Defining all security problems in the PP, P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT were augmented to the security problem definitions in chapter 3. Defining all security objectives in the PP, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT were augmented to the security objectives in chapter 4. Described below are the rationale for these augmented security problems and security objectives that conform to the PP.

Although the PP is written in English, the security problem definitions in chapter 3 and security objectives in chapter 4 are translated from English into Japanese. If the literal translation of the PP was thought to be difficult for readers to understand the PP in Japanese, the translation was made comprehensible. This, however, does not mean that its description deviates from the requirements of the PP conformance. Also, the description is neither increased nor decreased.

Augmentation of P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED

P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED encrypt data on HDD and satisfy both other organisational security policies in the PP and security objectives of the TOE. Therefore, P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED were augmented but still conform to the PP.

Augmentation of P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT

P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT refer to security problems and security objectives respectively, both of which are concerned with communications between the TOE and RC Gate. These communications are not assumed in the PP, so that they are independent from the PP. Neither transmission nor reception of the protected assets defined in the PP takes place in the communication between the TOE and RC Gate. Also, the protected assets are not operated from the RC Gate. For these reasons, these communications do not affect any security problems and security objectives defined in the PP. Therefore, P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT were augmented, yet still conform to the PP.

For those points mentioned above, the security problems and security objectives in this ST are consistent with those in the PP.

2.4.3 Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP

The SFRs for this TOE consist of the Common Security Functional Requirements, 2600.1-PRT, 2600.1-SCN, 2600.1-CPY, 2600.1-FAX, 2600.1-DSR, and 2600.1-SMI.

The Common Security Functional Requirements are the indispensable SFR specified by the PP. 2600.1-PRT, 2600.1-SCN, 2600.1-CPY, 2600.1-FAX, 2600.1-DSR, and 2600.1-SMI are selected from the SFR Package specified by the PP.

2600.1-NVS is not selected because this TOE does not have any non-volatile memory medium that is detachable.

Although the security requirements of this ST were partly augmented and instantiated over the security requirements of the PP, they are still consistent with the PP. Described below are the parts augmented and instantiated with the reasons for their consistency with the PP.

Augmentation of FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, and FAU_SAR.2

FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, and FAU_SAR.2 are augmented according to PP APPLICATION NOTE7 in order for the TOE to maintain and manage the audit logs.

Augmentation of FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_SOS.1

For the Basic Authentication function of the TOE, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_SOS.1 are augmented according to PP APPLICATION NOTE36.

Refinement of FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), and FIA_SOS.1

For authentication of normal users of this TOE, Basic Authentication conducted by the TOE and authentication conducted by the external authentication server can be used. According to PP APPLICATION NOTE 35, the authentications of users are assumed to be executed by the TOE or external IT devices. For this reason, both Basic Authentication and External Authentication comply with the PP. The refinement of FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), and FIA_SOS.1 is to identify these authentication methods; it is not to change the security requirements specified by the PP.

Augmentation and Refinement of FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2

Since the identification and authentication method for RC Gate differs from the identification and authentication methods for normal users or administrator, FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 are augmented according to PP APPLICATION NOTE 37 and PP APPLICATION NOTE 41, aside from FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a) and FIA_UID.1(b).

The refinement of FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 is to identify the identification and authentication method for normal users or administrator and the identification and authentication method for RC Gate; it is not to change the security requirements specified by the PP.

Ownership of Received Fax Documents

For the ownership of the received fax documents, the TOE has the characteristic that the ownership of the document is assigned to the intended user. This is according to PP APPLICATION NOTE 93.

Augmentation of FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1

This TOE claims O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED as the security objectives for the data protection applied to non-volatile memory media that are neither allowed to be attached nor removed by the administrator. To fulfil this claim, additional changes were augmented to the functional requirements FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1 and to the functional requirements interdependent with FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1; however, these changes still satisfy the functional requirements demanded in the PP.

Augmentation of information protected by FTP_ITC.1

FTP_ITC.1 was changed in this TOE. This change only augmented communication with RC Gate via LAN on the information protected by FTP_ITC.1 that the PP requires; it is to restrict the requirements in the PP. Therefore, this satisfies the functional requirements demanded in the PP.

Augmentation of restricted forwarding of data to external interface (FPT_FDI_EXP)

This TOE, in accordance with the PP, extends the functional requirement Part 2 due to the addition of the restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP).

Consistency Rationale of FDP_ACF.1(a)

While FDP_ACF.1.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1.2(a) in the PP require the access control SFP to the document data that is defined for each SFR package in the PP, this ST requires the access control SFP to the document data that is defined for each document data attribute, which is the security attribute for objects. This is not a deviation from the PP but an instantiation of the PP.

Although FDP_ACF.1.3(a) in the PP has no additional rules on access control of document data and user jobs, this ST allows the MFP administrator to delete document data and user jobs.

The TOE allows the MFP administrator to delete document data and user jobs on behalf of normal users who are privileged to delete them in case normal users cannot execute such privileges for some reasons. This does not deviate from the access control SFP defined in the PP.

Although FDP_ACF.1.4(a) in the PP has no additional rules on access control of document data and user jobs, this ST rejects supervisor and RC Gate to operate document data and user jobs.

Supervisor and RC Gate are not identified in the PP and are the special users for this TOE.

This indicates that the PP does not allow users to operate the TOE, unless they are identified as the users of document data and user jobs.

Therefore, FDP_ACF.1(a) in this ST satisfies FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP.

Additional Rules on FDP_ACF.1.3(b)

While FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in the PP allows users with administrator privileges to operate the TOE functions, this ST allows them to operate Fax Reception Function only, which is part of the TOE functions.

The TOE allows the MFP administrator to delete document data and user jobs (document access control SFP, FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a)), and as a result, the TSF restrictively allows the MFP administrator to access the TOE functions. Therefore, the requirements described in FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in the PP are satisfied at the same time. The fax reception process, which is accessed when receiving from a telephone line, is regarded as a user with administrator privileges.

Therefore, FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in this ST satisfies FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in the PP.

3 Security Problem Definitions

This section describes Threats, Organisational Security Policies and Assumptions.

3.1 Threats

Defined and described below are the assumed threats related to the use and environment of this TOE. The threats defined in this section are unauthorised persons with knowledge of published information aboutthe TOE operations and such attackers are capable of Basic attack potential.

T.DOC.DIS	Document disclosure
	Documents under the TOE management may be disclosed to persons without a login user name, or to persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document.
T.DOC.ALT	Document alteration
	Documents under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document.
T.FUNC.ALT	User job alteration
	User jobs under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the user job.
T.PROT.ALT	Alteration of TSF protected data
	TSF Protected Data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Protected Data.
T.CONF.DIS	Disclosure of TSF confidential data
	TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management may be disclosed to persons without a login user name, or to persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
T.CONF.ALT	Alteration of TSF confidential data
	TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Confidential Data.

3.2 Organisational Security Policies

The following organisational security policies are taken:

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION User identification and authentication

Only users with operation permission of the TOE shall be authorised to use the TOE.

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION Software verification

Procedures shall exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.

P.AUDIT.LOGGING Management of audit log records

The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events. The audit log shall be protected from unauthorised disclosure or alteration, and shall be reviewed by authorised persons.

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT Management of external interfaces

To prevent unauthorised use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces shall be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.

P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION Encryption of storage devices

The data stored on the HDD inside the TOE shall be encrypted.

P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT Protection of communication with RC Gate

As for communication with RC Gate, the TOE shall protect the communication data between itself and RC Gate.

3.3 Assumptions

The assumptions related to this TOE usage environment are identified and described.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED Access management

According to the guidance document, the TOE is placed in a restricted or monitored area that provides protection from physical access by unauthorised persons.

A.USER.TRAINING User training

The responsible manager of MFP trains users according to the guidance document and users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation and are competent to follow those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrator training

Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, are competent to correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with the guidance document following those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRUST Trusted administrator

The responsible manager of MFP selects administrators who do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance document.

4 Security Objectives

This section describes Security Objectives for TOE, Security Objectives of Operational Environment and Security Objectives Rationale.

4.1 Security Objectives for TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE.

O.DOC.NO_DIS Protection of document disclosure The TOE shall protect documents from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document. O.DOC.NO_ALT Protection of document alteration The TOE shall protect documents from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document. O.FUNC.NO_ALT Protection of user job alteration The TOE shall protect user jobs from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission tothe job. O.PROT.NO_ALT Protection of TSF protected data alteration The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Protected Data Protection of TSF confidential data disclosure O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Confidential Data O.CONF.NO_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access

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permission to the TSF Confidential Data

O.USER.AUTHORIZED User identification and authentication

The TOE shall require identification and authentication of users and shall ensure that users are authorised in accordance with security policies before allowingthem to use the TOE.

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED Management of external interfaces by TOE

The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with the security policies.

O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED Software verification

The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.

O.AUDIT.LOGGED Management of audit log records The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events in the MFP and prevent its unauthorised disclosure or alteration.

O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED Encryption of storage devices

The TOE shall ensure that the data is encrypted first and then stored on the HDD.

O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT Protection of communication with RC Gate

The TOE shall conceal the communication data on the communication path between itself and RC Gate, and detect any tampering with those communication data.

4.2 Security Objectives of Operational Environment

This section describes the security objectives of the operational environment.

4.2.1 IT Environment

OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED Audit log protection in trusted IT products

If audit logs are exported to a trusted IT product, the responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that those logs are protected from unauthorised access, deletion and modifications.

OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED Audit log access control in trusted IT products

If audit logs are exported to a trusted IT product, the responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that those logs can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorised persons.

OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED

Management of external interfaces in IT environment

The IT environment shall take a countermeasure for the prevention of unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces.

4.2.2 Non-IT Environment

OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED Physical management

According to the guidance document, the TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides protection from physical access to the TOE by unauthorised persons.

OE.USER.AUTHORIZED Assignment of user authority

The responsible manager of MFP shall give users the authority to use the TOE in accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation.

OE.USER.TRAINED User training

The responsible manager of MFP shall train users according to the guidance document and ensure that users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation and have the competence to follow those policies and procedures.

OE.ADMIN.TRAINED Administrator training

The responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation; have the training, competence, and time to follow the guidance document; and correctly configure and operate the TOE according to those policies and procedures.

OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED Trusted administrator

The responsible manager of MFP shall select administrators who will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance document.

OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED Log audit

The responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals according to the guidance document for detecting security violations or unusual patterns of activity.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes the rationale for security objectives. The security objectives are for upholding the assumptions, countering the threats, and enforcing the organisational security policies that are defined.

4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives

Table 7 describes the correspondence between the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies, and each security objective.

	0.DOC.NO_DIS	0.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	0.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	OE.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	0.AUDIT.LOGGED	OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTCTED	OE.AUDIT_ACCESS_AUTHORIZED	OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED	0.INTERFACE.MANAGED	OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED	OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED	O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT	OE.ADMIN.TRAINED	OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED	OE.USER.TRAINED
T.DOC.DIS	X						Х	Х													
T.DOC.ALT		Х					Х	Х													
T.FUNCALT			X				Х	х													
T.PROT.ALT				Х			Х	х													
T.CONF.DIS					Х		Х	Х													
T.CONF.ALT						Х	Х	х													
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION							Х	Х													
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION									X												
P.AUDIT.LOGGING										Х	Х	Х	Х								
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT														Х		Х					
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION																	Х				
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT																		X			
A.ACCESS.MANAGED															X						
A.ADMIN.TRAINING																			Х		
A.ADMIN.TRUST																				X	
A.USER.TRAINING																					X

Table 7 : Rationale for Security Objectives

4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions

The following describes the rationale for each security objective being appropriate to satisfy the threats, assumptions and organisational security policies.

T.DOC.DIS

T.DOC.DIS is countered by O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.

By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.DOC.NO_DIS, the TOE protects the documents from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to those documents.

T.DOC.DIS is countered by these objectives.

T.DOC.ALT

T.DOC.ALT is countered by O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.

By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.DOC.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the documents from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document.

T.DOC.ALT is countered by these objectives.

T.FUNC.ALT

T.FUNC.ALT is countered by O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.

By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.FUNC.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the user jobs from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the user job.

T.FUNC.ALT is countered by these objectives.

T.PROT.ALT

T.PROT.ALT is countered by O.PROT.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED. By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security

policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.PROT.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the TSF protected

data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF protected data.

T.PROT.ALT is countered by these objectives.

T.CONF.DIS

T.CONF.DIS is countered by O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.

By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.CONF.NO_DIS, the TOE protects the TSF confidential data from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF confidential data.

T.CONF.DIS is countered by these objectives.

T.CONF.ALT

T.CONF.ALT is countered by O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.

By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.CONF.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the TSF confidential data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, α by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF confidential data.

T.CONF.ALT is countered by these objectives.

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION is enforced by O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.

By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed to use the TOE.

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION is enforced by these objectives.

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION is enforced by O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED.

By O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED, the TOE provides measures for self-verifying the executable code of the TSF.

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION is enforced by this objective.



P.AUDIT.LOGGING

P.AUDIT.LOGGING is enforced by O.AUDIT.LOGGED, OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED, OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED and OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED.

By O.AUDIT.LOGGED, the TOE creates and maintains a log of TOE use and security-relevant events in the MFP and prevents its unauthorised disclosure or alteration.

By OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED, the responsible manager of MFP reviews audit logs at appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity according to the guidance document.

By OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED, if audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the responsible manager of MFP protects those records from unauthorised access, deletion and alteration. By OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP ensures that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorised persons.

P.AUDIT.LOGGING is enforced by these objectives.

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT is enforced by O.INTERFACE.MANAGED and OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED.

By O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, the TOE manages the operation of the external interfaces in accordance with the security policies. By OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED, the TOE constructs the IT environment that prevents unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces.

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT is enforced by these objectives.

P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION

P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION is enforced by O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED.

By O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED, the TOE shall encrypt the data to be written on the HDD, and written on the HDD shall be those encrypted data.

P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION is enforced by this objective.

P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT

P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is enforced by O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT. By O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT, the TOE shall conceal the communication data on the communication path between itself and RC Gate, and detect any tampering with those communication data. P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is enforced by this objective.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED

A.ACCESS.MANAGED is upheld by OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED.

By OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED, the TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment according to the guidance documents and is protected from the physical access by the unauthorised persons. A.ACCESS.MANAGED is upheld by this objective.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING

A.ADMIN.TRAINING is upheld by OE.ADMIN.TRAINED.

By OE.ADMIN.TRAINED, the responsible manager of MFP ensures that the administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of heir organisation. For this, the administrators have the training, competence, and time to follow the guidance documents, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING is upheld by this objective.

A.ADMIN.TRUST

A.ADMIN.TRUST is upheld by OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED.

By OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED, the responsible manager of MFP selects the administrators and they will not abuse their privileges in accordance with the guidance documents.

A.ADMIN.TRUST is upheld by this objective.

A.USER.TRAINING

A.USER.TRAINING is upheld by OE.USER.TRAINED.

By OE.USER.TRAINED, the responsible manager of MFP instructs the users in accordance with the guidance documents to make them aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, and the users follow those policies and procedures.

OE.USER.TRAINED is upheld by this objective.

5 Extended Components Definition

This section describes Extended Components Definition.

5.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces(FPT_FDI_EXP)

Family behaviour

This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external interface to another external interface.

Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products mayprovide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE ordevices that are connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.

Component levelling:

FPT_FDI_EXP: Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

| 1

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the functionality torequire TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role.

Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities
- b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role
- c) Revocation of such an allowance

Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

Rationale:

Quite often, a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples

are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that—if allowed at all—can only be allowed by an authorized role.

It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component.

The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP class. However, in this Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both user data and TSF data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this functionality.

This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and it could therefore be placed in either the FDP or the FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this led the authors to define a new family with just one member.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

 Hierarchical to:
 No other components

 Dependencies:
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

 FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1
 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data recomposition

 FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1
 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: the Operation Panel, LAN, telephone line] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: the LAN and telephone line].

6 Security Requirements

This section describes Security Functional Requirements, Security Assurance Requirements and Security Requirements Rationale.

6.1 Security Functional Requirements

This section describes the TOE security functional requirements for fulfilling the security objectives defined in section 4.1. The security functional requirements are quoted from the requirement defined in the CC Part2. The security functional requirements that are not defined in CC Part2 are quoted from the extended security functional requirements defined in the PP (*IEEE Standard for a Protection Profile in Operational Environment A (IEEE Std 2600.1-2009)*).

The part with assignment and selection defined in the [CC] is identified with **[bold face and brackets]**. The part with refinement is identified with (refinement:).

6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1	 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [selection: not specified] level of audit; and c) [assignment: auditable events of the TOE shown in Table 8].
FAU_GEN.1.2	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (f applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: types of job for FDP_ACF.1(a), all login user names that attempted the user identification for FIA_UID.1, communication direction of Web Function, communication IP address of the communication used for Web Function and folder transmission, recipient's e-mail address used for e-mail transmission of attachments, communication direction of communication with RC Gate, lockout operation type, Locked out User, and Locked out User who is to be released].

Table 8 shows the action (CC rules) recommended by the CC as auditable for each functional requirement and the corresponding auditable events of the TOE.

Functional Requirements	Actions Which Should Be Auditable	Auditable Events
FDP_ACF.1(a)	a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP.	Original: - Start and end operation of storing document data.
	b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP.c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check.	 Start and end operation of printing document data. Start and end operation of downloading document data. Start and end operation of faxing document data. Start and end operation of sending document data as attachments by e-mail. Start and end operation of sending document data to folder. Start and end operation of deleting document data.
		sending to folder, and deleting", are the job types of additional information that are required by the PP.
FDP_ACF.1(b)	 a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check. 	Original: Not recorded.
FIA_AFL.1	a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).	a) Minimal: Starting and releasing lockout
FIA_UAU.1(a)	 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism; c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions performed before authentication of the user. 	b) Basic: Success and failure of login operation

Table 8 : List of Auditable Events

FIA_UAU.1(b)	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism;b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism;c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions performed before authentication of the user.	b) Basic: Success and failure of login operation
FIA_UAU.2	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism;b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism.	b) Basic: Success and failure of login operation
FIA_UID.1(a)	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided;b) Basic: All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.	b) Basic: Success and failure of login operation. Also includes the user identification that is required by the PP as the additional information.
FIA_UID.1(b)	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided;b) Basic: All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.	b) Basic: Success and failure of login operation. Also includes the user identification that is required by the PP as the additional information.
FIA_UID.2	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, induding the user identity provided;b) Basic: All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.	b) Basic: Success and failure of login operation
FMT_SMF.1	a) Minimal: Use of the management functions.	a) Minimal: Record of management items in Table 26.
FMT_SMR.1	a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users that are part of a role;b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.	No record due to no modification.
FPT_STM.1	a) Minimal: changes to the time;b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.	a) Minimal: Settings of Year-Month-Day and Hour-Minute
FTA_SSL.3	a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism.	a) Minimal: Termination of session by auto logout.
FTP_ITC.1	 a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channel functions. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted channel functions. d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and target of all trusted channel functions. 	a) Minimal: Failure of communication with trusted channel.

FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

Hierarchical to:	No other components.	
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- Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
- FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
- FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection: prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

- Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
- FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [assignment: no other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

- Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
- FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: the MFP administrators] with the capability to read [assignment: all of log items] from the audit records.
- FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
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Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction



FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm in Table 9] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes in Table 9] that meet the following: [assignment: standards in Table 9].

Table 9 : List of Cryptographic Key Generation

Кеу Туре	Standard	Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Size
HDD cryptographic key	BSI-AIS31	TRNG	256 bits

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1	The TSF shall perform [assignment: cryptographic operations shown in Table 10] in
	accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm
	shown in Table 10] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes shown
	in Table 10] that meet the following: [assignment: standards shown in Table 10].

Table 10 : List of Cryptographic Operation

Кеу Туре	Standard	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Size	Cryptographic Operation
HDD cryptographic	FIPS197	AES	256 bits	- Encryption when writing the data on HDD
key				- Decryption when reading the data from HDD

6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection

FDP_ACC.1(a) Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objectsin Table 11].



Subjects	 Normal user process MFP administrator process
	- Supervisor process
	- RC Gate process
Objects	- Document data - User jobs
Operations	- Read
	- Delete

 Table 11 : List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (a)

FDP_ACC.1(b) Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1(b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects in Table 12].

Table 12 : List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (b)

Subjects	 Normal user process MFP administrator process Supervisor process RC Gate process
Object	- MFP application
Operation	- Execute

FDP_ACF.1(a) Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP_ACF.1.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: documentaccess control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: subjects or objects, and their corresponding security attributes shown in Table 13].

Table 13 : Subjects, Objects and Security Attributes (a)

Category	Subjects or Objects	Security Attributes
Subject	Normal user process	- Login user name of normal user - User role
Subject	MFP administrator process	- User role
Subject	Supervisor process	- User role
Subject	RC Gate process	- User role

Object	Document data	- Document data attribute - Document user list
Object	User job	- Login user name of normal user

FDP_ACF.1.2(a) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules to control operations among subjects and objects shown in Table 14].

Objects	Document Data Attributes	Operations	Subjects	Rules to control Operations
Document data	+PRT	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+PRT	Read	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+SCN	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+SCN	Read	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+FAXOUT	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+FAXOUT	Read	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+FAXIN	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process with login user name of normal user registered on document user list for document data.
Document data	+FAXIN	Read	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process with login user name of normal user registered on document user list for document data.
Document data	+CPY	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.
Document data	+CPY	Read	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process that created the document data.

Table 14 : Rules to Control Operations on Document Data and User Jobs (a)



Document data	+DSR	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process with login user name of normal user registered on document user list for document data.
Document data	+DSR	Read	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process with login user name of normal user registered on document user list for document data.
User jobs	No setting of document data attribute	Delete	Normal user process	Not allowed. However, it is allowed for normal user process with login user name of normal user, which is the security attribute of user jobs.

FDP_ACF.1.3(a) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules to control operations among subjects and objects shown in Table 15].

Objects	Document Data Attributes	Operations	Subjects	Rules to control Operations
Document data	+PRT	Delete	MFP administrator process	Allows.
Document data	+FAXIN	Delete	MFP administrator process	Allows.
Document data	+DSR	Delete	MFP administrator process	Allows.
User jobs	No setting of document data attribute	Delete	MFP administrator process	Allows.

FDP_ACF.1.4(a) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: deny the operations on the document data and user jobs in case of supervisor process or RC Gate process].

FDP_ACF.1(b) Security attribute-based access control

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation



FDP_ACF.1.1(b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: subjects or objects, and their corresponding security attributes shown in Table 16].

Category	Subjects or Objects	Security Attributes
Subject	Normal user process	 Login user name of normal user Available function list User role
	Supervisor process	- User role
	RC Gate process	- User role
Object	MFP application	- Function type

Table 16 : Subjects, Objects and Security Attributes (b)

FDP_ACF.1.2(b) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rule to control operations among objects and subjects shown in Table 17].

Table 17 : Rule to Control Operations on MFP Applications (b)

Object	Operation	Subject	Rule to control Operations
MFP application	Execute	Normal user process	Allows executing MFP application which MFP administrator allowed in available function list for normal user process.

FDP_ACF.1.3(b) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules that the Fax Reception Function operated using administrator permission is surely permitted].

FDP_ACF.1.4(b) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: deny an operation on MFP application in case of supervisor process or RC Gate process].

FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: user documents].

6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: 1 to 5]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: the authentication events of Basic Authentication shown in Table 18].

Table 18 : List of Authentication Events of Basic Authentication

Authentication Events
User authentication using the Operation Panel
User authentication using the TOE from client computer Web browser
User authentication when printing from the client computer
User authentication when using LAN Fax from client computer

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met], the TSF shall [assignment: perform actions shown in Table 19].

Table 19 : List of Actions for Authentication Failure

Unsuccessfully Authenticated Users	Actions for Authentication Failure
Normal user	The lockout for the normal user is released by the lockout time set by the MFP administrator, or release operation by the MFP administrator.
Supervisor	The lockout for a supervisor is released by the lockout time set by the MFP administrator, release operation by the MFP administrator, or elapse of a given time after the TOE's restart.
MFP administrator	The lockout for the MFP administrator is released by the lockout time set by the MFP administrator, release operation by a supervisor, or elapse of a given time after the TOE's restart.

FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: the security attributes listed in Table 20 for each user in Table 20].

Users	List of Security Attributes
Normal user	 Login user name of normal user User role Available function list
Supervisor	- User role
MFP administrator	 Login user name of MFP administrator User role
RC Gate	- User role

Table 20 : List of Security Attributes for Each User That Shall Be Maintained

FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

- FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (refinement: secrets used in Basic Authentication) meet [assignment: the following quality metrics].
- (1) Usable character and types:

Upper-case letters: [A-Z] (26 letters) Lower-case letters: [a-z] (26 letters) Numbers: [0-9] (ten digits) Symbols: SP (spaces) ! " # \$ % & '() * + , - . / : ; <=> ? @ [\]^_` { | } ~ (33 symbols)

(2) Registrable password length:

For normal users:

No fewer than the minimum character number specified by MFP administrator (8-32 characters) and no more than 128 characters.

For MFP administrators and a supervisor:

No fewer than the minimum character number specified by MFP administrator (8-32 characters) and no more than 32 characters.

(3) Rule:

Passwords that are composed of a combination of characters based on the password complexity setting specified by the MFP administrator can be registered. The MFP administrator specifies either Level 1 or Level 2 for password complexity setting.

FIA_UAU.1(a) Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.1.1(a) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, Web Image Monitor Help from a Web browser, system status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated (refinement: authentication with Basic Authentication).

FIA_UAU.1.2(a) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.1(b) Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.1.1(b) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, Web Image Monitor Help from a Web browser, system status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated (refinement: authentication of MFP administrator and supervisor with Basic Authentication, and authentication of normal user with external authentication server).

FIA_UAU.1.2(b) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated (refinement: authentication of a person who intends to use the TOE from RC Gate communication interface) before allowing other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

- Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: displaying dummy letters as authentication feedback on the Operation Panel] to the user while the authentication is in progress.

FIA_UID.1(a) Timing of identification

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA_UID.1.1(a) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, Web Image Monitor Help from a Web browser, system status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified (refinement: identification with Basic Authentication).
- FIA_UID.1.2(a) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UID.1(b) Timing of identification

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UID.1.1(b) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, Web Image Monitor Help from a Web browser, system status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before

the user is identified (refinement: authentication of MFP administrator and supervisor with Basic Authentication, and identification of normal user with external authentication server).

FIA_UID.1.2(b) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UID.2 User identification before action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1Timing of identification

- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified (refinement: identification of a person who intends to use the TOE from RC Gate communication interface) before allowing other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

- FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: login user name of normal user, login user name of MFP administrator, available function list, and user role].
- FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes listed in Table 21].

Table 21 : Rules for Initial Association of Attributes

Users	Subjects	User Security Attributes
Normal user	Normal user process	 Login user name of normal user User role Available function list
Supervisor	Supervisor process	- User role
MFP administrator	MFP administrator process	 Login user name of MFP administrator User role
RC Gate	RC Gate process	- User role

FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: none].

6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management

FMT_MSA.1(a)Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]



FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function

FMT_MSA.1.1(a)The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] to restrict the ability to [selection: query, modify, delete, [assignment: newly create]] the security attributes [assignment: security attributes in Table 22] to [assignment: the user roles with operation permission in Table 22].

Security Attributes	Operations	User Roles with Operation Permission
Login user name of normal user for Basic Authentication	Query, modify, delete, newly create	MFP administrator
	Query	Normal user who owns the applicable login user name
Login user name of normal user for External Authentication	Query, modify, delete, newly create	MFP administrator
Login user name of supervisor	Query, modify	Supervisor
	Newly create	MFP administrator
Login user name of MFP administrator	Query, modify	MFP administrator who owns the applicable login user name
	Query	Supervisor
Document data attribute	No operation permitted	None
Document user list [when document data attributes are (+PRT), (+SCN), (+CPY), and (+FAXOUT)]	No operation permitted	None
Document user list [when document data attribute is (+DSR)]	Query, modify	MFP administrator, applicable normal user who stored the document data
Document user list [when document data attribute is (+FAXIN)]	Query, modify	MFP administrator

Table 22 : User Roles for Security Attributes (a)

FMT_MSA.1(b)Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.



Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function

FMT_MSA.1.1(b)The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] to restrict the ability to [selection: query, modify, delete, [assignment: newly create]] the security attributes [assignment: security attributes in Table 23] to [assignment: the user roles with operation permission in Table 23].

Security Attributes	Operations	User Roles with operation permission
Login user name of normal user for Basic Authentication	Query, modify, delete, newly create	MFP administrator
	Query	Normal user who owns the applicable login user name
Login user name of normal user for External Authentication	Query, modify, delete, newly create	MFP administrator
Available function list	Query, modify	MFP administrator
	Query (however, query is not allowed in case of External Authentication)	Applicable normal user
Function type	No operation permitted	None
User role	No operation permitted	None

Table 23 : User Roles for Security Attributes (b)

FMT_MSA.3(a)Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

- Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
- FMT_MSA.3.1(a)The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] to provide [selection: restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
- FMT_MSA.3.2(a)The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: authorised identified roles shown in Table 24]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Objects	Security Attributes	Authorised Identified Roles
Document data	Document data attribute	No authorised identified roles
Document data [when document data attribute is (+DSR)]	Document user list	MFP administrator, Normal user who stored the applicable document data
Document data [when document data attributes are (+PRT), (+SCN), (+CPY), (+FAXIN), and (+FAXOUT)]	Document user list	No authorised identified roles
User job	Login user name of normal user	No authorised identified roles

Table 24 : Authorised Identified Roles Allowed to Override Default Values

FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1(b)The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] to provide [selection: restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2(b)The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: no authorised identified roles]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: query, modify, delete, [assignment: newly create]] the [assignment: list of TSF data in Table 25] to [assignment: the user roles in Table 25].

Table 25 : List of TSF Data

TSF Data	Operations	User Roles
Login password of normal user for Basic Authentication	Newly create, modify	MFP administrator
	Modify	Normal user who owns the login password
Login password of supervisor	Modify	Supervisor

TSF Data	Operations	User Roles
	Modify	Supervisor
Login password of MFP	Newly create	MFP administrator
administrator	Modify	MFP administrator who owns the login password
Number of Attempts before Lockout for Basic Authentication	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Setting for Lockout Release Timer for Basic Authentication	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Lockout time for Basic Authentication	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Date setting (year, month,	Query, modify	MFP administrator
day), time setting (hour, minute)	Query	Supervisor, normal user
Minimum character number for Basic Authentication	Query	MFP administrator
Password complexity setting for Basic Authentication	Query	MFP administrator
Auto logout time of the Operation Panel	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Audit logs	Query, delete	MFP administrator
HDD cryptographic key	Newly create	MFP administrator
	Newly create, modify, query, delete	MFP administrator
S/MIME user information	Query (however, operation of query on user certificate is not allowed in case of External Authentication)	Normal user
Destination information for folder transmission	Newly create, modify, query, delete	MFP administrator
	Query	Normal user
Stored Reception File User	Query, modify	MFP administrator
User authentication method	Query	MFP administrator
IPSec setting information	Query, modify	MFP administrator
@Remote setting information	Query	MFP administrator
Device Certificate	Modify	MFP administrator

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.



FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: management functions shown in Table 26].

Table 26 : List of Specification of Management Functions

Management Functions
New creation, query, modification, and deletion of the login user name of normal user by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query of own login user name by normal user when the Basic Authentication is used
New creation, query, modification, and deletion of the login user name of normal user by MFP administrator when External Authentication is used
Query and modification of login user name of supervisor by supervisor
New creation of login user name of MFP administrator by MFP administrator
Query and modification of own login user name by MFP administrator
Query of login user name of MFP administrator by supervisor
New creation and modification of login password of normal user by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Modification of own login password by normal user when the Basic Authentication is used
Modification of login password of supervisor by supervisor
Modification of login password of MFP administrator by supervisor
New creation of login password of MFP administrator by MFP administrator
Modification of own login password by MFP administrator
Query of minimum character number by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query of Password Complexity by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of auto logout time of the Operation Panel by MFP administrator
Query and modification of Number of Attempts before Lockout by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of Lockout Release Timer Setting by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of lockout time byMFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of document user list byMFP administrator
Query and modification of document user list by the normal user who stored the document
Query and modification of available function list by MFP administrator
Query of own available function list by normal user when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of date and time byMFP administrator
Query of date and time by supervisor
Query of date and time by normal user
Query and deletion of audit logs byMFP administrator
New creation of HDD encryption key byMFP administrator

New creation, query, modification and deletion of S/MIME user information byMFP administrator
Query of S/MIME user information by normal user
New creation, query, modification and deletion of destination information for folder transmission by MFP administrator
Query of destination information for folder transmission by normal user
Query and modification of Stored Reception File User by MFP administrator
Query of user authentication method by MFP administrator
Query and modification of IPSec setting information by MFP administrator
Query of @Remote setting information by MFP administrator
Modification of Device Certificate by MFP administrator

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: normal user, supervisor, MFP administrator,
	and RC Gate].

$FMT_SMR.1.2 \quad The \ TSF \ shall \ be \ able \ to \ associate \ users \ with \ roles.$

6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: the MFP Control Software, FCU Control Software]].
FPT_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: the audit log data file]] .
FPT_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: the stored TSF executable code]].
FPT_FDI_EXP	1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

Hierarchical to: No other components.



Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: the Operation Panel, LAN, telephone line] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: the LAN and telephone line].

6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access

FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: elapsed time of auto logout, completion of document data reception from the printer driver, completion of document data reception from the fax driver, and termination of communication with RC Gate].

6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: communication via the LAN of document data, function data, protected data, and confidential data, and

6.2 Security Assurance Requirements

communication with RC Gate via the LAN].

The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL3+ALC_FLR.2. Table 27 lists the assurance components of the TOE. ALC_FLR.2 was added to the set of components defined in evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3).

Assurance Classes	Assurance Components					
ADV:	ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description				

Assurance Classes	Assurance Components					
Development	ADV_FSP.3	Functional specification with complete summary				
	ADV_TDS.2	Architectural design				
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance				
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures				
ALC:	ALC_CMC.3	Authorisation controls				
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMS.3	Implementation representation CM coverage				
	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures				
	ALC_DVS.1	Identification of security measures				
	ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model				
	ALC_FLR.2	Flaw reporting procedures				
ASE:	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims				
Security Target evaluation	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition				
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction				
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives				
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements				
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition				
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification				
ATE:	ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage				
Tests	ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design				
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing				
	ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample				
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis				

6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

This section describes the rationale for security requirements.

If all security functional requirements are satisfied as below, the security objectives defined in "4 Security Objectives" are fulfilled.

6.3.1 Tracing

Table 28 shows the relationship between the TOE security functional requirements and TOE security objectives. Table 28 shows that each TOE security functional requirement fulfils at least one TOE security objective.



	0.DOC.NO_DIS	0.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	O.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	O.AUDIT.LOGGED	O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED	O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
FAU_GEN.1										Х		
FAU_GEN.2										Х		
FAU_STG.1										Х		
FAU_STG.4										Х		
FAU_SAR.1										Х		
FAU_SAR.2										Х		
FCS_CKM.1											Х	
FCS_COP.1											Х	
FDP_ACC.1(a)	Х	Х	Х									
FDP_ACC.1(b)							Х					
FDP_ACF.1(a)	Х	Х	Х									
FDP_ACF.1(b)							Х					
FDP_RIP.1	Х	Х										
FIA_AFL.1							Х					
FIA_ATD.1							Х					
FIA_SOS.1							Х					
FIA_UAU.1(a)							Х	Х				
FIA_UAU.1(b)							Х	Х				
FIA_UAU.2							Х	Х				
FIA_UAU.7							Х					
FIA_UID.1(a)							Х	Х				
FIA_UID.1(b)							Х	Х				
FIA_UID.2							Х	Х				
FIA_USB.1							Х					
FPT_FDI_EXP.1								Х				
FMT_MSA.1(a)	Х	Х	Х									
FMT_MSA.1(b)							Х					
FMT_MSA.3(a)	Х	Х	Х									

Table 28 : Relationship between Security	Objectives and Functional Requirements
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	0.DOC.NO_DIS	0.DOC.NO_ALT	O.FUNC.NO_ALT	O.PROT.NO_ALT	O.CONF.NO_DIS	O.CONF.NO_ALT	O.USER.AUTHORIZED	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	O.AUDIT.LOGGED	O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED	O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
FMT_MSA.3(b)							Х					
FMT_MTD.1				Х	Х	Х					Х	
FMT_SMF.1				Х	Х	Х					Х	
FMT_SMR.1				Х	Х	Х					Х	
FPT_STM.1										Х		
FPT_TST.1									Х			
FTA_SSL.3							Х	Х				
FTP_ITC.1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х						Х

6.3.2 Justification of Traceability

This section describes below how the TOE security objectives are fulfilled by the TOE security functional requirements corresponding to the TOE security objectives.

O.DOC.NO_DIS Protection of document disclosure

O.DOC.NO_DIS is the security objective to prevent the documents from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Specify and implement the access control to the document data.

FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) only allow the following persons to view document data according to the document data attributes: the normal user who generated the document data or the normal user who is registered on the document user list of the document data. The MFP administrator, supervisor and RC Gate are not allowed to view document data.

- (2) Prevent reading the deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments. Deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments are prevented from being read by FDP_RIP.1.
- (3) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving document data. The document data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
- (4) Management of the security attributes. FMT_MSA.1(a) specifies the available operations (newly create, query, modify and delete) on the login user name, and available operations (query and modify) on the document user list, and a specified user

is thus restricted to perform each operation.

FMT_MSA.3(a) surely sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of document data (object) when document data are generated.

By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), FDP_RIP.1, FTP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.1(a) and FMT_MSA.3(a), which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.DOC.NO_DIS is fulfilled.

O.DOC.NO_ALT Protection of document alteration

O.DOC.NO_ALT is the security objective to prevent the documents from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Specify and implement the access control to document data.

FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) allow the following persons to delete document data (there is no "editing operation" of document data) according to the document data attributes: the normal user who generated the document data, the normal user who is registered in the document user list of the document data, and the MFP administrator. The supervisor and RC Gate are not allowed to delete document data.

- (2) Prevent deleting the deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments. Deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments are prevented from being used by FDP_RIP.1.
- (3) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving document data. The document data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN interface are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
- (4) Management of the security attributes.

FMT_MSA.1(a) specifies the available operations (newly create, query, modify and delete) on the login user name, and available operations (query and modify) on the document user list, and a specified user is thus restricted to perform each operation.

FMT_MSA.3(a) surely sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of document data (object) when the document data are generated.

By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), FDP_RIP.1, FTP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.1(a) and FMT_MSA.3(a), which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.DOC.NO_ALT is fulfilled.

O.FUNC.NO_ALT Protection of user job alteration

O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the security objective to prevent the user jobs from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the user job. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

- Specify and implement the access control to user jobs.
 FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) allow the MFP administrator to delete user jobs, and the normal user with the permission to delete the applicable user job. The supervisor and RC Gate are not allowed to delete user jobs. Deletion is the only modification operation on this TOE's user jobs.
- (2) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving user jobs. The user jobs sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.



(3) Management of the security attributes.

FMT_MSA.1(a) restricts each available operation (newly create, query, modify and delete) for the login user name to specified users only.

FMT_MSA.3(a) sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of user jobs (object) when the user jobs are generated.

By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), FTP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.1(a) and FMT_MSA.3(a), which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.FUNC.NO_ALT is fulfilled.

O.PROT.NO_ALT Protection of TSF protected data alteration

O.PROT.NO_ALT is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to alter the TSF protected data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Management of the TSF protected data.

By FMT_MTD.1, onlythe MFP administrator is allowed to manage the minimum character number for Basic Authentication, password complexity setting for Basic Authentication, Number of Attempts before Lockout for Basic Authentication, settings for Lockout Release Timer for Basic Authentication, lockout time for Basic Authentication, auto logout time of the Operation Panel, date, time, S/MIME user information, destination folder, Stored Reception File User, user authentication method, IPSec setting information, @Remote setting information, and Device Certificate

(2) Specification of the Management Function.

FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.

- (3) Specification of the roles.FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
- (4) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving the TSF protected data. The TSF protected data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.

By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.PROT.NO_ALT is fulfilled.

O.CONF.NO_DIS Protection of TSF confidential data disclosure

O.CONF.NO_DIS is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to disclose the TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Management of the TSF confidential data.

FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password of normal user. A supervisor is allowed to operate the login password of supervisor. The supervisor and applicable MFP administrator are allowed to operate the login password of administrator. The MFP administrator is only allowed to operate the audit log and HDD cryptographic key.

- Specification of the Management Function.
 FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
- (3) Specification of the roles.FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.

(4) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving TSF confidential data. The TSF confidential data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.

By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.CONF.NO_DIS is fulfilled.

O.CONF.NO_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration

O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to alter the TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Management of the TSF confidential data.

FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password of normal user. A supervisor is allowed to operate the login password of supervisor. The supervisor and applicable MFP administrator are allowed to operate the login password of administrator. The MFP administrator is only allowed to operate the audit log and newly create an HDD cryptographic key.

- (2) Specification of the Management Function.FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
- (3) Specification of the roles.FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
- (4) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving TSF confidential data. The TSF confidential data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected byFTP_ITC.1.

By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.CONF.NO_ALT is fulfilled.

O.USER.AUTHORIZED User identification and authentication

O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective to restrict users in accordance with the security policies so that only valid users can use the TOE functions. As for normal users, the MFP administrator, and a supervisor, who all access the TOE from the Operation Panel or from the client PC over a network, the security policies of the authentication failure handling and verification of secrets need to be augmented. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Identify and authenticate the users prior to the TOE use.

FIA_UID.1(a) and FIA_UAU.1(a) identify and authenticate the persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or client computer on the network by the Basic Authentication.

FIA_UID.1(b) and FIA_UAU.1(b) identify and authenticate the persons by the Basic Authentication if the person who attempts to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or client computer on the network is the MFP administrator or supervisor, and if the person is the normal user, the External Authentication is used for the identification and authentication.

FIA_UID.2 identifies the person who attempts to use the TOE from the interface for RC Gate communication, and FIA_UAU.2 authenticates RC Gate.

(2) Allow the successfully identified and authenticated user to use the TOE. FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1 manage the access procedures to the protected assets of the users who are defined in advance, and associate the users who are successfully identified and authenticated with the access procedures. FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b) allow the applicable normal user to use the MFP application according to the operation permission granted to the successfully identified and authenticated normal user.

(3) Complicate decoding of login password.

FIA_UAU.7 displays dummy letters as authentication feedback on the Operation Panel and prevents the login password from disclosure.

FIA_SOS.1 accepts only passwords that satisfy the minimum character number and password character combination specified for the Basic Authentication by the MFP administrator, and makes it difficult to guess the password. For the External Authentication, this depends on the settings for the External Authentication.

FIA_AFL.1 does not allow the user who is unsuccessfully authenticated by the Basic Authentication for certain times to access to the TOE for certain period. For the External Authentication, this depends on the settings for the External Authentication.

(4) Terminate login automatically.

FTA_SSL.3 automatically logs out of the Operation Panel or a Web browser after no operation is performed from the Operation Panel or a Web browser for certain period and the auto logout time elapses. It also logs out the status of document data reception after the completion of document data reception from the printer driver or fax driver. The TOE terminates the session with RC Gate after completing the communication with RC Gate.

(5) Management of the security attributes.

According to FMT_MSA.1(b), the login user name and available function list of normal user are managed by the MFP administrator, and users are not allowed to operate the function type. FMT_MSA.3(b) sets the restrictive default value to the function type.

By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(b), FDP_ACF.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FTA_SSL.3, FMT_MSA.1(b) and FMT_MSA.3(b), which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.USER.AUTHORIZED is fulfilled.

The function for 2600.1-SMI (F.SMI), selected SFR Package from the PP, is used in conjunction with the function whose access control is enforced by FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b). Therefore, the access control for F.SMI is included with the access control by FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b) and fulfilled.

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED Management of external interfaces by TOE

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective to ensure that the TOE manages the operation of external interface according to the security policy. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Identify and authenticate the users prior to use the Operation Panel and LAN interface.

FIA_UID.1(a) and FIA_UID.1(b) identify the persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or client computer on the network, and FIA_UAU.1(a) and FIA_UAU.1(b) authenticate the identified users.

FIA_UID.2 identifies the persons who attempt to use the TOE from the interface for RC Gate communication, and FIA_UAU.2 authenticates the persons.

- (2) Automatically terminate the connection to the Operation Panel and LAN interface. FTA_SSL3 terminates the session after no operation is performed from the Operation Panel or LAN
- (3) Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 prevents the data received from the Operation Panel, LAN interface and telephone line from being transmitted from the LAN or telephone line without further processing by the TSF.

By satisfying FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FTA_SSL.3 and FPT_FDI_EXP.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is fulfilled.

O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED Software verification

interface for certain period.

O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is the security objective to ensure that MFP Control Software and FCU Control Software are verified. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Self-check

FPT_TST.1 checks if the MFP Control Software and FCU Control Software are verified software at the start-up.

By satisfying FTP_TST.1, which is the security functional requirement for this countermeasure, O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is fulfilled.

O.AUDIT.LOGGED Management of audit log records

O.AUDIT.LOGGED is the security objective to record the audit log required to detect the security intrusion, and allow the MFP administrator to view the audit log. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Record the audit log.

FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 record the events, which should be auditable, with the identification information of the occurrence factor.

(2) Protect the audit log.

FAU_STG.1 protects the audit logs from the alteration, and FAU_STG.4 deletes the audit logs that have the oldest time stamp, and records the new audit logs if auditable events occur and the audit log files are full.

(3) Provide Audit Function.

FAU_SAR.1 allows the MFP administrator to read audit logs in a format that can be audited. FAU_SAR.2 prohibits the persons other than the MFP administrator reading the audit logs.

(4) Reliable occurrence time of the event FPT_STM.1 provides a trusted time stamp, and a reliable record of the times when events occurred are recorded in the audit log.

By satisfying FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2 and FPT_STM.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.AUDIT.LOGGED is fulfilled.

O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED Encryption of storage devices

O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is the security objective to ensure the data to be written into the HDD is encrypted. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.

(1) Generate appropriate cryptographic keys.

FCS_CKM.1 generates the cryptographic key for encryption.

- Perform cryptographic operation.
 FCS_COP.1 encrypts the data to be stored in the HDD, and decrypts the data to be read from the HDD.
- (3) Manage the TSF data.FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator to manage the cryptographic keys.
- (4) Specification of Management Function.FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
- (5) Specification of the roles.FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.

By satisfying FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is fulfilled.

O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT Protection of communication with RC Gate

O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is the security objective to ensure the communication data between the TOE and RC Gate are concealed, and any tampering on the communication pathis detected. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasure.

(1) Use trusted channel for the communication with RC Gate

FTP_IT C.1 allows the TOE to establish the communication that protects the data from tampering and disclosure for the communication between the TOE and RC Gate.

By satisfying FTP_ITC.1, which is the security functional requirement for this countermeasure, O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is fulfilled.

6.3.3 Dependency Analysis

Table 29 shows the result of dependency analysis in this ST for the TOE securityfunctional requirements.

 Table 29 : Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements

TOE Security Functional Requirements	Claimed Dependencies	Dependencies S atisfied in ST	Dependencies Not Satisfied in ST
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM.1	None
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1	None
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1	None
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.1	FAU_STG.1	None
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1	None

FCS_CKM.1[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_COP.1] FCS_CCM.4FCS_COP.1FCS_CKM.4FCS_COP.1[FDP_TTC.1 or FDP_TC2 or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4FCS_CKM.1FCS_CKM.4FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACF.1(a)FDP_ACF.1(a)NoneFDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACF.1(b)NoneFDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1FIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneFIA_UB.1(c)NoneNoneFIA_UB.1(a)FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDT_FC.1]FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.3(a)<	EALL CAD 2	EALL CAD 1	EALL CAD 1	Nama
FCS_COP.1] FCS_CCM.4FCS_CCM.1 FCS_CCM.4FCS_CCM.1 FCS_CCM.1FCS_COP.1[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.4]FCS_CCM.1FCS_CCM.4FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACF.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)NoneFDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(a)NoneFDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)NoneFDP_ACF.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(a)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.3(a)FDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1(c)FIA_UID.1(c)NoneFIA_UAU.1(c)FIA_UID.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(c)NoneNone </td <td>FAU_SAR.2</td> <td>FAU_SAR.1</td> <td>FAU_SAR.1</td> <td>None</td>	FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_SAR.1	None
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FDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACF.1(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.2NoneNoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneNoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA		FCS_CKM.4		
FDP_ACF.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_MSA.3(a)FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_MSA.3(a)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FDP_ACC.1(a)	FDP_ACF.1(a)	FDP_ACF.1(a)	None
FMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.3(a)FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b)NoneFDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b) <td< td=""><td>FDP_ACC.1(b)</td><td>FDP_ACF.1(b)</td><td>FDP_ACF.1(b)</td><td>None</td></td<>	FDP_ACC.1(b)	FDP_ACF.1(b)	FDP_ACF.1(b)	None
FDP_ACF.1(b)FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_MSA.3(b)NoneFDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_ACC.1(a)FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FDP_ACF.1(a)	FDP_ACC.1(a)	FDP_ACC.1(a)	None
FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)FDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneFMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_JFC.1]FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)		FMT_MSA.3(a)	FMT_MSA.3(a)	
FDP_RIP.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.3FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FDP_ACF.1(b)		FDP_ACC.1(b)	None
FIA_AFL.1FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UAU.1(a)NoneFIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None		FMT_MSA.3(b)	FMT_MSA.3(b)	
FIA_ATD.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FDP_RIP.1	None	None	None
FIA_SOS.1NoneNoneNoneFIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.3FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDT_IFC.1]FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1(a)	FIA_UAU.1(a)	None
FIA_UAU.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)FIA_UID.1(a)NoneFIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_ATD.1	None	None	None
FIA_UAU.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)FIA_UID.1(b)NoneFIA_UAU.2FIA_UID.1FIA_UID.2NoneFIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_UB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFVT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_SOS.1	None	None	None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 None FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 None None FIA_UID.1(a) None None None None FIA_UID.1(a) None None None None FIA_UID.1(a) None None None None FIA_UID.1(b) None None None None FIA_UID.1(b) None None None None FIA_UID.1(b) None None None None FIA_UID.2 None None None None FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 None FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 None FMT_MSA.1(a) [FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1] FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1 None FMT_MSA.1(b) [FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 None FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(a) None FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MS	FIA_UAU.1(a)	FIA_UID.1(a)	FIA_UID.1(a)	None
FIA_UAU.7FIA_UAU.1FIA_UAU.1NoneFIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.1(a)FMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_UAU.1(b)	FIA_UID.1(b)	FIA_UID.1(b)	None
FIA_UID.1(a)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneNoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneNoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.2	None
FIA_UID.1(b)NoneNoneNoneFIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1	None
FIA_UID.2NoneNoneNoneFIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_UID.1(a)	None	None	None
FIA_USB.1FIA_ATD.1FIA_ATD.1NoneFPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMF.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_UID.1(b)	None	None	None
FPT_FDI_EXP.1FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SM R.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FIA_UID.2	None	None	None
FMT_SMR.1FMT_SM R.1FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMR.1FMT_SMF.1Image: Comparison of the state	FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_ATD.1	None
FMT_MSA.1(a)[FDP_ACC.1(a) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1FDP_ACC.1(a) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) (FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FPT_FDI_EXP.1	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1	None
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FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1FMT_SMF.1FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1]FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None	FMT_MSA.1(a)	,	FDP_ACC.1(a)	None
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FMT_MSA.1(b)[FDP_ACC.1(b) or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1FDP_ACC.1(b) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(a)FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_SMR.1NoneFMT_MSA.3(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)FMT_MSA.1(b)None			FMT_SMF.1	
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FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(b) None	$1 \text{ WII}_WISA.3(a)$		= 、 ,	140116
	FMT MSA 3(b)			None
	1.011_0000000	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1	TORE

FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	None
FMT_SMF.1	None	None	None
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1	None
FPT_STM.1	None	None	None
FPT_TST.1	None	None	None
FTA_SSL.3	None	None	None
FTP_ITC.1	None	None	None

The following explains the rationale for acceptability in all cases where a dependency is not satisfied:

Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4

Once the MFP administrator generates the cryptographic key that is used for the HDD encryption of this TOE at the start of TOE operation, the cryptographic key will be continuously used for the HDD and will not be deleted. Therefore, cryptographic key destruction by the standard method is unnecessary.

6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is the MFP, which is a commercially available product. The MFP is assumed that it will be used in a general office and this TOE does not assume the attackers with Enhanced-Basic or higher level of attack potential.

Architectural design (ADV_TDS.2) is adequate to show the validity of commercially available products. A high attack potential is required for the attacks that circumvent or tamper with the TSF, which is not covered in this evaluation. The vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs.

However, protection of the secrecy of relevant information is required to make security attacks more difficult, and it is important to ensure a secure development environment. Development sœurity (ALC_DVS.1) is therefore important also.

In order to securely operate the TOE continuously, it is important to appropriately remediate the flaw discovered after the start of TOE operation according to flow reporting procedure (ALC_FLR.2).

Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL3+ALC_FLR.2 is appropriate for this TOE.

7 TOE Summary Specification

This section describes the TOE summary specification for each security function. The security functions are described for each corresponding security functional requirement.

7.1 Audit Function

The Audit Function is to generate the audit log of TOE use and security-relevant events (hereafter, "audit events"). This function provides the recorded audit log in a legible fashion for users to audit (audit log review). The recorded audit logcan be viewed and deleted only by the MFP administrator.

FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2

The TOE records the audit log items, shown in Table 31, on the HDD in the TOE when audit events shown in Table 30 occur.

Audit log items include basic log items and expanded log items. Basic log items are recorded whenever audit logs are recorded, and expanded log items are recorded only when audit events occur and the audit log items shown in Table 31 are recorded.

FPT_STM.1

The date (year/month/day) and time (hour/minute/second) the TOE records for the audit log are derived from the system clock of the TOE.

FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, and FAU_STG.1

The TOE displays the operation menu for audit logs to be read on a Web browser screen only when it is accessed by the MFP administrator. The TOE provides the audit logs in a text format when the MFP administrator instructs the TOE to read the audit logs.

FAU_STG.4

The TOE writes the newest audit log over the oldest audit log when there is insufficient space in the audit log files to append the newest audit log.

Table 30 : List of Audit Events

Audit Events		
Start-up of the Audit Function (*1)		
Shutdown of the Audit Function (*1)		
Success and failure of login operations (except login operations from RC Gate)		
Success and failure of login operations from RC Gate communication interface		
Starting and releasing Lockout		
Table 26 Record of Management Function		

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Date settings (year/month/day), time settings (hour/minute)
Termination of session by auto logout
Failure of Web Function communication
Folder transmission
E-mail transmission of attachments
Printing via networks
LAN Fax via networks
Storing document data
Reading document data (print, download, fax transmission, e-mail transmission of attachments, and folder transmission)
Deleting document data
Communication with RC Gate

(*1): The start-up and shutdown of Audit Function are substituted with the TOE start-up event .

	Audit Log Items	Setting Values of Audit Log Items	Audit Events to record Audit Logs
	Starting date/time of an event	Values of the TOE system clock at an event occurrence	- All auditable events shown in Table 30
Basic Log Items	Ending date/time of an event	Values of the TOE system clock at an event occurrence	
gol	Event types	Audit event identity	
Items	Subject identity	User or TOE identity for an audit event caused by the user or TOE	
	Outcome (*2)	Audit event outcome (success or failure)	
	Communication directions	Communication directions (IN/OUT)	 Web Function communication Communication with RC Gate
Expanded Log Items	Communicating IP address	Communicating IP address	 Web Function communication Folder transmission Printing via networks LAN Fax via networks Communication with RC Gate
	Communicating e-mail address	Communicating e-mail address for e-mail transmission of attachments	- E-mail transmission of attachments
	Lockout operation type	Information to identify starting Lockout and releasing Lockout	 Starting and releasing Lockout

Table 31 : List of Audit Log Items



Locked out User	Login user name of a user who is locked out	 Starting and releasing Lockout
Locked out User who is to be released	Login user name of a user who is released from Lockout	 Starting and releasing Lockout

(*2): If an audit event is "Failure of Web Function communication", the failure will be recorded as a result.

7.2 Identification and Authentication Function

The Identification and Authentication Function is to verify whether persons who intend to use the TOE are authorised users (MFP administrator, supervisor, normal users, and RC Gate) by referring to the identification and authentication information obtained from the users, so that only persons who are confirmed as authorised users are allowed to use the TOE. Verification methods for normal users include those by Basic Authentication and External Authentication. Either Basic Authentication or External Authentication will be selected when the TOE is installed.

FIA_UAU.1(a) and FIA_UID.1(a): Application of Basic Authentication

The TOE identifies and authenticates a user by checking the login user name and login password entered by the user. However, regarding the viewing of user job lists, Web Image Monitor Help from a Web browser, system status, the counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notifications, the TOE identification and authentication is not required for the use of the TOE.

When the TOE is used from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the screen for a user to enter his or her login user name and login password is displayed, and this screen will be displayed until the entry of the login user name and login password is complete.

When the TOE is used from the printer driver or fax driver, the TOE receives the login user name and login password entered from each driver by a user.

When the entered login user name is the login user name of a normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor, the TOE checks if the entered login password match with the one pre-registered in the TOE.

FIA_UAU.1(b) and FIA_UID.1(b): Application of External Authentication

The TOE identifies and authenticates a user by checking the login user name and login password entered by the user. However, regarding the viewing of user job lists, Web Image Monitor Help from a Web browser, system status, the counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notifications, the TOE identification and authentication is not required for the use of the TOE.

When the TOE is used from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the screen for a user to enter his or her login user name and login password is displayed, and this screen will be displayed until the entry of the login user name and login password is complete.

When the TOE is used from the printer driver or fax driver, the TOE receives the login user name and login password entered from each driver by a user.

When the entered login user name is the login user name of MFP administrator or supervisor, the TOE checks if the entered login password matches with the one pre-registered by the MFP administrator or supervisor in the TOE.

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When the entered login user name is not the login user name of the MFP administrator or supervisor, the entered login user name and login password are sent to an external authentication server for confirmation.

When the sent login user name and login password are identified and authenticated, the user is allowed to use the TOE according to the identified user role.

FIA_USB.1, FIA_ATD.1, and FMT_SMR.1

If a user is identified and authenticated as a result of checking FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), and FIA_UID.1(b), the use of the TOE by the user is allowed as the identified user role (normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor). The user role assigned to the user at login will be maintained until the user logs out. If user identification and authentication fails, use of the TOE is denied.

FTA_SSL3

The automatic logout function the TOE provides is activated if the auto logout time (60 - 999 seconds) specified by the MFP administrator elapses after the final operation from the Operation Panel by the user who logs on to the TOE from the Operation Panel.

The automatic logout function the TOE provides is activated if the fixed auto logout time (30 minutes by default) elapses after the final operation from a Web browser by the user who logs on to the TOE from a Web browser.

The TOE logs out immediately after receiving the print data from the printer driver.

The TOE logs out immediately after receiving the transmission information from the fax driver.

The TOE terminates a session with RC Gate immediately after the communication with RC Gate is complete.

FIA_UAU.7

Regarding login passwords entered by a person who intends to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the TOE does not display the entered login password but it displays a sequence of dummy characters whose length is the same as that of the entered password.

FIA_AFL.1

When Basic Authentication is applied, the TOE counts the number of identification and authentication attempts that consecutively result in failure using the login user name of a normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor. When External Authentication is applied, the TOE counts the number of identification and authentication attempts that consecutively result in failure using the login user name of an MFP administrator or supervisor. The TOE locks out the login user name if the number of consecutive login failures exceeds the number of attempts before lockout.

If a user name is locked out, the user with that user name is not allowed to log in unless any of the following conditions is fulfilled.

- The lockout time set by the MFP administrator elapses.

- An "unlocking administrator" shown in Table 32 and specified for each user role releases the lockout.

- In case of the MFP administrator and supervisor, sixty seconds elapse since the MFP becomes executable after its power is turned off and then on.

Table 32 : Unlocking Administrators for Each User Role

User Roles (Locked out Users)	Unlocking Administrators
Normal user	MFP administrator
Supervisor	MFP administrator
MFP administrator	Supervisor

FIA_SOS.1

Login passwords for users can be registered only if these passwords meet the following conditions:

 Usable characters and types: Upper-case letters: [A-Z] (26 letters)

Lower-case letters: [a-z] (26 letters)

Numbers: [0-9] (ten digits)

Symbols: SP (space) ! " # \$ % & '() * +, - . / : ; < => ? @ [\]^_` { | } ~ (33 symbols)

- (2) Registrable password length:
 - For normal users

No less than the minimum character number for password (8-32 characters) specified by the MFP administrator and no more than 128 characters.

- For MFP administrators and a supervisor

No less than the minimum character number for password (8-32 characters) specified by the MFP administrator and no more than 32 characters.

(3) Combination of character types:

The number of combined character types specified by the MFP administrators (two types or more, or three types or more).

FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, and FIA_USB.1

A certificate is a set of identification and authentication information of RC Gate.

When the TOE receives a certificate from an IT device to access the TOE via RC Gate communication interface, the TOE checks if the certificate matches another certificate installed in the TOE. Only if the certificate sent from the IT device matches the one installed in the TOE so that the IT device is identified as RC Gate, the IT device whose user role is RC Gate is allowed to use the TOE

FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The TOE inputs information after the TSF reliably identifies and authenticates the input information from the Operation Panel or the client computer via LAN interface. Therefore, the input information cannot be forwarded unless the TSF is not involved in information identification and authentication.

7.3 Document Access Control Function

The Document Access Control Function is to allow authorised TOE users to operate document data and user jobs in accordance with the provided user role privilege or user privilege.

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FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a)

The TOE controls user operations for document data and user jobs in accordance with (1) access control rule on document data and (2) access control rule on user jobs.

(1) Access control rule on document data

The TOE provides users with the interface for stored documents to be printed, downloaded to the client computers, sent by fax, sent by e-mail as attachments, sent to folders, and deleted. The interface enables users to delete all the stored documents.

Users authorised to operate stored documents are MFP administrator and normal users. The supervisor and RC Gate are not allowed to operate stored documents.

When the MFP administrator or a normal user logs in from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the TOE displays a list of the stored documents whose operations are authorised and the menu for the authorised operations (printing, downloading to the client computers, sending by fax, sending by e-mail as attachments, sending to folders, deleting, and deleting all files). When the MFP administrator logs in from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the TOE displays a list of all the stored documents and the operation menu for deletion and deletion of all files. The MFP administrator can select and delete a document from the list of the stored documents or all documents.

When a normal user logs in from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the TOE displays a list of the stored documents that register the login user names of the normal users who logged in to the document user list, and an operation menu. They will be displayed according to the rules shown in Table 33. The privileges that allow users to edit the document user list are shown in "7.8 Security Management Function".

Also, the TOE allows only the user job owner to view and delete the document data handled as a user job while Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, Fax Enction, or Document Server Function is being used.

While no interface to change job owners is provided, an interface to cancel user jobs is provided. If a user job is cancelled, any document the cancelled job operates will be deleted.

I/F to be Used	Available Functions	Types of Stored Documents	Operations
	for Users	displayed in the List	displayed on the Menu
Operation	Document Server	Document Server documents	Print
Panel	Function		Delete
Operation	Document Server	Fax transmission documents	Print
Panel	Function		Delete
Operation Panel	Printer Function	Printer documents	Print Delete
Operation Panel	Scanner Function	Scanner documents	E-mail transmission of attachments Folder transmission Delete

Table 33 : Stored Documents Access	s Control Rules for Normal Users
------------------------------------	----------------------------------

Operation Panel	Fax Function	Fax transmission documents	Fax transmission E-mail transmission of attachments Folder transmission Print Delete
Operation Panel	Fax Function	Fax reception documents	Print Delete
Web browser	Document Server Function	Document Server documents	Print Delete
Web browser	Document Server Function	Scanner documents	E-mail transmission of attachments Folder transmission Download Delete (E-mail transmission of attachments and folder transmission are authorised for normal users who are privileged to use Scanner Function)
Web browser	Document Server Function	Fax transmission documents	Fax transmission Download Print Delete (Fax transmission is authorised for normal users who are privileged to use Fax Function)
Web browser	Printer Function	Printer documents	Print Delete
Web browser	Fax Function	Fax reception documents	Print Download Delete (Operations above are authorised only if normal users are privileged to use Document Server Function)

(2) Access control rule on user jobs

The TOE displays on the Operation Panel a menu to cancel a user job only if the user who logs in from the Operation Panel is a user job owner or MFP administrator and a cancellation of a user job is attempted by the owner or MFP administrator. Other users are not allowed to operate user jobs. When a user job is cancelled, any documents operated by the cancelled job will be deleted.

However, if the document data operated by the cancelled user job is a stored document, the data will not be deleted and remain stored in the TOE.

7.4 Use-of-Feature Restriction Function

The Use-of-Feature Restriction Function is to authorise TOE users to use Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function and Fax Function in accordance with the roles of the identified and authenticated TOE users and user privileges set for each user.

FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b)

The TOE verifies the role for an authorised TOE user who attempts to start operating Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function, and Fax Function.

If the role is that of normal user, the user can operate only functions that are included in the available function list set for each normal user.

If the role is that of MFP administrator, the user can operate Fax Reception Function that corresponds to MFP management.

If the role is that of supervisor and RC Gate, using any functions is not allowed.

7.5 Network Protection Function

The Network Protection Function is to provide network monitoring to prevent information leakage when LAN is used and to detect data tampering.

FTP_ITC.1

The encrypted communications provided by the TOE differ depending on communicating devices. Table 34 shows the encrypted communications provided by the TOE.

Communicating	Encrypted communications provided by the TOE	
Devices	Protocols Cryptographic Algorithms	
Client computer	TLS1.0	AES(128bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
External	Kerberos	AES(128bits, 256bits)
authentication server		
RC Gate	SSL3.0, TLS1.0	AES(128bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
FTP server	IPSec	AES(128bits, 192bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
SMB server	IPSec	AES(128bits, 192bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
SMTP server	S/MIME	3DES(168bits)

Table 34 : Encrypted Communications Provided by the TOE

7.6 Residual Data Overwrite Function

The Residual Data Overwrite Function is to overwrite specific patterns on the HDD and disable the reusing of the residual data included in the deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments on the HDD.

FDP_RIP.1

Methods to delete the HDD area through overwriting include sequential overwriting and batch overwriting. For sequential overwriting, the TOE constantly monitors the information on a residual data area, and overwrites the area if any existing residual data is discovered. If the user deletes document data, the TOE applies the method specified by the MFP administrator and overwrites the area on the HDD where the digital image data of the document data is stored. Also, when a user job is complete, the TOE applies the method specified by the MFP administrator and overwrites the area on the HDD where the digital image data of the document data is stored. Also, when a user job is complete, the TOE applies the method specified by the MFP administrator and overwrites the area on the HDD where temporary documents that are created while a user job is executed or the fragments of those temporary documents are stored.

For batch overwriting the TOE collectively overwrites the HDD with the method specified by the MFP administrator.

Overwriting methods include NSA method, DoD method, and random number method. NSA method overwrites twice by random numbers and once by Null(0). The DoD method overwrites once by a certain value, once by its complement, and further by random numbers to be verified afterwards. Random number method overwrites for three to nine times by random numbers. The MFP administrator specifies the number of times to overwrite when the TOE is installed.

7.7 Stored Data Protection Function

The Stored Data Protection Function is to encrypt the data on the HDD and protect the data so that data leakage can be prevented.

FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1

The TOE encrypts data before writing it on the HDD, and decrypts the encrypted data after reading it from the HDD. This process is applied to all data written on and read from the HDD. Detailed cryptographic operations are shown in Table 35.

Encryption-triggering Operations	Cryptographic Operations	Standard	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Size
Writing data to HDD	Encrypt		AES	256 bits
Reading data from HDD	Decrypt	FIPS197		

 Table 35 : List of Cryptographic Operations for Stored Data Protection

Following operations by the MFP administrator, the TOE generates a cryptographic key. If a login user is the MFP administrator, the screen to generate an HDD cryptographic key is provided from the Operation Panel.

If the MFP administrator gives instructions to generate an HDD cryptographic key from the Operation Panel, the TOE uses a genuine random number generator and generates random numbers that conform to the standard BSI-AIS31.

7.8 Security Management Function

The Security Management Function consists of functions to 1) control operations for TSF data, 2) maintain user roles assigned to normal users, MFP administrator, or supervisor to operate the Security Management Function, and 3) set appropriate default values to security attributes, all of which accord with user role privileges or user privileges that are assigned to normal users, MFP administrator, or supervisor.

FMT_MSA.1(a), FMT_MSA.1(b), FMT_MSA.3(a), FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1

The TOE allows operations for TSF data according to the rules described in Table 36.

TSF Data	Operation Interface	Operations	Users
Login user names of normal users when Basic Authentication is applied	Operation Panel, Web browser	Newly create, query, modify, delete	MFP administrator
apprice		Query	Applicable normal user
Login user names of normal users when External Authentication is applied (*1)	Operation Panel, Web browser	Newly create, query, modify, delete	MFP administrator
Login user name of supervisor	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	Supervisor
		Newly create	MFP administrator
Login user name of MFP administrator	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	Applicable MFP administrator
		Query	Supervisor
Document data attributes	No operation interfaces available	No operations allowed	None
Document user list Stored document types are Document Server document, scanner document, fax document and printer document (with stored print)	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator, applicable normal user who stored the document

Table 36 : Management of TSF Data



			1 age 80 01 85
Document user list Stored document type is fax received document(*2)	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Default values of the document user list	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator, applicable normal user who stored the documents
Available function list		Query, modify	MFP administrator
	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query (Query is unavailable for External Authentication)	Applicable normal user
Function types	No operation interfaces available	No operations allowed	None
User roles	No operation interfaces available	No operations allowed	None
Login passwords of normal users when Basic Authentication is applied	Operation Panel, Web browser	Newly create, modify	MFP administrator
		Modify	Applicable normal user
Login password of supervisor	Operation Panel, Web browser	Modify	Supervisor
	Operation Panel, Web browser	Modify	Supervisor
Login password of MFP		Newly create	MFP administrator
administrator		Modify	Applicable MFP administrator
Number of Attempts before Lockout when Basic Authentication is applied	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Settings for Lockout Release Timer when Basic Authentication is applied	Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Lockout time for Basic Authentication	Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Date settings (year/month/day)	Operation Panel,	Query, modify	MFP administrator
	Web browser	Query	Supervisor, normal user
Time	Operation Panel,	Query, modify	MFP administrator
	Web browser	Query	Supervisor, normal user

Minimum character number of password for Basic Authentication	Operation Panel	Query	MFP administrator
Password complexity setting for Basic Authentication	Operation Panel	Query	MFP administrator
Auto logout time of the Operation Panel	Operation Panel	Query, modify	MFP administrator
Audit log	Web browser	Query, delete	MFP administrator
HDD cryptographic key	Operation Panel	Newly create	MFP administrator
		Newly create, modify, query, delete	MFP administrator
S/MIME user information	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, (Query operation for a user certificate is unavailable for External Authentication)	Normal user
Destination folder	Operation Panel, Web browser	Newly create, modify, query, delete	MFP administrator
		Query	Normal user
Stored Reception File User	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator
User authentication method	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query	MFP administrator
IPSec setting information	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query, modify	MFP administrator
@Remote setting information	Operation Panel, Web browser	Query	MFP administrator
Device Certificate	Operation Panel, Web browser	Modify	MFP administrator

(*1): The login user name of a normal user that is registered on an external authentication server is not changed even though the MFP administrator newly creates, modifies, and deletes the login user name of the normal user that is registered on the TOE

(*2): If the MFP administrator modifies Stored Reception File User, and if the stored document type of the document user list of document data is received fax document, the list will be modified to the values of the Stored Reception File User.

FMT_MSA.3(a) and FMT_MSA.3(b)

The TOE sets default values for objects/subjects according to the rules described in Table 37 when those objects/subjects are generated.

Objects	Security attributes	Default values
Document data	Document data attribute	 +PRT: Documents printed from the client computer with direct print, locked print, hold print, and sample print. +SCN: Documents sent by e-mail as attachments or to folders from the MFP. +CPY: Documents copied using the MFP. +FAXOUT: Documents sent by fax from the MFP or client computer. +FAXIN: Documents received from a telephone line. +DSR: Documents stored in the TOE by using Copy Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function and Fax Data Storage Function. Documents printed using Document Server printing or stored print from the client computer.
Document data (stored document types are Document Server document, scanner document and fax document)	Document user list	Default values of a document user list assigned to each user.
Document data (stored document type is printer document)	Document user list	Login user name of a normal user who stored the document data.
Document data (stored document type is fax received document)	Document user list	Login user name of a normal user included in the Stored Reception File User list.
User jobs	Login user name of normal user	Login user name of a normal user who newly creates a user job.

Table 37 : List of Static Initialisation for Securit	y Attributes of Document Access Control SFP



Each MFP application	Function type	The values specified for each function type is
(Copy Function, Printer		as follows:
Function, Scanner		For Copy Function, values to identify Copy
Function, Document		Function.
Server Function and Fax		For Document Server Function, values to
Function)		identify Document Server Function.
		For Printer Function, values to identify Printer
		Function.
		For Scanner Function, values to identify
		Scanner Function.
		For Fax Function, values to identify Fax
		Function.

7.9 Software Verification Function

The Software Verification Function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of the MFP Control Software and FCU Control Software and confirm that these codes can be trusted.

FPT_TST.1

The TOE verifies software at the TOE start-up.

The TOE verifies the integrity of the MFP Control Software first by using the hash and then by checking the certificate. If the hash does not match its original value or the certificate verification fails, the TOE displays the error message and becomes unavailable. If the hash matches its original value and the certificate is verified, the TOE becomes available. The TOE also verifies the integrity of the audit log data files.

The TOE outputs the information used for integrity verification so that the integrity of the FCU Control Software can be verified. To check the integrity of the FCU Control Software, the information the TOE outputs will be compared with the information described in the guidance documents, so that the integrity of the FCU Control Software can be verified.

7.10 Fax Line Separation Function

The Fax Line Separation Function is to receive only faxes as input information from telephone lines so that unauthorised intrusion from telephone lines can be prevented. This function also can be used to prohibit transmissions of received faxes so that unauthorised intrusion from telephone lines to the LAN can be prevented.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The TOE receives fax data only as input information from telephone lines. If any communication that does not comply with the fax protocol is performed, the line is disconnected. Since the TOE is set to prohibit forwarding of received fax data during installation, received fax data will not be forwarded.