



Remote Communication Gate A Security Target

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1 ST Introduction

This chapter describes the ST Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, TOE Description and Glossary.

1.1 ST Reference

The ST identification information shows as follows:

ST Title: Remote Communication Gate A Security Target
ST Version: 2.02
Date: 2011-02-07
Authors: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

1.2 TOE Reference

Remote Communication Gate A, which is the TOE, is identified by the first four characters of the six-character Machine Code plus the firmware version. The firmware version combines versions of each firmware module: Application (A), Firmware Common Parts (C), Platform (P), and OS (K).

Manufacturer: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

Product Name: Remote Communication Gate A

(Note) The above-mentioned product is hereinafter referred to as "RC Gate".

Machine Code (First four characters): D459

Firmware Version: A2.06-C2.04-P2.01-K2.02

1.3 TOE Overview

This section describes the TOE Type, TOE Usage, Major Security Functions of TOE, and Operational Environment for the TOE.

1.3.1 TOE Type

The TOE is an IT device to be used for a service that remotely diagnoses and maintains digital MFPs and printers (hereinafter referred to as "devices") on a local area network (LAN). This remote diagnosis maintenance service, referred to as "@Remote" or "@Remote Service", provides the necessary maintenance functions for each device. The TOE sends information received from the targeted devices that use service to the maintenance centre, and the maintenance centre diagnoses the status of the devices based on the information.

1.3.2 TOE Usage

To provide @Remote Service, the TOE intermediates the communication between the devices to receive the remote diagnosis maintenance service and the maintenance centre. To use this service, users are required to connect the TOE to the office LAN where the device to receive the remote diagnosis maintenance service is installed.

Users can operate the TOE by using a Web browser from a computer that is connected to the LAN.

1.3.3 Major Security Functions of TOE

The major security functions of the TOE are the Communication Data Protection Function, the User Access Restriction Function, the RC Gate Firmware Verification Function, and the Audit Logging Function. The Communication Data Protection Function is a function to protect the communication path between the TOE and the maintenance centre, computers, and devices that communicate using SSL.

The User Access Restriction Function is a function to identify and authenticate users who attempt to use the TOE from computers, and to provide only pre-authorised operations for authorised users who are successfully identified and authenticated.

The RC Gate Firmware Verification Function is a function to confirm that the firmware of the TOE is manufacturer-genuine and to provide confirmation results for users.

The Audit Logging Function is a function to record logs, and to provide the specified users with the logs.

1.3.4 Operational Environment for the TOE

The connection image of the TOE is shown in Figure 1 and the TOE and non-TOE configuration items are described.




Figure 1: Connection figure of the TOE

1. CS (Communication Server)

A server located in the maintenance centre. The TOE requests to start communications and sends or receives the information for the maintenance service between the TOE and the CS.

2. Firewalls

A security system to protect the office LAN environment from external networks.

3. Devices

In this Security Target (ST), the "device" means either a digital MFP or a printer, both of which are connected to the office LAN environment and can communicate with the TOE. It is categorised according to its communication method with the TOE as either an HTTPS-compatible device or an SNMP-compatible device. The HTTPS-compatible device is a device that can communicate with the TOE using the Communication Data Protection Function of the RC Gate, and the SNMP-compatible device is a device that is not an HTTPS-compatible device and that can communicate with the TOE by means of Management Information Base (MIB). The targeted devices of the remote diagnosis maintenance service are the HTTPS-compatible devices and SNMP-compatible devices that are registered in the TOE. They are called the registered HTTPS-compatible devices and the registered SNMP-compatible devices, respectively. A registered device sends information related to the maintenance service to the TOE.

4. Computer

A computer is connected to the office LAN environment. Users can remotely operate the TOE from a

computer's Web browser. The Web browser should be Internet Explorer (from Ver. 6.0 to Ver. 8.0) with the Flash Player plugin (from Ver. 9.0 to Ver. 10.0).

5. RC Gate

RC Gate is the TOE that is connected to the office LAN environment. The optional memory (Remote Communication Gate Memory 1000) and optional storage (Remote Communication Gate Storage 1000), both of which are non-TOE configuration items, can be also installed in the TOE. When these options are installed in the TOE, this case is also included as the operational environment of the TOE.

1.4 TOE Description

This section describes Physical Scope of the TOE, Guidance Documents, Definitions of the Related Roles, Logical Scope of the TOE, and Protected Assets.

1.4.1 Physical Scope of the TOE

The physical scope of the TOE consists of the hardware/firmware shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Hardware configuration of the TOE

CPU

A semiconductor chip that performs basic computational processing for the TOE operations.

FROM

A non-volatile semiconductor memory medium that stores boot loader data, etc. No data will be lost even if the power is turned off. FROM is also called flash memory.

DDR-RAM

A volatile semiconductor memory that programs and data are loaded into at the TOE start-up.

SD Card

A non-volatile semiconductor memory in which the RC Gate Firmware and initial information are recorded at the factory. When operational, it is used as the storage memory.

Realtime Clock

A clock that keeps current time and is equipped with a battery to work during power-off.

LAN Connector for Connecting to an Internal Network

A LAN Connector used for communicating with computers, the CS, and devices.

LAN Connector for Connecting Computers

A LAN Connector to connect a computer for initial setting of IP addresses and for maintenance in the event of the TOE failure.

LCD

A display device that shows the IP address, status, and error messages of the TOE.

LED Green

A lamp that shows the power is ON/OFF, and is lit when the power is on.

LED Red

A lamp that shows the status of the RC Gate, which can be indicated by either of the following: the LED Red is lit or unlit, the LED Red flashes on and off at normal speed or rapidly.

AC Adapter

A power device to supply electric power.

RC Gate Firmware

A built-in system in the TOE that consists of modules for Application, Software Common Parts, Platform, and OS.

1.4.2 Guidance Documents

The guidance documents consisting of this TOE are as follows:

Guidance documents for Japan

- Remote Communication Gate A Safety Information (written in Japanese)
- Remote Communication Gate A Setup Guide (written in Japanese)
- Remote Communication Gate A Operating Instructions (written in Japanese)

Guidance documents for overseas countries

- Remote Communication Gate A Safety Information
- Remote Communication Gate A Setup Guide
- Remote Communication Gate A Operating Instructions

1.4.3 Definitions of the Related Roles

The related roles to RC Gate are defined as follows:

User

User means, collectively, the administrator and the general user of the RC Gate as described below. When this ST simply refers to "user", it refers to the administrator and the general user of the RC Gate.

Administrator

Administrator means an administrator of users who manage the RC Gate. The administrator can change the settings, view the status of the RC Gate, and audit from the computer. When this ST simply refers to "administrator", it indicates administrator of this RC Gate.

General user

General user is the authorised user whose TOE user account is given by administrator. The general user can view the device status from the computer.

Network administrator

Network administrator is an IT manager for users' LAN where the TOE is installed.

Device administrator

Device administrator is a person who manages the maintenance of the device that is connected to the users' LAN where the TOE is installed.

Organisational responsible manager

Organisational responsible manager is the responsible manager of users who belong to the organisation where the TOE is installed and operated. The organisational responsible manager has the authority to appoint each administrator.

CE

Customer engineer (CE) is a person who is educated to handle the TOE and performs the maintenance of the TOE. For maintenance, the CE can operate the TOE via the interface for the CE from a computer's Web browser. After the installation/setup of the TOE, the interface for the CE is disabled by the administrator.

Network user

Network user means the generic name of users who access the users' LAN environment where the TOE is installed. It also includes users who have no TOE user accounts.

1.4.4 Logical Scope of the TOE

An operational diagram of the TOE and the logical scope in the operational diagram are shown in Figure 3. The Basic Functions (non-Security Functions) that the TOE provides and the Security Functions of the TOE are described.




Figure 3: Logical scope of the TOE

1.4.4.1 Basic Functions

Service Call Function

A function that allows the TOE to report to the CS the device failure information received from the registered device. Based on the report, the maintenance centre analyses and handles the cause of the failure.

Machine Counter Notice Function

A function that allows the TOE to periodically notify the CS about the machine counter information (number of print pages counted for each device) received from the registered device. The counter values are used for billing information.

Counter per User Retrieval Function

A function that regularly notifies the CS of counter information on a per-user basis (the number of print pages counted for each user) that the TOE retrieves from the registered devices.

For this ST, the evaluation is performed with this function disabled.

Supply Call Function

A function that allows the TOE to notify the CS about the supply information (remaining toner and paper) received from the registered device. Based on the report, the maintenance centre supplies toner and paper.

Device Firmware Update Function

A function that allows the TOE to update the firmware of the registered HTTPS-compatible device with the device firmware received from the CS.

RC Gate Firmware Update Function

A function that allows the TOE to update the RC Gate's firmware with the RC Gate Firmware received from the CS.

Web Function

A function that allows users to remotely operate the TOE.

Users access the TOE via a computer's Web browser.

1.4.4.2 Security Functions**Communication Data Protection Function between the RC Gate and Devices**

A function to detect communication data tampering. This function can be mutually used by the TOE and the registered HTTPS-compatible devices for communication between them if the Service Call Function, the Machine Counter Notice Function, and the Supply Call Function are enabled.

This function does not cover the communication of Counter per User Retrieval Function.

Communication Data Protection Function between the RC Gate and CS

A function that allows the TOE to specify only the CS as a communication destination via the Internet, and furthermore, communication data between the TOE and the CS is secured. Also, this function detects data tampering.

Communication Data Protection Function between the RC Gate and Computers

A function that enables communication data between the TOE and computers to be secured if the Web Function is enabled.

User Identification and Authentication Function

A function that allows the TOE to provide only the authorised users for the TOE (administrator, general user) with the Web Function. The TOE requires entering the information (hereinafter referred to as "account information") to identify and authenticate users who attempt to use the Web Function. When users enter the account information, only successfully identified and authenticated users can operate the TOE.

Access Control Function of Information Received from Devices

A function that allows the TOE to restrict access to the information received from devices to only authorised users. The TOE allows successfully identified and authenticated users to access the information received from devices according to the users' roles.

RC Gate Firmware Verification Function

A function that allows the TOE to confirm that Application, Software Common Parts, Platform, and OS are officially provided by the manufacturers at the request of the user.

Security Management Function

A Web-based TOE Function that allows the administrator to exercise management authorities for the TOE.

Audit Logging Function

A function that generates the audit log entries, prevents the generated audit logs from being tampered and lost, and restricts the reading operation of audit logs.

The TOE records the required information for the security audit in the TOE as an audit log when the events required for the security audit occur. It is not allowed to change or delete the audit logs in the TOE, and only the administrator can view the audit logs.

1.4.5 Protected Assets

This subsection explains machine counter information, failure information, supply information, call notice history, device firmware, device firmware update history, RC Gate Firmware, and TSF data that the TOE protects.

Machine Counter Information

Machine counter information means the number of print pages counted for each device.

The machine counter information is sent to the TOE from each device, temporarily stored in the machine counter information area of the TOE, and periodically sent to the CS. Immediately after the TOE sends it to the CS, the machine counter information is overwritten in the machine counter information area. While the TOE stores the machine counter information, the administrator and the general user are allowed to view the information and perform no other operations related to the machine counter information. If the machine counter information sent from the device to the CS is tampered with, no appropriate @Remote services will be provided for the registered device.

Failure Information, Supply Information, and Call Notice History

Failure and supply information is sent from each device to the TOE, from the TOE to the CS as needed. If the failure information and supply information sent from the device to the CS is tampered with, no appropriate @Remote services will be provided for the registered device.

If the TOE receives the failure information or supply information, the TOE records service calls and supply calls (hereinafter referred to as "call notice history") in the call notice history area. The administrator and the general user are allowed only to view the call notice history; they cannot perform any other operations related to the call notice history.

Device Firmware and Device Firmware Update History

Device firmware and device firmware update history is part of the Device Firmware Update Functions, and device firmware will be sent from the CS to each device. Device firmware is installed in a device via the TOE from the CS. Integrity of the device firmware sent from the CS to the TOE must be assured.

The TOE records the history (hereinafter referred to as "device firmware update history") in the device firmware update history area for the execution of updating the device firmware. Only the administrator is allowed to view the device firmware update history; the administrator cannot perform other operations related to the device firmware update history.

RC Gate Firmware

RC Gate Firmware is installed in the TOE at the manufacturing facilities of the TOE and delivered to the user's site. It is authorised by the TOE administrator and sometimes can be updated with the RC Firmware Update Function. The RC Gate Firmware must be a genuine product of the manufacturer.

TSF Data

TSF data is recorded in the TOE. The authorised users for the TOE can newly create, alter, and delete the TSF data. Operations on TSF data are restricted by roles of the authorised users.

1.5 Glossary

For clear understanding of this ST, the meanings of the specific terms are defined in Table 1.

Table 1: Terms related to the TOE

Term	Definition
@Remote	A commercial name of this remote service
Information Received from Devices	A generic name of machine counter information, failure information, and supply information that the TOE receives from the registered device
Boot Loader	Loads the operating system immediately after turning on the power of the TOE.
MIB	An abbreviation of Management Information Base, a type of information of SNMP-controlled network devices. This information

Term	Definition
	is used for disclosure of the current status of the devices.

2 Conformance Claims

This chapter describes Conformance Claims.

2.1 CC Conformance Claims

CC conformance claims in this ST and TOE are described as follows:

- CC versions to which this ST claims conformance

Part 1:

Introduction and general model July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Japanese translation Ver.1.0)
CCMB-2009-07-001

Part 2:

Security functional components July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Japanese translation Ver.1.0)
CCMB-2009-07-002

Part 3:

Security assurance components July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Japanese translation Ver.1.0)
CCMB-2009-07-003

- Functional requirements: Part 2 conformant
- Assurance requirements: Part 3 conformant

2.2 PP Claims

This ST and TOE do not conform to any PPs.

2.3 Package Claims

The package that this ST and TOE conform to is Evaluation Assurance Level EAL3.

3 Security Problem Definition

This chapter defines Threats, Organisational Security Policies, and Assumptions.

3.1 Threats

Identified and defined below are the assumed threats for the TOE and the working environments where the TOE is installed.

T. FAKE_CS Spoofing on the Internet

Attackers may launch a pseudo CS on the Internet, install device firmware in the registered device, or send malicious programs such as a virus into the LAN.

T. INTERNET Tampering of Communication Information on the Internet

Attackers may disclose or tamper communication data sent over the Internet when the TOE communicates with the CS.

T. ACCESS Unauthorised Access

Unauthorised persons may perform a TOE operation that is authorised only for the general user or administrator. The general user may accidentally use the Security Management Function that is authorised only for the administrator.

3.2 Organisational Security Policies

This section describes the organisational security policies.

P.ATR_DEVICE Communication with HTTPS-Compatible Devices

When the TOE communicates with the registered HTTPS-compatible devices for the Machine Counter Notice Function, the Service Call Function, and the Supply Call Function, measures shall be provided at communication start-up to confirm that the HTTPS-compatible devices are valid, and the communication information between the TOE and the registered HTTPS-compatible devices shall be protected.

P.SOFTWARE Confirmation of the RC Gate Firmware Integrity

Procedures shall be provided to confirm that the RC Gate Firmware built into the TOE is a genuine RC Gate Firmware (that is, a manufacturer-genuine RC Gate Firmware).

P.AUDIT_LOGGING Management of Audit Log Records

The audit logs shall be recorded in the TOE when the required events occur in order to detect whether or not a security intrusion has occurred. Also, viewing the logs shall be only allowed to the authorised person. Modifying and deleting the logs by the unauthorised person shall be prevented.

P.PC_WEB Communication with Computers

For the Web Function, tampering of the information between computers and the TOE shall be detected and disclosure of passwords shall be prevented.

3.3 Assumptions

This section describes the assumptions of the TOE operations.

A.ADMINSHIP Conditions of Administrator

TOE administrator, network administrator, and device administrator shall not use their privileges maliciously.

A.TOE_ADMIN Administration of the TOE

The administrator shall have the necessary knowledge and perform the administrative roles for the secure management and operation of the TOE in the administrator's work. The administrator shall also provide physical protection for the TOE.

A.NETWORK Network Management

The network administrator shall maintain the LAN and instruct network users not to change the communication information between the TOE and registered devices that are not the HTTPS-compatible devices. The network administrator shall also provide protection for the LAN environment from external attackers via the Internet.

A.DEVICE Device Management

The device administrator shall maintain the device connected to the LAN. The genuine and unmodified device shall be acquired and used.

A.CE TOE Maintenance

Only a qualified CE shall be able to maintain the TOE.

4 Security Objectives

This chapter describes Security Objectives for the TOE, Security Objectives for Operational Environment, and Security Objectives Rationale.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE.

O.I&A Identification and Authentication

For remote operation of the TOE by users (general user and administrator) from a computer's Web browser, the TOE ensures that users are identified and authenticated prior to the remote operation and it ensures that the users are authorised to perform the remote operation of the TOE.

O.ACCESS Access Restriction

The TOE ensures that the protected assets can be accessed by users only according to their roles (general user, administrator).

O.COM_CS Protection of Communication Channels with CS

The TOE ensures that communication data on the communication path is secured when communicating with a genuine CS. It also ensures detection of data tampering.

O.COM_ATR_DEVICE Protection of Communication Channels with Devices

For the Machine Counter Notice Function, the Service Call Function, and the Supply Call Function, the TOE ensures that it communicates with the registered HTTPS-compatible device and secures the communication data on the communication path. It also ensures detection of data tampering.

O.COM_OPERATOR Data Protection of Remote Operation by User

For remote operation of the TOE by a user from a computer's Web browser, the TOE ensures that communication data on the communication path is secured. It also ensures detection of data tampering.

O. GENUINE Confirmation of the RC Gate Firmware Integrity

The TOE ensures that users can check the RC Gate Firmware built into the TOE is the genuine RC Gate Firmware.

O.AUDIT_LOGGED Management of Audit Log Records

The TOE ensures that the audit logs are recorded when the required events (start-up and shutdown of Audit Logging Function, reading of audit logs, execution of User Identification and Authentication Function, operation of account information, date update, communication failure with the CS, and execution of self check) occur in order to detect whether or not a security intrusion has occurred, and that the audit logs are provided only to the administrator for the detection of security intrusion. It also ensures that the audit logs are not modified or deleted.

4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment

This section describes security objectives for the operational environment.

OE.SUPER Appointment of Administrator Related to the TOE

Prior to the delivery of the TOE, the organisational responsible manager shall appoint the TOE administrator, the network administrator, and the device administrator. These candidates must be reliable persons in the organisation.

OE.ADMIN TOE Management

The administrator shall understand the TOE guidance, physically protect the TOE, and perform TOE management according to the description of the guidance.

OE.NETWORK Network Management

The network administrator shall instruct network users not to change the communication information between the TOE and registered devices that are not the HTTPS-compatible devices.

The network administrator shall install security systems such as firewalls between the external network and the LAN to protect the LAN environment from external attackers via the Internet.

OE.DEVICE Device Management

The device administrator shall acquire a device from a qualified channel and install it, and manage it, so it cannot be modified.

OE.CE CE Confirmation

For the maintenance of the TOE, the administrator shall allow only the qualified CE to maintain it.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes the corresponding relationship between security objectives and security problems, which constitute security objectives rationale.

4.3.1 Corresponding Relationship between Security Objectives and Security Problems

Table 2 shows the corresponding relationship for security objectives and security problem definition that includes threats, organisational security policies, and assumptions.

As shown in Table 2, one of the security objectives satisfies the assumption, counters the threat, and fulfils the organisational security policy. Each of the security objectives corresponds to at least one of the assumptions, threats, or organisational security policies.

Table 2: Corresponding relationship between security objectives and security problems

	O.I&A	O.ACCESS	O.COM_CS	O.COM_ATR_DEVICE	O.COM_OPERATOR	O.GENUINE	O.AUDIT_LOGGED	OE.SUPER	OE.ADMIN	OE.NETWORK	OE.DEVICE	OE.CE
T.FAKE_CS			X									
T.INTERNET			X									
T.ACCESS	X	X										
P.ATR_DEVICE				X								
P.SOFTWARE						X						
P.AUDIT_LOGGING							X					
P.PC_WEB					X							
A.ADMINSHIP								X				
A.TOE_ADMIN									X			
A.NETWORK										X		
A.DEVICE											X	
A.CE												X

T.FAKE_CS is countered by O.COM_CS because the TOE ensures communication with the CS only if the CS is genuine.

T.INTERNET is countered by O.COM_CS because O.COM_CS enables communication data on the communication path including the Internet between the TOE and the CS to be secured, and it detects data tampering.

T.ACCESS is countered by O.I&A and O.ACCESS. Confronted with threats posed by anyone other than the TOE users who access the TOE and other threats posed by the general user who mistakenly performs the TOE operations that are authorised only for the administrator, O.I&A identifies and authenticates users prior to the TOE operation from a computer's Web browser, which is the only way to access TOE management information and to operate the Management Functions. O.I&A allows users to operate the TOE only if such users are successfully authenticated within the preset number of authentication attempts, and O.ACCESS allows the users to manage the TOE management information, according to the user roles.

P.ATR_DEVICE is enforced by O.COM_ATR_DEVICE because O.COM_ATR_DEVICE allows only the pre-registered device to communicate with the TOE in the Counter Information Notice Function, the Service Call Function, and the Supply Call Function. O.COM_ATR_DEVICE also ensures that the protected assets are secured on the communication path between the TOE and the device, and detects data tampering.

P.SOFTWARE is enforced by O.GENUINE because users can check that the RC Gate Firmware is the genuine RC Gate Firmware.

P.AUDIT_LOGGING is enforced by O.AUDIT_LOGGED because the audit logs are recorded when the required events (start-up and shutdown of Audit Logging Function, reading of audit logs, execution of User Identification and Authentication Function, operation of account information, date update, communication failure with the CS, and execution of self check) occur in order to detect whether or not a security intrusion has occurred. It is only allowed for the administrator to view the recorded audit logs and not allowed for the users to modify and delete it.

P.PC_WEB is enforced by O.COM_OPERATOR because O.COM_OPERATOR detects the tampering of TSF data on the LAN and enables passwords to be secured when the Web Function is used.

A.ADMINSHIP is upheld by OE.SUPER because according to OE.SUPER, the organisational responsible manager appoints the TOE administrator, the network administrator, and the device administrator from reliable persons in the organisation prior to the delivery of the TOE. For this reason, the appointed person does not use the privileges maliciously.

A.TOE_ADMIN is upheld by OE.ADMIN because according to OE.ADMIN, the administrator understands and performs the operational procedures for the management in accordance with the guidance.

A.NETWORK is upheld by OE.NETWORK because OE.NETWORK requires the network administrator to instruct network users not to change the communication information between the TOE and registered

devices that are not the HTTPS-compatible devices, and to install security systems such as firewalls, and to allow only appropriate communication from the Internet to the LAN, so the LAN can be protected from the Internet.

A.DEVICE is upheld by OE.DEVICE because OE.DEVICE requires the device administrator to acquire the device from a qualified channel, so only a genuine device communicates with the TOE, and manage the device, so it cannot be modified.

A.CE is upheld by OE.CE because the administrator allows a qualified CE only to maintain the TOE for the maintenance.

5 Extended Components Definition

This ST and TOE do not define any extended security requirements, i.e. any new security functional requirements and security assurance requirements that are not described in the CC conforming claims in "2.1 CC Conformance Claims".

6 Security Requirements

This chapter describes Security Functional Requirements, Security Assurance Requirements, and Security Requirements Rationale.

6.1 Security Functional Requirements

This section defines the security functional requirements of the TOE. The security functional requirements are cited from the requirements specified in the CC Part 2.

[Bold typeface and Brackets] is used for identifying the operations of assignments and selections defined in CC Part 2. (Refinement:) is used for identification of refinement. Also, brackets and alphabet suffixes such as "(a)" and "(b)" are used for identification of "iterations".

6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

- FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
 - b) All auditable events for the **[selection: not specified]** level of audit; and
 - c) **[assignment: auditable events shown in Table 3]**.

Table 3 shows the actions that are below the basic level and recommended by the CC as auditable for each functional requirement (CC rules) and the corresponding auditable events of the TOE.

Table 3: List of auditable events

Functional requirements	Actions which should be auditable	Auditable events of TOE
FAU_GEN.1	None	-
FAU_GEN.2	None	-
FAU_SAR.1	a) Basic: Reading of information from the audit records.	a) Basic Reading of audit logs.
FAU_SAR.2	a) Basic: Unsuccessful attempts to read information from the audit records.	Auditable events not recorded.
FAU_STG.1	None	-
FAU_STG.4	a) Basic: Actions taken due to the audit storage failure.	Auditable events not recorded.
FDP_ACC.1	None	-

Functional requirements	Actions which should be auditable	Auditable events of TOE
FDP_ACF.1	a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP. c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in making an access check.	Auditable events not recorded.
FIA_AFL.1	a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).	<Individually-defined auditable events> Lockout start
FIA_ATD.1	None	-
FIA_SOS.1	a) Minimal: Rejection by the TSF of any tested secret; b) Basic: Rejection or acceptance by the TSF of any tested secret; c) Detailed: Identification of any changes to the defined quality metrics.	b) Basic Changing administrator's password (Outcome: Success/Failure) Changing general user's password (Outcome: Success/Failure) Adding general user's user name (Outcome: Success/Failure)
FIA_UAU.2	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism; b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism.	b) Basic Login (Outcome: Success/Failure)
FIA_UAU.6	a) Minimal: Failure of reauthentication; b) Basic: All reauthentication attempts.	Auditable events not recorded.
FIA_UID.2	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided; b) Basic: All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.	b) Basic Login (Outcome: Success/Failure)
FIA_USB.1	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. creation of a subject).	b) Basic Login (Outcome: Success/Failure)

Functional requirements	Actions which should be auditable	Auditable events of TOE
	b) Basic: Success and failure of binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. success or failure to create a subject).	
FMT_MTD.1	a) Basic: All modifications to the values of TSF data.	<Individually-defined auditable events> Changing administrator's password Newly creating general user's user name Newly creating general user's password Deleting general user's user name Deleting general user's password Changing general user's password Time and date of system clock
FMT_SMF.1	a) Minimal: Use of the management functions.	a) Minimal Successful login of administrator
FMT_SMR.1	a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users that are part of a role; b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.	a) Minimal Changing passwords of administrator Newly creating general user's user name Newly creating general user's password Deleting general user's user name Deleting general user's password Changing general user's password
FPT_STM.1	a) Minimal: changes to the time; b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.	a) Minimal: Changing time and date
FPT_TST.1	a) Basic: Execution of the TSF self tests and the results of the tests.	a) Basic: Execution of the self tests
FTA_SSL.3	a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism.	Auditable events not recorded.
FTP_ITC.1(a)	a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channel functions. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted channel functions. d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and target of all trusted channel functions.	a) Minimal: Communication failure between the RC Gate and CS
FTP_ITC.1(b)	a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the	Auditable events not recorded.

Functional requirements	Actions which should be auditable	Auditable events of TOE
	initiator and target of failed trusted channel functions. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted channel functions. d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and target of all trusted channel functions.	
FTP_TRP.1	a) Minimal: Failures of the trusted path functions. b) Minimal: Identification of the user associated with all trusted path failures, if available. c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted path functions. d) Basic: Identification of the user associated with all trusted path invocations, if available.	Auditable events not recorded.

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, **[assignment: no other audit relevant information]**.

FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide **[assignment: administrator]** with the capability to read **[assignment: audit data generated with FAU_GEN.1]** from the audit records.

FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to **[selection: prevent]** unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall **[selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records]** and **[assignment: no other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]** if the audit trail is full.

6.1.2 Class FDP: User data protection

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: access control policy of TOE management information]** on **[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects shown in Table 4]**.

Table 4: Subjects, objects, and operations

Subject	Object	Operations among subjects and objects
User process	Machine counter information area	Viewing

(The user type is administrator)	Call notice history area	Viewing
	Device firmware update history area	Viewing
User process (The user type is general user)	Machine counter information area	Viewing
	Call notice history area	Viewing

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control policy of TOE management information] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects shown in Table 5, and for each, security attributes].

Table 5: Subjects, objects, and security attributes

Category	Subject or Object	Security Attributes
Subject	User process	User type
Object	Machine counter information area	List of user types
Object	Call notice history area	List of user types
Object	Device firmware update history area	List of user types

FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules governing access on operations on objects shown in Table 6].

Table 6: Rules governing access

Operations on Object	Rules governing access
Viewing of machine counter information area	If one of the user types listed in the list of user types (administrator, general user) that is associated with the machine counter information area is identical to the user type associated with the user process, the user is allowed to view the machine counter information area.
Viewing of call notice history area	If one of the user types listed in the list of user types (administrator, general user) that is associated with the call notice history area is identical to the user type associated with the user process, the user is allowed to view the call notice history area.

Viewing of device firmware update history area	If one of the user types (administrator) listed in the list of user types that is associated with the device firmware update history area is identical to the user type associated with the user process, the user is allowed to view the device firmware update history area.
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FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: no rules, based on security attributes that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]**.

FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: no rules, based on security attributes that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]**.

6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when **[selection: [assignment: 3 (positive integer number)]]** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **[assignment: identification and authentication within 5 minutes from a computer's Web browser]**.

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **[selection: met]**, the TSF shall **[assignment: deny for 1 minute to identify and authenticate from computers by user name for administration or user name of general user which have been unsuccessful]**.

FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: **[assignment: user type, user name of general user]**.

FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet **[assignment: password composed of 8 to 13 ASCII characters from the following set, enclosed in parentheses (SP(space)!'#\$%&'()*,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~)]**.

FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions **[assignment: before the administrator is allowed to change the administrator's password]**.

FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: **[assignment: user type, user name of general user]**.

FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: **[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes listed in Table 7]**.

Table 7: Rules for the initial association of attributes

User	Subject on behalf of users	Rules for the initial association of security attributes
Administrator	User process	Set administrator to the user type. Clear user name.
General user	User process	Set general user to the user type. Set user name of general user to the user name.

FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: **[assignment: no rules for the changing of attributes]**.

6.1.4 Class FMT: Security management

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: **modify, delete** [assignment: **newly create**]] the [assignment: **TSF data in Table 8**] to [assignment: **user type in Table 8**].

Table 8: List of TSF information management

TSF Data	Operation	User Type
Administrator's password	Modify	Administrator
General user's user name	Newly create, delete	Administrator
General user's password	Newly create, modify, delete	Administrator
Date and time	Modify	Administrator
CE Access Permission Settings	Modify	Administrator
Device Firmware Update Permission Settings	Modify	Administrator
RC Gate Firmware Update Permission Settings	Modify	Administrator

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: **management functions listed in Table 9**].

Table 9: List of specification of management functions

Management Function
Modify administrator's password by administrator
Newly create and delete the general user's user name by administrator
Newly create, modify, and delete the general user's password by administrator
Modify date and time by administrator
Modify CE Access Permission Settings by administrator
Modify Device Firmware Update Permission Settings by administrator
Modify RC Gate Firmware Update Permission Settings by administrator

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles of **[assignment: administrator]**.

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF**FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **[selection: at the request of the authorised user]** to demonstrate the correct operation of **[selection: [assignment: Communication Data Protection Function between the TOE and CS]]**.

FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **[selection: TSF data]**.

FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **[selection: TSF]**.

6.1.6 Class FTA: TOE access**FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after **[assignment: the fixed auto logout time (5 minutes) from the last operation of the administrator and the general user after login from a Web browser]**.

6.1.7 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

FTP_ITC.1 (a) Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTP_ITC.1.1(a) The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product (**refinement: CS**) that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2(a) The TSF shall permit [**selection: the TSF**] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3(a) The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**assignment: list of functions described in Table 10**].

Table 10: Functions requiring trusted channels for communication between the RC Gate and CS

(a)

Function
Machine Counter Notice Function
Service Call Function
Supply Call Function
Device Firmware Update Function
RC Gate Firmware Update Function

FTP_ITC.1 (b) Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTP_ITC.1.1 (b) The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product (**refinement: the registered HTTPS-compatible device**) that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2 (b) The TSF shall permit [**selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product**] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 (b) The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**assignment: list of functions described in Table 11**].

Table 11: Functions requiring trusted channels for communication between the RC Gate and the registered HTTPS-compatible device (b)

Function
Machine Counter Notice Function
Service Call Function
Supply Call Function

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure].

FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: [assignment: remote operation of the TOE by a user using a computer's Web browser]].

6.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Evaluation Assurance Level of this TOE is EAL3. Table 12 lists the TOE assurance components. This list demonstrates a set of components defined by EAL3 of the Evaluation Assurance Level. No additional requirements were added to this list.

Table 12: TOE security assurance requirements (EAL3)

Assurance Class	Assurance Component
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
	ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
	ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures

Assurance Class	Assurance Component	
	ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2	Independent testing-sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis

6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

This section shows that the security functional requirements in "6.1 Security Functional Requirements" are valid because tracing, justification of traceability, and dependency are satisfied.

6.3.1 Tracing

Table 13 demonstrates the corresponding relationship between security objectives and functional requirements for the TOE respectively. The TOE security functional requirements trace back to one or more security objectives of the TOE (tracing). The "X" marks in the table indicate the corresponding relation.

Table 13: Relationship between security objectives and functional requirements

	O.I&A	O.ACCESS	O.COM_CS	O.COM_ATR_DEVICE	O.COM_OPERATOR	O.GENUINE	O.AUDIT_LOGGED
FAU_GEN.1							X

FAU_GEN.2							X
FAU_SAR.1							X
FAU_SAR.2							X
FAU_STG.1							X
FAU_STG.4							X
FDP_ACC.1		X					
FDP_ACF.1		X					
FIA_AFL.1	X						
FIA_ATD.1	X						
FIA_SOS.1	X						
FIA_UAU.2	X						
FIA_UAU.6	X						
FIA_UID.2	X						
FIA_USB.1	X						
FMT_MTD.1		X					
FMT_SMF.1		X					
FMT_SMR.1		X					
FPT_STM.1							X
FPT_TST.1						X	
FTA_SSL.3	X						
FTP_ITC.1(a)			X				
FTP_ITC.1(b)				X			
FTP_TRP.1					X		

6.3.2 Justification of Traceability

This subsection shows that the security functional requirements of the TOE satisfy the security objectives for the TOE.

O.I&A Identification and Authentication

O.I&A is a security objective that allows only general users or administrator to operate the TOE remotely. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasures must be satisfied:

- (1) A user who remotely operates the TOE shall be successfully identified and authenticated.
According to FIA_UID.2, the person who tries to remotely operate the TOE is identified as a user. According to FIA_UAU.2, it is required that the identified user be successfully authenticated.
- (2) The successfully authenticated user can remotely operate the TOE during the session.
According to FIA_USB.1, the general user and administrator must be associated with the user process, with which the user type and security attributes of the user name are associated. According to

FIA_ATD.1, the general user or the administrator is allowed to remotely operate the TOE by maintaining these security attributes.

- (3) The TOE terminates the session of the TOE remote operation automatically.
According to FTA_SSL.3, if the successfully authenticated user does not operate the computer for a certain period of time, the computer automatically logs off. Because of this functionality, if the successfully authenticated user is not available for operations during the session, unauthorised users are less likely to remotely operate the TOE from the computer.
- (4) The TOE makes it difficult to decode login passwords of general users and administrator.
According to FIA_SOS.1, passwords must be secure by using a number of characters and a combination of character types that are not guessable. According to FIA_AFL.1, no sufficient time to decode passwords shall be given.
- (5) The TOE re-authenticates users before changing the administrator's password.
To prevent users other than the administrator from changing the administrator's password, according to FIA_UAU.6, users shall be re-authenticated before changing administrator's password.

The necessary countermeasures to fulfil O.I&A are (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5). Therefore, O.I&A is fulfilled by accomplishing FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.6, FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1, and FTA_SSL.3 considered as the necessary security functional requirements for these countermeasures.

O.ACCESS Access Restriction

O.ACCESS is a security objective to control the access to protected assets in accordance with user types of users. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasures must be satisfied:

- (1) The TOE specifies and performs the access control for the machine counter information area, the call notice history area and the device firmware update history area.
By FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1, according to the access control policy of the TOE management information, if the user type associated with user process is administrator, the user is allowed to view machine counter information area, the call notice history area, and the device firmware update history area. If the user type is general user, the user is allowed to view the machine counter information area and call notice history area.
- (2) The TOE allows only the administrator to perform the security management.
According to FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_SMF.1, only the administrator is allowed to manage the TSF data.
- (3) The TOE maintains user type.
According to FMT_SMR.1, the identified and authenticated administrator is allowed to maintain its administrator role during the session and perform the Security Management Function.

The necessary countermeasures to fulfil O.ACCESS are (1), (2), and (3). Therefore, O.ACCESS is fulfilled by accomplishing FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1 considered as the necessary security functional requirements for these countermeasures.

O.COM_CS Protection of Communication Channels with CS

O.COM_CS is a security objective to assure communications with the genuine CS, secure communication data when communicating with the CS, and to detect data tampering. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasures must be satisfied:

- (1) The TOE communicates with the genuine CS.
According to FTP_ITC.1 (a), establish the communication channels to provide the function to identify the CS in the communication between the TOE and the CS, and verify the correctness of the CS.
- (2) The TOE protects the communication data with the CS.
According to FTP_ITC.1 (a), establish the reliable communication channels in the communication between the TOE and the CS, and prevent disclosure of protected assets on the communication path and detect the tampering of data.

The necessary countermeasures to fulfil O.COM_CS are (1) and (2). Therefore, O.COM_CS is fulfilled by accomplishing FTP_ITC.1 (a) considered as the necessary security functional requirements for these countermeasures.

O.COM_ATR_DEVICE Protection of Communication Channels with Devices

O.COM_ATR_DEVICE is a security objective to ensure that for the Counter Information Notice Function, the Service Call Function, and the Supply Call Function, the TOE communicates with the registered devices and it secures the communication data between the registered HTTPS-compatible devices and the TOE in the LAN to detect data tampering. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasures must be satisfied:

- (1) The TOE communicates with the genuine and registered HTTPS-compatible device.
According to FTP_ITC.1 (b), establish the communication channels to provide the function to identify HTTPS in the communication between the TOE and the registered HTTPS-compatible device, and verify the correctness of the registered HTTPS-compatible device.
- (2) The TOE protects the communication data with the registered HTTPS-compatible devices.
According to FTP_ITC.1 (b), establish the reliable communication channels in the communication between the TOE and the registered HTTPS-compatible devices, secure the communication data on the communication path, and detect data tampering.

The necessary countermeasures to fulfil O.COM_ATR_DEVICE are (1) and (2). Therefore, O.COM_ATR_DEVICE is fulfilled by accomplishing FTP_ITC.1 (b) considered as the necessary security functional requirements for these countermeasures.

O.COM_OPERATOR Data Protection of Remote Operation by User

O.COM_OPERATOR is a security objective to enable communication data on the communication path in the communication of the TOE remote operation by using a computer's Web browser by users to be secured. It also ensures detection of data tampering. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasure must be satisfied:

- (1) The TOE protects data for the bilateral communication between the TOE and users operating the Web Function.
According to FTP_TRP.1, communicate with a trusted path between the TOE and computers that are

used for the remote operation and secure the communication data on the communication path. It also detects data tampering.

The necessary countermeasure to fulfil O.COM_OPERATOR is (1). Therefore, O.COM_OPERATOR is fulfilled by accomplishing FTP_TRP.1 considered as the necessary security functional requirements for this countermeasure.

O.GENUINE Confirming the Integrity of RC Gate Firmware

O.GENUINE is a security objective to ensure that RC Gate Firmware built in the TOE is the genuine RC Gate Firmware. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasure must be satisfied:

- (1) The TOE checks the integrity of the RC Gate Firmware.

According to FPT_TST.1, verify the integrity of executable codes of the RC Gate Firmware at the request of the authorised user and verify that it is the genuine RC Gate Firmware.

The necessary countermeasure to fulfil O.GENUINE is (1). Therefore, O.GENUINE is fulfilled by accomplishing FPT_TST.1 considered as the necessary security functional requirements for this countermeasure.

O.AUDIT_LOGGED Management of Audit Log Records

O.AUDIT_LOGGED is a security objective to record the audit logs when the required events (start-up and shutdown of Audit Logging Function, reading of audit logs, execution of User Identification and Authentication Function, operation of account information, data update, communication failure with the CS, and execution of self check) occur in order to detect whether or not a security intrusion has occurred. It also allows the administrator with the management permission of the RC Gate to view the audit logs. To fulfil this security objective, the following countermeasure must be satisfied:

- (1) Record audit logs

FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 record the information for security audit including the user identification information that results in the events when the required events (start-up and shutdown of Audit Logging Function, reading of audit logs, execution of User Identification and Authentication Function, operation of account information, date update, communication failure with the CS, and execution of self check) occur.

- (2) Provide Audit Function

FAU_SAR.1 allows only the administrator with management permission of RC Gate to read the audit logs in a format that can be audited, and FAU_SAR.2 prohibits persons other than administrator with management permission of RC Gate from reading audit logs.

- (3) Protect audit logs

FAU_STG.1 protects audit logs from being modified. If auditable events occur and the audit log files are full, FAU_STG.4 writes the newer audit logs over audit logs that have the oldest time stamp.

- (4) Reliable time of event occurrence

FPT_STM.1 provides a trusted time stamp, and records the reliable times when events occurred in the audit logs.

The necessary countermeasures to fulfil O.AUDIT_LOGGED are (1), (2), (3) and (4). Therefore, O.AUDIT_LOGGED is fulfilled by accomplishing FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4,

FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, and FPT_STM.1 considered as the necessary security functional requirements for these countermeasures.

6.3.3 Dependency Analysis

Table 14 demonstrates the corresponding status of dependencies for security functional requirements of the TOE. For security functional requirements of the TOE that do not satisfy any dependencies, the verifiable rationale of the dependencies is specified.

Table 14: Corresponding table of dependencies for the TOE security functional requirements

TOE Security Functional Requirement	Dependency required by the CC	Dependency satisfied in the ST	Dependency not satisfied in the ST
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM.1	N/A
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.2	N/A
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1	N/A
FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_SAR.1	N/A
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1	N/A
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.1	FAU_STG.1	N/A
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1	N/A
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1	FMT_MSA.3
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.2	N/A
FIA_ATD.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
FIA_SOS.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.2	N/A
FIA_UAU.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
FIA_UID.2	N/A	N/A	N/A
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_ATD.1	N/A
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	N/A
FMT_SMF.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.2	N/A
FPT_STM.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
FPT_TST.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
FTA_SSL.3	N/A	N/A	N/A
FTP_ITC.1(a)	N/A	N/A	N/A
FTP_ITC.1(b)	N/A	N/A	N/A

TOE Security Functional Requirement	Dependency required by the CC	Dependency satisfied in the ST	Dependency not satisfied in the ST
FTP_TRP.1	N/A	N/A	N/A

Described below is the rationale for dependencies whose functional requirements are not necessarily satisfied:

The reason for removing the dependencies from FDP_ACF.1 to FMT_MSA.3.

The security attributes of objects (the machine counter information area, the call notice history area, and the device firmware update history area) are fixed, so they are not initialised. The security attributes of subject (user process) are fixed, so they are not initialised. Therefore, FMT_MSA.3 is not required.

6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is a commercial product used in general office environments. It is assumed to attack from the Internet by attackers who have a basic capability, and it is assumed that protected assets are disclosed and modified by misuse of the TOE in the office.

To respond to such attacks, the TOE security assurance requirements include the evaluation of the TOE design, the evaluation of securely using the TOE as described in the guidance, and since the confidentiality of the relevant information are protected to make such attacks more difficult, it also includes that the secure development environment is evaluated. All dependencies of assurance requirements are met because these assurance requirements conform to EAL3. Therefore, EAL3 is appropriate.

7 TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes each security functional requirement for the methods and mechanisms of the TOE that satisfy the security functional requirements described in 6.1.

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

The TOE generates the audit logs when the following auditable events occur, and adds them to the audit log files.

- Start-up of audit function
- Shutdown of audit function
- Login
- Lockout
- Changing administrator's password
- Newly creating general users
- Changing general user's password
- Deleting general users
- Set up of date and time
- SSL cryptographic communication failure with the CS
- Execution of the self tests
- Reading audit logs

* The start-up and shutdown of audit function are substituted with the event of the TOE start-up.

The security audit log consists of the following information:

- Date and time of events
- Type of events
- User type
- User name (for general users)
- Results

FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

The TOE records the following information for each user who results in the auditable event in the audit logs: user type for the administrator, and user name for the applicable general user.

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

The TOE has a function that allows viewing the audit logs from Web browser of computer and provides the administrator with this function.

FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

The TOE does not provide the function that allows viewing the audit logs from Web browser of computers unless the user's user type is the administrator.

FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

The TOE does not provide the function that deletes and changes the audit logs and audit log files.

FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

The TOE writes the newer audit logs over the oldest audit logs if the audit log file is full and has no space to add the audit logs.

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

The TOE enforces the access control policy of the TOE management information. The access control policy of the TOE management information is an access control policy that allows the administrator and the general user to view the machine counter information area and the call notice history area. It also allows the administrator to view the device firmware update history area.

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

The TOE provides the successfully identified and authenticated user with the screen to view the machine counter information area and the call notice history area. If the user type of the successfully identified and authenticated user is administrator, it also provides the user with the screen to view the device firmware update history area. The TOE does not implement any interfaces to modify or delete the machine counter information area, the call notice history area, and the device firmware update history area.

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

The TOE counts the number of the authentication failure attempts within five minutes for each user from a computer's Web browser. A user who fails to login three times will not be authenticated for the next one minute even if the user enters the correct password that satisfies the requirements of the Identification and Authentication Function. If the user is successfully authenticated, the TOE resets to 'ZERO' the number of the failure attempts of the user.

FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

The TOE maintains the user type that the user selects for identification and authentication until session termination. If the user is general user, the TOE associates and maintains the user type with the user name of the general user for identification and authentication.

FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

When the administrator intends to change passwords of the administrator and general user, the TOE checks if a new password satisfies the conditions specified in (1) and (2). If both of these conditions are met, the TOE registers the new password. Otherwise, an error message will appear without registering the login password.

(1) Characters that can be used: the following ASCII characters

SP(space)!"#\$%&'()*,-./0123456789:;<=>?@`{|}~
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[¥]^_
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

(2) Required number of characters: 8-13 characters.

FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

The TOE displays the login screen for the user who attempts to use it from a computer's Web browser. In the login screen, there is the entering area for their user type, user name, and password. The administrator enters their user type and password and the general user enters their user type, user name, and password. The TOE does not display other screens until the user is successfully authenticated.

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

The TOE displays the administrator screen for password change and requires the administrator to enter the current password if the administrator chooses to change it, and the TOE re-authenticates the administrator using the entered password.

FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

The TOE displays the login screen to enter the user type, the user name, and the password if the user attempts to use it from a computer's Web browser. The TOE does not display other screens until the user is successfully authenticated.

FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

The TOE associates the user process with the user who is successfully identified and authenticated. The user process associates the user type and the user name as security attributes.

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

The TOE provides the screen to perform the following operations on TSF data, only if the user type of the successfully identified and authenticated user is administrator:

- Change administrator's password
- Newly create and delete general user's user name
- Newly create, change, and delete general user's password
- Change date and time
- Change the CE Access Permission Settings
- Change the Device Firmware Update Permission Settings
- Change the RC Gate Firmware Update Permission Settings

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

The TOE provides the screen to perform the following operations, only if the user type of the successfully identified and authenticated user is administrator:

- Change administrator's password by administrator
- Newly create and delete general user's user name by administrator
- Newly create, change, and delete general user's password by administrator
- Change date and time by administrator
- Change CE Access Permission Settings by administrator
- Change Device Firmware Update Permission Settings by administrator
- Change RC Gate Firmware Update Permission Settings by administrator

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The TOE maintains the user type (administrator) associated with the user process that is associated with administrator who is successfully identified and authenticated until session termination from the Web browser after being successfully identified and authenticated.

FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

The TOE provides its system clock for the date (year, month and day) and time (hour, minute and second) of the audit log records.

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

The TOE runs a suite of self tests at the request of the administrator to demonstrate the correct operation of the Communication Data Protection Function between the TOE and CS. The TOE also runs a suite of self tests to verify the integrity of executable codes in TSF data and the RC Gate Firmware.

FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

The TOE provides functions that force the user to log off automatically when the fixed auto logout time (five minutes) elapses after the last user operation from the Web browser.

FTP_ITC.1(a) Inter-TSF trusted channel

The TOE communicates with the CS using SSL and verifies that the CS is certified, and provides SSL cryptographic communications for communications via the LAN between the TOE and the CS. The encrypted communication can be used for the Machine Counter Notice Function, the Service Call Function, the Supply Call Function, the Device Firmware Update Function, and the RC Gate Firmware Update Function.

FTP_ITC.1(b) Inter-TSF trusted channel

The TOE communicates with HTTPS-compatible devices using SSL and verifies that the HTTPS-compatible devices are certified, and provides SSL cryptographic communications between the TOE and the registered HTTPS-compatible devices. The encrypted communication can be used for the Machine Counter Notice Function, the Service Call Function, and the Supply Call Function.

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path

The TOE provides SSL cryptographic communications between the TOE and computers by SSL communication for remote access from a computer's Web browser.