



## **Imagio Security Card Type 9**

## **DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type I**

## **Security Target**

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This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.

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## 1 ST Introduction

This section describes the ST reference, TOE reference, TOE overview, and TOE description.

### 1.1 ST Reference

The following are the identification details of this ST.

Title : imagio Security Card Type 9, DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type I Security Target  
Version : 1.00  
Date : 2010-03-25  
Authors : Yasushi FUNAKI, Masahiro ITOH, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

### 1.2 TOE Reference

This TOE is a software product for imagio Security Card Type 9 and DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type I, which are manufactured by RICOH COMPANY, LTD. The TOE is identified by the following manufacturer, TOE names, and version. "imagio Security Card Type 9" is the product name of this TOE when it is marketed in Japan, and "DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type I" when marketed in overseas countries. While the product names are different in Japanese and overseas markets, the software is identical.

Manufacturer: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

TOE name:

imagio Security Card Type 9 Software (in Japan)

DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type I Software (in overseas countries)

Version: 1.01m

### 1.3 TOE Overview

This section defines the TOE type, non-TOE hardware and software that are required for operations, TOE usages, and major TOE security functions.

#### 1.3.1 TOE Type

The TOE is an optional software product for RICOH's digital Multi Function Product (hereafter "MFP"). The TOE utilises overwriting methods for data on the MFP's memory media.

Overwriting methods are used to prevent data retrieval by overwriting with specific values the data on the storage media.

### 1.3.2 Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software

Installation of a RICOH's MFP is required for TOE operations. RICOH's MFP comes with lists for optional products (listed product information for optional products that can be installed), which are specific to each MFP model. If an MFP can install the TOE, the optional product information list that is supplied with the MFP specifies the TOE as an installable product. MFP users can refer to the list to identify MFPs that the TOE can be installed on.

Annex A specifies the MFPs on which this TOE can be installed.

An MFP is an IT product that can input, output, and store documents. Combining these functions enables users to perform Copy, Print, Scan, and Document Server Functions.

If these functions are performed and the hard disk (hereafter "HDD") of the MFP is mounted, part or all of the document will be stored on the HDD as temporary working data. Deleting a document that was stored by using the Document Server Function is accomplished by logical deletion of data; the actual document data remains on the HDD. The temporary working data or actual data (logically deleted) that is left on the HDD is called residual data.

### 1.3.3 TOE Usage

The TOE is an optional product of the MFP and stored on an SD card, which will be distributed to users. In order to use the TOE, a customer engineer must install the TOE.

If the TOE is enabled, buttons and icons that are related to the TOE functions will be displayed on the MFP's Operation Panel. The Operation Panel allows users to configure TOE settings or select TOE functions for operations.

### 1.3.4 TOE Major Security Features

To erase data, the TOE applies data overwrite operations and invalidates data on the areas of the HDD that the MFP specifies.

## 1.4 TOE Descriptions


This section defines physical scope of the TOE, user guidance documents, and logical scope of the TOE.

### 1.4.1 Physical Scope of TOE

The TOE is a loadable software product that runs on the MFP. In order to specify the physical scope of the TOE, the environment for MFP operations and TOE positioning in the operation environments will be specified.

### 1.4.1.1 MFP Operation Environment

It is assumed that the MFP will be installed in an office environment so that it can be connected to an internal or external network, telephone lines, or client computers through USB, corresponding to user needs. Once connected to a network, the MFP can communicate with client computers, FTP servers, SMB servers, or SMTP servers. If connected to a telephone line, the MFP can send and receive fax data. An assumed working environment of the MFP is outlined in Figure 1.




**Figure 1: MFP Working Environment**

### 1.4.1.2 TOE Positioning in MFP Operation Environment

The MFP's hardware configuration includes the following: an Operation Panel, an Engine Unit, a Fax Unit, a Controller Board, an HDD, a Network Unit, USB Ports, and an SD Card Slot. See Figure 2 below for the MFP's hardware configuration.





**Figure 2: MFP's Hardware Configuration and TOE Positioning**

The firmware to control MFP operations is installed in memory on the Controller Board. The SD card the TOE is stored in is inserted into the SD Card Slot of the MFP. The SD card is used to load the TOE on the MFP. Once loaded, the TOE communicates with the MFP's firmware and applies data overwrite operations to delete data that is stored on the HDD.

#### 1.4.2 User Guidance Documents

Below are the user guidance documents that are provided for users when the TOE is supplied.

If the TOE is shipped to users in Japan, the user guidance documents in Japanese will be provided. If shipped to users in overseas countries, the user guidance documents in English will be provided. Because the user guidance in English is a translated version of the user guidance documents in Japanese, so the contents are the same in both Japanese and English.

- Name of Japanese guidance documents
  - imagio Security Card Type 7
  - imagio Security Card Type 9
  - Operating Instructions
- Name of English guidance documents
  - DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type H
  - DataOverwriteSecurity Unit Type I
  - Operating Instructions
  - Notes for Users

### 1.4.3 Logical Scope of TOE

The TOE functionality consists of sequential and batch overwriting. The Sequential and Batch Overwrite Functions are described below.

See "1.4.4 MFP Functions Related to the TOE" for the Auto Erase Memory Function and the Erase All Memory Function that are provided by MFP, which is outside the TOE.

#### **Sequential Overwrite Function**


To delete residual data, the TOE applies data overwrite operations to the specific data stored on the HDD locations specified by the MFP. For this operation, the user can specify the overwrite method. If the Auto Erase Memory Function is applied and the unnecessary data area is identified on the HDD, the MFP specifies the HDD area that the data overwrite operations of the Sequential Overwrite Function is applied to.

#### **Batch Overwrite Function**

The TOE will delete all of the data, following the MFP instructions for application of overwrite operations to the specific data that is stored on all areas of the HDD. For this operation, the user can specify the overwrite method. When the user specifies the Batch Overwrite Function on the Operation Panel and this function is initiated, the MFP will send instructions for batch overwrite operations to the TOE.

### 1.4.4 MFP Functions Related to TOE

The Sequential and Batch Overwrite Functions of the TOE are hierarchical to the Auto Erase Memory Function and the Erase All Memory Function of the MFP. In addition, the Sequential and Batch Overwrite Functions are related to the following functions of the MFP: Residual Data Management Function, Sequential Overwrite Operation Configuration Function, Batch Overwrite Start-up/Suspension Function, and Residual Data Status Display Function. TOE functions and MFP functions related to the TOE are outlined in Figure 3, and each function is explained below:



**Figure 3: TOE Functions and MFP Functions Related to the TOE**

**Auto Erase Memory Function**

A function to overwrite residual data by using the Sequential Overwrite Function of the TOE if residual data is generated on the HDD. The Residual Data Management Function checks whether or not there is any residual data.

**Erase All Memory Function**

A function to overwrite all areas on the HDD by using the Batch Overwrite Function of the TOE if users select the start-up of the function.

This function can be used to invalidate the document data or authorised MFP user information that is stored on the HDD of the MFP if the MFP is physically disposed of or transferred to another section.

**Residual Data Management Function**

A function to manage the HDD area where the residual data exist. If the Sequential Overwrite Function of the TOE is enabled, the residual data area on the HDD that is specified by the MFP is the residual data area controlled by this function.

**Auto Erase Memory Operation Setting Function**

A function to enable or disable the Auto Erase Memory Function from the MFP's Operation Panel. Only the MFP administrators are allowed to enable or disable the Auto Erase Memory Function.

**Batch Overwrite Start-up/Suspension Function**

A function to start or suspend the Erase All Memory Function from the MFP's Operation Panel. Only the MFP administrators are allowed to start or suspend the Erase All Memory Function.

**Residual Data Status Display Function**

A function to display an icon representing the state of residual data status on MFP's Operation Panel. The icon indicates three states: residual data available, no residual data available, and data being overwritten.

## 2 Conformance Claims

This chapter describes CC conformance claims, PP conformance claims, conformance claims for security requirements package, and conformance claims rationale.

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claims

The CC conformance claim of this ST and TOE is as follows:

- CC version this ST and TOE claims conformance for:
  - Part 1:  
Introduction and general model, September, 2006 Ver.3.1 Revision 1 (Japanese translated version 1.2)  
CCMB-2006-09-002
  - Part 2:  
Security functional components, September, 2007 Ver.3.1 Revision 2 (Japanese translated version 2.0)  
CCMB-2007-09-002
  - Part 3:  
Security assurance components, September, 2007 Ver.3.1 Revision 2 (Japanese translated version 2.0)  
CCMB-2007-09-003
- Functional requirements: Part 2 Extended
- Assurance requirements: Part 3 Conformant

### 2.2 PP Conformance Claims

This ST claims no conformance to PPs.

### 2.3 Conformance Claims for Security Requirement Packages

This ST claims conformance for the following security requirements:

- This ST claims no conformance for functional requirement packages.
- Assurance requirement packages are EAL3 conformant.

### 2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale

This ST claims no conformance to PPs, so the rationale for conformance claims is not relevant.

### 3 Security Problems

This section defines threats, organisational security policies, and assumptions.

#### 3.1 Threats

No threats can be identified that the TOE and its operational environment counter.

#### 3.2 Organisational Security Policies

This section identifies the organisational security policy that the TOE shall follow.

##### **P.UNREADABLE**

The TOE shall protect the data area on the HDD that the MFP specifies and prevent the data in the area from being read.

#### 3.3 Assumptions

This section identifies assumptions that are related to the TOE environment.

##### **A.MODE.AUTOMATIC**

The TOE operations shall not be interrupted by MFP power-off while the TOE completes overwrite operations by the sequential overwriting method.

##### **A.MODE.MANUAL**

The implementation of the Batch Overwrite Function of the TOE shall not be unintentionally suspended while the TOE completes overwrite operations by the Auto Erase Memory Function. The unintentional suspension means the operation of temporary suspension button or the MFP power-off.

## 4 Security Objectives

This section defines the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE's operational environment

### 4.1 TOE Security Objectives

This section identifies the security objectives that can be applied to the TOE.

#### **O.OVERWRITE**

To eliminate any potential leakage of the data that is stored on the HDD area that the MFP specifies, the TOE applies overwrite operations to the area and invalidates the data.

### 4.2 Security Objectives for TOE's Operational Environment

This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE's operational environment.

#### **OE.MODE.AUTOMATIC**

When turning off the MFP, the user shall check the operational status of the icon on the Operation Panel. If the overwrite operations by the sequential overwrite method is complete, the user can turn off the machine.

#### **OE.MODE.MANUAL**

When applying the Batch Overwrite Function, the user shall ensure that the batch overwrite operations for the MFP will not be suspended unintentionally. The unintentional suspension means the operation of temporary suspension button or the MFP power-off.

### 4.3 Rationale for Security Objectives

The security objectives are designed to achieve the organisational security policies or satisfy the assumptions that are specified in "3 Security Objectives". The relationship between the security objectives and the organisational security policies as well as assumptions is specified below in Table 1.

**Table 1: Relationship between Security Objectives and Security Problems**

Security problems Security objectives	P.UNREADABLE	A.MODE.AUTOMATIC	A.MODE.MANUAL
O.OVERWRITE	X		
OE.MODE.AUTOMATIC		X	
OE.MODE.MANUAL			X

**P.UNREADABLE**

P.UNREADABLE is enforced by O.OVERWRITE because O.OVERWRITE ensures that data overwrite operations applied to the HDD area that the MFP specifies make the data in the area unreadable.

**A.MODE.AUTOMATIC**

A.MODE.AUTOMATIC is achieved by OE.MODE.AUTOMATIC because completion of the TOE's overwrite operations prior to the MFP's power loss ensures that the TOE's overwrite operations are not interrupted.

**A.MODE.MANUAL**

A.MODE.MANUAL is achieved by OE.MODE.MANUAL because the user management of the MFP during batch overwrite operations prevents the overwrite operations from being suspended unintentionally.



## 5 Extended Components Definition

This section defines the extended components of security function components and security assurance components.

### 5.1 Extended Components of Security Function Components

Directed by the following reasons, this ST defines FDP\_SIP.1, which is an extended component of the security function components that are specified in the CC Part 2.

#### Rationale for necessity for component extension and component family augmentation

The TOE invalidates the data that is stored on the partial or entire area of the data resource a trusted IT product specifies, and the TSF does not control this data resource. FDP\_RIP is a component family in the existing CC components that invalidates data. The data FDP\_RIP invalidates is part of the data the TSF controls. This indicates that the data the TOE invalidates differs from the one FDP\_RIP invalidates, so no refinement can be provided for FDP\_RIP components (FDP\_RIP.1.1, etc.).

Moreover, if new components are added to FDP\_RIP, it may be wrongly conceived that the partial or entire data the TOE invalidates is stored in the data resource the TSF controls. For this, a new component family must be added. This new component family is defined as SIP.

#### Rationale for applicable class


Generally, the data a trusted IT product specifies and the TOE applies overwrite operations to is the user data of the trusted IT product. For this, the appropriate class for extended components is FDP class.

#### FDP\_SIP Protection of specified information

- Family behaviour

This family requires that any data in the data resource a trusted IT product specifies shall be invalid.

- Component levelling



FDP\_SIP.1 requires that the TSF shall ensure no data in the specified data resource can be reused.

- Management: FDP\_SIP.1

There are no management activities forseen.

A trusted IT product manages all functions the TOE provides, and only the IT product can use the TOE functions. For this reason, no management activities are required.

- Audit: FDP\_SIP.1

There are no auditable events forseen.

**FDP\_SIP. 1    Protection of specified information**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SIP.1.1    The TSF shall ensure any data in the specified data resource is overwritten.

**5.2    Extended Components of Security Assurance Components**

No extensions augment the security assurance components.

## 6 Security Requirements

This section defines security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security requirements rationale.

### 6.1 Security Functional Requirements

This section demonstrates the security functional requirement the TOE provides.

#### **FDP\_SIP.1 Protection of specified information**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure any data in the specified data resource is overwritten.

### 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for this TOE are limited to those that conform to the evaluation assurance level 3 specified in CC Part 3. Below specified in Table 2 are the security assurance requirements this TOE requires.

**Table 2: TOE Security Assurance Requirements**

Assurance classes	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
	ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
	ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle
ASE: Security target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

Assurance classes	Assurance components	
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis

### 6.3 Rationale for Security Requirements

This section describes the rationale behind security requirements that consist of rationale for security functional requirements, dependency verification, and rationale for security assurance requirements.

#### 6.3.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements

O.OVERWRITE is the only security objective, and FDP\_SIP.1 is the only security functional requirement, for this TOE. O.OVERWRITE is fulfilled by FDP\_SIP.1 and corresponding relationships can be maintained between them. Therefore, all security functional requirements for this TOE are associated with at least one security objective. For this reason, security functional requirements are necessary.

Moreover, to eliminate any leakage potential of the data that is stored on the HDD area that the MFP specifies, O.OVERWRITE requires that all data in the area shall be invalid, and FDP\_SIP.1 applies overwrite operation to the data in the specified area. Consequently, the requirements for O.OVERWRITE can be fully satisfied by FDP\_SIP.1.

#### 6.3.2 Dependency Verification

No dependencies are assumed for FDP\_SIP.1, which represents the security functional requirements for this TOE. Accordingly, the dependency of the security requirements for this TOE is satisfied.

#### 6.3.3 Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements

This TOE is an optional product provided with MFPs, which are commercially available. Office installation is assumed for MFPs, and malicious parties with basic attack potential are assumed. Consequently, the TOE shall ensure it can counter attacks from malicious parties with basic attack potential, which are expected to happen in general offices.

Verifications based on EAL3 certification include verification of security functions and their architecture, guidance documents that are compiled to ensure security functions are properly used, security measures that are applied to development environments and distribution routes, configuration management for configuration items, and testing based on security functions and their architecture.

These packages for verification satisfactorily ensure that the TOE can counter attacks from malicious parties with basic attack potential against general and commercially available products in offices.

Consequently, selection of EAL3 is appropriate.

## 7 TOE Summary Specifications

SF.OVERWRITE represents security functions that can be deprived from FDP\_SIP.1, security functional requirements for the TOE. Below, SF.OVERWRITE is outlined and methods specified by SF.OVERWRITE to achieve FDP\_SIP.1 are defined.

### **SF.OVERWRITE**

The TOE applies overwrite operations to the HDD area that the MFP specifies. To create the area that the MFP specifies for overwrite operations, sequential overwriting and batch overwriting are available. Details of both functions are described below:

- Sequential Overwrite Function  
The MFP's Residual Data Management Function constantly monitors the residual data area on the HDD. If an area of generated residual data is detected, the TOE implements data overwrite operations on the residual data area.
- Batch Overwrite Function  
When receiving batch overwrite instructions from the MFP, the TOE applies batch overwrite operations to the data that is stored on the HDD. The TOE also receives cancellation instructions. Once receiving the cancellation instructions, the TOE suspends batch overwrite operations.

To overwrite data, the NSA, DoD, and random number methods can be used. The TOE receives overwrite instructions from the MFP, which specifies which method is used for data overwriting. Brief explanations for each method are as follows:

- NSA method:  
Data overwritten twice by random numbers and once by null (0).
- DoD method  
Data overwritten once by fixed numbers, once by their complements, once by random numbers, and the results will be verified.
- Random number method:  
Data overwritten a number of times (1–9 times) specified using random numbers. The MFP specifies the number of overwrite operations.

### **Achieving FDP\_SIP.1**

FDP\_SIP.1 is the requirement to ensure that overwrite operations are applied to the data on the resource area (HDD) that the MFP, a trusted IT product, specifies.

SF.OVERWRITE is achieved by applying overwrite operations to the HDD area that the MFP specifies for sequential or batch overwriting. For this, the method the MFP specifies can be implemented from the NSA, DoD, and random number methods. By so doing, all data on the HDD becomes invalid.

## 8 Appendix

### 8.1 Glossary

Refer to Table 3 for the terms used in this ST.

**Table 3: Terms Used in this ST**

Terms	Definitions
MFP	A digital multi function product. A printer with multiple functions (copy, print, etc.)
SD memory card	A secure digital memory card. A highly functional memory card that is the size of a postage stamp and can be used to install the TOE and other applications on the MFP.
Document Server Function	One of the MFP functions. This function allows users to store scanned paper document data on the HDD of the MFP. In addition, by using its Copy, Print, and Document Server Functions, users can print and delete the document that is stored on the HDD of the MFP.

### 8.2 References

Below are the referential materials used for this documentation:

- CC Version 3.1 Revision 2

Evaluation criteria:

"English version"

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version3.1

Part 1: Introduction and general model Revision 1(CCMB-2006-09-001)

Part 2: Security functional components Revision 2(CCMB-2007-09-002)

Part 3: Security assurance components Revision 2(CCMB-2007-09-003)

"Japanese translated version"

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version3.1

Part 1: Introduction and general model Revision 1 (Japanese translated version 1.2)

Part 2: Security functional components Revision 2 (Japanese translated version 2.0)

Part 3: Security assurance components Revision 2 (Japanese translated version 2.0)

Evaluation methodology:

"English version"

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1

Evaluation methodology Revision 2 (CCMB-2007-09-0004)

"Japanese translated version"

3.1 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation version 3.1  
Evaluation Methodology Revision 2 (Japanese translated version 2.0)



## Annex A

Table 4 specifies MFPs where installation of the TOE can be assumed.

**Table 4: TOE Installable MFP**

<b>Product name in Japan</b>	<b>Product names in overseas countries</b>
Ricoh imagio MP 4000/5000 series	Ricoh Aficio MP 4000/5000 series Savin 9040/9050 series Lanier LD 040/050 series Lanier MP 4000/5000 series Gestetner MP 4000/5000 series infotec MP 4000/5000 series nashuatec MP 4000/5000 series Rex-Rotary MP 4000/5000 series

*Note: "series" in the product names above indicates a product family whose standard component configurations do not affect TOE performance but differ by each product of the product family.*