
Fuji Xerox
ApeosPort-IV 4070/3070
DocuCentre-IV 4070/3070
Series Controller Software

Security Target

Version 1.0.4

This document is a translation of the evaluated
and certified security target written in Japanese.



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1. ST INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes Security Target (ST) Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description.

1.1. ST Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this ST.

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| ST Title: | Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-IV 4070/3070 DocuCentre-IV 4070/3070 Series Controller Software Security Target |
| ST Version: | V 1.0.4 |
| Publication Date: | December 27, 2011 |
| Author: | Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. |

1.2. TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this TOE.

The TOE resides within the ApeosPort-IV 4070, ApeosPort-IV 3070, DocuCentre-IV 4070, DocuCentre-IV 3070.

The TOE is identified by the following TOE name and ROM version:

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| TOE Identification: | Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-IV 4070/3070 DocuCentre-IV 4070/3070 Series Controller Software. |
| Version: | Controller ROM Ver. 1.0.10 |
| Manufacturer: | Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. |

1.3. TOE Overview

1.3.1. TOE Type and Major Security Features

1.3.1.1. TOE Type

This TOE, categorized as an IT product, is the controller software for MFD and has copy, print, and scan functions.

The TOE is provided as the firmware product which controls the whole MFD and protects the following against threats: the document data stored on the internal HDD, the used document data, the security audit log data, the document data exists on the internal network between the TOE and the remote, and the TOE setting data. The TOE is stored on the controller ROM which is on the controller board.

1.3.1.2. Function Types

Table 1 shows the function types and functions provided by the TOE.

Table 1: Function Types and Functions Provided by the TOE

| Function types | Functions provided by the TOE |
|-------------------|---|
| Basic Function | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control Panel - CWIS - Copy - Print - Scan - Network Scan - Fax - Direct Fax (with local authentication only) - Internet Fax |
| Security Function | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hard Disk Data Overwrite - Hard Disk Data Encryption - User Authentication - Administrator's Security Management - Customer Engineer Operation Restriction - Security Audit Log - Internal Network Data Protection - Fax Flow Security |

- The Data Security Kit, an option, must be used to obtain the security features of the TOE.
- Optional Fax board (out of the TOE boundary) is required to use Fax, Direct Fax, Internet Fax, and Fax Flow Security functions.
- To use print, scan, and Direct Fax functions, the following items shall be installed to the external client for general user and that for system administrator: printer driver, Network Scan Utility, and fax driver.
- There are two types of user authentication, local authentication and remote authentication, and the TOE behaves with either one of the authentication types depending on the setting. In this ST, the difference of the TOE behavior is described if the TOE behaves differently depending on the type of authentication being used. Unless specified, the behavior of the TOE is the same for both authentication types.

There are two types of Remote Authentication: LDAP Authentication and Kerberos Authentication. To set SA (system administrator privilege) as user role assumption in Kerberos authentication, LDAP server is also necessary.

Note)

- DocuCentre IV does not have Remote Authentication function and S/MIME function. Each function of Remote Authentication, S/MIME, E-mail, and Internet Fax that are written in

the following sections is subject to evaluation of ApeosPort IV only.

- The Fax function of this TOE supports only G3 protocol. The models that support G4 (G4 Model) are not the target of evaluation.

1.3.1.3. Usage and Major Security Features of TOE

The TOE is mainly used to perform the following functions:

- Copy function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and print them out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel. When more than one copy of an original data is ordered, the data read from IIT are first stored into the MFD internal HDD. Then, the stored data are read out from the internal HDD for the required number of times so that the required number of copies can be made.
- Print function is to decompose and print out the print data transmitted by a general user client.
- CWIS (CentreWare Internet Service) is to retrieve the document data scanned by MFD from Mailbox.

It also enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting data via Web browser.

- Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and store them into Mailbox within the MFD internal HDD, according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.

The stored document data can be retrieved via standard Web browser by using CWIS or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only).

- Network Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and transmit the document data to FTP server, SMB server, or Mail server, according to the information set in the MFD. This function is operated according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
- Fax function and Control Panel function are to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data are read from IIT and then sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data are received from the sender's machine via public telephone line and then printed out from the recipient's IOT or stored in Mailbox.
- The Internet Fax function and Control Panel function are to send and receive fax data via the Internet, not public telephone line.
- The Direct Fax function is to send data from a user client to the destination via public telephone line. The data are first sent to MFD as a print job and then to the destination without being printed out (with local authentication only).

The TOE provides the following security features:

- Hard Disk Data Overwrite
To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data are overwritten with new data after any job of copy, print, scan, etc. is completed.
- Hard Disk Data Encryption
The document data and the security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the

internal HDD when using any function of copy, print, scan, etc. or configuring various security function settings.

- **User Authentication**

Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user and this function identifies and authenticates users. A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the fax driver, Network Scan Utility, ApeosWare Device Setup or CWIS of the general user client, or MFD control panel.

- **System Administrator's Security Management**

This function allows only the system administrator identified and authorized from the control panel or system administrator client to refer to and change the TOE security function settings.

- **Customer Engineer Operation Restriction**

A system administrator can prohibit CE from referring to and changing the TOE security function settings.

- **Security Audit Log**

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who used what function.

- **Internal Network Data Protection**

This function protects the communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data. (The following general encryption communication-protocols are supported: SSL/TLS, IPSec, SNMP v3, and S/MIME.)

- **Fax Flow Security**

This function prevents unauthorized access to the TOE or the internal network via Fax board from public telephone line.

1.3.2. Environment Assumptions

This TOE is assumed to be used as an IT product at general office and to be connected to public telephone line, user clients, and the internal network protected from threats on the external network by firewall etc.

Figure 1 shows the general environment for TOE operation.




Figure 1: General Operational Environment

1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software

In the operational environment shown in Figure 1, the TOE (controller software) and the following non-TOE hardware/software exist.

(1) MFD:

The MFD has a user interface to provide MFD functions and the hardware for scan/print/copy functions. It includes the control panel, ADF, IIT, IOT, controller board, and Fax board (option).

(2) General user client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. When a client is connected to the MFD via the internal network and when the printer driver, Network Scan Utility, and fax driver are installed to the

client, the general user can request the MFD to print, fax, and retrieve the document data. The user can also request the MFD to retrieve the scanned document data via Web browser by using scan function of the MFD. Additionally, the general user can change the settings which he/she registered to the MFD: Mailbox name, password, access control, and automatic deletion of document.

When the client is connected to the MFD directly via USB and printer/fax driver is installed to the client, the user can request the MFD to print/fax the document data.

(3) System administrator client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. A system administrator can refer to and change TOE setting data via Web browser or ApeosWare Device Setup.

(4) Mail server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends/receives document data to/from Mail server via mail protocol.

(5) FTP server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends document data to FTP server via FTP.

(6) SMB server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends document data to SMB server via SMB.

(7) LDAP server

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD acquires identification and authentication information from LDAP server via LDAP. In addition, it acquires SA information of user role assumptions.

(8) Kerberos server

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD acquires identification and authentication information from Kerberos server via Kerberos.

(9) Fax board:

The Fax board is connected to external public telephone line and supports G3 protocols. The Fax board is connected to the MFD via USB interface to enable sending and receiving of fax.

The OS of (2) general user client and (3) system administrator client are assumed to be Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Windows 7.

1.4. TOE Description

This section describes user assumptions and logical/physical scope of this TOE.

1.4.1. User Assumptions

Table 2 specifies the roles of TOE users assumed in this ST.

Table 2: User Role Assumptions

| User | Role Description |
|--|---|
| Administrator of the organization | An administrator or responsible official of the organization which owns and uses TOE. |
| General user | A user of TOE functions such as copy, print and fax. |
| System administrator (Key operator + System Administrator Privilege [SA]) | A user who is authorized to manage the device using the system administrator mode. A system administrator can refer to and rewrite the TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions via TOE control panel, ApeosWare Device Setup, and Web browser. |
| Customer engineer (CE) | A user who can configure the TOE operational settings using the interface for CE. |

1.4.2. Logical Scope and Boundary

The logical scope of this TOE consists of each function of the programs recorded on the controller ROM.

Figure 2 shows the logical architecture of the MFD.




Figure 2: MFD Units and TOE Logical Scope

1.4.2.1. Basic Functions

As shown in Table 3, the TOE provides the functions of control panel, copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, Internet Fax, Direct Fax (with local authentication only), and CWIS to general user.

Table 3: TOE Basic Functions

| Function | Description |
|------------------------|--|
| Control Panel Function | Control panel function is a user interface function for general user, CE, and system administrator to operate MFD functions. |
| Copy Function | Copy function is to read the original data from IIT and print them out from |

| | |
|---|--|
| | <p>IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.</p> <p>When more than one copy of an original is ordered, the data read from IIT are first stored into the MFD internal HDD. Then, the stored data are read out from the internal HDD for the required number of times so that the required number of copies can be made.</p> |
| Print Function | <p>Print function is to print out the data according to the instruction from a general user client. The print data created via printer driver are sent to the MFD to be analyzed, decomposed, and printed out from IOT.</p> <p>The print function is of two types: the normal print in which the data are printed out from IOT directly after decomposed and the Store Print in which the bitmap data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD and then printed out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.</p> |
| Scan Function, Network Scan Function | <p>Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and then store them into the internal HDD according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.</p> <p>A general user can retrieve the stored document data from a general user client via CWIS or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only).</p> <p>Network scan function is to read the original data from IIT and automatically transmit them to a general user client, FTP server, Mail server, or SMB server according to the information set in the MFD. A general user can request this function from the control panel.</p> |
| Fax Function | <p>Fax function is to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data them read from IIT and sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data are received from the sender's machine via public telephone line.</p> |
| Direct Fax (with local authentication only) Function, Internet Fax Function | <p>Direct Fax (with local authentication only) function is to directly fax document data to the destination. According to the instruction from a general user client to send a fax, the print data created via fax driver are sent to the MFD, analyzed, and decomposed. Then, the data are converted to the format for fax sending and sent to the destination via public telephone line.</p> <p>Internet Fax function is to send and receive fax data as in the normal Fax function. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data are read from IIT and sent to the destination via the Internet. The document data are received from the sender's machine via the Internet and printed out from the recipient's IOT.</p> |
| CWIS Function | <p>CWIS is to retrieve the scanned document data and the received fax data that are stored in the internal HDD according to the instruction from Web browser of a general user client.</p> <p>CWIS also enables System Administrator's Security Management by which a system administrator can access and rewrite TOE setting data. For this, a</p> |

| | |
|--|--|
| | system administrator must be authenticated by his/her ID and password entered from Web browser of a system administrator client. |
|--|--|

1.4.2.2. Security Functions

The security functions provided by the TOE are the following.

(1) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data are overwritten with new data after each job (copy, print, scan, Network Scan, Fax, Internet Fax, or Direct Fax) is completed. Without this function, the used document data remain and only the management data are deleted.

(2) Hard Disk Data Encryption

Some data such as the security audit log data and the document data in Mailbox remain in the internal HDD even if the machine is powered off. To solve this problem, the document data and security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, Internet Fax, and Direct Fax (with local authentication only), or configuring various security function settings.

(3) User Authentication

Access to the MFD functions is restricted to the authorized user. To be identified and authenticated, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFD control panel, fax driver, Network Scan Utility, ApeosWare Device Setup, or CWIS of the user client.

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel:

Copy, fax (send), Internet Fax (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)

b) Functions controlled by Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only) of user client:

Function to retrieve document data from Mailbox

c) Functions controlled by CWIS:

Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation

Among the above functions which require user authentication, some particularly act as security functions. The following are the security functions which prevent the unauthorized reading of document data in the internal HDD by an attacker who is impersonating an authorized user:

- The Store Print function (Private Print function) and the Mailbox function, which require user authentication from the control panel,
- The function to retrieve document data from Mailbox (Mailbox function) which requires user

authentication by using CWIS or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only), and the Store Print function (Private Print function) by file designation using CWIS.

Figure 3 shows the authentication flow of the above functions.




Figure 3: Authentication Flow for Private Print and Mailbox

- Store Print Function (Private Print Function)

When the MFD is set to “Save as Private Charge Print,” and a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, the print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

In the same way, when a user is authenticated by entering his/her ID and password from CWIS for authentication, and the user sends a print request by designating the files within a user client, the print data are temporarily stored in Private Print area according to the user ID.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.

- Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and Fax board which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. When the user is authenticated, the document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user's instruction from the control panel.

To store the received fax data into Mailbox, user authentication is not required. Among the received fax data transmitted over public telephone line, the following data are automatically classified and stored into each corresponding Mailbox: the received fax data whose corresponding Mailbox is specified by the sender, the received fax data from a particular sender (the data are classified according to the sender's telephone number), and the received fax data from an unknown sender.

To retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to the each registered user's ID, user authentication is required; the MFD compares the user ID and password preset in the device against those entered by a user from the control panel, CWIS, or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only).

(4) System Administrator's Security Management

To grant a privilege to a specific user, this TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the System Administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and set the following security functions from the control panel:

- Refer to and set Hard Disk Data Overwrite;
- Refer to and set Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to and set the functions that use password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication;
- Set the ID and password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user, and set the password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator's authentication fails;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA) (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the SSL/TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the S/MIME communication;
- Refer to and set the User Authentication;
- Refer to and set the Store Print;
- Refer to and set the date and time;

Additionally, this TOE allows only the system administrator, who is authenticated from the system administrator client via Web browser using CWIS, to refer to and set the following security functions via CWIS:

- Set the ID the password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user, and set the password (with local authentication

only);

- Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator's authentication fails;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA, with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set Audit Log;
- Refer to and set the SSL/TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the SNMPv3 communication;
- Refer to and set the SNMPv3 authentication password.
- Refer to and set the S/MIME communication;
- Create/upload/download an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to and set the User Authentication;

Moreover, this TOE allows only the key operator (excluding SA), who is authenticated from the system administrator client via ApeosWare Device Setup, to refer to and set the following security functions:

- Set the ID and password of key operator;
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user, and set the password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the functions that use the password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication;
- Refer to and set User Authentication;
- Refer to and set date and time;

(5) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction

This TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to or enable/disable the Customer Engineer Operation Restriction setting from the control panel and CWIS. For this, CE cannot refer to or change the setting of each function described in (4) System Administrator's Security Management.

(6) Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. Only a system administrator can supervise or analyze the log data by downloading them in the form of tab-delimited text file via Web browser using CWIS. To download the log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled.

(7) Internal Network Data Protection

The communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the following general encryption communication-protocols:

- SSL/TLS

- IPSec
- SNMP v3
- S/MIME

(8) Fax Flow Security

A Fax board is an option and is connected to TOE controller board via USB interface. An attacker cannot access the TOE or the internal network from public telephone line via the Fax board.

1.4.2.3. Settings for the Secure Operation

System administrator shall set the following to enable security functions in 1.4.2.2.

- Hard Disk Data Overwrite
Set to [Enabled].
- Hard Disk Data Encryption
Set to [Enabled].
- Passcode Entry from Control Panel
Set to [Enabled].
- Access denial when system administrator's authentication fails
Default [5] Times.
- SSL/TLS
Set to [Enabled]
- IPSec
Set to [Enabled]
- S/MIME
Set to [Enabled]
- User Authentication
Set to [Local Authentication] or [Remote Authentication]
- Store Print
Set to [Save As Private Charge Print]
- Audit Log
Set to [Enabled]
- SNMPv3
Set to [Enabled]
- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
Set to [Enabled]

1.4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary

The physical scope of this TOE is the controller board. Figure 4 shows configuration of each unit and TOE physical scope.




Figure 4: MFD Units and TOE Physical Scope

The MFD consists of the PWB units of controller board and control panel, IIT, and IOT, ADF.

The controller board is connected to the control panel via the internal interfaces which transmit control data, and the controller board is connected to the Fax board, the IIT board, and IOT board via the internal interfaces which transmit document data and control data.

The controller board is a PWB which controls MFD functions of copy, print, scan, and fax. The board has a network interface (Ethernet) and local interfaces (USB) and is connected to the IIT board and

IOT board.

The control panel is a panel on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to use and configure MFD functions of copy, print, scan, and fax.

The IIT (Image Input Terminal) is a device to scan an original and send its data to the controller board for copy, scan, and fax functions.

The IOT (Image Output Terminal) is a device to output image data which was sent from the controller board.

The ADF(Auto Document Feeder) is a device to automatically transfer original documents to IIT.

1.4.4. Guidance

The following are the guidance documents for this TOE.

- ApeosPort-IV 4070/3070 DocuCentre-IV 4070/3070 Administrator Guide
- ApeosPort-IV 4070/3070 DocuCentre-IV 4070/3070 User Guide
- ApeosPort-IV 4070/3070 DocuCentre-IV 4070/3070 Security Function Supplementary Guide

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1. CC Conformance Claims

This ST and TOE conform to the following evaluation standards for information security (CC):

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation

Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 3 Japanese Version 1.0

Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 3 Japanese Version 1.0

Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 3 Japanese Version 1.0

The security functional requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 2.

The security assurance requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 3.

2.2. PP Claims, Package Claims

2.2.1. PP Claims

There is no applicable Protection Profile.

2.2.2. Package Claims

This ST conforms to EAL3.

2.2.3. Conformance Rationale

There is no applicable PP rationale since this ST does not conform to PP.

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This chapter describes the threats, organizational security policies, and the assumptions for the use of this TOE.

3.1. Threats

3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE

This TOE protects the following assets (Figure 5):

(1) Right to use MFD functions

The general user's right to use each function of the TOE is assumed as an asset to be protected.

(2) Document data stored for job processing

When a general user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and scan, the document data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. The user can retrieve the stored document data in the MFD from a general user client by CWIS function and Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only). The stored data include general user's confidential information and are assumed as assets to be protected.

(3) Used document data

When a general user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and scan, the document data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. When the jobs are completed or canceled, only the management information is deleted but the data itself remains. The residual data include general user's confidential information and are assumed as assets to be protected.

(4) Security audit log data

In the function of Security Audit Log, the important events such as device failure, configuration change and user operation are recorded based on when and who operated what function. For preventive maintenance and response to the events and detection of unauthorized access, only a system administrator can retrieve the log data stored in MFD by CWIS function. The log data are assumed as assets to be protected.

(5) TOE setting data

A system administrator can set TOE security functions from the MFD control panel or system administrator client by the function of System Administrator's Security Management. The setting data stored in the TOE (see Table 4) can be a threat to other assets if used without authorization and are assumed as assets to be protected.




Figure 5: Assets under and not under Protection

Note) The data stored in a general client and server within the internal network and the general data on the internal network are not assumed as assets to be protected. This is because TOE functions prevent the access to the internal network from public telephone line and it cannot be a threat.

Table 4 categorizes the TOE setting data recorded on NVRAM and SEEPROM of the controller board.

Table 4: Categories of TOE Setting Data

| Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note) |
|---|
| Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite |
| Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption |
| Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication |
| Data on minimum password length of user password |
| Data on ID and password of system administrator |
| Data on access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator |

| Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note) |
|---|
| Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction |
| Data on Internal Network Data Protection |
| Data on Security Audit Log |
| Data on Mailbox |
| Data on User Authentication |
| Data on Store print |
| Data on date and time |

Note: The setting data other than TOE setting data are also stored on NVRAM and SEEPROM. Those setting data, however, are not assumed as assets to be protected because they do not engage in TOE security functions.

3.1.2. Threats

Table 5 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE. An attacker is considered to have the disclosed information on TOE operations and low-level attack capability.

Table 5: Threats Addressed by the TOE

| Threat (Identifier) | Description |
|---------------------|--|
| T.RECOVER | An attacker may remove the internal HDD and connect it to commercial tools so that he/she can read out and leak the document data, used document data, security audit log data from the HDD without authorization. |
| T.CONFDATA | An attacker may access, read, or alter, from control panel or system administrator client, the TOE setting data which only a system administrator is allowed to access. |
| T.DATA_SEC | An attacker may read document data and security audit log data from control panel or Web browser without authorization. |
| T.COMM_TAP | An attacker may intercept or alter document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network. |
| T.CONSUME | An attacker may access the TOE and use TOE functions without authorization. |

3.2. Organizational Security Policies

Table 6 below describes the organizational security policy the TOE must comply with.

Table 6: Organizational Security Policy

| Organizational Policy (Identifier) | Description |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| P.FAX_OPT | At the behest of the US military in Japan, it must be ensured that the internal network cannot be accessed via public telephone line. |

3.3. Assumptions

Table 7 shows the assumptions for the operation and use of this TOE.

Table 7: Assumptions

| Assumption (Identifier) | Description |
|----------------------------|--|
| Personnel Confidence | |
| A.ADMIN | A system administrator shall have the necessary knowledge of TOE security functions to perform the given role of managing the TOE and shall not operate the TOE with malicious intent. |
| Protection Mode | |
| A.SECMODE | A system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document to manage the TOE and its external environment. |

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment and the rationale.

4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

Table 8 defines the security objectives to be accomplished by the TOE.

Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE

| Security Objectives(Identifier) | Description |
|---------------------------------|--|
| O.AUDITS | The TOE must provide the Security Audit Log function and its log data which are necessary to monitor unauthorized access. |
| O.CIPHER | The TOE must encrypt the document data, used document data, and security audit log data to be stored into the HDD so that they cannot be analyzed even if retrieved. |
| O.COMM_SEC | The TOE must provide encryption communication function to protect the document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network between TOE and the remote from interception and alteration. |
| O.FAX_SEC | The TOE must prevent the unauthorized access to the internal network via Fax modem from public telephone line. |
| O.MANAGE | The TOE must inhibit a general user from accessing the TOE setting data. The TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to configure the security functions. |
| O.RESIDUAL | The TOE must provide overwrite function to prevent the used document data in the internal HDD from being reproduced or recovered. |
| O.USER | The TOE must provide the function to identify TOE user and allow only the authorized user to retrieve, and delete the document data and to change the password. |
| O.RESTRICT | The TOE must inhibit an unauthorized user from using the TOE functions. |

4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment

Table 9 defines the security objectives for the TOE environment.

Table 9: Security Objectives for the Environment

| Security Objectives(Identifier) | Description |
|---------------------------------|---|
| OE.ADMIN | A system administrator who is assigned by an organization administrator as an appropriate and reliable person for this TOE management and who receives necessary training to manage the TOE. |
| OE.SEC | A system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document to manage the TOE. In addition, a system administrator shall manage the external IT environment according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document. |

4.3. Security Objectives Rationale

The security objectives are established to correspond to the assumptions specified in Security Problem Definition, to counter the threats, or to realize the organizational security policies. Table 10 shows assumptions / threats / organizational security policies and the corresponding security objectives. Moreover, Table 11 shows that each defined security problem is covered by the security objectives.

Table 10: Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security Policies and the Corresponding Security Objectives

| Security Problems | A.ADMIN | A.SECMODE | T.RECOVER | T.CONFDATA | T.COMM_TAP | T.DATA_SEC | T.CONSUME | P.FAX_OPT |
|---------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Security Objectives | | | | | | | | |
| O.AUDITS | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| O.CIPHER | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| O.COMM_SEC | | | | | ✓ | | | |
| O.FAX_SEC | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| O.MANAGE | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| O.RESIDUAL | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| O.USER | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| O.RESTRICT | | | | | | | ✓ | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Security Problems | A.ADMIN | A.SECMODE | T.RECOVER | T.CONFDATA | T.COMM_TAP | T.DATA_SEC | T.CONSUME | P.FAX_OPT |
| | OE.ADMIN | ✓ | | | | | | |
| Security Objectives | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| OE.ADMIN | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| OE.SEC | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | |

Table 11: Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem

| Security Problem | Security Objectives Rationale |
|------------------|---|
| A.ADMIN | By satisfying the following objective, A.ADMIN can be realized: By OE.ADMIN, a system administrator is assigned by an organization administrator as an appropriate and reliable person for this TOE management, and receives necessary training to manage the TOE and performs the TOE management according to the guidance. |
| A.SECMODE | By satisfying the following objectives, A.SECMODE can be realized: By OE.SEC, a system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document to manage the TOE. In addition, a system administrator shall manage the external IT environment according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document. |
| T.RECOVER | By satisfying the following objective, T.RECOVER can be countered: By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the TOE security functions (i.e. Hard Disk Data Overwrite and Hard Disk Data Encryption) and disable the reading-out of the document data and security audit log data in the internal HDD as well as the recovery of the used document data. To be specific, this threat can be countered by the following security objectives: O.CIPHER and O.RESIDUAL. By O.CIPHER, the document data and security audit log data in the internal HDD are encrypted to disable the reference and reading-out of the document data, used document data, and security audit log data. By O.RESIDUAL, the used document data are overwritten and deleted to disable the recovery and reproduction of the used document data stored in the internal HDD. |
| T.CONFDATA | By satisfying the following objective, T.CONFDATA can be countered: By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the security functions (i.e. User |

| Security Problem | Security Objectives Rationale |
|------------------|--|
| | <p>Authentication with Password, System Administrator Password, Access Denial due to System Administrator's Authentication Failures, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, and Audit Log) and permits only the authenticated system administrator to change the TOE setting data. In addition, it is necessary to manage the external IT environment according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document.</p> <p>To be specific, this threat can be countered by the following security objectives, O.MANAGE, O.USER, and O.AUDITS:</p> <p>By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is allowed to enable/disable the TOE security functions and to refer to / update the TOE setting data.</p> <p>By O.USER, only the authorized user is allowed to change the password.</p> <p>By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.</p> |
| T.CONSUME | <p>By satisfying the following objective, T.CONSUME can be countered.</p> <p>By O.RESTRICT, the access to the TOE can be controlled.</p> |
| T.COMM_TAP | <p>By satisfying the following objectives, T.COMM_TAP can be countered.</p> <p>By OE.SEC, the document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network can be protected from interception.</p> <p>By O.COMM_SEC, the client/server authentication function of encryption communication protocol allows only the authorized user to send/receive the communication data. Encrypting communication data with encryption function also disables the interception and alteration of the internal network data (incl. document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data).</p> |
| T.DATA_SEC | <p>By satisfying the following objectives, T.DATA_SEC can be countered.</p> <p>By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the following passwords, user authentication function, and security audit log function: User Password, System Administrator Password, Local Authentication or Remote Authentication, Security Audit Log. Then, only the authenticated user is allowed to access the security audit log data and document data. In addition, it is necessary to manage the external IT environment according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document.</p> <p>By O.USER, only the authenticated user is allowed to read out the document data and security audit log data stored in the internal HDD.</p> <p>By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is</p> |

| Security Problem | Security Objectives Rationale |
|------------------|--|
| | <p>allowed to configure the TOE security functions.</p> <p>By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.</p> |
| P.FAX_OPT | <p>By satisfying the following objectives, P.FAX_OPT can be observed.</p> <p>By O.FAX_SEC, the access to the internal network via public telephone line is disabled. This realizes P.FAX_OPT.</p> <p>Since the data received from public telephone line are not sent to the internal network, the internal network cannot be accessed.</p> |

5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

5.1. Extended Components

This ST conforms to CC Part 2 and CC Part 3, and there are no extended components which shall be defined.

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security requirement rationale.

The terms and phrases used in this chapter are defined below.

- Subject

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|--|--|
| Key Operator Process | Operation upon using Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of key operator succeeded. |
| SA Process | Operation upon using Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of SA succeeded. |
| General User Process | Operation upon using Mailbox and Store Print when the user authentication of general user succeeded. |
| Receiving information from public telephone line | To receive the document data from the sender's machine via public telephone line, as receiving fax data. |
| Sending information to public telephone line | To send the document data to the destination via public telephone line according to the general user's instruction from the control panel or client PC, as sending fax data. |
| Sending information to the internal network | To send the Network Scan data or the data received by Internet Fax to the destination, a client PC, within the internal network. |
| Receiving information from the internal network. | To receive the print data or the Direct Fax (with local authentication only) /Internet Fax data from the sender, a client PC, within the internal network. |

- Object

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|------------------|--|
| Mailbox | A logical box created in the MFD internal HDD. Mailbox can store the scanned document data or the document data received via fax, categorizing by users and senders. |
| Personal Mailbox | The Mailbox privately used by a general user. Each user can create his/her own Personal Mailbox. |
| Shared Mailbox | The Mailbox shared by any general user. Key operator can create the Shared Mailbox. |
| Store Print | A print function in which bitmap data (decomposed print data) are temporarily stored in the MFD internal HDD and then printed out according to the |

| | |
|---|--|
| | authenticated general user's instruction from the control panel. |
| Used document data stored in the internal HDD | The remaining data in the MFD internal HDD even after deletion. The document data are first stored into the internal HDD, used, and then only their files are deleted. |
| Document data | Document data means all the data including image data transmitted across the MFD when any of copy, print, scan or fax functions is operated by a general user. |
| Security Audit Log | The chronologically recorded data of important events of the TOE. The events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result. |

- Operation

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|--------------------|--|
| Delivery | MFD receives the data from public telephone line for fax function. |
| Modify of behavior | To change the settings of the following information: User Authentication (Local, Remote) Store Print (Save or Deletion of login failure job)) Internal Network Data Protection (Certificate and encryption type) Hard Disk Data Overwrite (number of overwrite, data of overwrite) |
| Modify | Changes of TSF data and security attributes(user identifier). |

- Data

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|---|---|
| Data on public telephone line Fax data | The data which flow on public telephone line for fax communication. |

- Security attributes

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|-------------------|---|
| General User role | Indicates the authority required for general user to use the TOE. |
| SA role | Indicates the authority required for SA to use the TOE. |
| Key Operator role | Indicates the authority required for key operator to use the TOE. |

| | |
|---|---|
| General User identifier | User ID and password used to authenticate and identify general user. |
| SA identifier | User ID and password used to authenticate and identify SA. |
| Key Operator identifier | User ID and password used to authenticate and identify key operator. |
| Owner identifier of Mailbox (Personal, Shared) | Data on each Mailbox, incl. permitted user, box name, password, conditions for deleting documents, etc. |
| Owner identifier of Store Print | Data on Private Print, incl. user ID, password, measures to be taken at authentication failure, etc. |

- Entity outside the TOE

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|--|--|
| System Administrator | This term covers both key operator and SA. |
| Key Operator | An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance and makes TOE security function settings. |
| System Administrator Privilege (SA) | The user(s) who manage MFD maintenance and configure TOE security functions. SA can be created/registered by key operator or the other SA who is already registered. |
| General User | Any person who uses copy, scan, fax, and print functions of MFD. |

- Other terminology

| Term/phrase | Definition |
|---|--|
| The Fuji Xerox's standard method, FXOSEC | The Fuji Xerox's standard algorithm to generate a cryptographic key. This is used when MFD is booted. |
| AES | The FIPS-standard encryption algorithm used for encryption/decryption of Hard Disk data. |
| Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator ID | When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts of system administrator ID has exceeded the specified number of times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power-on and power-off, and ApeosWare Device Setup and the web browser do not accept authentication operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on. |
| Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication | The data on whether to enable/disable the use of password to be entered from MFD control panel in user authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on ID of key operator | ID data for key operator authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |

| | |
|--|---|
| Data on password of key operator | Password data for key operator authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on ID of SA | ID data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on password of SA | Password data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on ID of General User | ID data for general user authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on password of General User | Password data for general user authentication. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator | The data on whether to enable/disable access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator ID. They also incorporate the data on the allowable number of the failures before access denial. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on Security Audit Log | The data on whether to enable/disable the function to trace/ record the important events of the TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation, based on when and who operated what function. |
| Data on User Authentication | The data on whether to enable/disable the authentication function using the data on user authentication when copy, scan, fax, and print functions of MFD are used. It also incorporates the data on the setting. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on Store Print | The setting data on whether to store the received print data to Private Print area or print it out. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on Internal Network Data Protection | The data on whether to enable/disable the general encryption communication protocols to protect the communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data. They also incorporate the data on the setting. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction | The data on whether to enable/disable Customer Engineer Operation Restriction. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption | The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Hard Disk Data Encryption. They also incorporate the data on the encryption seed key. Included in the TOE setting data. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite | The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Hard Disk Data Overwrite. They also incorporate the data on the number of pass (overwrite procedure). Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Data on date and time | The horologe information to manage log. Included in the TOE setting data. |
| Public telephone line | The line/network on which the data flow for fax communication. |
| System Administrator mode | An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions according to the operational environment. This mode is distinguished from the operation mode that enables a general user to use the MFD functions. |
| Certificate | Defined in the X.509 which is recommended by ITU-T. The data for user authentication (name, identification name, organization where he/she belongs to, etc.), public key, expiry date, serial number, signature, etc. |
| Printer driver | Software to convert the data on a general user client into print data written in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on the user client. |
| Fax Driver | Software for Direct Fax (with local authentication only) function, which enables a general user to fax data to the destination directly from a general user client through MFD. The user can send the fax data just as printing. Used on the user client. |
| Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only) | Software for a general user client to retrieve the document data stored in Mailbox of MFD. |

6.1. Security Functional Requirements

Security functional requirements which the TOE offers are described below. The security functional requirements are based on the class and component which are specified by the [CC part 2].

6.1.1. Class FAU: Security audit

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and
- c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].

[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]

- *not specified*

[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]

- *the actions to be audited (defined by CC) and the corresponding auditable events (events to be recorded as execution log) of TOE. Shown in Table 12*

Table 12: Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events

| Functional Requirements | Actions to be audited (defined by CC) | Auditable events of TOE |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| FAU_GEN.1 | None | - |
| FAU_SAR.1 | a) Basic: Reading of information from the audit records. | <i>Basic: Successful download of audit log data.</i> |
| FAU_SAR.2 | a) Basic: Unsuccessful attempts to read information from the audit records. | <i>Basic: Unsuccessful download of audit log data.</i> |
| FAU_STG.1 | None | - |
| FAU_STG.4 | a) Basic: Actions taken due to the audit storage failure. | <i>None</i> |
| FCS_CKM.1 | a) Minimal: Success and failure of the activity. b) Basic: The object attribute(s), and object value(s) excluding any sensitive information (e.g. secret or | <i>None</i> |

| | | |
|-----------|--|---|
| | private keys). | |
| FCS_COP.1 | a) Minimal: Success and failure, and the type of cryptographic operation. b) Basic: Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of operation, subject attributes and object attributes. | <i>None</i> |
| FDP_ACC.1 | None | - |
| FDP_ACF.1 | a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check. | <i>Basic: Creation/deletion of Mailbox. User name, job information, and success/failure regarding access to Mailbox and execution of Store Print.</i> |
| FDP_IFC.1 | None | - |
| FDP_IFF.1 | a) Minimal: Decisions to permit requested information flows. b) Basic: All decisions on requests for information flow. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an information flow enforcement decision. d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the information that has flowed based upon policy goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material). | <i>None</i> |
| FDP_RIP.1 | None | - |
| FIA_AFL.1 | a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal). | <i><Minimal> Authentication lock of system administrator Authentication failure from control panel and CWIS.</i> |
| FIA_ATD.1 | None | - |
| FIA_SOS.1 | a) Minimal: Rejection by the TSF of any tested secret; b) Basic: Rejection or acceptance by the TSF of any tested secret; c) Detailed: Identification of any changes to the defined quality metrics | <i><Individually defined auditable events> Registration of user and changes in user registration data (password)</i> |

| | | |
|------------|--|---|
| FIA_UAU.1 | <p>a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism;</p> <p>b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism.</p> <p>c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions performed before authentication of the user.</p> | <p>< Basic > <i>Success/failure of authentication</i></p> |
| FIA_UAU.7 | None | - |
| FIA_UID.1 | <p>a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided;</p> <p>b) Basic: All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.</p> | <p>< Basic > <i>Success/failure of authentication</i></p> |
| FIA_USB.1 | <p>a) Minimal: Unsuccessful binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. creation of a subject).</p> <p>b) Basic: Success and failure of binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. success or failure to create a subject).</p> | <p>< Basic > <i>Registration of system administrator, and changes in user registration data (role)</i></p> |
| FMT_MOF.1 | a) Basic: All modifications in the behavior of the functions in the TSF. | <p><Basic> <i>Changes in security function configuration.</i></p> |
| FMT_MSA.1 | a) Basic: All modifications of the values of security attributes. | <p><Basic> <i>Creation/deletion of Mailbox. User name, job information, and success/failure regarding access to Mailbox and execution of Store Print.</i></p> |
| FMT_MSA.3 | <p>a) Basic: Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules.</p> <p>b) Basic: All modifications of the initial values of security attributes.</p> | None |
| FMT_MTD.1. | a) Basic: All modifications to the values of TSF data. | <p><Individually defined auditable events> <i>Changes in registration data (ID, password) of system administrator, and in the setting of security functions.</i></p> |
| FMT_SMF.1 | a) Minimal: Use of the management functions. | <p>< Minimal > <i>Access to system</i></p> |

| | | |
|-----------|---|--|
| | | <i>administrator mode</i> |
| FMT_SMR.1 | a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users that are part of a role; b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role. | <Minimal> <i>Registration of system administrator, changes in user registration data (role), and deletion of system administrator</i> |
| FPT_STM.1 | a) Minimal: changes to the time; b) Detailed: providing a timestamp. | <Minimal> <i>Changes in time setting.</i> |
| FTP_TRP.1 | a) Minimal: Failures of the trusted path functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the user associated with all trusted path failures, if available. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted path functions. d) Basic: Identification of the user associated with all trusted path invocations, if available. | <Minimal> <i>Failure of the trusted Communication within a specified period of time, and client host data (host name or IP address)</i> |

- FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
 - b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information].

[assignment: other audit relevant information].

- none

- FAU_SAR.1: Audit review
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

- FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.

- FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

[assignment: authorized users]

- *system administrator*

[assignment: list of audit information]

- *all log information*

FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
- *prevent*

FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.

[selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”]
- *overwrite the oldest stored audit records*
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
- *no other actions to be taken*

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 6.1.2. Class FCS: | Cryptographic support |
| FCS_CKM.1 | Cryptographic key generation |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components |
| Dependencies: | [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction |
| FCS_CKM.1.1 | TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: list of standards] - <i>none</i> [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] - <i>the Fuji Xerox's standard method, FXOSEC</i> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - <i>256bits</i> |
| FCS_COP.1 | Cryptographic operation |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components |
| Dependencies: | [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction |
| FCS_COP.1.1 | The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: list of standards] - <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] - <i>AES</i> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - <i>256bits</i> [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] - <i>encryption of the document data and security audit log data to be</i> |

stored in the internal HDD and decryption of the document data and security audit log data retrieved from the internal HDD.

6.1.3. Class FDP: User data protection

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: access control SFP]

- *MFD access control SFP*

[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

- *subjects, objects, and operations between subjects and objects listed in Table 13*

Table 13: Operations between Subjects and Objects Covered by MFD Access Control SFP

| Subject | Object | Operation |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|---|
| <i>Key operator process</i> | <i>Mailbox</i> | <i>Creation of Personal Mailbox Deletion of Personal Mailbox Creation of Shared Mailbox Deletion of Shared Mailbox Deletion of all document data Retrieval of all document data</i> |
| | <i>Store Print</i> | <i>Deletion of all document data Retrieval of all document data</i> |
| <i>SA process</i> | <i>Mailbox</i> | <i>Creation of Personal Mailbox Deletion of Personal Mailbox Deletion of all document data Retrieval of all document data</i> |
| | <i>Store Print</i> | <i>Deletion of all document data Retrieval of all document data</i> |
| <i>General user process</i> | <i>Mailbox</i> | <i>Creation of Personal Mailbox Deletion of Personal Mailbox Deletion of all document data Retrieval of all document data</i> |
| | <i>Store Print</i> | <i>Deletion of document data Retrieval of document data</i> |

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

[assignment: access control SFP]
 - *MFD access control SFP*
 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
 - *general user identifier corresponding to the general user process, SA identifier corresponding to the SA process, Key operator identifier corresponding to the Key operator process,*
 - *owner identifier corresponding to each Mailbox, owner identifier corresponding to each Store Print area*

FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].

[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
 - *the rules, shown in Table 14, for controlling the access among controlled subjects using the controlled operations on the controlled objects*

Table 14: Rules for Access Control

| <i>Rules for Mailbox Operation in the General User Process and SA Process</i> |
|---|
| <p>- <i>Creation of Personal Mailbox</i> <i>In the general user process and SA process to create Personal Mailbox, the Personal Mailbox in which general user identifier and SA identifier are set as its owner is created.</i></p> <p>- <i>Deletion of Personal Mailbox</i> <i>When the general user identifier and SA identifier of the general user process and SA process match the owner identifier of Personal Mailbox, deletion of the</i></p> |

| |
|--|
| <p><i>corresponding Personal Mailbox is allowed.</i></p> <p><i>- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Personal Mailbox</i></p> <p><i>When the general user identifier and SA identifier of the general user process and SA process match the owner identifier of Mailbox, retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed.</i></p> <p><i>- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox</i></p> <p><i>Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox are allowed.</i></p> |
| <p><i>Rules for Store Print Operation in the General User Process and SA Process</i></p> |
| <p><i>- Deletion and retrieval of document data</i></p> <p><i>When the general user identifier and SA identifier of the general user process and SA process match the owner identifier of Store Print, retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed. When the document data are deleted, the corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.</i></p> |
| <p><i>Mailbox Operation in the Key Operator Process</i></p> |
| <p><i>-In the key operator process, creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox in which the key operator identifier is set are allowed, and creation and deletion of Personal Mailbox by all registered users are allowed.</i></p> |

FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

- the rules, shown in Table 15, for explicitly authorizing access of the subject to an object based on security attributes.

Table 15: Rules for Explicit Access Authorization

| |
|--|
| <p><i>Rule for Mailbox Operation in the Key Operator Process</i></p> |
| <p><i>- In the key operator process, deletion of all Mailbox, deletion and retrieval of the document data inside are allowed.</i></p> |
| <p><i>Rule for Store Print Operation in the Key Operator Process and SA Process</i></p> |
| <p><i>- In the key operator process and SA process, regarding all Store Print, deletion and retrieval of the document data inside are allowed.</i></p> |

FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

- no rules that explicitly deny the access

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
 Hierarchical to: No other components
 Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP].

[assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP]

- *subjects, information, and operations that cause the information to flow, which are listed in Table 16.*

Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations that cause the information to flow

| Subject | Information | Operation |
|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Receiving information from public telephone line</i> | <i>Data on public telephone line</i> | <i>Delivery</i> |
| <i>Sending information to the internal network</i> | | |

[assignment: information flow control SFP]

- *Fax information flow control SFP*

FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
 Hierarchical to: No other components
 Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].

[assignment: information flow control SFP]

- *Fax information flow control SFP*

[assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes]

- *none. (Sending information to public telephone line, receiving*

information from the internal network, and the corresponding data on the public telephone line are not controlled under the Fax information flow control SFP).

- FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes].
- [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes]
- *the data received from public telephone line must not be sent to the internal network at any case*
- FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules].
- [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules]
- *none.*
- FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flows].
- [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flows]
- *none.*
- FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].
- [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].
- *none.*
- FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
- FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource

is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: list of objects].

[assignment: list of objects]

- *used document data stored in the internal HDD*

[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]

- *deallocation of the resource from*

6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and authentication

FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1(1) The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].

[assignment: list of authentication events]

- *key operator authentication*

[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]

- *[assignment: positive integer number]*

[assignment: positive integer number]

- 5

FIA_AFL.1.2 (1) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

- *met*

[assignment: list of actions]

- *never allow the control panel to accept any operation except power cycle. Web browser and ApeosWare Device Setup are also inhibited from accepting authentication operation until the main unit is cycled.*

FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Dependencies: | FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication |
| FIA_AFL.1.1(2) | <p>The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].</p> <p>[assignment: list of authentication events] - SA authentication (with local authentication)</p> <p>[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] - [assignment: positive integer number] [assignment: positive integer number] - 5</p> |
| FIA_AFL.1.2 (2) | <p>When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].</p> <p>[selection: met, surpassed] - met</p> <p>[assignment: list of actions] - never allow the control panel to accept any operation except power cycle. Web browser is also inhibited from accepting authentication operation until the main unit is cycled.</p> |
| FIA_AFL.1 (3) | Authentication failure handling |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components |
| Dependencies: | FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication |
| FIA_AFL.1.1 (3) | <p>The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].</p> <p>[assignment: list of authentication events] - general user authentication</p> <p>[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] - [assignment: positive integer number]</p> |

[assignment: positive integer number]

- 1

FIA_AFL.1.2 (3) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

- *met*

[assignment: list of actions]

- *have the control panel to display the message of “authentication was failed” and to require reentry of the user information. The TSF shall also have Web browser and Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only) to reenter the user information*

FIA_AFL.1 (4) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1 (4) The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].

[assignment: list of authentication events]

- *SA authentication (with remote authentication)*

[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]

- *[assignment: positive integer number]*

[assignment: positive integer number]

- 1

FIA_AFL.1.2 (4) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

- *met*

[assignment: list of actions]

- *have the control panel to display the message of “authentication was failed” and to require reentry of the user information. The TSF shall also*

have Web browser to reenter the user information

| | |
|------------------|--|
| FIA_ATD.1 | User attribute definition |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
| Dependencies: | No dependencies. |
| FIA_ATD.1.1 | The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes]. [assignment: list of security attributes]. <i>- Key Operator role</i> <i>- SA role</i> <i>- General User role</i> |
| FIA_SOS.1.1 | The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (SA password and U.NORMAL password when local authentication is used) meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. [assignment: a defined quality metric]. <i>- Password length is restricted to 9 or more characters</i> |
| FIA_UAU.1 | Timing of authentication |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components |
| Dependencies: | FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification |
| FIA_UAU.1.1 | The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] <i>- data receive from public telephone line</i> <i>- storing the document data delivered from printer driver</i> |
| FIA_UAU.1.2 | The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. |
| FIA_UAU.7 | Protected authentication feedback |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components |
| Dependencies: | FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication |
| FIA_UAU.7.1 | The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress. |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| | [assignment: list of feedback] <i>- display of asterisks (“*”) to hide the entered password characters</i> |
| FIA_UID.1 | Timing of identification |
| Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
| Dependencies: | No dependencies |
| FIA_UID.1.1 | The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] <i>- fax receive from public telephone line</i> |
| FIA_UID.1.2 | The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. |
| FIA_USB.1 | User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components. |
| Dependencies: | FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition |
| FIA_USB.1.1 | The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes]. [assignment: list of user security attributes]. <i>- Key Operator role</i> <i>- SA role</i> <i>- General User role</i> |
| FIA_USB.1.2 | The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. <i>- none</i> |
| FIA_USB.1.3 | The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]. <i>- none</i> |

6.1.5. Class FMT: Security management

FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of]

- *enable, disable, or modify the behavior of*

[assignment: list of functions]

- *for security listed in Table 17*

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]

- *the roles listed in Table 17*Table 17: List of Security Functions

| Security Functions | enable, disable, or modify the behavior of | Roles |
|---|--|-------------------------|
| <i>Use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication</i> | <i>enable, disable</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator ID</i> | <i>enable, disable</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>User Authentication</i> | <i>enable, disable, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Security Audit Log</i> | <i>enable, disable</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Store Print</i> | <i>enable, disable, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Internal Network Data Protection</i> | <i>enable, disable, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Customer Engineer Operation Restriction</i> | <i>enable, disable</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Hard Disk Data Encryption</i> | <i>enable, disable</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Hard Disk Data Overwrite</i> | <i>enable, disable, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |

FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]

- *MFD access control SFP*

[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]

- *query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]*

[assignment: other operations]

- *create*

[assignment: list of security attributes]

- *user identifier, Mailbox owner identifier, and Store Print owner identifier*

[assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- *the operations and roles listed in Table 18*

Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles

| Security Attribute | query, delete, modify, create | Roles |
|---|-------------------------------------|--|
| <i>Key operator identifier</i> | <i>modify</i> | <i>Key operator</i> |
| <i>SA identifier (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>query, modify delete, create</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>General user identifier (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>query, modify delete, create</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Mailbox owner identifier (Personal Mailbox)</i> | <i>query, delete, create</i> | <i>General user , SA</i> |
| <i>All Mailbox owner identifier (All of Personal Mailbox)</i> | <i>query, delete, create</i> | <i>Key operator</i> |
| <i>Mailbox owner identifier (Shared Mailbox)</i> | <i>query, delete, create</i> | <i>Key operator</i> |
| <i>Store Print owner identifier</i> | <i>query, delete</i> | <i>Key operator, SA , General user</i> |
| <i>All Store Print owner identifier</i> | <i>query, delete</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]

- *MFD access control SFP*

[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]

- *[assignment: other property]*

- *Initialization property in Table 19*

Table 19 Initialization property

| Object | Security Attributes | Default |
|--------------------|--|--|
| <i>mail box</i> | <i>Owner identifier of mail box</i> | <i>Creator's user identifier and available user identifier</i> |
| <i>store print</i> | <i>Owner identifier of store print</i> | |

FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]

- *none*

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
 Hierarchical to: No other components
 Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

- *query, modify, delete*
[assignment: other operations]]
- *create*
[assignment: list of TSF data]
- *TSF data listed in Table 19*
[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
- *the roles listed in Table 20*

Table 20: Operation of TSF Data

| TSF Data | <i>query, modify, delete, create</i> | Roles |
|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <i>Data on key operator ID</i> | <i>modify</i> | <i>Key operator</i> |
| <i>Data on key operator Password</i> | <i>modify</i> | <i>Key operator</i> |
| <i>Data on SA ID (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>query, modify, delete, create</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on SA Password (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on General user ID (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>query, modify, delete, create</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on General user Password (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA, General user</i> |
| <i>Data on User Authentication</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on minimum password length of user password (with local authentication only)</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on store print</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on Access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on Security Audit Log</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on Internal Network Data Protection</i> | <i>query, modify, delete</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |
| <i>Data on date and time</i> | <i>query, modify</i> | <i>Key operator, SA</i> |

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF].

[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
- Security Management Functions listed in Table 21

Table 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF

| Functional requirements | Management items defined by CC | Management functions of TOE |
|-------------------------|--|---|
| FAU_GEN.1 | There are no management activities foreseen. | <i>Management of data on Security Audit Log settings</i> |
| FAU_SAR.1 | a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the group of users with read access right to the audit records. | <i>Management of data on key operator (ID and password) Management of data on SA (ID and password) (with local authentication only)</i> |
| FAU_SAR.2 | None | - |
| FAU_STG.1 | None | - |
| FAU_STG.4 | a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure. | <i>None Reason: The control parameter of audit log is fixed and is not managed.</i> |
| FCS_CKM.1 | None | - |
| FCS_COP.1 | None | <i>Management of data on Hard Disk Data Encryption</i> |
| FDP_ACC.1 | None | - |
| FDP_ACF.1 | a) Managing the attributes used to make explicit access or denial based decisions. | <i>Management of owner identifier of Mailbox Management of owner identifier of store print Management of data on store print</i> |
| FDP_IFC.1 | None | - |
| FDP_IFF.1 | a) Managing the attributes used to make explicit access based decisions. | <i>None Reason: Access is restricted and does not need to be managed.</i> |
| FDP_RIP.1 | a) The choice of when to perform residual information protection (i.e. upon allocation or deallocation) could be made configurable within the TOE. | <i>Management of data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite</i> |
| FIA_AFL.1 | a) Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication attempts; | <i>Management of allowable number of system</i> |

| | | |
|-----------|--|---|
| | b) Management of actions to be taken in the event of an authentication failure. | <i>administrator's authentication failures Management of Access Denial</i> |
| FIA_ATD.1 | a) if so indicated in the assignment, the authorized administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users. | <i>None Reason: There are no additional security attributes and there are no additional security attributes to be managed.</i> |
| FIA_SOS.1 | a) the management of the metric used to verify the secrets. | <i>- Management of data on minimum password length of user password</i> |
| FIA_UAU.1 | a) Management of the authentication data by an administrator; b) Management of the authentication data by the associated user; c) Managing the list of actions that can be taken before the user is authenticated. | <i>- Management of data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication. - Management of data on key operator(ID and password) - Management of data on SA and general user (ID and password) (with local authentication only) - Management of data on user authentication.</i> |
| FIA_UAU.7 | None | - |
| FIA_UID.1 | a) The management of the user identities. b) If an authorised administrator can change the actions allowed before identification, the managing of the action lists. | <i>- Management of data on key operator(ID) - Management of data on SA and general user (ID) (with local authentication only) - Management of data on user authentication.</i> |
| FIA_USB.1 | a) an authorized administrator can define default subject security attributes. b) an authorized administrator can change subject security attributes. | <i>None Reason: Action and security attributes are fixed and are not managed.</i> |
| FMT_MOF.1 | a) Managing the group of roles that can interact with the functions in the TSF; | <i>Management of data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction</i> |
| FMT_MSA.1 | a) managing the group of roles that can interact with the security attributes; b) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values. | <i>None Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed.</i> |
| FMT_MSA.3 | a) managing the group of roles that can | <i>None Reason: The role group is</i> |

| | | |
|------------|---|--|
| | specify initial values; b) managing the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values. | <i>only a system administrator and is not managed.</i> |
| FMT_MTD.1. | a) Managing the group of roles that can interact with the TSF data. | <i>Management of data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction</i> |
| FMT_SMF.1 | None | - |
| FMT_SMR.1 | a) Managing the group of users that are part of a role. | <i>None Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed</i> |
| FPT_STM.1 | a) management of the time. | <i>Management of time and data.</i> |
| FTP_TRP.1 | a) Configuring the actions that require trusted path, if supported. | <i>Management of data on Internal Network Data Protection.</i> |

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 Hierarchical to: No other components
 Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
 - *system administrator ,SA, general user*

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.1.6. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

6.1.7. Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
 Hierarchical to: No other components.
 Dependencies: No dependencies.

- FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].
- [selection: remote, local]
- *remote*
- [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].
- *modification, disclosure*
- FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
- [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users]
- *remote users*
- FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].
- [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].
- *TOE communication service via Web, communication service for printer driver, communication service for fax driver, communication service for network utility, communication service for ApeosWare Device Setup, and other services which require trusted path*

6.2. Security Assurance Requirements

The requirements for the TOE security assurance are described in Table 22.

The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL3. All the requirement components for assurance are quoted directly from the component of EAL3 specified by [the CC part 3].

Table 22: EAL3 Assurance Requirements

| Assurance Requirements | Assurance Component Name |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Class ADV: Development | |
| ADV_ARC.1 | Security architecture description |
| ADV_FSP.3 | Functional specification with complete summary |
| ADV_TDS.2 | Architectural design |
| Class AGD: Guidance documents | |
| AGD_OPE.1 | Operational user guidance |
| AGD_PRE.1 | Preparative procedures |
| Class ALC: Life-cycle support | |
| ALC_CMC.3 | Authorization controls |
| ALC_CMS.3 | Implementation representation CM coverage |
| ALC_DEL.1 | Delivery procedures |
| ALC_DVS.1 | Identification of security measures |
| ALC_LCD.1 | Developer defined life-cycle model |
| Class ASE: Security Target evaluation | |
| ASE_CCL.1 | Conformance claims |
| ASE_ECD.1 | Extended components definition |
| ASE_INT.1 | ST introduction |
| ASE_OBJ.2 | Security objectives |
| ASE_REQ.2 | Derived security requirements |
| ASE_SPD.1 | Security problem definition |
| ASE_TSS.1 | TOE summary specification |
| Class ATE: Tests | |
| ATE_COV.2 | Analysis of coverage |
| ATE_DPT.1 | Testing: basic design |
| ATE_FUN.1 | Functional testing |
| ATE_IND.2 | Independent testing - sample |
| Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment | |
| AVA_VAN.2 | Vulnerability analysis |

6.3. Security Requirement Rationale

6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale

Table 23 lists security functional requirements and the corresponding security objectives. As shown in Table 23, each security functional requirement corresponds to at least one security objective of the TOE.

Table 24 shows the rationale demonstrating that each security objective is assured by TOE security functional requirements.

Table 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objectives

| Security Objectives \ Security Functional Requirements | O.AUDITS | O.CIPHER | O.COMM_SEC | O.FAX_SEC | O.MANAGE | O.RESIDUAL | O.RESTRICT | O.USER |
|--|----------|----------|------------|-----------|----------|------------|------------|--------|
| FAU_GEN.1 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FAU_SAR.1 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FAU_SAR.2 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FAU_STG.1 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FAU_STG.4 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FCS_CKM.1 | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| FCS_COP.1 | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| FDP_ACC.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FDP_ACF.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FDP_IFC.1 | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| FDP_IFF.1 | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| FDP_RIP.1 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 (1) | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_AFL.1 (2) | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_AFL.1 (3) | | | | | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_AFL.1 (4) | | | | | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_ATD.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FIA_SOS.1 | | | | | | | | |
| FIA_UAU.1 | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_UAU.7 | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_UID.1 | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| FIA_USB.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FMT_MOF.1 | | | | | ✓ | | | |

| Security Objectives | O.AUDITS | O.CIPHER | O.COMM_SEC | O.FAX_SEC | O.MANAGE | O.RESIDUAL | O.RESTRICT | O.USER |
|---------------------|----------|----------|------------|-----------|----------|------------|------------|--------|
| | | | | | | | | |
| FMT_MSA.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FMT_MSA.3 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FMT_MTD.1 | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| FMT_SMF.1 | | | | | ✓ | | | |
| FMT_SMR.1 | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| FPT_STM.1 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FTP_TRP.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |

Table 24: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale

| Security Objectives | Security Functional Requirements Rationale |
|---------------------|---|
| O.AUDITS | <p>O. AUDITS is the objective that provides the function to record auditable events and its log data.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.AUDITS can be realized.</p> <p>By FAU_GEN.1, the security audit log data are generated for the auditable events: (However, audit is unnecessary for the following functional requirements for each reason described below.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FAU_STG.4: The total number of audit log data events is fixed. The data are stored and updated automatically. - FCS_CKM.1: When cryptographic key generation fails, a system error occurs at the time of booting of the MFD. - FSC_COP.1: An encryption failure is monitored as job status. - FDP_IFF.1: The flow is fixed. No event is to be monitored. - FMT_MSA.3: No change is to be applied to default values and rules. <p>By FAU_SAR.1, the authorized system administrator can read the security audit log data from an audit log file.</p> <p>By FAU_SAR.2, only the authorized system administrator can access the audit log.</p> <p>By FAU_STG.1, the security audit log data stored in an audit log file is protected from unauthorized deletion and alteration.</p> <p>By FAU_STG.4, when the audit log file is full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten and a new audit event is stored into the audit log file.</p> |

| Security Objectives | Security Functional Requirements Rationale |
|---------------------|--|
| | By FPT_STM.1, the auditable events are recorded with time stamp in the audit log, using highly reliable clock of the TOE. |
| O.CIPHER | <p>O. CIPHER is the objective that encrypts the used document data and the security audit log data i in the internal HDD so that they cannot be analyzed even if retrieved.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.CIPHER can be realized.</p> <p>By FCS_CKM.1, the cryptographic key is generated in accordance with the specified cryptographic key size (256 bits).</p> <p>By FCS_COP.1, the document data and security audit log data to be stored into the internal HDD are encrypted and then decrypted when the data are read, in accordance with the determined cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size.</p> |
| O.COMM_SEC | <p>O.COMM_SEC is the objective that protects the document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network from interception and alteration.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.COMM_SEC can be realized:</p> <p>By FTP_TRP.1, a highly reliable communication path is provided through communication data encryption protocol so that the document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network between the TOE and the remote can be protected from threats.</p> |
| O.FAX_SEC | <p>O.FAX_SEC is the objective that prevents the unauthorized access to the internal network via public telephone line.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.FAX_SEC can be realized:</p> <p>By FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, the internal network to which the TOE is connected is prevented from being accessed via public telephone line from the communication path of TOE fax modem.</p> |
| O.MANAGE | <p>O. MANAGE is the objective that allows only an authenticated system administrator to access the system administrator mode for security function setting and inhibits a general user from accessing the TOE setting data. By satisfying the following security requirements, O.MANAGE can be realized:</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when the number of key operator authentication failures reaches the defined number of times.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.</p> |

| Security Objectives | Security Functional Requirements Rationale |
|---------------------|--|
| | <p>By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to identify an authorized system administrator or general user.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.</p> <p>By FMT_MOF.1, the person who enables/disables TOE security functions and makes functional settings is limited to system administrator.</p> <p>By FMT_MTD.1, the person who can make settings of TOE security functions is limited to system administrator. Thus, only system administrators can query, modify, and create TSF data.</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for system administrator.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1 (1), the role related to the security is limited to system administrator by maintaining the role of system administrator as a user who has special authority.</p> |
| O.RESIDUAL | <p>O.RESIDUAL is the objective that disables the reproduction and recovery of the used document data in the internal HDD.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.RESIDUAL can be realized:</p> <p>By FDP_RIP.1, the previous information of the used document data stored in the internal HDD is made unavailable.</p> |
| O.RESTRICT | <p>O.RESTRICT is the objective that offers the function to inhibit an unauthorized person from using the TOE.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.RESTRICT can be realized:</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when the number of key operator authentication failures reaches the defined number of times.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (3), when general user authentication fails, “incorrect password” message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (4), when SA authentication fails (at remote authentication), “incorrect password” message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.</p> <p>By FIA_UIA.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to identify an authorized general user and system administrator.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication</p> |

| Security Objectives | Security Functional Requirements Rationale |
|---------------------|---|
| | information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected. |
| O.USER | <p>O.USER is the objective that identifies the TOE user and allows only the authorized user to retrieve, and delete the document data and to change password.</p> <p>By satisfying the following security requirements, O.USER can be realized:</p> <p>By FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1, user authentication is performed. Only authorized user is allowed to operate the objects.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when the number of key operator authentication failures reaches the defined number of times.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (3), when general user authentication fails, “incorrect password” message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.</p> <p>By FIA_AFL.1 (4), when SA authentication fails (at remote authentication), “incorrect password” message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.</p> <p>By FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1, each role of key operator, SA, and general user is maintained and only the authorized users are associated with the subjects.</p> <p>By FIA_SOS1, the minimum length of password for SA and general user is limited.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to identify an authorized general user and system administrator.</p> <p>By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.1, the query, modify, deletion, and creation of security attributes are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MSA.3, the suitable default values are managed.</p> <p>By FMT_MTD.1, the setting of password for key operator is limited to key operator, that for SA is limited to key operator and SA, and that for general user is limited to system administrator and the general user (when it is his/her own).</p> <p>By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for authorized users.</p> <p>By FMT_SMR.1, the role of general user and system administrator is</p> |

| Security Objectives | Security Functional Requirements Rationale |
|---------------------|---|
| | maintained and associated with the general user and system administrator. |

6.3.2. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

Table 25 describes the functional requirements that security functional requirements depend on and those that do not and the reason why it is not problematic even if dependencies are not satisfied.

Table 25: Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements

| Functional Requirement | Dependencies of Functional Requirements | |
|--|---|---|
| | Requirement that is dependent on | Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale |
| FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation | FPT_STM.1 | - |
| FAU_SAR.1 Audit review | FAU_GEN.1 | - |
| FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review | FAU_SAR.1 | - |
| FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage | FAU_GEN.1 | - |
| FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss | FAU_STG.1 | - |
| FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation (The stored data in the internal HDD) | FCS_COP.1 | FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFD is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the MFD main unit is powered off. Therefore, the dependency on FCS_CKM.4 does not need to be satisfied. |
| FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (The stored data in the internal HDD) | FCS_CKM.1 | FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFD is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the MFD main unit is powered off. |
| FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control | FDP_ACF.1 | - |

| Functional Requirement | Dependencies of Functional Requirements | |
|--|---|---|
| | Requirement that is dependent on | Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale |
| FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control | FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 | - |
| FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (Fax information flow) | FDP_IFF.1 | - |
| FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (Fax information flow) | FDP_IFC.1 | FMT_MSA.3: A static attribute initialization is not required because Fax Information Flow has no security attribute. |
| FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection | None | |
| FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling (Key operator) | FIA_UAU.1 | |
| FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling (SA, local authentication) | FIA_UAU.1 | |
| FIA_AFL.1(3) Authentication failure handling (General user) | FIA_UAU.1 | |
| FIA_AFL.1(4) Authentication failure handling (SA, remote authentication) | FIA_UAU.1 | |
| FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition | None | |
| FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets | None | |
| FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication | FIA_UID.1 | |
| FIA_UAU.7 | FIA_UID.1 | |

| Functional Requirement | Dependencies of Functional Requirements | |
|--|---|--|
| | Requirement that is dependent on | Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale |
| Protected authentication feedback | | |
| FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification | None | |
| FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding | FIA_ATD.1 | - |
| FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior | FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 | - |
| FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes | FDP_ACC.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 | - |
| FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization | FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 | - |
| FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data | FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 | - |
| FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions | None | |
| FMT_SMR.1 Security roles | FIA_UID.1 | |
| FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamp | None | |
| FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path | None | |

6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is for a MFD, a commercial product. The following threats are assumed to be caused by a low-level attacker: attack or interception/alteration of data on internal network via a MFD external interface from control panel, Web browser or ApeosWare Device Setup of system administrator's client; and reading-out of information by removing the internal HDD and connecting it to a commercial tool.

To counter these threats, this TOE is required to provide the security functions which assure security.

The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL3 which includes the following analyses:

- Analysis of the security measures of the TOE at development phase

(Performing/analyzing systematic tests and evaluating the management of the development environment and the developed products.)

Analysis of whether the sufficient guidance information is included so that the security functions can be used safely. Therefore, EAL 3 is the reasonable evaluation level for this TOE.

7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This chapter describes the summary specifications of the security functions provided by this TOE.

7.1. Security Functions

Table 26 shows security functional requirements and the corresponding TOE security functions.

The security functions described in this section satisfy the TOE security functional requirements that are specified in section 6.1 of this ST.

Table 26: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security Functions

| Security Functions Security Functional Requirements | TSE_IOW | TSE_CIPHER | TSE_USER_AUTH | TSE_FMT | TSE_CE_LIMIT | TSE_FAU | TSE_NET_PROT | TSE_FAX_FLOW |
|--|---------|------------|---------------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|--------------|
| FAU_GEN.1 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FAU_SAR.1 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FAU_SAR.2 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FAU_STG.1 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FAU_STG.4 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FCS_CKM.1 | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| FCS_COP.1 | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| FDP_ACC.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FDP_ACF.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FDP_IFC.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FDP_IFF.1 | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| FDP_RIP.1 | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 (1) | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 (2) | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 (3) | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 (4) | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_ATD.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_SOS.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_UAU.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_UAU.7 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_UID.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FIA_USB.1 | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| FMT_MOF.1 | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | |

| Security Functions Security Functional Requirements | TSF_IOW | TSF_CIPHER | TSF_USER_AUTH | TSF_FMT | TSF_CE_LIMIT | TSF_FAU | TSF_NET_PROT | TSF_FAX_FLOW |
|--|---------|------------|---------------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|--------------|
| FMT_MSA.1 | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | |
| FMT_MSA.3 | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| FMT_MTD.1 | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| FMT_SMF.1 | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| FMT_SMR.1 | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| FPT_STM.1 | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| FTP_TRP.1 | | | | | | | ✓ | |

The summary of each TOE security function and the corresponding security functional requirements are described below.

7.1.1. Hard Disk Data Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

According to Hard Disk Data Overwrite setting which is configured by a system administrator with the system administrator mode, the used document data in the internal HDD are deleted by either one or three pass overwrite procedure on the document data area when each job of copy, print, scan, Network Scan, fax, Internet Fax, or Direct Fax is completed.

This is because whether to prioritize efficiency or security depends on the usage environment of the MFD.

When efficiency is prioritized, one pass overwrite procedure is applied. When security is prioritized, three pass overwrite procedure is applied. Three pass overwrite has lower processing speed than one pass but can provide more solid overwrite function. Therefore, three pass is an appropriate number of times to overwrite.

(1) FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

To control the overwrite function conducted after each job, two options are available: one pass (zero) overwrite procedure and three pass (random number / random number / zero) overwrite procedure.

List of the used document data which are to be overwritten and deleted is on the internal HDD.

When the existence of the used document data are found in this list at the time of booting the TOE, the overwrite function is performed.

7.1.2. Hard Disk Data Encryption (TSF_CIPHER)

According to Hard Disk Data Encryption setting which is configured by a system administrator with

the system administrator mode, the document data and security audit log data are encrypted before stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, Network Scan, fax, Internet Fax, Direct Fax, or configuring various security function settings.

(1) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

The TOE uses the “hard disk data encryption seed key” configured by a system administrator and generates a 256-bit encryption key at the time of booting through FXOSENK algorithm, which is Fuji Xerox’s standard method and a secure algorithm with sufficient complexity. (When the "hard disk data encryption seed key" is the same, the same cryptographic key is generated.)

(2) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Before storing the document data and security audit log data into the internal HDD, the TOE encrypts the data using the 256-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting (FCS_CKM.1) and the AES algorithm based on FIPS PUBS 197. When reading out the stored data, the TOE decrypts the data also using the 256-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting and the AES algorithm.

7.1.3. User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH)

Access to the MFD functions is restricted to the authorized user. A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the fax driver / Network Scan Utility / CWIS / ApeosWare Device Setup of the user client, or MFD control panel.

Authentication is performed using the user information registered in MFD or remote server.

There are the following two types of authentication depending on how user information is registered.

a) Local Authentication

In local authentication, authentication is managed by using the user information registered in the TOE.

b) Remote Authentication

Authentication is performed by remote authentication server. User information is not registered in the TOE. In remote authentication, authentication is performed by using the user information managed by remote authentication server (LDAP server or Kerberos server).

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

- Functions controlled by the MFD control panel
Copy, fax (send), Internet Fax (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox operation, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)
- Functions controlled by Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only) of user client
Function to retrieve document data from Mailbox.
- Functions controlled by CWIS
Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data

from Mailbox, and print function by file designation

- Functions controlled by ApeosWare Device Setup (Available for key operator only.)
Creation, deletion, and setting change of Mailbox

In addition, access to and setting change of the TOE security functions are restricted to the authorized system administrator. A system administrator needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFD control panel or system administrator client.

(1) FIA_AFL.1 (1) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the key operator authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with system administrator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser and ApeosWare Device Setup do not accept authentication operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.

(2) FIA_AFL.1 (2) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the SA authentication upon local authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with system administrator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser do not accept authentication operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.

(3) FIA_AFL.1 (3) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the general user authentication which is performed before using the MFD functions. When the entered password does not match the one set by an authorized user, the message saying “authentication was failed” is displayed on the control panel, requesting re-entry of the user information.

Re-entry of user information is also required at Web browser and Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only)

(4) FIA_AFL.1 (4) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the SA authentication upon remote authentication which is performed before using the MFD functions. When the entered password does not match the one set by SA, the message saying “authentication was failed” is displayed on the control panel, requesting re-entry of the user information.

Re-entry of user information is also required at Web browser.

(5) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

The function of the TOE to define and retain the roles of key operator, SA, and general user.

(6) FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

When setting a password of SA and general user, the TOE rejects settings if the password is less than the minimum number of characters.

(7) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

The TOE requests a user to enter his/her ID and password before permitting him/her to operate the MFD function via Web browser, Network Scanner Utility, ApeosWare Device Setup, and fax driver of a user client, or the control panel. The entered user ID and password are verified against the data registered in the TOE setting data.

This identification (FIA_UID.1) and the authentication (FIA_UAU.1) are simultaneously performed, and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed.

In the Private Print function, the received user ID from the printer driver of a user client is compared with the ID registered in the TOE setting. The print data are classified according to the user ID and temporarily stored in the TOE.

When receiving fax data by the public telephone line, the TOE receives the fax data and stores them in Mailbox before performing user identification and authentication.

(8) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

The TOE offers the function to display the same number of asterisks (^*) as the entered-password characters on the control panel, Web browser, or ApeosWare Device Setup in order to hide the password at the time of user authentication.

(9) FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

With the authenticated ID, TOE associates the roles of key operator, SA, and general user with the subjects.

(10) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

With the user authentication function, the TOE permits the authenticated user to handle the identities related to each Mailbox and Store Print as shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Management of security attributes

| Security Attributes | query, modify ,delete, create | Roles |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|
| Key operator identifier | modify | Key operator, |
| SA identifier (with local authentication only) | query, modify ,delete, create | Key operator, SA |
| General user identifier (with local authentication only) | query, modify ,delete, create | Key operator, SA |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mailbox owner identifier (Personal Mailbox) | query, delete, create | General user, SA |
| All Mailbox owner identifier (All of Personal Mailbox) | query, delete, create | Key operator |
| Mailbox owner identifier (Shared Mailbox) | query, delete, create | Key operator |
| Store Print owner identifier | query, delete | Key operator, SA, General user |
| All Store Print owner identifier | query, delete | Key operator, SA |

(11) FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

The TOE provides the user interface for setting password only to the authenticated authorized user.

The setting of password for key operator is limited to key operator, that for SA (with local authentication only) is limited to key operator and SA, and that for general user (with local authentication only) is limited to system administrator and the general user (when it is his/her own).

(12) FMT_SMR.1 Security role

The TOE maintains the roles of system administrator and general user and associates these roles to the authorized users.

(13) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

With the user authentication function, the TOE permits the authenticated user to operate Mailbox and Store Print (Private Print) as shown in Table 28.

Table 28: Access Control

| | Personal Mailbox | Shared Mailbox | Store Print |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Creation of Mailbox | Available for general user, SA and key operator | Available for key operator | - |
| Deletion of Mailbox | Available for registered general user, SA and key operator | Available for key operator | - |
| Retrieval and Deletion of document | Available for registered general | Available for general user, SA and key | Available for general user, SA and key |

| | | | |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| data | user ,SA and key operator | operator | operator |
| Retrieval and Deletion of all document data | Available for key operator | Available for key operator | Available for SA and key operator |

User authentication is performed before accessing Mailbox or Store Print.

a) Private Print Function

When the MFD is set to “Save as Private Charge Print,” and a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, the print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

In the same way, when a user is authenticated by entering his/her ID and password from CWIS for authentication, and the user sends a print request by designating the files within a user client, the print data are temporarily stored in Private Print area according to the user ID.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel. When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.

b) Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and Fax board which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the MFD control panel. When the user is authenticated, the document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user’s instruction from the control panel.

To store the received fax data into Mailbox, user authentication is not required. Among the received fax data transmitted over public telephone line, the following data are automatically classified and stored into each corresponding Mailbox: the received fax data whose corresponding Mailbox is specified by the sender, the received fax data from a particular sender (the data are classified according to the sender’s telephone number), and the received fax data from an unknown sender.

To retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to each registered user ID, user authentication is required; the MFD compares the user ID and password preset in the MFD against those entered by a general user from the control panel, CWIS, or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only).

•Mailbox Operation by a General User / SA

- Creation of Personal Mailbox

When a general user / SA operates to create Personal Mailbox, the Personal Mailbox in which general user identifier / SA identifier is set as its owner is created.

- Deletion of Personal Mailbox

When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Personal Mailbox, deletion of the corresponding Personal Mailbox is allowed.

- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Personal Mailbox

When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Personal Mailbox, retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed.

- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox

Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox are allowed.

- Store Print Operation by a General User / SA

- Deletion and retrieval of document data

When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Store Print area, retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed. When the document data are deleted, the corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.

- Mailbox Operation by the Key Operator

Creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox are allowed.

Creation and deletion of Personal Mailboxes of all the registered users are permitted only if the key operator operates via ApeosWare Device Setup. For all Mailboxes, the key operator's operations to delete Mailbox, and to retrieve, and delete the document data inside are allowed.

- Store Print Operation by the Key Operator / SA

For all the Store Print areas, the key operator's / SA's operations to retrieve and delete the document data inside are allowed.

7.1.4. System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT)

To grant a privilege to a specific user, this function allows only the authorized system administrator to access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and configure the settings of the following TOE security functions from the control panel or system administrator client.

- (1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change the TOE setting data related to the following TOE security functions and to make setting whether to enable/disable each function.

With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.

The settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from the control panel.

- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, enable/disable it, and set the number of pass (overwrite procedure);

- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Encryption and enable/disable it;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to the setting on the use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication, and enable/disable it;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator identification, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;
- Change the key operator ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of failures;
- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA, with local authentication only);
- Refer to the setting of SSL/TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication/Remote Authentication, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of Store Print and set store/print;
- Refer to and set date and time;

With CWIS function, the settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from a system administrator client via Web browser.

- Change the key operator ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;
- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA, with local authentication only);
- Refer to the setting of Security Audit Log and enable/disable it, (When Security Audit Log is enabled, security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text to a system administrator client.);
- Refer to the setting of SSL/TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of SNMP v3 communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Set the authentication password for SNMPv3 communication;

- Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Download/upload and create an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication/Remote Authentication, and configure the details;

This TOE allows only the key operator (exc. SA) who is authenticated from system administrator client via ApeosWare Device Setup to refer to and set the following security functions.

- Change the key operator ID and password;
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the setting on the use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication/Remote Authentication, and configure the details;
- Refer to and set date and time;

(2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

The TOE restricts the handling of the general user identifier only to a system administrator.

(3) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

Regarding Mailbox and Store Print, the TOE sets the user identifier created as owner identifier and the available user identifier, and set them as default values of security attributes.

(4) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system administrator.

7.1.5. Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)

A system administrator can restrict CE's operation in the system administrator mode to inhibit CE from referring to / changing the settings related to System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT). This function can prevent setting change by an attacker who is impersonating CE.

(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change (enable/disable) the TOE settings related to Customer Engineer Operation Restriction from the control panel and CWIS.

With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.

(2) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system administrator.

7.1.6. Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU)

According to Security Audit Log setting which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, the important events of the TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. All the TOE users are the targets of this audit log.

(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

It is assured that the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log.

Table 29 shows the details of the audit log data.

Table 29: Details of Security Audit Log Data

| | | |
|--|--------------------------|--|
| The auditable events are recorded with the following fixed size entries: | | |
| - | Log ID: | consecutive numbers as an audit log identifier (1 - 60000) |
| - | Date: | date data (yyyy/mm/dd, mm/dd/yyyy, or dd/mm/yyyy) |
| - | Time: | time data (hh:mm:ss) |
| - | Logged Events: | event name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits) |
| - | User Name: | user name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits) |
| - | Description: | description on events (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details) |
| - | Status: | status or result of event processing (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details) |
| - | Optionally Logged Items: | additional information recorded to audit log (except common record items) |

| Logged Events | Description | Status |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| Change in Device Status | | |
| System Status | Started normally (cold boot) | - |
| | Started normally (warm boot) | |
| | Shutdown requested | |
| | User operation (Local) | Start/End |
| User Authentication | | |
| Login/Logout | Login | Successful, Failed (Invalid UserID), Failed (Invalid Password), Failed |
| | Logout | |
| | Locked System Administrator Authentication | - (Number of authentication failures recorded) |
| | Detected continuous Authentication Fail | |
| Change in Audit Policy | | |

| Logged Events | Description | Status |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Audit Policy | Audit Log | Enable/Disable |
| Job Status | | |
| Job Status | Print | Completed, Completed with Warnings, Canceled by User, Canceled by Shutdown, Aborted, Unknown |
| | Copy | |
| | Scan | |
| | Fax | |
| | Mailbox | |
| | Print Reports | |
| | Job Flow Service | |
| Change in Device Settings | | |
| Device Settings | Adjust Time | Successful/Failed |
| | Create Mailbox | |
| | Delete Mailbox | |
| | Switch Authentication Mode | Successful |
| | Change Security Setting | (Setting items recorded) |
| Access to Data Stored in Device | | |
| Device Data | Import Certificate | Successful/Failed |
| | Delete Certificate | |
| | Add Address Entry | |
| | Delete Address Entry | |
| | Edit Address Entry | |
| | Export Audit Log | |
| Communication | Trusted Communication | Failed (Protocol and communication destination stored) |

(2) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

It is assured that all the information recorded in the audit log can be retrieved.

Security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text by pressing the button “store as a text file.” To download security audit log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before using Web browser.

(3) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

The person who retrieves the audit log is limited to the authenticated system administrator. A system administrator can access the audit log only via Web browser and the access from the control panel is inhibited. Therefore, a system administrator needs to log in from Web browser to access the audit log.

(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

There is no function to delete the audit log, and the audit log data are protected from untrusted alteration and modification.

(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

When audit log file is full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten with the new data so that the new data is not lost but surely recorded.

Auditable events are stored with time stamps into NVRAM. When the number of stored events reaches 50, the 50 logs on NVRAM is stored into one file (“audit log file”) within the internal HDD. Up to 15,000 events can be stored. When the number of recorded events exceeds 15,000, the oldest audit log file is overwritten and a new audit event is stored.

(6) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

The time stamp of TOE’s clock function is issued when the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log file.

By TSF_FMT, only a system administrator is enabled to change the clock setting.

7.1.7. Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT)

Internal Network Data Protection is provided by the following four protocols which are configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode:

(1) FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

The document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the encryption communication protocol that ensures secure data communication between the TOE and IT products (communication service via Web, communication service for printer driver, communication service for fax driver, communication service for network utility, communication service for ApeosWare Device Setup, and other services which require trusted path). This trusted path is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communication data from modification or disclosure.

a) SSL/TLS

According to the SSL/TLS communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, SSL/TLS ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

By supporting SSL/TLS, the TOE can act as SSL/TLS server or SSL/TLS client. Moreover, SSL/TLS can protect data transmission between the TOE and the remote from interception and alteration. Protection from interception is realized by encrypting transmission data with the following cryptographic keys. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as SSLv3/TLSv1/TLSv1.2 upon every session
Specifically, one of the cryptographic suites below is adopted:

| Cryptographic Suites of SSL/TLS | Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key | Hash Method |
|---------------------------------|---|-------------|
| SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | RC4 / 128 bits | SHA-1 |
| SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | 3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits | SHA-1 |
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | AES / 128 bits | SHA-1 |
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | AES / 256 bits | SHA-1 |
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | AES / 128 bits | SHA256 |
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | AES / 256 bits | SHA256 |

Protection from the alteration is realized by HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code - IETF RFC 2104) of SSL/TLS.

When SSL/TLS communication is enabled on the Web client, requests from the client must be received via HTTPS. The SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before IPsec, SNMPv3, or S/MIME is enabled or before security audit log data are downloaded by a system administrator.

b) IPsec

According to the IPsec communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, IPsec ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

IPsec establishes the security association to determine the parameters (*e.g.* private key and cryptographic algorithm) to be used in the IPsec communication between the TOE and the remote. After the association is established, all transmission data among the specified IP addresses are encrypted by the transport mode of IPsec until the TOE is powered off or reset. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as IPsec (ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload) at every session
Specifically, one of the following combinations between secret-key cryptographic method and hash method is adopted:

| Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key | Hash Method |
|---|-------------|
| AES / 128 bits | SHA-1 |
| 3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits | SHA-1 |

c) SNMPv3

According to the SNMP v3 communication which is configured by a system administrator using

the system administrator mode, SNMP v3 is supported. This is one of the security solutions for the network management protocol, SNMP. As defined in IETF RFC3414, SNMP v3 is used for not only data encryption but also authentication of each SNMP message.

To enable this function, both authentication password and privacy password need to be set up in both the TOE and the remote server. Length of both passwords must be 8 characters or more.

Authentication of SNMP v3 uses SHA-1 hash function; encryption of the protocol uses CBC-DES. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as SNMP v3 at every session:

| Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key | Hash Method |
|---|-------------|
| DES / 56 bits | SHA-1 |

d) S/MIME

According to the S/MIME communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, S/MIME ensuring secure mail communication is supported. This protects the security of document data on the internal and external networks.

By S/MIME encrypting mail function, the document data being transmitted to/from the outside by E-mail are protected from interception. By S/MIME signature mail function, the document data are protected from interception and alteration.

A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting mail encryption and lost at the time of completion of the encryption or powering off the MFD main unit.

Secret-key cryptographic method generated as S/MIME for every mail

| Cryptographic Method and Size of Secret Key |
|---|
| RC2 / 128 bits |
| 3Key Triple-DES/168 bits |
| AES / 128 bits |
| AES / 192 bits |
| AES / 256 bits |

Hash method generated as S/MIME for every mail

| hash method |
|-------------|
| SHA1 |
| SHA256 |

7.1.8. Fax Flow Security (TSF_FAX_FLOW)

This function inhibits unauthorized access to the TOE via the Fax board, which is connected to the controller board via USB interface, at any case. The data on public telephone line are not delivered to the internal network.

(1) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

The data on public telephone line are not delivered to the internal network.

8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

8.1. Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this ST:

| Acronym | Definition |
|----------|--|
| ADF | Auto Document Feeder |
| CC | Common Criteria |
| CE | Customer Engineer / Customer Service Engineer |
| CWIS | CentreWare Internet Service |
| DRAM | Dynamic Random Access Memory |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level |
| FIPS PUB | Federal Information Processing Standard publication |
| IIT | Image Input Terminal |
| IOT | Image Output Terminal |
| IT | Information Technology |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| MFD | Multi Function Device |
| NVRAM | Non Volatile Random Access Memory |
| PDL | Page Description Language |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| SAR | Security Assurance Requirement |
| SEEPRM | Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory |
| SFP | Security Function Policy |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| SMTP | Simple Mail Transfer Protocol |
| SOF | Strength of Function |
| ST | Security Target |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TSF | TOE Security Function |

8.2. Terminology

The following terms are used in this ST:

| Term | Definition |
|---|--|
| User | Any entity outside the TOE who interacts with the TOE: <i>i.e.</i> general user, system administrator, and CE. |
| System Administrator Privilege (SA) | A user authorized by key operator to manage MFD maintenance and configure TOE security functions. |
| System Administrator | An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance and configures TOE security functions. This term covers both key operator and SA. |
| Customer Engineer (CE) | Customer service engineer, an engineer who maintains and repairs MFD. |
| Attacker | A malicious user of TOE |
| Control Panel | A panel of MFD on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to operate the MFD |
| General User Client | A client for general user. |
| System Administrator Client | A client for system administrator. An administrator can refer to and rewrite TOE setting data of MFD via Web browser and ApeosWare Device Setup. |
| CentreWare Internet Service (CWIS) | CWIS is a service on a Web server in the TOE to confirm the status of the TOE, change settings of the TOE, and request retrieval and printing of documents toward the TOE via the Web browser of the user client. CWIS can be used via the Windows standard Web browser. |
| ApeosWare Device Setup | Software for a key operator to conduct settings and management of multiple MFDs from the system administrator client. It enables reference and editing of registration information such as user information, access restriction, mailbox, address book, and job flow, and also the basic device information in a list. |
| System Administrator Mode | An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions according to the operational environment. This mode is distinguished from the operation mode that enables a general user to use the MFD functions. |
| Fax Driver | Software for Direct Fax (with local authentication only) function, which enables a general user to fax data to the destination directly from a general user client through MFD. The user can send the fax data just as printing. Used on the user client. |
| Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only) | Software for a general user client to retrieve the document data stored in Mailbox of MFD. |
| Printer driver | Software to convert the data on a general user client into print data written in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on |

| Term | Definition |
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| | the user client. |
| Print Data | The data written in PDL, a readable format for MFD, which are to be converted into bitmap data by the TOE decompose function. |
| Control Data | The data that are transmitted by command and response interactions. This is one the type of the data transmitted between MFD hardware units. |
| Bitmap Data | The decomposed data of the data read by the copy function and the print data transmitted from a user client to MFD by the print function. Bitmap data are stored into the internal HDD after being compressed in the unique process. |
| Decompose Function | A function to analyze and convert the print data written in PDL into bitmap data. |
| Decompose | To analyze and convert the data written in PDL into bitmap data by the decompose function. |
| Original | Texts, images and photos to be read from IIT in the copy function. |
| Document Data | <p>Document data means all the data, including images, transmitted across the MFD when any of copy, print, scan or fax functions is used by a general user. The document data includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bitmap data read from IIT and printed out from IOT (copy function), - Print data sent by general user client and its decomposed bitmap data (print function), - Bitmap data read from IIT and then stored into the internal HDD (scan function), - Bitmap data read from IIT and sent to the fax destination and the bitmap data faxed from the sender's machine and printed out from the recipient's IOT (fax function). |
| Used Document Data | The remaining data in the MFD internal HDD even after deletion. The document data are first stored into the internal HDD, used, and then only their files are deleted. |
| Security Audit Log Data | The chronologically recorded data of important events of the TOE. The events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result. |
| Internally Stored Data | The data which are stored in a general user client or in the general client and server, but do not include data regarding TOE functions. |
| General Data | The data on the internal network. The general data do not include data regarding TOE functions. |
| TOE Setting Data | The data which are created by the TOE or for the TOE and may affect the TOE operations. Specifically, they includes the information regarding the functions of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, Hard Disk Data Encryption, System Administrator's Security Management, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, Use of password entered from MFD control panel |

| Term | Definition |
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| | in user authentication, ID and password of system administrator, access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, Internal Network Data Protection, Security Audit Log, Mailbox, and User Authentication. |
| General Client and Server | Client and server which do not directly engage in TOE operations |
| Deletion from the Internal Hard Disk Drive (HDD) | Deletion from the internal HDD means deletion of the management information. When deletion of document data from the internal HDD is requested, only the management information corresponding to the data is deleted. Therefore, user cannot access the document data which were logically deleted. However, the document data themselves are not deleted but remain as the used document data until new data is written in the same storage area. |
| Overwrite | To write over the area of the document data stored in the internal HDD when deleting the data. |
| Cryptographic Seed Key | The 12 alphanumeric characters to be entered by a user. When data in the internal HDD are encrypted, a cryptographic key is generated based on the cryptographic seed key. |
| Cryptographic Key | The 256-bit data which is automatically generated based on the cryptographic seed key. Before the data are stored into the internal HDD, they are encrypted with the cryptographic key. |
| Network | A general term to indicate both external and internal networks. |
| External Network | The network which cannot be managed by the organization that manages the TOE. This does not include the internal network. |
| Internal Network | Channels between MFD and highly reliable remote server / client PC. The channels are located in the network of the organization, the owner of the TOE, and are protected from the security risks coming from the external network. |
| User Authentication | A function to limit the accessible TOE functions by identifying the user before he/she uses each TOE function. There are two modes, Local Authentication and Remote Authentication, and either mode is used for operation. |
| Local Authentication | A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user information registered in the MFD. |
| Remote Authentication | A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user information registered in the remote authentication server. |

9. REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST.

| Short Name | Document Title |
|-------------|---|
| [CC Part 1] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-001 (Japanese version 1.0, dated December 2009, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan) |
| [CC Part 2] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Part 2: Security functional components, dated July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-002 (Japanese version 1.0, dated December 2009, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan) |
| [CC Part 3] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Part 3: Security assurance components, dated July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-003 (Japanese version 1.0, dated December 2009, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan) |
| [CEM] | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1 Evaluation Methodology, dated July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-004 (Japanese version 1.0, dated December 2009, translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan) |