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Computer Virus / Unauthorized Computer Access Incident Report [Summary]


July 20, 2007
IT Security Center
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA)

This is a summary of computer virus/unauthorized computer access incident reports for June, 2007 and 1st Half (January to June) compiled by IPA.

I. Reminder for the Month:

To prevent virus infection from external memory devices such as USB memory, etc., “Better not to connect your USB memory to your computer easily!”

(1)   Damage Status

There are number of consultations relevant to USB memory that “soon after a user threw in his/her USB memory, anti-virus software detected virus” which filed with IPA in June.

These indicate virus is spreading from the USB memory infected which secondarily infects to a computer from that infected USB memory. In addition, according to the occurrence of computer virus in May and June, there existed number of virus which infects via external memory devices, such as USB memory, etc.

Infected from ...

(2)   USB Memory

USB memory is an easy device to use in which you can simply connect to the USB port in a computer. Accordingly, it is the most user-friendly memory device among CDs,FDs (floppy disks), MOs (magnet optical disks) which does not require read/write devices exclusively for them. USB memory is relatively reasonable and portable: Some of them are likely to accommodate over 1G memory, USB memory has been widely promulgated among computer user community.

The features of the USB memory is connectivity: it is easy to connect to any of computers so that you can save/carry even larger size of files anywhere you want. What if the USB memory itself is being infected by virus, it easily turns over the mean which readily carries virus! There is another risk to enlarge infection if you throw in the USB memory to the other computers with ease.

 

(3)   Countermeasures

When you use USB memory, be sure to conduct certain security measures referring (A) and (B) described below to prevent damages by virus infection via the USB port.

 

(A)   Security measures of the computer which uses USB memory

Fundamentally, it means to conduct anti-virus measures for your computer. Nowadays, there also existed some viruses which search external memory device such as USB memory, etc. for infection.

Accordingly, it is VERY RISKY that the USB memory probably be infected by virus if you throw in the USB memory to the computers publicly available (i.e. those computers being provided in an Internet café, etc.) as such computers may not have been conducted certain security measures.

You should better to check with or without of virus before you use that computer; if you cannot check virus immediately, you should better not to throw in USB memory with ease.

It is important to resolve security holes (weakness relevant to security) by Windows Update/Microsoft Update along with updating the virus signatures on your anti-virus software upon use.

Typical viruses which infect USB memory, etc. are as follows:

W32/SillyFD-AA:

This virus searches the devices which connect to external memory such as USB memory, etc., to copy the virus itself to the external devices to create Autorun.inf file, but built-in HDDs.

http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32sillyfdaa.html

W32/LiarVB-A:

This virus infects the devices which connect to external memory such as USB memory, etc. The virus copies itself to the devices searched to create Autorun.inf file. In addition, the virus stores such HTML files specifically describes about AIDS and HIV in a computer.

http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32liarvba.html

Autorun.inf file configures the execution type of files which extension is .exe for which the virus intends to run automatically within the Autorun.inf file. When a computer loads the CDs and/or DVDs inclusive of the Autorun.inf file, the virus can automatically start the execution type of file previously configured.

Autorun.inf file typically does not start up with USB memory, but default configuration of Windows Vista; you cannot totally feel ease, however, as there is some virus which infecting USB memory attempts to automatically start up the virus itself by creating the Autorun.inf file.

Reference:

IPA – Seven anti-virus requirements for computer users:

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/antivirus/7kajonew.html (in Japanese)

IPA – Five must-dos for dealing with files attached to email:

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/antivirus/spyware5kajyou.html (in Japanese)

IPA – Anti-bot measures:

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/antivirus/bot.html (in Japanese)

 

Then, be sure to conduct virus check within USB memory throwing it in your computer with the following method securely.

As you already aware that throwing in the USB memory for which source is unknown to your computer is VERY RISKY . In case the USB memory is being infected, you should not throw it in easily as your computer will probably be infected.

(B) Security measures on USB memory

Be sure to take following procedures in advance to prevent running the execution file immediately after throwing in the USB memory.

Which is the source of infection??

(i) if you are a Windows Vista user…

In case your Windows Vista is having been in default configuration, the execution file will be immediately started up if there is Autorun.inf file in the USB memory.

The execution file will not be started immediately if you throw in the USB memory to your computer by hitting the “shift” key on your keyboard; it is still risky if the Vista is in its default configuration. For your further security to ensure preventing the execution file automatically runs, be sure to conduct following configuration.

start” ? “ Control Panel” ? “Hardware and Sound” ? “Automatic retrieve of CDs and/or the other media”

Configuration Screen of gAutomatic Retrieve of CDs and/or the Other Mediah on Windows Vista

Chart 1-1: Configuration Screen of “Automatic Retrieve of CDs and/or the Other Media” on Windows Vista

The virus code (Autorun.inf) is may be infected other than the execution file, we will encourage you to configure your computer (Windows Vista) for the other files (audio files, video files, DVD movies, etc.) with the same manner by referring above mentioned procedures.

 

(ii) if you are a Windows 2000/XP user…

Although there are Autorun.inf and execution file in the USB memory, the execution file will not be started soon after you throw in the memory in your computer. However, the execution file will be started if you double click the drive on the “My Computer” screen which recognizing the USB memory.

My Computer screen

Chart 1-2: My Computer screen

Be sure to conduct virus check the drive which recognizing the USB memory with your anti-virus software before you double click to confirm with or without if there is unknown suspicious file in the drive which recognizing the USB memory.

To view your “Windows Explorer” screen, you can click “View” ? “Explorer Bar” ? “Folder” in turn from your “My Computer” screen. You can also view the contents of the drive (Chart 1-4) if you can click the drive which recognizing the USB memory from the left hand side part of the “Windows Explorer” screen (Chart 1-3).

Windows Explorer screen ? 1

Chart 1-3: Windows Explorer screen – 1

 

Windows Explorer screen ? 2

Chart 1-4: Windows Explorer screen – 2

 

II. Reporting Status for Computer Virus further details, please refer to the

   Attachment 1

The detection number [1] of virus for June was about 0.50M and was increased about 35.5% from 0.62M reported in May. In addition, the reported number [2] of virus for June was 2,898 and was decreased 14.3% from 3,383 in May.


[1]Detection number:

Reported virus counts (cumulative) found by a filer.

[2]Reported number:

Virus counts are aggregated: viruses of same type and variants reported on the same day are counted as one case number regardless how many viruses or the actual number of viruses is found by the same filer on the same day. In June, the reported number was 2,898: aggregated virus detection number was about 0.50M.

The worst detection number was for W32/Netsky with about 0.42M , W32/Stration with about 0.02M and W32/Mytob with 0.16M were subsequently followed.

Detection # of Virus about 0.50M (about 0.77M) -35.5%

Chart 2-1

Reported # of Virus 2,898 (3,383) -14.3%

Chart 2-2

Note) #s in the parenthesis are the #s for previous month.

 

III. Reporting Status for Unauthorized Computer Access (includes Consultations) Please refer to the Attachment 2 –

Report for unauthorized computer access and status of consultation

 

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Total for Reported (a)

32

23

13

15

19

41

 

Damaged (b)

22

14

9

12

13

36

Not Damaged (c)

10

9

4

3

6

5

Total for Consultation (d)

52

50

43

31

37

27

 

Damaged (e)

25

28

20

20

21

11

Not Damaged (f)

27

22

23

11

16

16

Grand Total (a + d)

84

73

56

46

56

68

 

Damaged (b + e)

47

42

29

32

34

47

Not Damaged (c + f)

37

31

27

14

22

21

(1) Reporting Status for Unauthorized Computer Access

Reported number for June was 41: of 36 was the number actually damaged .

(2) Accepting Status for Consultations relevant to Unauthorized Computer Access, etc.

Consultation counts relevant to unauthorized computer access was 27: of 11 (of 2 was also counted as reported number) was the actual number that some sort of damage was reported.

(3) Status of Damage

The breakdown of damage report were: Intrusion with 6 , Source Address Spoofing with 2 and Others (Damaged) with 28 . The breakdown of the damage being reported relevant to intrusion include: alteration of web contents with 1, server was turned into a steppingstone to attack to the other sites with 1, alteration of data within server with 2, etc. The causes of intrusion were: exploitation of vulnerability (*1) within program with 3 (program for web server with 1 and for the other applications with 2), and insufficient configuration settings with 2, etc.

(4) Damage Instances:

[Intrusion]

(i) Server was used as a steppingstone to attack to the other site

<Instance>

-   “We'd been conducted password cracking attack (*3) to the ports used by SSH (*2) from the computers of your organization” so complained from the outside of this organization.

•  Explicitly study was conducted and detected that 2 Linux machines were attempted for intrusion. It is realized that certain password cracking tool was embedded to one of them to be used as a steppingstone to attack to the other sites. There were not any signs that password cracking attack was conducted; however, both machines were successfully logged into with single ID/password attempts.

•  Additional study was conducted on a Windows machine which connected to the Linux machines used as a client, the Windows' security function against virus was being disabled and the rootkit (*5) including key logger (*4) was having been embedded.

(ii) Web site was having been altered because of the mis-configuration of

      WebDAV (*6)

<Instance>

-   The top page of our web pages was having been altered so communicated by the out side of organization.

-   Study was conducted accordingly. It is realized that number of files in the web server were altered and their related logs (*7) were all deleted. In addition, another file replaced/altered by some malicious codes was also embedded. The codes were executed, but failed, though.

-   WebDAV function was employed for the server, but was being maliciously operated by the user intruded from outside who'd not have privilege to connect because of mis-configuration of user authentication.

 

IV. Accepting Status of Consultation

The gross number for the consultation for June was 932 . Of the consultation relevant to “ One-click Billing Fraud ” was 285 (May: 185), the consultation relevant to “ High-pressured selling of software for security measures ” with 12 (May: 19) and the consultation relevant to “ Winny ” with 11 (May: 6), etc.

Movement in entire number of consultation accepted by IPA /method

 

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Total

946

1019

1127

827

814

932

 

Automatic Response System

582

603

697

486

484

537

Telephone

324

336

376

279

254

339

e-mail

39

75

54

58

69

53

Fax, Others

1

5

0

4

7

3

*IPA consults/advises for computer viruses/unauthorized computer accesses as well as the other information concerning overall security issues

Mail: ?????????? for virus issues, ????????????for crack issues.

Tel.: +81-3-5978-7509 (24-hour automatic response)

Fax: +81-3-5978-7518 (24-hour automatic response)

*The Total case number includes the number in Consultation (d) column of the Chart in the “III. Reported Status for Unauthorized Computer Access” and “IV. Accepting Status of Consultation”.

*”Automatic Response System”:   Accepted numbers by automatic response
*“Telephone”:                           Accepted numbers by the Security Center personnel

 

<Reference>

Shift in Number of Consultation relevant to One-click Billing Fraud

Consultation #s for One-click Billing Fraud Computer Virus and Unauthorized Computer Access for September and the 3 rd Quarter

2. One-click Billing Fraud

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/english/virus/press/200609/E_PR200609.html

Computer Virus and Unauthorized Computer Access for August

2. Consultation Number for the Damages by One-click Billing Fraud is Unchangeably Many!!

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/english/virus/press/200608/E_PR200608.html

<Reference>

Shift in the consultation number for High-Pressured Selling of Security Software

Consultation #s for High-pressured Selling of Security Measures Software

As for the activities of high-pressured selling of security software, please also refer to the following link.

Reminder for the month (for the month of April)

“Be Cautious with the High-pressured Selling Activities of Software for Security Measures!!”

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/english/virus/press/200604/E_PR200604.html

The main instances for consultations are as follows.

(i) Server is infected by bot?

Consultation:

A mail came from CCC ( Cyber Clean Center ) via the provider I am signing with. The mail said that “My computer is being infected by bot”. Then I have downloaded bot removal tool and responded in accordance with the procedure the mail specified. What will be the next step to be involved?

Response:

CCC's important role is to communicate users by mail letting them know that “their PCs are being infected by bot in cooperation with providers to promote bot removal . Along with installing anti-virus software and committing “ do not come by suspicious site ”, “ do not open the files which source is unknown ” as well as to “ keep OSs always updated (to conduct Windows Update, etc.)” as the foundation so that we can minimize the potentiality to get infected by virus.

<Reference>

Cyber Clean Center (the collaboration project in between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI))

https://www.ccc.go.jp/en_index.html

 

(ii) There are unknown icons existed on the family use desktop…

Consultation:

Realized that there are some unknown icons namely “ Gabos ”, “Setup”, etc. existed on a family computer. Is this the virus work?

Response:

It can be assumed that the other user (s) in your family member may have been installed them. “ Gabos is one of file sharing software . Those data stored in your computer will be disclosed on the Internet in case you mis-operate . In addition, data may be deviated if your computer is infected by virus. It is necessary to share family users such potential risks . To prevent data deviation while you do not know, file sharing software should not be installed such a computer for family use .

 

<Reference>

IPA – to prevent from information deviation by Winny (in Japanese)

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/topics/20060310_winny.html

 

V. Accessing Status Captured by the Internet Monitoring (TALOT2”) in June

According to the Internet Monitoring (TALOT2), the total of unwanted (one-sided) number of access in June 2007 was 293,252 for 10 monitoring points. That is, the number of access was 1,086 from 277 source addresses/monitoring point/day.

Since each monitoring environment for the TALOT2 is nearly equal to the general connection environment used for the Internet; it can be considered that the same amount of unwanted (one-sided) access can be monitored for the general Internet users' connection environment. In another word, your computer is being accessed from 277 unknown source addresses in average/day or you are being accessed from 4 times from one source address which considered unauthorized.

# of Access and Source # of Access in Average/Monitoring Point/Day

Chart 5.1: Unwanted (One-sided) # of Access and Source # of Access/Monitoring Point/Day

The Chart 5.1 shows the # of access and the source # of access in average/monitoring point/day from January to June 2007. According to this chart, both unwanted accesses seemed to be moderately decreasing.

The accessing status in June 2007 is stabilized as it was in May. Accesses to the ports 135/tcp and 445/tcp are unchangeably many; in addition, such accesses to the ports 1026/udp and 1027/udp which send popup mail exploiting Windows Messenger service are increased.

Note)   Please be noted as for June, the monitoring data are only available from June 4 to 30 as the TALOT2 system maintenance period was fallen on June 1 to 3.

 

(1) Access Targeting 1026/udp and 1027/udp

Accesses to the ports 1026/udp and 1027/udp in June 2007 are almost doubled compared with the one in May 2007. Most of these accesses are from China .

The Chart 5.2 and the Chart 5.3 shows the shift in # of access classified by source area to the ports 1026/udp and 1027/udp for the last 2 months, May and June 2007.

Shift in # of Access to the Port 1026/upd Classified by Source Area (10 Monitoring Points)

Chart 5.2: Shift in # of Access to the Port 1026/udp Classified by Source Area from May to June 2007

Shift in # of Access to the Port 1027/udp Classified by Source Area (10 Monitoring Points)

Chart 5.3: Shift in # of Access to the Port 1027/udp Classified by Source Area from May to June 2007

These accesses send popup messages exploiting Windows Messenger service. There are some requirements, however, to display such messages; they may not be displayed on all computers.

Since most of them may be harmless spams so that you can ignore them. However, there is risk that some of them run malicious codes remotely if certain security patches to the vulnerability of Windows Messenger service are not applied. Accordingly, be sure to confirm that the security patches are being applied one more time.

<Referential Information>

Buffer Overrun in Messenger Service Could Allow Remote Code Execution (828035) (MS03-043)

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms03-043.mspx

Nowadays, Messenger service exploits to send such virus or you may be induced to phishing sites. Accordingly, we encourage you to reconfirm the security measures applied to your computer which uses the Messenger service.

For further details, please refer to the following site.

Attachment3_Observation Status Captured by the Internet Monitoring (TALOT2)

http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/english/virus/press/200706/TALOT200706.html

 


“Various Statistics Information Provided by Other Organizations/Vendors are Publicized in the Following Sites”


@police:      http://www.cyberpolice.go.jp/english/
Trendmicro: http://www.trendmicro.com/en/home/us/home.htm
McAfee:      http://www.mcafee.com/us/


“Interpretation for Glossaries”

(*1) Vulnerability :

In the information security, vulnerability typically refers the existence of weakness which may result unscheduled and/or unexpected event which reduces secured state from the protocols relevant to system, network or application, or refers the errors in the design and/or implementation. It may also refer the insufficient state of the configuration relevant to security. Generally, vulnerability is also called as security hole.

(*2) SSH (Secure Shell) :

A protocol or a program used for log-in to another computer via the network, execute commands by a computer remotely and transfer files to another computer. Since data via the network is encrypted, a series of operations through the Internet can be conducted safely.

(*3) Password Cracking :

The approach to identify anyone else's password by analyzing, etc. Approaches include brute-force attack, dictionary attack, etc. and there is the code for exclusively crack as well.

*Brute Force Attack:

One of attacking methods that attempts to combination of letters exhaustively to analyze password in accordance with a certain rule. It refers to forcible attacking method.

*Dictionary Attack:

One of attacking methods that attempts to every word listed on a dictionary from very beginning to its end to analyze password.

(*4) Key Logger :

The program which records information input from keyboard.

(*5) Rootkit :

A set of software used by an attacker after intruded to a computer. Generally, a rootkit includes log alteration tool, backdoor tool and a series of system commands being altered.

(*6) WebDAV (Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning) :

The mechanism which expands http (hypertext transfer protocol) that enables to edit/manage files and folders and their versions on web server from web browser.

(*7) Log :

Status of a computer usage or record for data communication. Generally, it records operator's ID, time and date the computer is operated and the contents of operation, etc.

 

The details are as follows:
- Attachment 1 Computer virus Incident Report [Details]
- Attachment 2 Unauthorized Computer Access Incident Report [Details]

- Attachment 3 Observation Status by Internet Monitoring System (TALOT2)

- Attachment 4 Computer virus Incident Report for the 1st Half (January to June)

- Attachment 5 Unauthorized Computer Access Incident Report for the 1st Half (January to June)

   


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