

Surveillance Report

Issue Date: 2014-7-11

Document No.: SRP-C0329-01

This is to report that surveillance has been conducted on the following Target of Evaluation (hereinafter referred to as "TOE"), based on the Requirements for IT Security Certification (CCM-02) 8.1. It is recommended to use as a reference along with the Certification Report.

TOE:

Certification No.	C0329
Sponsor	Canon Inc.
TOE Name	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model
TOE Version	1.0
PP Conformance	IEEE Std 2600.1™-2009
Assurance Package	EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Developer	Canon Inc.
Evaluation Facility	Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc. Information Security Evaluation Office

Surveillance Number: JISEC-SV14-001

Report on Surveillance Conducted:

- **Surveillance Result**

It is confirmed that this TOE has a possibility of security being compromised; therefore, it is determined that this TOE fails to maintain its certification.

- **Surveillance Summary**

It was found out that the information has been published, which is inconsistent with the developer documentation that is a rationale for the assurance of this TOE. Since there is a possibility that the assurance of this TOE cannot be fulfilled in regard to the evaluation results based on the documentation, surveillance has been conducted from 2014-03 to 2014-07.

As a result of surveillance, it was verified that this TOE has a possibility of security not being maintained in operational environments that are not placed under the strict control, because an assumption that is a rationale for the assurance during the evaluation of this



TOE has not been met. The certification of this TOE has been suspended, and JISEC has asked the applicant to take corrective actions on this matter.

Currently, the re-evaluation of this TOE has been conducted, so the product cannot be provided as a certified product. For those procurement personnel who already purchased this TOE, it is reported that service personnel from Canon Inc., have addressed and confirmed the settings for all the certified products in service.

For more details on the problem pointed out in this surveillance, please contact Canon Inc., the developer of this TOE, who provides the information.

For reference: "Product Advisories"

<http://www.usa.canon.com/cusa/support/consumer?pageKeyCode=prdAdvDetail&docId=0901e02480c1bb79>



Certification Report

Kazumasa Fujie, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan

Target of Evaluation

Application date/ID	2011-03-22 (ITC-1344)
Certification No.	C0329
Sponsor	Canon Inc.
Name of the TOE	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model
Version of the TOE	1.0
PP Conformance	IEEE Std 2600.1-2009
Assurance Package	EAL3 Augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Developer	Canon Inc.
Evaluation Facility	Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc. Information Security Evaluation Office

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

2011-11-29

Takumi Yamasato, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
IT Security Center
Technology Headquarters

Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme".

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 3
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 3

Evaluation Result: Pass

"Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the "IT Security Certification Procedure" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary	5
1.1 Product Overview	5
1.1.1 Assurance Package	5
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality	5
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives	5
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions	6
1.1.3 Disclaimers	6
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation	6
1.3 Certification	6
2. Identification	7
3. Security Policy.....	8
3.1 Security Function Policies	9
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies	9
3.1.1.1 Threats	9
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats.....	9
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies	10
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies	10
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies	11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope	13
4.1 Usage Assumptions	13
4.2 Environmental Assumptions	13
4.3 Clarification of Scope	15
5. Architectural Information	16
5.1 TOE Boundary and Component	16
5.2 IT Environment	17
6. Documentation	18
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results.....	19
7.1 Evaluation Approach	19
7.2 Overview of Evaluation Activity	19
7.3 IT Product Testing	19
7.3.1 Developer Testing	19
7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing	22
7.3.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing	24
7.4 Evaluated Configuration	26
7.5 Evaluation Results.....	26
7.6 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations	27
8. Certification.....	28
8.1 Certification Result.....	28

8.2 Recommendations	28
9. Annexes.....	29
10. Security Target	29
11. Glossary.....	30
12. Bibliography.....	32

1. Executive Summary

This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model, Version 1.0" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Canon Inc., and the evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2011-11 by Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc. Information Security Evaluation Office (hereinafter referred to as "Evaluation Facility"). It reports to the sponsor, Canon Inc., and provides security information to the consumers and procurement personnel who are interested in this TOE.

The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter referred to as the "ST") that is the appendix of this report together. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of the TOE are described in the ST.

This Certification Report assumes general consumers who purchase this TOE to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee individual IT product itself.

1.1 Product Overview

An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is as follows. Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.

1.1.1 Assurance Package

Assurance Package of the TOE is EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2.

1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality

The TOE is a multifunction printer (hereinafter referred to as "MFP") that offers Copy, Print, Universal Send, I-fax Receive, and Mail Box capabilities. Additionally, the TOE supports connection of a Fax Board as an option to provide the telephone-based fax transmission.

The security functions provided by the TOE satisfy all security functional requirements, as required and defined in the Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, IEEE Std 2600.1-2009 [14] (hereinafter referred to as the "PP").

About these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance package. The TOE assumes threats and assumptions as described in the following sections.

1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives

The TOE assumes threats as described below and provides the security functions to counter those threats.

Assets of the TOE, namely user document data and the data that have an effect on security functions, are susceptible to unauthorized disclosure or alteration through manipulation of

the TOE, or through access to the TOE's network communications data.

To prevent unauthorized disclosure or alteration of those assets, the TOE provides security functions such as identification and authentication, access control, and encryption.

1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions

It is assumed that the evaluated products are managed under the following configurations and assumptions.

It is assumed that the TOE will be located in an environment where the physical components of the TOE and its interfaces are protected from unauthorized access. The TOE shall be configured and maintained appropriately according to the guidance documents.

1.1.3 Disclaimers

- The conformance to the PP claimed by this TOE includes the fax function. Therefore, the evaluated configuration includes a fax board as an optional feature of the MFP or TOE. Hence, the following are inconsistent with the evaluated configuration.
 - > Configurations without a fax board
 - > Models containing a fax board as a standard feature (Characterized by the letter F at the end of the model name, such as iR-ADV 4045F (Translation note: Japanese market only))
- The Identification and Authentication Function contained in the target of this evaluation does not apply to incoming print jobs. Although the protocol used in the submission of the print job contains an identification and authentication mechanism, that mechanism is out of the scope of this evaluation.

1.2 Conduct of Evaluation

Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed on 2011-11 based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[1], "IT Security Certification Procedure"[2], and "Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure"[3] provided by the Certification Body.

1.3 Certification

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and Observation Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation evidence materials, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process. Those concerns pointed out by the Certification Body were fully resolved, and the Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the Evaluation Facility and fully concluded certification activities.

2. Identification

The TOE is identified as follows:

Name of the TOE: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model

Version of the TOE: 1.0

Developer: Canon Inc.

The TOE consists of the following software, hardware, and licenses.

(Translation note: The Japanese names are originally written in Japanese and translated into English.)

Table 2-1 Components of the TOE

Component Name	Description
(Japanese Name) Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series (English Name) Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series	Any of the following MFP: iR-ADV 4051, iR-ADV 4045, iR-ADV 4035, iR-ADV 4025.
(Japanese Name) iR-ADV Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.1 Ver 1.00 (English Name) iR-ADV Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria Ver 1.00	Contains the control software and security kit license for "Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series".
(Japanese Name) HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Kit-C (Canon MFP Security Chip 2.01) (English Name) HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Kit-C (Canon MFP Security Chip 2.01)	Hardware which encrypts all data stored in the HDD.
(Japanese Name) Data Erase Kit-C (English Name) Data Erase Kit-C	Contains the license for enabling the HDD Data Erase function of the control software.
(Japanese Name) Access Management System Kit-B (English Name) Access Management System Kit-B	Contains the license for enabling the access control function of the control software.

The user can verify that a product is the TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the following means.

According to the procedure written in the guidance document, the user operates the control panel of the MFP and confirms the identification information of the TOE components displayed on the panel.

3. Security Policy

This chapter describes security function policies and organisational security policies provided by the TOE to counter threats.

In addition to offering MFP capabilities such as Copy, Print, and Scan, the TOE is capable of storing user document data in its hard disk and has the functionality for interacting with user terminals and various servers over the network.

The PP, to which the TOE is conformant, assumes an environment where a relatively high level of security is ensured and where accountability for actions is required, and specifies the security functional requirements for such an environment.

To supplement the use of the MFP functions, the TOE offers security functions that satisfy the security functional requirements specified in the PP. These include user identification and authentication, access restriction, HDD data encryption and data erase functions, and cryptographic communication protocols, and protect user document data and data that have an effect on TOE security functions, which are TOE assets, from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.

In terms of the use of the TOE, the following roles are assumed.

- U.NORMAL
A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE, such as Copy, Print, and Scan.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
The TOE user in this role has special privileges that allow configuration of security functions.
- TOE Owner
A person or organisational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing related security policies.

The TOE assets are defined as follows.

- User Document Data
User Document Data consist of the information contained in a user's document.
- User Function Data
User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE. This includes information such as print priority and print settings.
- TSF Confidential Data
TSF Confidential Data are data used by the security functions, and for which integrity and confidentiality must be preserved. This includes information such as user password, Box PIN, and audit logs. This does not, however, include cryptographic keys, since the user has no interface to its access.
- TSF Protected Data
TSF Protected Data are data used by the security functions, and for which only integrity must be preserved. This includes information such as user identification and access privilege information.

3.1 Security Function Policies

The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Chapter 3.1.1. and to meet the organisational security policies shown in Chapter 3.1.2.

3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies

3.1.1.1 Threats

The TOE assumes the threats shown in Table 3-1 and provides the functions for countermeasure against them. These threats are the same as those specified in the PP.

Table 3-1 Assumed Threats

Identifier	Threat
T.DOC.DIS	User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.DOC.ALT	User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.FUNC.ALT	User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.PROT.ALT	TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.CONF.DIS	TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.CONF.ALT	TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats

The TOE counters the threats shown in Table 3-1 by the following security function policies.

(1) Countermeasures against threat "T.DOC.DIS", "T.DOC.ALT", "T.FUNC.ALT"

These are threats to user data. The TOE counters the threats by the following functions: "User Authentication", "Function Use Restriction", "Job Output Restriction", "HDD Data Erase", "HDD Data Encryption" and "LAN Data Protection".

"User Authentication" and "Function Use Restriction" function of the TOE allows only the authorized users to use the TOE functions. For details, refer to the description of P.USER_AUTHORIZATION in Section 3.1.2.2.

"Job Output Restriction" function of the TOE enforces access control when an identified and authenticated user performs the operation such as Print, Preview, Send to Network, Fax TX, Delete, Change Print Priority, and Change Print Settings on print jobs and I-fax jobs stored in the TOE or document data stored in a box, thereby ensuring that only the owner of the documents or U.ADMINISTRATOR gains access to perform these operations. The TOE determines that the identified and authenticated user is the rightful document owner as follows:

- For documents submitted as print jobs, the identified and authenticated user is determined to be the owner of the document if his/her user name matches the user name information of the document specified upon submission of the print job.
- For document data stored as a result of scanning or received by I-fax, the user is required to enter the correct box PIN when the user operates the document data. The boxes where these document data are stored are assigned per user, and pre-configured with a 7-digit box PIN. If the user enters the correct PIN, then the user is determined to be the owner of the document data stored in the box.

"HDD Data Erase" function of the TOE permanently erases the HDD area where the document data are stored, by overwriting with random data upon deleting the document data, to ensure that the document data are never recovered.

"HDD Data Encryption" function of the TOE encrypts all data stored in the removable HDD of the TOE, and prevents that the underlying information are disclosed or altered by tampering the detached HDD from the MFP. It uses the 256-bit AES encryption algorithm. Its cryptographic key is generated using the FIPS PUB 186-2 deterministic random number generator algorithm, and destroyed upon power off.

"LAN Data Protection" function of the TOE uses the secure communication protocol, IPSec, when the TOE communicates with other IT devices over the LAN, and protects the communicated data from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.

With the above functions, the TOE prevents unauthorized use of the TOE, unauthorized access to data stored in the HDD and communication data, thus the TOE protects the assets from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.

(2) Countermeasures against threat "T.PROT.ALT", "T.CONF.DIS", "T.CONF.ALT"

These are threats to TSF data that affects the security functions. The TOE counters the threats by the following functions: "User Authentication", "Management", "HDD Data Encryption", and "LAN Data Protection".

"Management" function of the TOE allows only the authorized U.ADMINISTRATOR to manage user information and various configuration data. The authorized U.NORMAL can change its own password and the PIN for the mail box they use.

"User Authentication", "HDD Data Encryption", and "LAN Data Protection" work as described in 1).

With the above functions, the TOE prevents unauthorized use of the TOE, unauthorized access to data stored in the HDD and communication data, thus the TOE protects the assets from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.

3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies

3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies

Organisational security policies required in use of the TOE are shown in Table 3-2. These organisational security policies are the same as specified in the PP except for addition of P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION. P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION is augmented under the premise that it would generally be required to use a removable HDD on the TOE.

Table 3-2 Organisational Security Policies

Identifier	Organisational Security Policy
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION	To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION	To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING	To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT	To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION	To prevent access TOE assets in the HDD with connecting the other HCDs, TOE will have authorized access the HDD data.

3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies

The TOE provides the security functions to fulfill the Organisational Security Policies shown in Table 3-2.

(1) Means for organisational security policy "P.USER.AUTHORIZATION"

This policy is realized by "User Authentication" and "Function Use Restriction" functions of the TOE.

"User Authentication" function of the TOE only permits the users who are successfully identified and authenticated to use the TOE. To enhance the identification and authentication mechanism, the TOE enforces a password policy to use passwords of a certain minimum length containing a mixture of character types, and a lockout policy whereby a lockout of certain duration is imposed upon a certain number of failed authentication attempts.

Incoming print jobs or fax/I-fax jobs are accepted without requiring identification and authentication. The resulting document data are stored within the TOE, and not automatically printed out nor transmitted. To print out or transmit document data stored in the TOE, the user must operate the control panel of the TOE, which will require identification and authentication.

"Function Use Restriction" function of the TOE performs access restriction on the use of the TOE functions, so that only the identified and authorized users with appropriate permissions are permitted to use the functions. For access restriction, users are assigned "roles" which are bound to permission information. This information is used to determine whether the use of the function is permitted to that user or not.

With the above functions, the TOE ensures that only the authorized users are permitted use of the TOE.

(2) Means for organisational security policy "P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION"

This policy is realized by "Self-Test" function of the TOE.

"Self-Test" function of the TOE checks the integrity of the cryptographic algorithm and the cryptographic key generation algorithm that are used by LAN Data Protection function, after decrypting the executable code which is encrypted and stored in the HDD, at start-up. Thereby, the integrity of the executable code of the TOE security functions is ensured.

Note that the self-test function does not check all executable codes of the TOE security functions. The evaluator evaluates that if the integrity of the part of the TOE security functions is verified, the integrity of all other executable codes decrypted by the same mechanisms is also ensured.

(3) Means for organisational security policy "P.AUDIT.LOGGING"

This policy is realized by "Audit Log" function of the TOE.

"Audit Log" function of the TOE generates and stores audit logs in the TOE's HDD at the occurrence of security-relevant events when security functions are used. The stored audit logs can be viewed only by an authorized U.ADMINISTRATOR via a Web browser.

(4) Means for organisational security policy "P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT"

This policy is realized by "User Authentication" and "Forward Received Jobs" functions of the TOE.

"User Authentication" function of the TOE ensures that only identified and authenticated users are allowed to use the TOE. Additionally, a session will be terminated if a user leaves the session inactive longer than the specified time.

"Forward Received Jobs" function of the TOE restricts data received from any external interface to be forwarded directly to the LAN without prior processing by the TOE.

These functions prevent the unauthorized use of the interfaces of the TOE.

(5) Means for organisational security policy "P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION"

This policy is realized by the Device Identification and Authentication function, which is part of "HDD Data Encryption" function of the TOE.

The Device Identification and Authentication function in the "HDD Data Encryption" function is provided by the HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board, one of the components of the TOE. The HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board acquires the MFP device authentication ID from the MFP device when it is initially mounted. At each start-up, it uses this information for a challenge and response method to confirm the identity of the MFP device, and grants access to the HDD only if it confirms successfully that it is mounted on the correct MFP device.

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to judge the use of the TOE.

4.1 Usage Assumptions

Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. These assumptions are the same as specified in the PP.

The effective performance of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.

Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE

Identifier	Assumptions
A.ACCESS.MANAGED	The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING	TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING	Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. * The meaning of "correctly configure" includes the description specified in (1) and (2) of Section 8.2 "Recommendations".
A.ADMIN.TRUST	Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

4.2 Environmental Assumptions

The TOE is a MFP designed to operate in a typical office environment, where the MFP is connected by an internal LAN, and the internal LAN is protected by Firewall, etc, from threats from the Internet. The assumed operational environment of the TOE is shown in Figure 4-1.

Users of the TOE can operate the TOE from its control panel, from a PC connected via USB, or from a PC connected to the LAN.




Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of TOE

The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.

- (1) Fax Board
It is attached to the TOE to enable telephone-based fax transmission. The Fax Board is outside the scope of the TOE.
It refers to Canon Super G3 FAX Board-AK1.
- (2) PC
It is a generic PC used by a user to connect to the TOE, via USB or internal LAN. It requires the following software.
 - Printer driver: (Evaluation performed using) Canon LIPSLX Printer Driver Version 20.60
 - Web browser: (Evaluation performed using) Microsoft Internet Explorer 8
- (3) User Authentication Server
The TOE supports two methods of "User Authentication" of the TOE described in Chapter 3: "Internal Authentication" where authentication takes place using user information stored within the TOE, and "External Authentication" which uses user information stored in an external server.

The User Authentication server is the server that is used by the TOE for External Authentication, and the authentication protocol to be used is Kerberos.
- (4) Mail Server
A Server is installed as required to facilitate the I-fax capability of the MFP.
- (5) Time Server
It is the NTP service commonly provided over the Internet. As long as the environment

allows, it is recommended that a time server be configured in the TOE, to synchronize the time in the MFP that is used as the timestamp on audit logs. Otherwise, the time that is configured and maintained by the TOE's Management function is used instead.

Note that the reliability of software and hardware other than the TOE shown in this configuration is not subject to the evaluation.

4.3 Clarification of Scope

In this evaluation, the evaluator evaluates that the security functional requirements for the identification and authentication regarding the MFP's Print function specified in the PP do not apply to incoming print jobs. Rather, they apply only when executing operations on document data accumulated in the MFP, created by the submitted print jobs. As such, the following security functions are considered out of the scope of this evaluation.

- (1) The TOE supports various print protocols for the submission of print jobs. Some protocols have their own identification and authentication mechanisms, and those mechanisms are out of the scope of this evaluation. Examples of this include the identification and authentication mechanism in the IPP protocol or in the FTP protocol for FTP print.
- (2) When submitting a print job to the TOE through a print driver, the user is asked to provide the user name and PIN. This input is not used by the identification and authentication function. A PIN is associated with each document data submitted as a print job, and the user must provide the correct PIN in order to print that data (This is known as "Secured Print"). This behavior is outside the scope of this evaluation. The user name is not checked for validity, but is simply associated with the submitted print job. The user name is used by the access restriction function.

5. Architectural Information

This chapter describes the objective and relevance regarding the scope of the TOE and the main components of the TOE.

5.1 TOE Boundary and Component

The configuration of the MFP or TOE as well as the IT environment other than MFP is shown in Figure 5-1. In Figure 5-1, the TOE is shown within the bold line box. User Authentication Server, Mail Server, PC, Time Server and User are outside of the TOE.




Figure 5.1 TOE boundary

In Figure 5-1, the components shown in blue box within the TOE are the security functions of the TOE described in Chapter 3, and the remaining components shown in white box within the TOE are the basic functions of the MFP. For details on the MFP basic functions, see Terminology in Chapter 11.

Users of the TOE operate the TOE from its control panel ("UI Func" in Figure 5-1), from a PC connected to the LAN using a Web browser ("Web Browser" contained in "PC" in Figure 5-1), or from a PC connected via LAN or USB using a print driver (indicated only as the "PC" and a print driver is not illustrated in Figure 5-1).

The security functions of the TOE are applied when the user uses MFP basic functions. The following describes the relation between the security functions and the MFP basic

functions.

- (1) When a user submits a print job from a PC connected via LAN or USB, or when a fax/I-fax job is received, the jobs are accepted without requiring identification and authentication, and the resulting document data are stored within the TOE. The user may perform operations on the document data later, using the control panel or from a Web browser.

When the user attempts to access the MFP basic functions from the control panel or from a Web browser, "User Authentication" and "Function Use Restriction" function are applied, so that only authorized users are allowed to use the TOE. Subsequently, when the user attempts to execute an operation on a document data stored in the TOE, "Job Output Restriction" function is applied, so that only the owner of the document data or the Administrator is allowed to operate the document data.

When the user attempts to use "Management" function or browse audit logs provided by "Audit Log" function from the control panel or a Web browser, "User Authentication" function is applied, so that only the identified and authenticated user with Administrator privileges can gain access to the TOE.

Note that audit logs are generated by "Audit Log" function when these security functions are used.

- (2) In the use described in (1) above, "HDD Data Encryption" function is applied to all data stored in the internal HDD, and "HDD Data Erase" function is applied when document data are deleted.
- (3) In the use described in (1) above, "LAN Data Protection" function is applied when the TOE communicates with other IT devices over the LAN. In addition, "Forward Received Jobs" restricts data received from any external interface to be forwarded without any TOE security functions applied.

5.2 IT Environment

When the external authentication method is used for "User Authentication" function of the TOE, Kerberos protocol is used to query the information contained in the User Authentication Server to perform user identification and authentication. User account information is registered in the User Authentication Server through the management function of the User Authentication Server.

The time information recorded on the TOE's audit logs is provided by the TOE. The time information of the TOE is set and maintained by the Management function of the TOE, or can be synchronized with an external time server using the NTP protocol.

The TOE uses IPSec protocol to communicate with other IT devices over the network. As such, those IT devices need to have IPSec configured as well.

6. Documentation

The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed below. TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy the assumptions.

(Japanese Name)

- imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4045/4045F/4035/4035F/4025/4025F e-Manual [FT5-4125(000)]
- iR-ADV Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.1 Administrator Guide [FT5-4123(000)]
- "ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Kit-B1" Access Management System V3.0 Individual Management Configuration Administrator Guide [FT5-4125(000)]
- HDD Data Encryption Kit User's Guide [FT5-2437(020)]
- To Read Before Using iR-ADV Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.1 [FT5-4124(000)]

(English Name)

- imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4051/4045/4035/4025 e-Manual [FT5-4128(000)(US) / FT5-4129(000)(AP)]
- iR-ADV Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria Certification Administrator Guide [FT5-4126(000)]
- ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KIT-B1 Access Management System V3.0 Individual Management Configuration Administrator Guide [FT5-4128(000)(US) / FT5-4129(000)(AP)]
- HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Kit-C Series User Documentation [FT5-2440(020)]
- Before Using iR-ADV Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria Certification [FT5-4127(000)]

Note that "US" shows the document for the United States, and "AP" shows the document for Asia Pacific.

7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results

7.1 Evaluation Approach

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in accordance with the assurance components in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. In the Evaluation Technical Report, it explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict of each work unit in the CEM.

7.2 Overview of Evaluation Activity

The history of evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

Evaluation has started on 2011-03 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2011-11. The evaluator received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the evaluator directly visited the development and manufacturing sites on 2011-07 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for the operation in life-cycle support, such as configuration management, delivery, and development security, by investigating records and interviewing staff. For some development and manufacturing sites, site visits were omitted as the Evaluation Facility determined that the examination details of the past CC-certified products could be reused. Further, the evaluator executed the sampling check of the developer testing and the evaluator testing by using developer testing environment at developer site on 2011-08.

Concerns found in evaluation activities for each work unit were all issued as the Observation Reports and were reported to the developer. These concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all concerns were solved eventually.

Concerns that the Certification Body found in the evaluation process were described as a certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. After the Evaluation Facility and the developer examined it, these concerns were reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.

7.3 IT Product Testing

The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had executed. As a result of the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation and those confirmed validity, the evaluator executed the reappearance testing, additional testing and penetration testing based on vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary.

7.3.1 Developer Testing

The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer executed and the documentation of actual testing results. It explains the content of the developer testing evaluated by the evaluator as follows.

1) Developer Testing Environment

The testing configuration performed by the developer is the same as the operational environment for the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The TOE used in the developer testing is iR-ADV 4025 model with the same TOE identification described in Chapter 2. The evaluator evaluated that it is sufficient to test a representative model only, since the differences between the MFP models are hardware performances such as scanning and printing speeds, and there is no difference in the behavior of the security functions. Note that the evaluator tests another MFP models that are not tested by the developer to verify machine independence. For details, see Section 7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing.

Configuration elements other than the TOE are listed in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1 Variations of the TOE

Device Name	Description
PC	The user's PC. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PC with Windows 7 Professional or WindowsXP Professional SP3 installed - Web browser: Internet Explorer 8 - Printer driver: Canon LIPSLX Printer Driver Version 20.60
User Authentication Server/ Time Server	It serves as the authentication server used in external authentication and/or the Internet time server. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PC with Windows Server 2008 Enterprise SP1 installed - Authentication server software: Active Directory Domain Services (which comes with the OS) - Time server software: Windows TIME (which comes with the OS)
Mail Server	It is used as the server for I-fax transmissions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PC with Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition SP1 installed. - Mail Server software: Microsoft POP3 Service (which comes with the OS) Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (which comes with the OS)
Fax Board	Super G3 FAX Board-AK1
Fax Machine	There is a fax machine (not shown) at the free end of the telephone line in Figure 4-1. In tests, it is connected to the fax board via a pseudo-exchanger. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - iR-ADV4045

The developer testing was performed in the same TOE testing environment as the TOE configuration identified in the ST.

It should be noted, however, that there are some dissimilarities with the configuration specified in the ST. The test environment used by the developer had no Internet connection, and therefore no Firewall; the Internet Time Server was substituted with the software on the User Authentication Server/Time Server. The evaluator evaluated that these dissimilarities do not affect the purpose, which is to test the TOE's functions.

2) Summary of Developer Testing

Summary of the developer testing is as follows.

a. Developer Testing Outline

Outline of the developer testing is as follows.

<Developer Testing Approach>

- (1) The output messages of the user interfaces, the TOE's behavior, and the contents of audit logs are confirmed by operating the user interfaces, such as control panel, Web browser, and printer driver.
- (2) To confirm the HDD Data Erase function, the HDD protocol analyzer is used to read the deleted contents of the HDD to ensure that the contents are overwritten with random data.
- (3) To confirm the HDD Data Encryption function, encrypted data stored in the HDD is compared with data encrypted by another tool, to ensure that the TOE implements the cryptographic algorithm according to the specification. In addition, for cryptographic key generation, random numbers are generated using various seed values, and the results are compared with known data to ensure that the TOE implements the cryptographic key generation algorithm according to the specification.
- (4) To confirm the IPsec function, IPsec communication is established with the PC to ensure that IPsec communication functions properly. Furthermore, a network analyzer is used to ensure that the secure communication protocol is applied according to the specification.
- (5) To confirm the Device Identification and Authentication function of the HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board, the behaviors are checked both when mounted on the MFP with the correct ID and when mounted on another different MFP with an incorrect ID.

<Developer Testing Tools>

The tools used for the developer testing are shown in Table 7-2 below.

Table 7-2 Tools for Developer Testing

Tool Name	Description
HDD Protocol Analyzer Catalyst Enterprises Inc ST4-31-0186	A tool that monitors the bus connected to the HDD and analyzes input/output data.
Network Analyzer Wireshark Version 1.2.11	A tool that monitors and analyzes data communicated over the LAN.
Encryption Library Fujitsu AES library for FR ver. 1.0	It is used to compare encrypted data and to check the accurate implementation of the encryption algorithm.

<Developer Testing Effort>

MFP basic functions and security management functions were operated from every interface, and the security functions to be applied to various input parameters were confirmed to operate according to the specification. In addition, all acceptable setting

values for the evaluated configuration such as internal or external authentication setting were confirmed to operate according to the specification.

b. Scope of the Executed Developer Testing

The developer testing was executed on 283 items by the developer. By the coverage analysis, it was verified that all security functions and external interfaces described in the functional specification had been tested. By the depth analysis, it was verified that all subsystems and subsystem interfaces described in the TOE design had been sufficiently tested.

c. Result

The evaluator confirmed the approach of the executed developer testing and the legitimacy of tested items, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the testing plan and the actual testing approach. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the testing results expected by the developer and the actual testing results executed by the developer.

7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing

The evaluator executed the sample testing to reconfirm the execution of the security function by the test items extracted from the developer testing. The evaluator executed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the "Independent Testing") to reconfirm that security functions are certainly implemented from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation. The independent testing executed by the evaluator is explained as follows.

1) Independent Testing Environment

The configuration of the testing conducted by the evaluator was the same as the configuration of the developer testing.

Testing of the TOE performed by the evaluator was carried out using the iR-ADV 4051 and iR-ADV 4025 models with the same TOE identification described in Chapter 2.

The evaluator independent testing was executed in the same environment as the TOE configuration identified in the ST.

2) Summary of Independent Testing

Summary of the Independent testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

a. Independent Testing Points of View

The evaluator projected the independent testing in terms of the following viewpoints, based on the developer testing and the provided evaluation evidence materials, in order to verify by the evaluator him/herself that the TOE security functions work as specified.

<Viewpoint of Independent Testing>

- (1) By testing other models which were not tested by the developer, confirm that the differences between the models are those of hardware performance (i.e., processing speed) only, and the differences do not affect the behavior of the security functions.
- (2) In terms of sampling developer tests, extract test items from the testing performed by the developer so that all TSFI and security functions are included, and perform

the same tests as the developer.

- (3) In the developer testing, since some interfaces were not rigorously tested to examine the behavior of the security functions, confirm the behavior using parameters that are not yet tested.

b. Independent Testing Outline

The independent testing conducted by the evaluator is outlined as follows:

<Independent Testing Approach>

Using the same method as in the developer testing, the same testing and the testing with changed parameters are conducted.

<Independent Testing Tools>

The same testing tool as in the developer testing was used.

<Contents of Independent Testing Performed>

Table 7-3 shows outline of the independent testing conducted by the evaluator with corresponding viewpoints of the independent testing. Note that while the developer testing covers all setting values, the evaluator testing is performed using the default setting values that are set immediately after completing all installation procedures.

Table 7-3 Conducted Independent Testing

Viewpoint of Independent Testing	Outline of Independent Testing
(1)(2)	Based on the viewpoint, test items are extracted from developer tests, and the same tests are repeated to determine that the same results can be obtained. Out of 283 test items in total, 115 test items were tested.
(3)	Confirm that the behavior is according to the specification, when the length of the user password or box PIN is around the threshold value.
(3)	The TOE has multiple roles available for U.NORMAL. Confirm that whatever the role a user is assigned for U.NORMAL, a user will not be able to use the management functions only for U.ADMINISTRATOR according to the specification.
(3)	Confirm that the behavior is as expected, when a secured print job is submitted using a user name that is not registered in the TOE. (i.e., The Administrator can browse or delete all secured print jobs. For a non-Administrator, access is denied since the user name will not match.)
(3)	Confirm that a log of the transmission error is generated according to the specification, if a document stored in a box is being transmitted to the network, and the LAN cable is unplugged.
(3)	Confirm that HDD Data Erase function properly operates, even when fax transmission is interrupted due to a problem outside the TOE.
(3)	Confirm that no IPsec connectivity is established, when IPsec is not properly configured (not encrypted) on the connected PC.

c. Result

All the executed independent testing was correctly completed, and the evaluator

confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.

7.3.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluator devised and executed the necessary evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") about the possibility of exploitable concern at assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation. It explains the penetration testing executed by the evaluator as follows.

1) Summary of the Penetration Testing

Summary of the penetration testing executed by the evaluator is as follows.

a. Vulnerability of Concern

The evaluator searched into the provided evidence and the public domain information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.

Note that for cryptographic keys, the evaluator determines that attackers with the assumed attack potential cannot obtain or guess the cryptographic key, based on analysis of the mechanism used at TOE start-up to generate the cryptographic key and the developer tests for that mechanism.

- (1) There is a concern corresponding to this TOE regarding the publicly available vulnerability information, such as the possibility of unauthorized use of network service and various vulnerability of Web.
- (2) There is a concern in Web interfaces that the TOE operates unexpectedly for the input exceeding the limit value.
- (3) There is a concern in Web interfaces that identification and authentication or access control mechanisms may be bypassed if the URL is specified directly or session management information is guessed.
- (4) There is a concern that the TOE operates unexpectedly when powered OFF/ON during start-up or shut-down.
- (5) There is a concern that the TOE operates unexpectedly when the same document data are accessed simultaneously from the control panel and from a Web browser.
- (6) There is a concern that the TOE operates unexpectedly when the TOE's resources such as disk space are exhausted.

b. Penetration Testing Outline

The evaluator executed the following penetration testing to identify possibly exploitable vulnerabilities.

< Penetration Testing Environment >

The penetration Testing was conducted in the same environment as the evaluator independent testing, but used by adding the PC with a tool for the penetration testing. Details of the tools used in the testing are shown in Table 7-4 below.

Table 7-4 Tools for Penetration Testing

Tool Name	Description
PC for Penetration Testing	PC with Windows XP, which operates the following penetration testing tools.
(1) Nessus 4.2.1. (build 9119)	A tool that detects network service vulnerabilities. Vulnerability data are the latest as of July 29, 2011.
(2) nmap 5.00	A tool that detects available network services.
(3) Nikto 2.1.4	A tool that detects Web server vulnerabilities. Vulnerability data are the latest as of July 29, 2011.
(4) Tamper IE 1.0.1.13	A tool that mediates communication between the Web browser (PC) and the Web server (TOE) to browse or alter communications. Tamper IE enables transmitted data to be tampered with and transmitted to a Web server, without being subject to web browser constraints.

<Contents of Penetration Testing Performed>

Table 7-5 shows outline of the penetration testing for the vulnerability of concern.

Table 7-5 Outline of Penetration Testing

Vulnerability of Concern	Outline of Penetration Testing
(1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Using Nessus and nmap on the TOE, it is searched for any open ports and vulnerabilities. It is confirmed that no ports are opened that should not be, and that no known vulnerabilities exist on the open ports. - Using Nikto, it is searched for vulnerabilities in the TOE's Web server function, and confirmed there are no known vulnerabilities.
(2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the "Change Password" screen, TamperIE is used to tamper with the communication between the Web browser and the TOE so that a wrong-length password is transmitted. This correctly resulted in error, showing no abnormal behavior.
(3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the Web browser's login screen, it is attempted to bypass login by specifying the desired URL directly, and confirmed that login cannot be bypassed. - During login from the Web browser to the TOE, TamperIE is used to obtain session information, and it is confirmed they are random numbers that cannot be guessed by an attacker possessing the assumed attack potential.
(4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When the TOE is powered OFF during start-up, it is confirmed that the TOE shuts down properly showing no abnormal behavior. - When the TOE is powered ON during shutdown, it is confirmed that the TOE starts up after shutting down, showing no abnormal behavior.
(5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When the same document is accessed simultaneously from the control panel and a Web browser, one with the intent to delete the document, the other to merge and save under the same file name, delete operation for the former and save operation for the latter succeed, showing no abnormal behavior.

Vulnerability of Concern	Outline of Penetration Testing
(6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When the HDD is full, it is attempted to save additional data, and confirmed that it results in error, showing no abnormal behavior. - Similar tests were performed to check the maximum number of registered users, maximum number of secured print jobs, as well as maximum fax receptions, which showed no abnormal behavior.

c. Result

In the penetration testing conducted by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any exploitable vulnerability that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could exploit.

7.4 Evaluated Configuration

The conditions for the evaluated configuration of the TOE are as described in the guidance documents. The user must follow the guidance documents to set up the TOE. Some of the settings are fixed in this evaluation, because certain settings like disabling security functions weaken security. If any settings that affect security are changed to the value that is advised not to set in the guidance documents, then the MFP with those settings is no longer the evaluated configuration.

7.5 Evaluation Results

The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.

- PP Conformance:

2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A (IEEE Std 2600.1-2009)

SFR packages conformance defined in the above PP:

- 2600.1-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment A: Conformant
 - 2600.1-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment A: Conformant
 - 2600.1-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment A: Conformant
 - 2600.1-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment A: Conformant
 - 2600.1-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment A: Conformant
 - 2600.1-NVS, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment A: Augmented
 - 2600.1-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment A: Augmented
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
 - Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance components.

- All assurance components of EAL3 package
- Augmented assurance component ALC_FLR.2

The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.

7.6 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

The evaluator recommendations for users are not mentioned.

8. Certification

The Certification Body conducted the following certification based on the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.

1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be reflected.
3. Submitted evidential materials shall be sampled, the contents shall be examined, and the related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as certification oversight reviews and were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the Observation Report and certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.

8.1 Certification Result

As a result of verification of the submitted Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Reports and related evaluation deliverables, the Certification Body determined that the TOE satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL3 and assurance components ALC_FLR.2 in the CC part 3.

8.2 Recommendations

- (1) The conformance to the PP claimed by this TOE includes the fax function. Therefore, the evaluated configuration includes a fax board as an optional feature of the MFP or TOE.

Hence, the following are inconsistent with the evaluated configuration:

- Configurations without a fax board.
 - Models containing a fax board as a standard feature (Characterized by the letter F at the end of the model name, such as iR-ADV 4045F (Translation note: Japanese market only))
- (2) This evaluation was performed with use of the fax inbox feature disabled. If the use of fax inbox is enabled, then that is no longer the evaluated configuration.
 - (3) In terms of the security functional requirements specified in the PP, this evaluation acknowledges that the requirements for identification and authentication do not apply to incoming print jobs from PC. Consumers expecting identification and authentication to be enforced for incoming print jobs are therefore advised to take note that the TOE specifications may not be consistent with their needs.

9. Annexes

There is no annex.

10. Security Target

Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided within a separate document of this Certification Report.

Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model Security Target
Version 0.11 (August 5, 2011) Canon Inc.

11. Glossary

The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.

CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP	Protection Profile
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.

MFP	Multifunction Product
HCD	Hardcopy Device

The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.

Box	Refers to the mail box/inbox where document data created by scan, print, and fax jobs, are stored in the TOE.
Box functionality (Mail box/inbox)	Allows scanned document data or document data specified from a PC to be stored in a mail box, or documents received by I-fax to be stored in an inbox. Allows for operations such as print, send and delete of document data stored in a mail box or inbox.
Box PIN	PIN used for access to mail boxes and inboxes where document data are stored.
Copy function	Produces duplicates of the hardcopy document by scanning and printing.
Fax Inboxes	If a file received through fax/I-fax matches the specified forwarding conditions, it is stored in the Fax Inbox. You can print the stored file whenever necessary using the desired settings.
Hardcopy Device (HCD)	A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of an electronic document or image. These systems include printers, scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs (multifunction peripherals), MFDs (multifunction devices), "all-in-ones," and other similar products.
I-Fax	Short for Internet Fax. Uses the Internet to receive and send faxes.
Input function	A function to input hardcopy documents into the TOE.
Output function	Allows the TOE to output hardcopy documents.

Print function	Produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form stored in the TOE.
Print Settings	Contains various print setting options for selecting color/monochrome, paper type, and duplex printing, etc.
Receive function	Allows I-fax documents received in electronic form to be printed in hardcopy form, or transmitted in electronic form.
Scan function	Allows the conversion of data from its hardcopy form to its electronic form, to create document data.
Secured Print	PIN-based printing function of the TOE.
Send (Universal Send) function	Allows scanned document data or document data stored in a mail box/inbox to be received for transmission to an email address, shared folder on a PC, or I-fax transmission.
TOE Owner	A person or organisational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing related security policies.
TSF Confidential Data	Assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE.
TSF Protected Data	Assets for which alteration by a User who is not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
U. ADMINISTRATOR	A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
UI function	Allows the user to operate the TOE from the control panel, and the TOE to display information on the control panel.
U.NORMAL	A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE.
User Document Data	The asset that consists of the information contained in a user's document.
User Function Data	The asset that consists of the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE.

12. Bibliography

- [1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme, February 2011, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
- [2] IT Security Certification Procedure, February 2011, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
- [3] Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure, February 2011, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
- [4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-001
- [5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part2: Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-002
- [6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-003
- [7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-001, (Japanese Version 1.0, December 2009)
- [8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-002, (Japanese Version 1.0, December 2009)
- [9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-003, (Japanese Version 1.0, December 2009)
- [10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-004
- [11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-004, (Japanese Version 1.0, December 2009)
- [12] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model Security Target Version 0.11 (August 5, 2011) Canon Inc.
- [13] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE 4000 Series 2600.1 model Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, November 15, 2011, Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc. Information Security Evaluation Office
- [14] IEEE Std 2600.1-2009, IEEE Standard for a Protection Profile in Operational Environment A, Version 1.0, June 2009